Move Miasma npm abuse into dedicated page

src/SUMMARY.md

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
     - [Gh Actions - Artifact Poisoning](pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/gh-actions-artifact-poisoning.md)
     - [GH Actions - Cache Poisoning](pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/gh-actions-cache-poisoning.md)
     - [Gh Actions - Context Script Injections](pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/gh-actions-context-script-injections.md)
+    - [GH Actions - npm Supply Chain Abuse](pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/gh-actions-npm-supply-chain-abuse.md)
   - [Accessible Deleted Data in Github](pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/accessible-deleted-data-in-github.md)
   - [Basic Github Information](pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/basic-github-information.md)
 - [Gitea Security](pentesting-ci-cd/gitea-security/README.md)

src/pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/README.md

@@ -745,42 +745,14 @@ import base64,os;exec(base64.b64decode(os.environ["STAGE2_B64"]))
 
 Drop the line above into a file such as `evil.pth` inside `site-packages` and it will execute during Python startup. This is especially useful in build agents that continuously spawn Python tooling (`pip`, linters, test runners, release scripts).
 
-#### `binding.gyp` / node-gyp execution (`Phantom Gyp`)
+#### npm supply-chain pivots from GitHub Actions
 
-Not every install-time execution path lives in `package.json` lifecycle hooks. `node-gyp`'s `configure` step looks for a `binding.gyp` file in the package directory, so a compromised publisher can shift execution into the native build path and bypass controls that only audit `preinstall` / `postinstall`.
+For `binding.gyp` / Phantom Gyp execution, wormable npm publishing with stolen CI identities, and the limits of trusted publishing provenance after workflow compromise, check:
 
-Practical implications during an assessment:
+{{#ref}}
+gh-actions-npm-supply-chain-abuse.md
+{{#endref}}
 
-- Inspect the **published tarball**, not only the Git repo, for unexpected `binding.gyp`, `node-gyp`, or native-addon metadata in packages that should be pure JavaScript.
-- Treat a sudden `binding.gyp` addition as an **execution primitive**, especially if defenders rely on lifecycle-hook monitoring or `--ignore-scripts` as their main intake control.
-- Review release jobs that run `npm install`, `npm rebuild`, or other dependency build steps after restoring untrusted artifacts/caches, because a poisoned package can move execution to the native-build path.
-
-#### Wormable npm publishing from CI / stolen maintainer identities
-
-Once code runs in a maintainer workstation or release workflow, a single stolen registry identity can be turned into **self-propagating package compromise**:
-
-1. Harvest maintainer secrets (`~/.npmrc`, PATs, OIDC request env vars, cloud creds, SSH keys).
-2. Enumerate which packages the compromised identity or team can publish to.
-3. Republish malicious versions across each writable package so downstream `npm install` executions create more credential-generation nodes.
-
-This becomes more dangerous when the release workflow uses **trusted publishing**: if the attacker steals the GitHub Actions OIDC material from a job with `id-token: write`, the poisoned release can still receive **valid provenance** because the legitimate workflow really built it. Provenance answers _which workflow built this artifact_, not _whether the workflow/source tree was clean_.
-
-Useful checks:
-
-- Look for workflows that combine `id-token: write` with `npm publish`, `changesets`, or release bots and **do not require a human approval step**.
-- Check whether the compromised identity can enumerate org/team package access (for example with `npm access ls-packages`) and whether package publishing bypasses 2FA.
-- Add friction to the propagation loop with **staged publishing** / human 2FA approval and `minimumReleaseAge` quarantine before consuming newly published versions.
-
-#### Repository-local AI assistant persistence
-
-A compromised publisher or repo writer does not need to stop at install-time execution. Another persistence layer is to commit **assistant instruction/config files** into the repository so the next developer who opens the project feeds attacker-controlled instructions into local tooling. High-signal paths include:
-
-- `.claude/settings.json`
-- `.cursor/rules`
-- `.gemini/`
-- editor/IDE task or settings files that steer AI helpers
-
-This is useful after CI compromise because the attacker can push those files with a stolen maintainer token, and the trigger later becomes **repository open / assistant load** instead of `npm install`. During reviews, diff for new assistant-policy files with the same suspicion level as new workflow files or build scripts.
 
 #### Alternate exfil when outbound traffic is filtered
 
@@ -995,12 +967,8 @@ An organization in GitHub is very proactive in reporting accounts to GitHub. All
 - [A Survey of 2024–2025 Open-Source Supply-Chain Compromises and Their Root Causes](https://words.filippo.io/compromise-survey/)
 - [Weaponizing the Protectors: TeamPCP’s Multi-Stage Supply Chain Attack on Security Infrastructure](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/teampcp-supply-chain-attacks/)
 - [Mini Shai-Hulud: Frequently asked questions about the TeamPCP npm and PyPI supply chain campaign](https://www.tenable.com/blog/mini-shai-hulud-frequently-asked-questions)
-- [What the Miasma campaign reveals about the new supply chain threat model and the underground market for developer credentials](https://www.tenable.com/blog/what-the-miasma-campaign-reveals-about-the-new-supply-chain-threat-model-and-the-underground)
 - [Events that trigger workflows - GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/events-that-trigger-workflows)
 - [Trusted publishing for npm packages | npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/)
-- [Staged publishing for npm packages | npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/staged-publishing/)
 - [Generating provenance statements | npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements/)
-- [npm orgs | npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/using-npm/orgs.html)
-- [node-gyp README](https://github.com/nodejs/node-gyp)
 
 {{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

src/pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/gh-actions-npm-supply-chain-abuse.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# GH Actions - npm Supply Chain Abuse
+
+{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+
+## Overview
+
+After an attacker gets code execution in a GitHub Actions release workflow, maintainer workstation, or package build pipeline, npm publishing becomes a high-impact pivot. The goal is usually to steal publisher identity material, publish malicious versions, and turn downstream installs into more credential-generation nodes.
+
+Typical credential sources:
+
+- `~/.npmrc`, `NPM_TOKEN`, registry sessions, and npm automation tokens.
+- GitHub PATs, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, release-bot credentials, SSH keys, and `.netrc` / git credential helpers.
+- GitHub Actions OIDC request material (`ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL` and `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN`) in jobs with `id-token: write`.
+- Cloud credentials, Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens, and `.env` files present in the release environment.
+
+## Install-Time Execution Primitives
+
+### Lifecycle hooks
+
+The classic npm route is to publish a malicious package version with `preinstall`, `install`, `postinstall`, or `prepare` scripts. Any developer workstation or CI job that installs the version executes attacker-controlled code.
+
+```json
+{
+  "scripts": {
+    "postinstall": "node ./scripts/collect.js"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Defenders often monitor these scripts, so red-team reviews should also inspect less obvious execution paths.
+
+### `binding.gyp` / node-gyp execution (Phantom Gyp)
+
+Not every install-time execution path lives in `package.json` lifecycle hooks. `node-gyp`'s configure step looks for a `binding.gyp` file in the package directory, so a compromised publisher can shift execution into the native build path and bypass controls that only audit `preinstall` / `postinstall`.
+
+Practical checks:
+
+- Inspect the **published tarball**, not only the Git repo, for unexpected `binding.gyp`, `node-gyp`, or native-addon metadata in packages that should be pure JavaScript.
+- Treat a sudden `binding.gyp` addition as an execution primitive, especially if defenders rely on lifecycle-hook monitoring or `--ignore-scripts`.
+- Review release jobs that run `npm install`, `npm rebuild`, or dependency build steps after restoring untrusted artifacts/caches.
+
+## Wormable npm Publishing
+
+Once code runs in a maintainer workstation or release workflow, a single stolen registry identity can be turned into self-propagating package compromise:
+
+1. Harvest maintainer secrets (`~/.npmrc`, PATs, OIDC request env vars, cloud creds, SSH keys).
+2. Enumerate packages the compromised identity or team can publish to.
+3. Republish malicious versions across each writable package.
+4. Let downstream installs create more credential-generation nodes.
+
+Useful enumeration from a compromised npm identity:
+
+```bash
+npm whoami
+npm access ls-packages
+npm access ls-collaborators <scope-or-package>
+```
+
+Attackers usually prefer packages with frequent CI installs, transitive popularity, or release automation that will install the malicious version quickly.
+
+## Trusted Publishing and Provenance Limits
+
+Trusted publishing/OIDC removes long-lived static npm tokens, but it does not make a compromised release workflow safe. If the attacker controls code that runs in a job with `id-token: write`, the malicious release can still receive valid provenance because the legitimate workflow really built and published it.
+
+Provenance answers **which workflow built this artifact**, not **whether the workflow, source tree, cache, or build steps were clean**.
+
+High-signal review points:
+
+- Workflows combining `id-token: write` with `npm publish`, `pnpm publish`, `changesets`, release bots, or custom publish wrappers.
+- Release jobs that restore caches or artifacts from lower-trust workflows before publishing.
+- Jobs that publish without human approval, environment protection rules, or a second reviewer.
+- Workflows that request OIDC before all build inputs have been verified.
+
+## Hardening
+
+- Use trusted publishing/OIDC instead of static npm tokens, but pair it with protected environments and human approval for sensitive scopes.
+- Add staged publishing / human 2FA approval for high-impact packages where possible.
+- Use `minimumReleaseAge` or equivalent dependency quarantine controls before consuming newly published package versions.
+- Separate cache keys by trust boundary and never execute restored cache contents before integrity checks.
+- Diff published tarballs against source repositories, and alert on unexpected native build metadata such as `binding.gyp`.
+- Disable or tightly review lifecycle scripts in CI (`npm config set ignore-scripts true`) where builds do not need them.
+- Monitor package access (`npm access ls-packages`) and remove stale maintainers, bots, and teams.
+
+## References
+
+- [What the Miasma campaign reveals about the new supply chain threat model and the underground market for developer credentials](https://www.tenable.com/blog/what-the-miasma-campaign-reveals-about-the-new-supply-chain-threat-model-and-the-underground)
+- [Trusted publishing for npm packages | npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/)
+- [Staged publishing for npm packages | npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/staged-publishing/)
+- [npm orgs | npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/using-npm/orgs.html)
+- [node-gyp README](https://github.com/nodejs/node-gyp)
+
+{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}