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lambda attacks recheck
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@@ -32,6 +32,56 @@ Abusing Lambda Layers it's also possible to abuse extensions and persist in the
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../../aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence/aws-abusing-lambda-extensions.md
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{{#endref}}
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### AWS Lambda – VPC Egress Bypass
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Force a Lambda function out of a restricted VPC by updating its configuration with an empty VpcConfig (SubnetIds=[], SecurityGroupIds=[]). The function will then run in the Lambda-managed networking plane, regaining outbound internet access and bypassing egress controls enforced by private VPC subnets without NAT.
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{{#ref}}
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aws-lambda-vpc-egress-bypass.md
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{{#endref}}
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### AWS Lambda – Runtime Pinning/Rollback Abuse
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Abuse `lambda:PutRuntimeManagementConfig` to pin a function to a specific runtime version (Manual) or freeze updates (FunctionUpdate). This preserves compatibility with malicious layers/wrappers and can keep the function on an outdated, vulnerable runtime to aid exploitation and long-term persistence.
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{{#ref}}
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aws-lambda-runtime-pinning-abuse.md
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{{#endref}}
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### AWS Lambda – Log Siphon via LoggingConfig.LogGroup Redirection
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Abuse `lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration` advanced logging controls to redirect a function’s logs to an attacker-chosen CloudWatch Logs log group. This works without changing code or the execution role (most Lambda roles already include `logs:CreateLogGroup/CreateLogStream/PutLogEvents` via `AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole`). If the function prints secrets/request bodies or crashes with stack traces, you can collect them from the new log group.
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{{#ref}}
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aws-lambda-loggingconfig-redirection.md
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{{#endref}}
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### AWS - Lambda Function URL Public Exposure
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Turn a private Lambda Function URL into a public unauthenticated endpoint by switching the Function URL AuthType to NONE and attaching a resource-based policy that grants lambda:InvokeFunctionUrl to everyone. This enables anonymous invocation of internal functions and can expose sensitive backend operations.
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{{#ref}}
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aws-lambda-function-url-public-exposure.md
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{{#endref}}
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### AWS Lambda – Event Source Mapping Target Hijack
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Abuse `UpdateEventSourceMapping` to change the target Lambda function of an existing Event Source Mapping (ESM) so that records from DynamoDB Streams, Kinesis, or SQS are delivered to an attacker-controlled function. This silently diverts live data without touching producers or the original function code.
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{{#ref}}
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aws-lambda-event-source-mapping-target-hijack.md
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{{#endref}}
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### AWS Lambda – EFS Mount Injection data exfiltration
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Abuse `lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration` to attach an existing EFS Access Point to a Lambda, then deploy trivial code that lists/reads files from the mounted path to exfiltrate shared secrets/config that the function previously couldn’t access.
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{{#ref}}
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aws-lambda-efs-mount-injection.md
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{{#endref}}
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{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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