MIGRATION TYPOS

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-basic-information/README.md

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Users can have **MFA enabled to login** through the console. API tokens of MFA e
 - **Secret access key ID**: 40 random upper and lowercase characters: S836fh/J73yHSb64Ag3Rkdi/jaD6sPl6/antFtU (It's not possible to retrieve lost secret access key IDs).
 
 Whenever you need to **change the Access Key** this is the process you should follow:\
-&#xNAN;_Create a new access key -> Apply the new key to system/application -> mark original one as inactive -> Test and verify new access key is working -> Delete old access key_
+_Create a new access key -> Apply the new key to system/application -> mark original one as inactive -> Test and verify new access key is working -> Delete old access key_
 
 ### MFA - Multi Factor Authentication
 

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-sts-persistence.md

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ Temporary tokens cannot be listed, so maintaining an active temporary token is a
 
 # With MFA
 aws sts get-session-token \
-    --serial-number <mfa-device-name> \
-    --token-code <code-from-token>
+    --serial-number <mfa-device-name> \
+    --token-code <code-from-token>
 
 # Hardware device name is usually the number from the back of the device, such as GAHT12345678
 <strong># SMS device name is the ARN in AWS, such as arn:aws:iam::123456789012:sms-mfa/username

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-sagemaker-privesc.md

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ curl "http://169.254.170.2$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI"
 ### `sagemaker:CreateHyperParameterTuningJob`, `iam:PassRole`
 
 An attacker with those permissions will (potentially) be able to create an **hyperparameter training job**, **running an arbitrary container** on it with a **role attached** to it.\
-&#xNAN;_I haven't exploited because of the lack of time, but looks similar to the previous exploits, feel free to send a PR with the exploitation details._
+_I haven't exploited because of the lack of time, but looks similar to the previous exploits, feel free to send a PR with the exploitation details._
 
 ## References
 

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-cognito-enum/cognito-identity-pools.md

@@ -168,21 +168,21 @@ For this you might need to have access to the **identity provider**. If that is
 Anyway, the **following example** expects that you have already logged in inside a **Cognito User Pool** used to access the Identity Pool (don't forget that other types of identity providers could also be configured).
 
 <pre class="language-bash"><code class="lang-bash">aws cognito-identity get-id \
-    --identity-pool-id &#x3C;identity_pool_id> \
-    --logins cognito-idp.&#x3C;region>.amazonaws.com/&#x3C;YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=&#x3C;ID_TOKEN>
+    --identity-pool-id <identity_pool_id> \
+    --logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=<ID_TOKEN>
 
 # Get the identity_id from the previous commnad response
 aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
-    --identity-id &#x3C;identity_id> \
-    --logins cognito-idp.&#x3C;region>.amazonaws.com/&#x3C;YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=&#x3C;ID_TOKEN>
+    --identity-id <identity_id> \
+    --logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=<ID_TOKEN>
 
 
 # In the IdToken you can find roles a user has access because of User Pool Groups
 # User the --custom-role-arn to get credentials to a specific role
 aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
-    --identity-id &#x3C;identity_id> \
-<strong>    --custom-role-arn &#x3C;role_arn> \
-</strong>    --logins cognito-idp.&#x3C;region>.amazonaws.com/&#x3C;YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=&#x3C;ID_TOKEN>
+    --identity-id <identity_id> \
+<strong>    --custom-role-arn <role_arn> \
+</strong>    --logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=<ID_TOKEN>
 </code></pre>
 
 > [!WARNING]

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/eventbridgescheduler-enum.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 **Amazon EventBridge Scheduler** is a fully managed, **serverless scheduler designed to create, run, and manage tasks** at scale. It enables you to schedule millions of tasks across over 270 AWS services and 6,000+ API operations, all from a central service. With built-in reliability and no infrastructure to manage, EventBridge Scheduler simplifies scheduling, reduces maintenance costs, and scales automatically to meet demand. You can configure cron or rate expressions for recurring schedules, set one-time invocations, and define flexible delivery windows with retry options, ensuring tasks are reliably delivered based on the availability of downstream targets.
 
-There is an initial limit of 1,000,000 schedules per region per account. Even the official quotas page suggests, "It's recommended to delete one-time schedules once they've completed." 
+There is an initial limit of 1,000,000 schedules per region per account. Even the official quotas page suggests, "It's recommended to delete one-time schedules once they've completed."
 
 ### Types of Schedules