gh cache

src/pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/README.md

@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ GitHub exposes a cross-workflow cache that is keyed only by the string you suppl
 - Cache entries are shared across workflows and branches whenever the `key` or `restore-keys` match. GitHub does not scope them to trust levels.
 - Saving to the cache is allowed even when the job supposedly has read-only repository permissions, so “safe” workflows can still poison high-trust caches.
 - Official actions (`setup-node`, `setup-python`, dependency caches, etc.) frequently reuse deterministic keys, so identifying the correct key is trivial once the workflow file is public.
+- Restores are just zstd tarball extractions with no integrity checks, so poisoned caches can overwrite scripts, `package.json`, or other files under the restore path.
 
 **Mitigations**
 
@@ -806,4 +807,3 @@ An organization in GitHub is very proactive in reporting accounts to GitHub. All
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