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# AWS - ECS Post Exploitation
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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## ECS
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For more information check:
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{{#ref}}
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../aws-services/aws-ecs-enum.md
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{{#endref}}
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### Host IAM Roles
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In ECS an **IAM role can be assigned to the task** running inside the container. **If** the task is run inside an **EC2** instance, the **EC2 instance** will have **another IAM** role attached to it.\
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Which means that if you manage to **compromise** an ECS instance you can potentially **obtain the IAM role associated to the ECR and to the EC2 instance**. For more info about how to get those credentials check:
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{{#ref}}
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https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf
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{{#endref}}
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> [!CAUTION]
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> Note that if the EC2 instance is enforcing IMDSv2, [**according to the docs**](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-metadata-v2-how-it-works.html), the **response of the PUT request** will have a **hop limit of 1**, making impossible to access the EC2 metadata from a container inside the EC2 instance.
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### Privesc to node to steal other containers creds & secrets
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But moreover, EC2 uses docker to run ECs tasks, so if you can escape to the node or **access the docker socket**, you can **check** which **other containers** are being run, and even **get inside of them** and **steal their IAM roles** attached.
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#### Making containers run in current host
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Furthermore, the **EC2 instance role** will usually have enough **permissions** to **update the container instance state** of the EC2 instances being used as nodes inside the cluster. An attacker could modify the **state of an instance to DRAINING**, then ECS will **remove all the tasks from it** and the ones being run as **REPLICA** will be **run in a different instance,** potentially inside the **attackers instance** so he can **steal their IAM roles** and potential sensitive info from inside the container.
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```bash
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aws ecs update-container-instances-state \
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--cluster <cluster> --status DRAINING --container-instances <container-instance-id>
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```
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The same technique can be done by **deregistering the EC2 instance from the cluster**. This is potentially less stealthy but it will **force the tasks to be run in other instances:**
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```bash
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aws ecs deregister-container-instance \
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--cluster <cluster> --container-instance <container-instance-id> --force
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```
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A final technique to force the re-execution of tasks is by indicating ECS that the **task or container was stopped**. There are 3 potential APIs to do this:
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```bash
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# Needs: ecs:SubmitTaskStateChange
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aws ecs submit-task-state-change --cluster <value> \
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--status STOPPED --reason "anything" --containers [...]
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# Needs: ecs:SubmitContainerStateChange
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aws ecs submit-container-state-change ...
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# Needs: ecs:SubmitAttachmentStateChanges
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aws ecs submit-attachment-state-changes ...
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```
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### Steal sensitive info from ECR containers
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The EC2 instance will probably also have the permission `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` allowing it to **download images** (you could search for sensitive info in them).
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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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