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Convey tx verification failure reasons to the RPC client

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This allows appropriate action to be taken, like displaying
the reason to the user.

Do just that in simplewallet, which should help a lot in
determining why users fail to send.

Also make it so a tx which is accepted but not relayed is
seen as a success rather than a failure.
This commit is contained in:
moneromooo-monero
2016-03-27 12:37:18 +01:00
parent 1559c71ef2
commit 24b3e9007a
10 changed files with 98 additions and 23 deletions
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src/cryptonote_core/tx_pool.cpp
+15 -3
View File
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
if(!check_inputs_types_supported(tx))
{
tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
tvc.m_invalid_input = true;
return false;
}
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("transaction use more money then it has: use " << print_money(outputs_amount) << ", have " << print_money(inputs_amount));
tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
tvc.m_overspend = true;
return false;
}
@@ -124,6 +126,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("transaction fee is not enough: " << print_money(fee) << ", minimum fee: " << print_money(needed_fee));
tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
tvc.m_fee_too_low = true;
return false;
}
@@ -132,6 +135,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("transaction is too big: " << blob_size << " bytes, maximum size: " << tx_size_limit);
tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
tvc.m_too_big = true;
return false;
}
@@ -142,21 +146,23 @@ namespace cryptonote
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transaction with id= "<< id << " used already spent key images");
tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
tvc.m_double_spend = true;
return false;
}
}
if (!m_blockchain.check_tx_outputs(tx))
if (!m_blockchain.check_tx_outputs(tx, tvc))
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transaction with id= "<< id << " has at least one invalid outout");
tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
tvc.m_invalid_output = true;
return false;
}
crypto::hash max_used_block_id = null_hash;
uint64_t max_used_block_height = 0;
#if BLOCKCHAIN_DB == DB_LMDB
bool ch_inp_res = m_blockchain.check_tx_inputs(tx, max_used_block_height, max_used_block_id, kept_by_block);
bool ch_inp_res = m_blockchain.check_tx_inputs(tx, max_used_block_height, max_used_block_id, tvc, kept_by_block);
#else
bool ch_inp_res = m_blockchain.check_tx_inputs(tx, max_used_block_height, max_used_block_id);
#endif
@@ -480,7 +486,8 @@ namespace cryptonote
if(txd.last_failed_id != null_hash && m_blockchain.get_current_blockchain_height() > txd.last_failed_height && txd.last_failed_id == m_blockchain.get_block_id_by_height(txd.last_failed_height))
return false;//we already sure that this tx is broken for this height
if(!m_blockchain.check_tx_inputs(txd.tx, txd.max_used_block_height, txd.max_used_block_id))
tx_verification_context tvc;
if(!m_blockchain.check_tx_inputs(txd.tx, txd.max_used_block_height, txd.max_used_block_id, tvc))
{
txd.last_failed_height = m_blockchain.get_current_blockchain_height()-1;
txd.last_failed_id = m_blockchain.get_block_id_by_height(txd.last_failed_height);
@@ -496,7 +503,12 @@ namespace cryptonote
if(txd.last_failed_id == m_blockchain.get_block_id_by_height(txd.last_failed_height))
return false;
//check ring signature again, it is possible (with very small chance) that this transaction become again valid
#if BLOCKCHAIN_DB == DB_LMDB
tx_verification_context tvc;
if(!m_blockchain.check_tx_inputs(txd.tx, txd.max_used_block_height, txd.max_used_block_id, tvc))
#else
if(!m_blockchain.check_tx_inputs(txd.tx, txd.max_used_block_height, txd.max_used_block_id))
#endif
{
txd.last_failed_height = m_blockchain.get_current_blockchain_height()-1;
txd.last_failed_id = m_blockchain.get_block_id_by_height(txd.last_failed_height);