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add Rosenpass, the tool
Initial implementation of the Rosenpass tool, implemented by @koraa. Includes contributions and some lints from @wucke13. Co-authored-by: wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>
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106
src/lprf.rs
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106
src/lprf.rs
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//! The rosenpass protocol relies on a special type
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//! of hash function for most of its hashing or
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//! message authentication needs: an incrementable
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//! pseudo random function.
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//!
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//! This is a generalization of a PRF operating
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//! on a sequence of inputs instead of a single input.
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//!
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//! Like a Dec function the Iprf features efficient
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//! incrementability.
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//!
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//! You can also think of an Iprf as a Dec function with
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//! a fixed size output.
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//!
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//! The idea behind a Iprf is that it can be efficiently
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//! constructed from an Dec function as well as a PRF.
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//!
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//! TODO Base the construction on a proper Dec function
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pub struct Iprf([u8; KEY_SIZE]);
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pub struct IprfBranch([u8; KEY_SIZE]);
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pub struct SecretIprf(Secret<KEY_SIZE>);
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pub struct SecretIprfBranch(Secret<KEY_SIZE>);
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pub fn prf_into(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) {
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// TODO: The error handling with sodium is a scurge
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hmac_into(out, key, data).unwrap()
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}
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pub fn prf(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; KEY_SIZE]{
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mutating([0u8; KEY_SIZE], |r| prf_into(r, key, data))
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}
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impl Iprf {
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fn zero() -> Self {
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Self([0u8; KEY_SIZE])
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}
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fn dup(self) -> IprfBranch {
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IprfBranch(self.0)
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}
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// TODO: Protocol! Use domain separation to ensure that
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fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> Self {
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Self(prf(&self.0, v))
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}
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fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
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SecretIprf::prf_invoc(&self.0, v.secret())
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}
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fn into_value(self) -> [u8; KEY_SIZE] {
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self.0
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}
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fn extract(self, v: &[u8], dst: &mut [u8]) {
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prf_into(&self.0, v, dst)
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}
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}
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impl IprfBranch {
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fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> Iprf {
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Iprf(prf(self.0, v))
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}
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fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
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SecretIprf::prf_incov(self.0, v.secret())
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}
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}
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impl SecretIprf {
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fn prf_invoc(k: &[u8], d: &[u8]) -> SecretIprf {
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mutating(SecretIprf(Secret::zero()), |r|
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prf_into(k, d, r.secret_mut()))
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}
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fn from_key(k: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
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Self(k)
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}
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fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> SecretIprf {
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Self::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v)
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}
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fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
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Self::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
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}
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fn into_secret(self) -> Secret<KEY_SIZE> {
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self.0
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}
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fn into_secret_slice(self, v: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) {
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prf_into(self.0.secret(), v, dst)
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}
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}
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impl SecretIprfBranch {
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fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> SecretIprf {
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SecretIprf::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v)
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}
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fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
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SecretIprf::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
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}
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}
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