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feat(whitepaper): Explicitly handle erasure of eski to achieve forward secrecy
This is a minor security fix: Before this change the specification left erasing the secret key to the implementation. The reference implementation did erase `eski` but only after receiving the responder confirmation package (EmptyData at the time) instructing the initiator to stop retransmission of the InitConf package. With this change, `eski` is erased before transmission of the InitConf package.
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@@ -466,6 +466,7 @@ The responder does not need to do anything special to handle RespHello retransmi
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During the implementation of go-rosenpass, Steffen Vogel found a number of problems ([issue #68](https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/68)) with the whitepaper. Version two of the document primarily addresses these issues:
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- Handle race conditions when both peers complete concurrent handshakes in switched roles. Backwards compatible. Initially addressed in [397a776](https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/commit/397a776c55b1feae1e8e5aceef01cf06bf56b6ed) "fix: Race condition due to concurrent handshake"
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- Explicitly erase `eski` (forward secrecy). This is a minor security fix: Before this change the specification left erasing the secret key to the implementation. The reference implementation did erase `eski` but only after receiving the responder confirmation package (EmptyData at the time) instructing the initiator to stop retransmission of the InitConf package. With this change, `eski` is erased before transmission of the InitConf package.
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## Protocol version 1 -- 2023-03-04
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