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feat: fix lemma transformation, WIP pretty_print, cProfile

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Co-authored-by: Benjamin Lipp <blipp@rosenpass.eu>
This commit is contained in:
Anja Rabich
2026-03-30 18:37:30 +02:00
co-authored by Benjamin Lipp
parent aa2f037f89
commit ca90e05f89
1 changed files with 99 additions and 46 deletions
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marzipan/src/letfuncdecl.py
+95 -42
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@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import cProfile
import dataclasses
import io
import pprint
import pstats
import sys
from copy import deepcopy
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, fields, is_dataclass
from pstats import SortKey
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
from lark import Lark, Token, Transformer, Tree, ast_utils, tree, v_args
@@ -100,6 +104,9 @@ class ImpliesGterm(ast_utils.Ast):
left: Gterm
right: Gterm
def pretty_print(self, indent=0):
print(f"{self.left} ==> {self.right}")
@dataclass
class EventGterm(ast_utils.Ast):
@@ -158,23 +165,36 @@ class LetfunDecl(ast_utils.Ast):
@dataclass
class LemmaPublicVars(ast_utils.Ast):
lemma: Gterm
public_vars: Optional[List] = None
optional_lemma: Optional[Lemma] = None
class LemmaGterm(ast_utils.Ast):
gterm: Gterm
lemma: Optional[Lemma] = None
@dataclass
class LemmaSecrets(ast_utils.Ast):
lemma: Gterm
class LemmaPublicVars(ast_utils.Ast):
gterm: Gterm
public_vars: Optional[List] = None
lemma: Optional[Lemma] = None
@dataclass
class LemmaPublicVarsSecret(ast_utils.Ast):
gterm: Gterm
secret: Ident
public_vars: Optional[List] = None
optional_lemma: Optional[Lemma] = None
lemma: Optional[Lemma] = None
@dataclass
class Lemma(ast_utils.Ast):
lemma: Gterm | LemmaPublicVars | LemmaSecrets
lemma: LemmaGterm | LemmaPublicVars | LemmaPublicVarsSecret
# def __post_init__(self):
# print(f"[constructor] Lemma: lemma={self.lemma}")
# def __init__(self, lemma=None, arg2=None, arg3=None):
# print(f"[constructor] Lemma: {lemma}, {arg2}, {arg3}")
# self.lemma = lemma
@dataclass
@@ -183,9 +203,14 @@ class LemmaDeclCore(ast_utils.Ast):
lemma: Lemma
@dataclass
class LemmaAnnotation(ast_utils.Ast):
annotation: str
@dataclass
class LemmaDecl(ast_utils.Ast):
lemma_annotation: Optional[str]
lemma_decl_annotation: Optional[LemmaAnnotation]
lemma_decl_core: LemmaDeclCore
@@ -293,9 +318,12 @@ let_gterm: "let" IDENT "=" gterm "in" gterm
gbinding: "!" NAT "=" gterm [";" gbinding]
| IDENT "=" gterm [";" gbinding]
lemma: gterm [";" lemma]
| gterm "for" "{" "public_vars" _non_empty_seq{IDENT} "}" [";" lemma]
| gterm "for" "{" "secret" IDENT [ "public_vars" _non_empty_seq{IDENT}] "[real_or_random]" "}" [";" lemma]
lemma_gterm: gterm [";" lemma]
lemma_public_vars: gterm "for" "{" "public_vars" _non_empty_seq{IDENT} "}" [";" lemma]
lemma_public_vars_secret: gterm "for" "{" "secret" IDENT [ "public_vars" _non_empty_seq{IDENT}] "[real_or_random]" "}" [";" lemma]
lemma: lemma_gterm
| lemma_public_vars
| lemma_public_vars_secret
lemma_annotation: _LEMMA ESCAPED_STRING
lemma_decl: [lemma_annotation] lemma_decl_core
lemma_decl_core: "lemma" [ typedecl ";"] lemma "."
@@ -334,8 +362,9 @@ transformer = ast_utils.create_transformer(this_module, ToAst())
def ast_deepcopy_except(node):
if is_dataclass(node):
if (
isinstance(node, QueryAnnotation) or isinstance(node, ReachableAnnotation)
# or isinstance(node, LemmaAnnotation)
isinstance(node, QueryAnnotation)
or isinstance(node, ReachableAnnotation)
or isinstance(node, LemmaAnnotation)
):
return None
@@ -345,6 +374,8 @@ def ast_deepcopy_except(node):
for field in fields(node):
if isinstance(node, QueryDecl) and field.name == "query_decl_annotation":
kwargs[field.name] = None
elif isinstance(node, LemmaDecl) and field.name == "lemma_decl_annotation":
kwargs[field.name] = None
else:
child_node = getattr(node, field.name)
child_node_deepcopy = ast_deepcopy_except(child_node)
@@ -392,7 +423,12 @@ def print_tree(asttree: list, column=0, indent=2):
print_tree(value, column + 1)
def handle_dataclass(d):
print(f"{' ' * (column)}{type(d).__name__} [handle_dataclass: class name]")
if hasattr(d, "pretty_print") and callable(getattr(d, "pretty_print")):
pp = f"[{d.pretty_print()}]"
else:
pp = ""
print(f"{' ' * (column)}{type(d).__name__} [handle_dataclass: class name] {pp}")
for f in fields(d):
next_d = getattr(d, f.name)
if next_d is not None:
@@ -435,26 +471,34 @@ def print_tree(asttree: list, column=0, indent=2):
def parse(input: str):
parsetree = parser.parse(input)
print("=" * 100)
print("print parsetree")
print(parsetree.pretty())
# print("=" * 100)
# print("print parsetree")
# print(parsetree.pretty())
ast = transformer.transform(parsetree)
print("=" * 100)
print("print_tree ast")
print_tree(ast)
print("=" * 100)
print(ast)
# clean_ast = parsetree_deepcopy_except(
# ast, ["lemma_annotation", "query_annotation", "reachable_annotation"]
# )
# print("=" * 100)
# print("print_tree ast")
# print_tree(ast)
# print("=" * 100)
# print(ast)
# # clean_ast = parsetree_deepcopy_except(
# # ast, ["lemma_annotation", "query_annotation", "reachable_annotation"]
# # )
pr = cProfile.Profile()
pr.enable()
clean_ast = ast_deepcopy_except(ast)
print("=" * 100)
pr.disable()
s = io.StringIO()
sortby = SortKey.CUMULATIVE
ps = pstats.Stats(pr, stream=s).sort_stats(sortby)
ps.print_stats()
print(s.getvalue())
# print("=" * 100)
print("print clean_ast")
print(clean_ast)
print("=" * 100)
print("print_tree clean_ast")
print_tree(clean_ast)
# print("=" * 100)
# print("=" * 100)
# print(ast)
@@ -462,22 +506,31 @@ def parse(input: str):
if __name__ == "__main__":
parse("""
@lemma "secrecy: Adv can not learn shared secret key"
lemma kp:key_prec, skp:kem_sk_prec;
attacker(trusted_key(kp)).
@query "non-interruptability: Adv cannot start a responder session with the same key twice"
query ic1:InitConf_t, ic2:InitConf_t, ck:key, t1:time, t2:time;
event(ResponderSession(ic1, ck))@t1 && event(ResponderSession(ic2, ck))@t2
==> t1 = t2.
@reachable "non-secrecy: The attacker can learn the value of a shared key"
query k:key;
attacker(prepare_key(k)) && attacker(k).
@lemma "secrecy: The adversary can learn a trusted kem pk only by using the reveal oracle"
lemma skp:kem_sk_prec;
attacker(kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(skp)))
==> event(RevealPk(kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(skp)))).
@lemma "secrecy: Attacker knowledge of a kem sk implies the key is not trusted"
lemma k:kem_sk, kp:kem_sk_prec;
attacker(prepare_kem_sk(k)) && attacker(k) ==> k <> trusted_kem_sk(kp).
@lemma "asymmetric secrecy: Secure SSKI is sufficient for ck secrecy after trusted InitHello transmission from responder perspective"
lemma ck_ini:key, ck:key, any_psk:key, any_sskr:kem_sk, PSsski:kem_sk_prec, any_epki:kem_pk, any_epti:key, PSspti:seed_prec;
let secure_spki = kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(PSsski)) in
let secure_spti = rng_key(trusted_seed(PSspti)) in
attacker(ck)
&& event(OskOinit_hello(ck_ini, ck, any_psk, any_sskr, secure_spki, any_epki, any_epti, secure_spti)).
""")
# parse("""
# letfun test ( foo : bar ) = foo .
# """)
# """
# @reachable "non-secrecy: The attacker can learn the value of a shared key"
# query k:key;
# attacker(prepare_key(k)) && attacker(k).
# @lemma "secrecy: Adv can not learn shared secret key"
# lemma kp:key_prec, skp:kem_sk_prec;
# attacker(trusted_key(kp)).