modules/recon/terraform-state-exposure.yaml flags an exposed terraform state
file on the terraform_version key paired with a state structure key, then
extracts the version. the structure key keeps a document that merely mentions
terraform_version from matching.
modules/recon/kubeconfig-exposure.yaml flags an exposed kubeconfig on the
kind: Config marker paired with a cluster or credential key, then extracts the
cluster api endpoint. it catches an exec auth kubeconfig with no embedded key
since the cluster block alone is a leak.
modules/recon/docker-compose-exposure.yaml flags an exposed compose file on the
services key paired with a service definition key, then extracts the first
image reference to surface the stack and its versions.
each module pairs a unique marker with a structure key and rejects an html
body, so a page that only names the marker is not a leak.
internal/modules/infra_config_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a bare terraform_version mention, a bare
kind: Config mention, a bare services key, an html page carrying the markers, a
plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each marker, structure gate, guard and
extractor proven to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/laravel-ignition-exposure.yaml probes the live
/_ignition/health-check endpoint and extracts can_execute_commands, the flag
that marks the CVE-2021-3129 remote code execution surface. this is an active
probe, complementary to the version based ignition entry in the framework cve
map.
modules/recon/symfony-profiler-exposure.yaml flags an exposed web profiler on
its structural markers and extracts a request token to pivot to a captured
request.
modules/recon/spring-heapdump-exposure.yaml flags an exposed actuator heap
dump on the hprof magic anchored at the start of the body, which a json marker
module cannot see because the dump is binary, and extracts the hprof version.
the anchor keeps a page that merely quotes the magic from matching.
internal/modules/debug_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to end
through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a prose mention of ignition, the hprof magic away
from the start, a plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may match, plus an
exposed ignition with command execution disabled that still flags and reports
the false flag.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, anchor and extractor proven
to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
four built-in go modules (nuclei-scan, framework-detection, shodan-lookup,
whois-lookup) wrap a legacy per-target scan that also has its own flag, so
running -am alongside one of those flags (e.g. -am -nuclei) ran the same
per-target scan twice. skip the wrapper module in the run loop when its flag
already ran. securitytrails-lookup is not deduped: its -securitytrails flag
expands the target list rather than scanning a target, so the module is not a
duplicate of it.
apache mod_status and nginx stub_status pages expose worker state,
client addresses and request urls. match the three real shapes (the
apache html "Apache Server Status for" page, the apache auto Scoreboard
line, and the nginx "Active connections" plus "server accepts handled
requests" block) and extract the apache version when present.
load yaml-defined detectors from ~/.config/sif/signatures (AppData\Local
on windows), mirroring the user-modules convention, so a framework sif
does not ship can be detected without a rebuild. they load lazily once
per run from DetectFramework and register alongside the built-ins.
each file is one detector, scored by the same weighted signature match as
the built-ins. confidence is linear rather than their sigmoid (importing
it would cycle), so a detector clears the 0.5 threshold once its matched
weights pass half. a name matching a built-in overrides it and inherits
that built-in's version patterns and cves, the same as a user module. a
single unparseable file warns and is skipped rather than failing the scan.
implements the custom signature support help-wanted item in contributing.
* refactor(config): extract registerFlags from Parse
split flag registration into a registerFlags helper so callers, including
tests, can build and inspect the flag set without parsing os.Args. pure
move, no behavior change.
* feat(config): add scan templates via -template
wire up the existing -template flag to load a batch of scan settings from
a built-in preset or a local yaml file, so a run does not have to pass
every flag by hand.
a value is a named preset (minimal, recon, full) embedded in the binary,
or a path to a local yaml file keyed by flag long-names. it merges as the
goflags config before parsing, so command-line flags still win and it
replaces the ambient config for that run.
implements #5.
probe /actuator and the env, health and metrics endpoints for an
exposed actuator, which leaks environment variables, config and
runtime internals. sif already fingerprints spring boot as a framework
but never checks whether its actuator endpoints are left open.
the matchers key on structural shapes rather than bare tokens: the env
propertySources array, a hal index whose links resolve under /actuator,
detailed health components, and jvm metric names. a bare {"status":"UP"}
health check, a generic hateoas api and prose mentions do not match.
a custom management base-path (actuator moved off /actuator) and spring
boot 1.x root endpoints are not covered.
modules/recon/joomla-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed configuration.php
backup through the JConfig class paired with the password property, so a generic
php class is not reported, then extracts the database password.
modules/recon/drupal-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed settings.php backup
through the databases array paired with a literal password value, so an array
that lacks the marker or resolves the password from the environment is not
reported, then extracts the password.
modules/recon/magento-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed app/etc/env.php
backup through the crypt or mode marker paired with a literal key or password
value, so a generic return array or a cloud placeholder is not reported, then
extracts the crypt key.
internal/modules/cms_config_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to end
through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a strict
review wants pinned: a config missing its password, a generic php class, an array
without the databases marker, a databases array with no password, an env
indirection password, a return array without a magento marker, a magento config
with no credential, a cloud placeholder key, an html tutorial for each file, a
plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
detectWordPress treated any 2xx on /wp-login.php, /wp-admin/ or /wp-config.php
as wordpress, but the http client follows redirects and many sites soft-404
(200 for every path) or catch-all redirect to their homepage. a probed path
then returns 200 without being wordpress at all, so plain static sites and
marketing pages were flagged as wordpress.
read the probed response and require one of the existing wordpress markers in
its body before counting it. a real /wp-login.php still references wp-includes
assets, so genuine detection holds.
classifyXSSContext defaulted any non-html, non-script reflection to attribute context. a reflection echoed into element text with the angle brackets escaped but quotes left raw (common for encoders limited to < > &) was then reported as a high-severity attribute injection, even though a quote in text content has no delimiter to break out of.
classify a reflection as attribute only when the canary actually lands inside an open tag; everything else is inert element text and yields no finding. the in-tag test is a byte-scan, not a parser, so rare malformed markup can still mis-bucket.
the ghost and pantheon entries keyed on each platform's older unclaimed-domain
copy, which the live pages no longer serve, so a real dangling subdomain went
undetected. verified against live unclaimed subdomains: <random>.ghost.io now
returns "Failed to resolve DNS path for this host" and <random>.pantheonsite.io
returns a "404 - Unknown site" page. key on those instead.
ghost also serves a bare "Site unavailable." on some hosts; the body match holds
one substring per service, so it keys on the distinctive arm and a page showing
only "Site unavailable." is not detected.
-mt builds the run list by appending modules.ByTag per tag and -m by appending
each id, neither de-duplicated, so a module matching two requested tags
(nuclei-scan is tagged both vuln and cve, so -mt vuln,cve) or listed twice ran
twice. de-duplicate toRun by module id, preserving first-seen order, before
executing.
modules/recon/svn-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .svn working copy through the
wc.db sqlite header anchored at the first byte paired with a working copy table
name, so a generic sqlite database is not reported, then extracts the
repository url.
modules/recon/mercurial-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .hg repository through
the revlog format requirements that the requires file lists, so prose that
names mercurial is not reported, then extracts the requirement.
modules/recon/bazaar-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .bzr repository through the
Bazaar meta directory signature, so a page that names a bazaar is not reported,
then extracts the format.
internal/modules/vcs_metadata_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a generic sqlite database, an unanchored magic,
prose naming mercurial, a marketplace page, an html tutorial for the text
formats, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
The cors probe followed up to three redirects, then read the cors headers off the final response. Its own comment said the cap existed so the headers came from the host we asked about, so the code contradicted its intent: a target that only redirects to a permissive third party had that party's misconfiguration reported against it.
Stop following redirects, matching the open-redirect scanner. The redirect cap was a const shared with the xss probe, so xss now owns its own xssMaxRedirects with its follow behavior unchanged.
modules/recon/netrc-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .netrc through the machine
login password grammar, requiring the keywords in order so prose that names
them out of order does not match, then extracts the machine host.
modules/recon/pgpass-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .pgpass through a single
line host:port:database:user:password record with a numeric or wildcard port,
which a yaml config or a multi line body does not satisfy, then extracts the
host.
modules/recon/mysql-client-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .my.cnf
through a client section paired with a cleartext password key, so a section
without a credential is not reported, then extracts the client user.
internal/modules/dotfile_credential_exposure_test.go drives the three modules
end to end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near
misses a strict review wants pinned: out of order prose, a yaml db config, a
non numeric port, a multi line body, a section without a password, a password
without a section, an html tutorial for each file, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/docker-registry-api-exposure.yaml flags a Docker registry reachable
anonymously through its /v2/ base, keyed on a 200 paired with the
Docker-Distribution-Api-Version: registry/2.0 response header (the header rides on a
401 too, so the 200 gate is what proves anonymous reach), then extracts the api
version.
modules/recon/harbor-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Harbor registry through its
unauthenticated /api/v2.0/systeminfo endpoint, keyed on the harbor_version and
auth_mode fields, then extracts the harbor version.
internal/modules/registry_exposure_test.go drives both modules through
ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses: docker registry on
a header-less 200 and on a 401 that still carries the header, harbor with one keying
field missing, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
probe phpinfo.php, info.php, php_info.php, test.php and i.php for an
exposed phpinfo() page, which leaks the full php config, environment,
loaded extensions and $_SERVER (often credentials).
a finding requires both a phpinfo header (the version-stamped title or
the zend engine credit) and a config table row (the PHP Version or
System cell), so a page that only quotes one of those in prose does not
match. the php version is read from the config table.
an exposed /metrics endpoint leaks process, runtime and request
internals that aid recon. match the prometheus text exposition format
structurally (a # HELP line plus a # TYPE line ending in one of the
known metric types) so a json /metrics or prose that mentions the
format does not trip it. extract the go runtime version from go_info
when it is present.
a flask app left on debug=True wraps the wsgi app in werkzeug's
DebuggedApplication, which serves its debugger assets unauthenticated:
GET /?__debugger__=yes&cmd=resource&f=debugger.js returns the debugger
javascript with no pin and no live exception required. that exposes the
interactive console (an rce vector) and tracebacks that leak source and
config.
probe that asset path and match two javascript anchors stable across
werkzeug 0.14 through 3.0 so a page that only references the debugger
does not match, then read the werkzeug version from the server header.
add a yaml module that posts a minimal introspection query to common
graphql paths and flags endpoints whose schema is exposed. the matcher
keys on the json result shape ("__schema":{ and "queryType":{) instead of
the bare __schema/queryType substrings, so a disabled endpoint that echoes
the query in its error does not false-positive. scoped to post+json
requests; get-only and persisted-query endpoints are out of scope.
the extractPotentialBuckets TODO asked to handle non-adjacent label
combos and strip the tld. strip the trailing tld label so we stop
guessing it ("com", "com-s3", "example-com"), and pair every label
with every other rather than only adjacent ones, so a deep host like
shop.cdn.example yields shop-example too.
this widens the candidate set (and the s3 probes) per host. multi-part
suffixes like .co.uk still leave a junk label; publicsuffix would
refine that as a follow-up.
a django app left on DEBUG=True renders a technical 404 or 500 page
that leaks settings, the url config, the traceback and request details.
a non-existent path triggers the 404 page on such apps; match the
"seeing this error because you have DEBUG = True" footer together with
the page chrome so a normal 404 does not match, then extract the django
version.
scanLines used a default bufio.Scanner (64k token cap) and never
checked scanner.Err(), so a wordlist line past the cap silently halted
the scan and dropped that line plus everything after it. return the
error so the wordlist loaders fail loud instead of running against a
truncated list.
an elasticsearch node left without authentication answers its root
banner to any client, and versions before 8.0 ship with no auth by
default, so a 200 at / means every index is readable without
credentials. match the "You Know, for Search" tagline together with
the lucene_version field so a page that only quotes the tagline in
prose does not match, then read the cluster version from the
version.number field.
move FaviconHash and its base64 chunking into a leaf package so the scan check and the module engine share one implementation instead of each carrying a copy. no behavior change; the golden test moves with it.
detectWordPress flagged any page whose body merely contained the word
"wordpress", so sites that only mention it (wp-hosting marketing, comparison
pages) were misreported: acquia.com, a Drupal site, was detected as WordPress.
wp-content, wp-includes and wp-json already identify a real install and appear
on every wordpress page, so the bare word adds only false positives. drop it.
probe /_all_dbs instead of the / welcome banner: couchdb serves the
banner publicly even on a secured 3.x, so a 200 there only proves an
instance is reachable. /_all_dbs is admin-gated by default since 3.0
(admin_only_all_dbs), so a 200 listing means the database names are
readable without auth on every version, while a secured server returns
401. the match requires a json array carrying a system database
(_users, _replicator or _global_changes), which keeps non-couchdb
arrays and prose clean.
no version is extracted: the /_all_dbs array carries no version string.
instances with renamed or deleted system databases are not matched.
specToResult computed an operation's auth status with len(op.Security) == 0,
which a value slice cannot tell apart from an absent block: an operation that
overrides the global requirement with an empty array (security: []) or an
empty requirement object (security: [{}]) decoded the same as one that simply
inherits the global default, so those deliberately-public endpoints were
reported as authenticated. decode the operation security into a pointer to
keep absent distinct from explicit-empty, and treat both empty forms as
anonymous-reachable.
the page scanner and the next.js manifest parser both reassembled the
response body line by line with a default bufio.Scanner (64k token
cap), so a line past the cap (common with minified or inlined js)
silently halted the read and dropped every script and route reference
after it. read the whole body instead, capped at 5mb.
parsing the raw page bytes also fixes script tags split across a
newline, which the old line-joined reassembly merged and missed.
the asp.net detector carried {Pattern: "X-Powered-By: ASP.NET", HeaderOnly:
true}, but containsHeader matches a signature against each header name and each
value separately, never against a joined "name: value" string. so that pattern
could never match anything. it only added its 0.4 to the detector's total
weight, diluting every real signal: a genuine response (an X-AspNetMvc-Version
header, an X-Powered-By: ASP.NET header, an .aspx link) scored 1.1/3.8 = 0.47,
just under the 0.5 threshold, and went undetected.
the live "ASP.NET" header signature already matches the X-Powered-By value, so
removing the dead one loses no coverage and lifts that same response to
1.1/3.4 = 0.56. adds a regression test for it.
modules/recon/aws-credentials-exposure.yaml flags exposed .aws/credentials,
.s3cfg and .boto files on the access and secret key markers, and extracts
the AKIA/ASIA access key id.
modules/recon/npmrc-exposure.yaml flags a .npmrc only when it carries an
auth token or password, not a bare registry config, and extracts the
registry the token belongs to.
modules/recon/docker-config-exposure.yaml flags .docker/config.json and the
legacy .dockercfg on the base64 auth field, and extracts the registry host.
each module ands a negative matcher on the usual html markers so a 200 page
that merely names a key is not a hit, the same guard the env exposure module
uses.
internal/modules/credential_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses
a strict review wants pinned: an html doc that only names a key, a plain 200
body, a 404, and a jwt shaped docker auth value, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, guard and extractor proven
to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
fork PRs get a read-only token on pull_request, so the label, size and
ci-summary jobs 403 and the summary check shows red on every external
PR. run on pull_request_target (write token, base-repo context), key the
concurrency group on the PR number so runs don't collide, and drop the
size job's unused checkout. none of these jobs check out or run PR code,
they only call the github API with the event payload, so this is the
safe labeler pattern.
supersedes #146 (same fix by @TBX3D, which conflicted after the checkout
bump in #143).
modules/recon/spring-application-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Spring
application config, in either properties or yaml form, on a datasource marker
paired with a credential field, then extracts the jdbc url. requiring the
credential keeps a config that holds no secret from being reported.
modules/recon/appsettings-exposure.yaml flags an exposed ASP.NET Core
appsettings.json, the .NET Core counterpart to web.config, on a
ConnectionStrings section paired with an inline password, then extracts the
connection string.
modules/recon/wp-config-backup-exposure.yaml flags an exposed wp-config backup,
the leftover .bak or swap copy that serves raw php, on the DB_PASSWORD constant
paired with another db define, then extracts the database password.
internal/modules/app_config_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a config with no credential, a password outside a
connection strings section, a passwordless connection string, prose that names
DB_PASSWORD, a config shown in an html page, a plain 200 body and a 404, none
of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, marker, guard and extractor
proven to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/rails-database-yml-exposure.yaml flags an exposed
config/database.yml on the adapter key paired with a credential key, then
extracts the database name. requiring a credential key keeps a credential free
sqlite config from being reported as a high severity leak.
modules/recon/rails-secrets-yml-exposure.yaml flags an exposed
config/secrets.yml on the secret_key_base key and extracts the secret, the
value an attacker needs to forge rails sessions.
modules/recon/rails-master-key-exposure.yaml flags an exposed master key, the
32 hex value that decrypts the encrypted credentials store. the matcher anchors
the hex to the whole body so a longer digest such as a sha256 served at the
same path does not match, and the same probe covers config/credentials.
internal/modules/rails_secret_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a credential free sqlite config, a longer hex
digest, a hex value away from the body start, an html page naming the markers,
a config without the markers and a 404, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, guard, anchor and extractor
proven to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/vscode-sftp-exposure.yaml flags an exposed vscode-sftp config on
its tool keys, remotePath and uploadOnSave, then extracts the deploy host. the
tool keys keep an unrelated json config that merely carries host and credential
fields from matching.
modules/recon/sublime-sftp-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Sublime SFTP config
on its snake case keys, upload_on_save and sync_down_on_open, and extracts the
deploy host.
modules/recon/ftpconfig-exposure.yaml flags an exposed remote-ftp config on its
connection timeout keys, connTimeout and pasvTimeout, and extracts the deploy
host.
each module requires a credential field alongside the tool key and rejects an
html body, so a login page served on the same path is not a leak and an
unrelated json config is not a high severity credential finding.
internal/modules/deploy_config_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: an html login page carrying the same keys, a plain
json config without the tool keys, a tool config with a host but no credential
field and a 404, none of which may match. it also pins a key auth config with
no password as a leak the credential matcher must still catch.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, guard and extractor proven to
bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
The attack field was parsed but never read, so every module ran the
clusterbomb cross-product. Honor it: pitchfork pairs path[i] with
payload[i] and stops at the shorter list, clusterbomb stays the default.
Unknown attack values are rejected at parse time instead of silently
ignored.
modules/recon/htpasswd-exposure.yaml flags an exposed htpasswd file on a line
that holds a recognised password hash, an apache md5, a bcrypt, a sha crypt or
a {SHA} digest, then extracts the user. matching the hash format keeps a line
that holds a plaintext value from being reported.
modules/recon/webconfig-exposure.yaml flags an exposed asp.net web.config on the
configuration root paired with a dotnet section, then extracts a connection
string, the value that carries the database server and password.
modules/recon/htaccess-exposure.yaml flags an exposed htaccess file on its
apache directives and extracts the AuthUserFile path, which points at the
password file to fetch next.
internal/modules/webserver_config_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end
to end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses
a strict review wants pinned: a plaintext htpasswd line, a configuration without
a dotnet section, an html page, a plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may
match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, hash format, section gate,
guard and extractor proven to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/vault-api-exposure.yaml flags an internet reachable HashiCorp
Vault through its unauthenticated seal-status, keyed on the sealed flag paired
with a vault-only status field, then extracts the version for cve matching.
modules/recon/consul-api-exposure.yaml flags a Consul http api that answers
without an acl token, keyed on the Datacenter field paired with an agent or
node marker, then extracts the datacenter.
modules/recon/etcd-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed etcd through its version
endpoint, keyed on the etcdserver and etcdcluster fields that a generic version
response does not carry, then extracts the server version.
internal/modules/orchestration_api_exposure_test.go drives the three modules
end to end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near
misses a strict review wants pinned: a sealed flag with no vault field, a
datacenter field alone, a version response from another service, a partial etcd
reply, a plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/private-key-exposure.yaml flags an exposed PEM private key on
the BEGIN PRIVATE KEY marker, so a public key or prose that merely names a key
is left alone, then extracts the key type.
modules/recon/git-credentials-exposure.yaml flags an exposed git credential
store on a remote url that carries an inline password, paired with a guard
that drops a url shown inside an html page, then extracts the host the
credential reaches.
modules/recon/pypirc-exposure.yaml flags an exposed pypirc on an index section
paired with a credential field, then extracts the pypi upload token. requiring
the credential keeps a bare index listing from being reported.
internal/modules/secret_file_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a public key, prose that names a key, a remote url
with no password, a pypi section with no credential, a credential shown in an
html page, a plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, marker, guard and extractor
proven to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/airflow-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Apache Airflow webserver
through its unauthenticated health endpoint, keyed on the metadatabase and
scheduler health blocks, then extracts the scheduler heartbeat.
modules/recon/flink-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Apache Flink dashboard,
keyed on the flink version paired with the slot total that a generic overview does
not carry, then extracts the flink version.
modules/recon/kafka-connect-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Kafka Connect rest
api, keyed on the kafka cluster id paired with the version, then extracts the
version.
internal/modules/data_pipeline_api_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: each service with one keying field missing, a generic
health response, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/sql-dump-exposure.yaml flags an exposed SQL dump on its
mysqldump and pg_dump idioms paired against a guard that drops SQL shown
inside an html page, then extracts the dumped table name.
modules/recon/sqlite-database-exposure.yaml flags an exposed SQLite file on
the 16 byte format magic anchored to the start of the body, then extracts a
schema table name. anchoring the magic keeps a page that merely embeds the
header from being reported.
modules/recon/redis-dump-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Redis RDB snapshot on
the RDB magic anchored to the start of the body, then extracts the format
version.
internal/modules/database_file_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end
to end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near
misses a strict review wants pinned: a SQL tutorial page, a bare select, prose
that names the sqlite or redis format, a header embedded mid body, a plain 200
body and a 404, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, magic anchor, guard and
extractor proven to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
