add recon modules for container and proxy control planes that answer without authentication: traefik serves its full routing config at /api/overview when the api is enabled, nomad dumps the agent config at /v1/agent/self when acls are disabled (403 otherwise), and portainer discloses its version and instance id at the public /api/status.
add recon modules for unauthenticated local inference servers that leak model inventory without a key: ollama, koboldcpp, text-generation-webui (oobabooga), and tabby.
add recon modules for unauthenticated inference servers that expose an openai-style /v1/models inventory without a key: vllm, llama.cpp, lm studio, and infinity.
add recon modules for self-hosted databases whose http interface is reachable
without credentials: clickhouse runs arbitrary sql because the default user has
an empty password, confirmed here by reading the server version through the
http interface, and the open-source dgraph alpha has no authentication so its
/health endpoint discloses the cluster while /query and /admin read and drop
all data; a clickhouse that requires a password returns 403 and an alpha behind
an authenticating proxy returns 401 and neither is flagged.
add recon modules for self-hosted agent builders and compute
orchestration. ray exposes an unauthenticated compute dashboard whose
job api allows code execution, skypilot exposes an open cloud and
kubernetes control plane when basic auth is disabled, dify flags a
console that allows open registration, and langflow fingerprints a
reachable instance over its public version api.
add two recon modules detecting anon-by-design service registries that leak the internal service map:
- eureka-registry-exposure (medium): probes /eureka/apps and matches the registry envelope markers apps__hashcode and versions__delta (the EurekaJacksonCodec formats them with a default '_' -> '__' replacement, so they appear verbatim in both the xml and json forms); eureka has no auth, so an open registry discloses every instance's internal hostname, ip and ports and accepts rogue registrations, while a spring-security-secured eureka returns 401; extracts the first instance ip from either form
- spring-boot-admin-exposure (medium): probes /instances and matches the registration/healthUrl/statusInfo shape; the codecentric server ships no security, so an open one discloses every registered app's internal management and health urls (a pivot to their actuators), while a secured one returns 401 or redirects to login; extracts the first internal health url
both modules carry hard-test coverage: eureka is proven on both its xml and json forms, with an N-1 trap (an apps__hashcode-less envelope stays quiet) and a prose trap (a page that merely mentions the word applications stays quiet); sba has an N-1 statusInfo trap; both have 401 secured-instance cases and cross false-positive guards both ways.
add two recon modules detecting anon-by-design big-data control surfaces that leak operational topology:
- zookeeper-admin-exposure (medium): probes /commands/monitor on a zookeeper adminserver and matches the command/monitor envelope plus server_state; the adminserver has no auth on reads, so an open one discloses the version, ensemble role, connection counts and data size, while a firewalled or disabled adminserver is not reachable; extracts the version
- hadoop-namenode-exposure (medium): probes /jmx for the NameNodeInfo bean and matches the bean name plus LiveNodes/DeadNodes; the namenode jmx is unauthenticated unless kerberos spnego is set, so an open one discloses the hdfs version and every datanode internal hostname, while a kerberos-secured namenode returns 401; extracts the software version
trino/presto were dropped: /v1/info is ResourceSecurity(PUBLIC) so it answers on secured clusters too and would be a fingerprint, not an exposure.
both modules carry hard-test coverage with N-1 anchor traps (a non-monitor zookeeper command and a non-NameNodeInfo hadoop bean stay quiet), cross false-positive guards both ways and a secured-instance status case.
add two recon modules detecting exposed kafka management consoles that ship without authentication by default:
- kafka-ui-exposure (high): probes /api/clusters on a kafbat/provectus kafka ui and matches the kafka-ui-specific defaultCluster/brokerCount keys plus the online/offline/initializing status enum; an open instance leaks the cluster topology and lets an unauthenticated session browse and produce records, while a login- or oauth-protected instance returns 401 and is not flagged
- kafdrop-exposure (high): probes / with an Accept: application/json header and matches the ClusterInfoVO summary/preferredReplicaPercent/brokers/topics shape; an open instance discloses broker hostnames, topics and messages, while an instance with the optional basic auth returns 401
both modules carry hard-test coverage with cross false-positive guards both ways, non-enum-status and missing-key negative cases, a wire-level check that the kafdrop module sends the Accept header, and 401 secured-instance cases
add a recon module for an n8n instance that serves /rest/settings without
authentication; the endpoint exists so the frontend can load but it discloses
the webhook url structure, instance id, release channel, configured
authentication method and whether owner setup is still pending, which aids
reconnaissance and can indicate a claimable instance; it is unauthenticated by
design so this is reported as information disclosure.
add a recon module for a grafana with anonymous access enabled: by default
grafana requires a login and /api/search returns 401, but when anonymous
access is turned on the endpoint lists every dashboard without credentials,
exposing the internal metrics, hostnames and queries they contain, and the same
anonymous session can reach backend data sources through the data source proxy;
a grafana that requires login returns 401 and is not flagged.
add recon modules for self-hosted automation servers whose api is reachable
without credentials when misconfigured: jenkins /api/json answers when
anonymous read access is enabled and lists every job, view and node, and
apache nifi /nifi-api/flow/about answers when the instance runs without
security; each open instance reaches a script console or processor that runs
arbitrary code, while a jenkins without anonymous read returns 403 and a
secured nifi returns 401 and neither is flagged.
add a recon module for an unauthenticated prometheus alertmanager: the
/api/v2/status endpoint answers without credentials and returns config.original,
the full running configuration, which discloses receiver integrations and any
embedded credentials such as slack, pagerduty and webhook urls and smtp
passwords, along with the build version and cluster peers; an instance behind an
authenticating proxy returns 401 and is not flagged.
add recon modules for self-hosted browser-automation grids that do not
authenticate their status endpoint: selenium grid /status discloses every
registered node with its os and browser slots, and selenoid /status discloses
the running sessions, capacity and browser images; each open grid also lets
anyone create a session that drives a real browser to arbitrary internal urls,
while a grid behind an authenticating proxy returns 401 and is not flagged.
add recon modules for self-hosted background-job dashboards that ship no
authentication of their own and rely on the hosting application to protect
them: sidekiq web /sidekiq/stats discloses the redis server internals and the
job queue, celery flower /api/workers (reachable only when its api is
deliberately opened) discloses every worker's broker config and registered
tasks, and rq-dashboard /0/data/queues.json discloses the redis-backed queue
names and job counts; each open instance also allows killing, retrying or
deleting jobs, while a deployment protected by the application returns a
redirect or 401 and is not flagged.
add recon modules for self-hosted data-orchestration webservers that ship no built-in authentication: dagster /server_info discloses the webserver and core versions, and mage /api/status discloses the scheduler status and server repository path; both reach an editor or graphql api on the same instance that can execute arbitrary code.
add recon modules for unauthenticated proxy and server admin interfaces that should be loopback-only: caddy /config/ returns the full running configuration and accepts a config-replacing post, and envoy /server_info exposes the build and command-line options of an admin interface that also offers config_dump and shutdown.
add a recon module for an exposed node-red admin api; with adminAuth unset the /flows endpoint returns the flow configuration without a token and the open admin api allows flow deployment that runs arbitrary code through function and exec nodes, while a secured instance returns 401.
add recon modules that fingerprint ci/cd pipeline servers via their public version endpoints: concourse /api/v1/info, woodpecker /version (keyed on its source repository) and gocd /go/api/version (keyed on its gocd commit url); each answers without authentication and discloses the server version.
add recon modules for unauthenticated observability backends that leak service topology and log data: loki serves its log query api when auth_enabled is false (401 otherwise), and jaeger and zipkin ship no authentication so a reachable instance exposes the service map and trace data.
add a recon module for the one-api / new-api self-hosted llm gateway,
whose public status endpoint discloses the system name, version, and
quota configuration.
add recon modules for self-hosted speech inference servers that are exposed without authentication: speaches (faster-whisper successor, speech-to-text and text-to-speech) keyed on its non-openai model task field, and xtts-api-server keyed on its get-folders endpoint that discloses local filesystem paths.
add recon modules for self-hosted vector and semantic search engines
reachable without auth: marqo, vespa, and meilisearch each allow
unauthenticated read and write of the indexed data, and their root or
version endpoints disclose the build.
add recon modules for self-hosted training and experiment-tracking
platforms reachable without auth: mlflow, tensorboard, aim, and
determined disclose experiments, the artifact store, training run paths,
and cluster topology over unauthenticated apis.
add recon modules for self-hosted image generation servers reachable
without auth: comfyui, automatic1111, fooocus-api, and iopaint each
expose unauthenticated generation or editing and disclose the installed
models.
Ran `gofmt -w .` accross the repo to fix formatting drift.
Mechanical `gofmt -w .` only. No functional or behavioural changes.
CONTRIBUTING.md requires gofmt-clean code; these files had slipped.
rename the go module path from github.com/dropalldatabases/sif to
github.com/vmfunc/sif across go.mod, all imports, the golangci exclude
list, release install docs and docs. pure string rename, no logic change.
a wordlist file fuzzes the {{word}} path placeholder, one request per
non-empty line, reusing the dirlist scanner's line reader. composes with
the existing attack modes and matchers-condition; updates attack-mode
tests for the new signature.
#189 added the condition param to checkMatchers; the favicon matcher test
(#183) still called the 3-arg form, breaking the build once both landed.
pass "" (default and-condition) to restore single-matcher semantics.
modules/recon/netdata-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Netdata agent through its
unauthenticated /api/v1/info endpoint, keyed on the mirrored_hosts and cores_total
fields a generic info response does not carry, then extracts the agent version.
modules/recon/cadvisor-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed cAdvisor container monitor
through its /api/v1.3/machine endpoint, keyed on the machine_id and cpu_frequency_khz
fields, then extracts the machine id.
internal/modules/metrics_exposure_test.go drives both modules through
ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a strict review
wants pinned: each service with one keying field missing, a generic json, a plain 200
and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/docker-api-exposure.yaml flags an unauthenticated Docker Engine
api, keyed on the api version paired with the minimum api version that a generic
version endpoint does not carry, then extracts the engine version.
modules/recon/kubernetes-api-exposure.yaml flags an internet reachable Kubernetes
api server through its anonymous version endpoint, keyed on the git version
paired with a build field, then extracts the version.
modules/recon/kubelet-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed kubelet whose pod list
leaks the cluster workload, keyed on the PodList kind paired with an api version,
then extracts a pod namespace.
internal/modules/runtime_api_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to end
through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a strict
review wants pinned: a generic version response, each service with one keying
field missing, a service list that is not a pod list, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/maven-settings-exposure.yaml flags an exposed settings.xml through
the settings or servers structure paired with a password element, so a mirror
only config is not reported, then extracts the server username.
modules/recon/gradle-properties-exposure.yaml flags an exposed gradle.properties
through a password, secret or token property with a value on the same line,
skipping comments and empty assignments, then extracts the property name.
modules/recon/nuget-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed nuget.config through a
packageSourceCredentials section paired with a cleartext password key, so a
plain package source list or an appsettings password is not reported, then
extracts the feed username.
internal/modules/buildtool_credential_exposure_test.go drives the three modules
end to end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near
misses a strict review wants pinned: a mirror only settings, a non credential
properties file, a commented password, an empty value, a plain source list, an
appsettings password, an html tutorial for each file, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/terraform-state-exposure.yaml flags an exposed terraform state
file on the terraform_version key paired with a state structure key, then
extracts the version. the structure key keeps a document that merely mentions
terraform_version from matching.
modules/recon/kubeconfig-exposure.yaml flags an exposed kubeconfig on the
kind: Config marker paired with a cluster or credential key, then extracts the
cluster api endpoint. it catches an exec auth kubeconfig with no embedded key
since the cluster block alone is a leak.
modules/recon/docker-compose-exposure.yaml flags an exposed compose file on the
services key paired with a service definition key, then extracts the first
image reference to surface the stack and its versions.
each module pairs a unique marker with a structure key and rejects an html
body, so a page that only names the marker is not a leak.
internal/modules/infra_config_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a bare terraform_version mention, a bare
kind: Config mention, a bare services key, an html page carrying the markers, a
plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each marker, structure gate, guard and
extractor proven to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/laravel-ignition-exposure.yaml probes the live
/_ignition/health-check endpoint and extracts can_execute_commands, the flag
that marks the CVE-2021-3129 remote code execution surface. this is an active
probe, complementary to the version based ignition entry in the framework cve
map.
modules/recon/symfony-profiler-exposure.yaml flags an exposed web profiler on
its structural markers and extracts a request token to pivot to a captured
request.
modules/recon/spring-heapdump-exposure.yaml flags an exposed actuator heap
dump on the hprof magic anchored at the start of the body, which a json marker
module cannot see because the dump is binary, and extracts the hprof version.
the anchor keeps a page that merely quotes the magic from matching.
internal/modules/debug_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to end
through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a prose mention of ignition, the hprof magic away
from the start, a plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may match, plus an
exposed ignition with command execution disabled that still flags and reports
the false flag.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher, anchor and extractor proven
to bite (break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/joomla-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed configuration.php
backup through the JConfig class paired with the password property, so a generic
php class is not reported, then extracts the database password.
modules/recon/drupal-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed settings.php backup
through the databases array paired with a literal password value, so an array
that lacks the marker or resolves the password from the environment is not
reported, then extracts the password.
modules/recon/magento-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed app/etc/env.php
backup through the crypt or mode marker paired with a literal key or password
value, so a generic return array or a cloud placeholder is not reported, then
extracts the crypt key.
internal/modules/cms_config_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to end
through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a strict
review wants pinned: a config missing its password, a generic php class, an array
without the databases marker, a databases array with no password, an env
indirection password, a return array without a magento marker, a magento config
with no credential, a cloud placeholder key, an html tutorial for each file, a
plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/svn-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .svn working copy through the
wc.db sqlite header anchored at the first byte paired with a working copy table
name, so a generic sqlite database is not reported, then extracts the
repository url.
modules/recon/mercurial-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .hg repository through
the revlog format requirements that the requires file lists, so prose that
names mercurial is not reported, then extracts the requirement.
modules/recon/bazaar-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .bzr repository through the
Bazaar meta directory signature, so a page that names a bazaar is not reported,
then extracts the format.
internal/modules/vcs_metadata_exposure_test.go drives the three modules end to
end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses a
strict review wants pinned: a generic sqlite database, an unanchored magic,
prose naming mercurial, a marketplace page, an html tutorial for the text
formats, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/netrc-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .netrc through the machine
login password grammar, requiring the keywords in order so prose that names
them out of order does not match, then extracts the machine host.
modules/recon/pgpass-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .pgpass through a single
line host:port:database:user:password record with a numeric or wildcard port,
which a yaml config or a multi line body does not satisfy, then extracts the
host.
modules/recon/mysql-client-config-exposure.yaml flags an exposed .my.cnf
through a client section paired with a cleartext password key, so a section
without a credential is not reported, then extracts the client user.
internal/modules/dotfile_credential_exposure_test.go drives the three modules
end to end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near
misses a strict review wants pinned: out of order prose, a yaml db config, a
non numeric port, a multi line body, a section without a password, a password
without a section, an html tutorial for each file, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
modules/recon/docker-registry-api-exposure.yaml flags a Docker registry reachable
anonymously through its /v2/ base, keyed on a 200 paired with the
Docker-Distribution-Api-Version: registry/2.0 response header (the header rides on a
401 too, so the 200 gate is what proves anonymous reach), then extracts the api
version.
modules/recon/harbor-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed Harbor registry through its
unauthenticated /api/v2.0/systeminfo endpoint, keyed on the harbor_version and
auth_mode fields, then extracts the harbor version.
internal/modules/registry_exposure_test.go drives both modules through
ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near misses: docker registry on
a header-less 200 and on a 401 that still carries the header, harbor with one keying
field missing, a plain 200 and a 404.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
Tigah