paths was typed as a map of operation structs, so a spec with a $ref
string path item (valid in openapi 3.1) failed to decode and the whole
spec was dropped with no finding. decode path items into a generic tree
and extract per-operation security manually, treating a non-array
security value as absent so it inherits the global default rather than
being reported as an anonymous endpoint.
specToResult computed an operation's auth status with len(op.Security) == 0,
which a value slice cannot tell apart from an absent block: an operation that
overrides the global requirement with an empty array (security: []) or an
empty requirement object (security: [{}]) decoded the same as one that simply
inherits the global default, so those deliberately-public endpoints were
reported as authenticated. decode the operation security into a pointer to
keep absent distinct from explicit-empty, and treat both empty forms as
anonymous-reachable.
jwt fetches the target once then analyzes every harvested token offline:
flags alg:none, the rs256->hs256 confusion surface, missing/expired exp
and plaintext sensitive claims, and cracks a small bundled weak-hmac list.
openapi probes the conventional spec paths, parses json/yaml and enumerates
paths plus unauthenticated operations. favicon computes the shodan-style
mmh3 hash (python base64.encodebytes chunking, signed int32) for tech
fingerprinting and the http.favicon.hash pivot, pinned by a golden test.
