modules/recon/vault-api-exposure.yaml flags an internet reachable HashiCorp
Vault through its unauthenticated seal-status, keyed on the sealed flag paired
with a vault-only status field, then extracts the version for cve matching.
modules/recon/consul-api-exposure.yaml flags a Consul http api that answers
without an acl token, keyed on the Datacenter field paired with an agent or
node marker, then extracts the datacenter.
modules/recon/etcd-api-exposure.yaml flags an exposed etcd through its version
endpoint, keyed on the etcdserver and etcdcluster fields that a generic version
response does not carry, then extracts the server version.
internal/modules/orchestration_api_exposure_test.go drives the three modules
end to end through ExecuteHTTPModule and asserts the leak alongside the near
misses a strict review wants pinned: a sealed flag with no vault field, a
datacenter field alone, a version response from another service, a partial etcd
reply, a plain 200 body and a 404, none of which may match.
verify: go test ./internal/modules, each matcher and extractor proven to bite
(break -> red, restore -> green).
