add two recon modules detecting anon-by-design service registries that leak the internal service map:
- eureka-registry-exposure (medium): probes /eureka/apps and matches the registry envelope markers apps__hashcode and versions__delta (the EurekaJacksonCodec formats them with a default '_' -> '__' replacement, so they appear verbatim in both the xml and json forms); eureka has no auth, so an open registry discloses every instance's internal hostname, ip and ports and accepts rogue registrations, while a spring-security-secured eureka returns 401; extracts the first instance ip from either form
- spring-boot-admin-exposure (medium): probes /instances and matches the registration/healthUrl/statusInfo shape; the codecentric server ships no security, so an open one discloses every registered app's internal management and health urls (a pivot to their actuators), while a secured one returns 401 or redirects to login; extracts the first internal health url
both modules carry hard-test coverage: eureka is proven on both its xml and json forms, with an N-1 trap (an apps__hashcode-less envelope stays quiet) and a prose trap (a page that merely mentions the word applications stays quiet); sba has an N-1 statusInfo trap; both have 401 secured-instance cases and cross false-positive guards both ways.
