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sif/internal
TigahandGitHub 788d20c18e fix(crawl): stop redirects escaping crawl scope, cap fanout (#333)
* docs(scan): correct crawl's false robots.txt claim

the doc comment said robots.txt is respected because colly honors it
by default, but colly's default is IgnoreRobotsTxt=true and Crawl never
flips it, so Disallow rules were never enforced. state the actual,
intentional behavior instead: a recon crawler has no reason to treat
Disallow as a scope boundary.

pin the behavior with a regression test so it isn't "fixed" into a
partial robots.txt implementation by accident later.

* fix(scan): cap crawl request fanout

MaxDepth only bounds recursion depth; colly's own MaxRequests budget
was left at 0 (unlimited) and Crawl set no Limit rule, so a hostile
page fanning out to an attacker-controlled number of links got every
one of them fetched at that depth (b^d). cap the total number of
requests a single Crawl call will make with a fixed internal budget.

TestCrawl_BoundsRequestFanout proves a 2500-link fanout page no longer
drives the server past maxCrawlRequests+1 actual fetches.

* fix(scan): stop redirects from escaping crawl scope

Crawl called SetClient(httpx.Client(timeout)), which replaces colly's
whole *http.Client and discards the CheckRedirect colly installs to
re-check AllowedDomains on every redirect hop. with it gone, redirects
fell back to net/http's default: follow up to 10 hops to any host. an
in-scope page could 302 the crawler to an arbitrary off-scope host
(e.g. a cloud metadata endpoint) and it would be fetched.

colly's own AllowedDomains only matches on hostname anyway, which
would still let a same-host, different-port redirect through (an
internal service reachable on the same IP). build our own http.Client
on top of httpx's shared transport instead, with a CheckRedirect that
requires the redirect target to share the exact host:port of the
request that produced it, and caps the hop count ourselves since a
custom CheckRedirect drops net/http's own 10-redirect default.

TestCrawl_RedirectRejectsOffScopeHost proves the off-scope host is no
longer fetched; TestCrawl_RedirectFollowsSameHost proves ordinary
same-host redirects still are.
2026-07-22 12:53:41 -07:00
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