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Merge pull request #507 from CravateRouge/master

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Add ADCS ESC DC registry checks
This commit is contained in:
SirBroccoli
2025-10-07 10:50:43 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent c83eef9cd8 b8b4a0fc14
commit be3fe91da4
1 changed files with 79 additions and 8 deletions
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87
winPEAS/winPEASexe/winPEAS/Checks/ActiveDirectoryInfo.cs
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@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ using System.DirectoryServices;
using System.Security.AccessControl;
using System.Security.Principal;
using winPEAS.Helpers;
using winPEAS.Helpers.Registry;
using winPEAS.Info.FilesInfo.Certificates;
namespace winPEAS.Checks
{
@@ -17,7 +19,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
new List<Action>
{
PrintGmsaReadableByCurrentPrincipal,
PrintAdcsEsc4LikeTemplates
PrintAdcsMisconfigurations
}.ForEach(action => CheckRunner.Run(action, isDebug));
}
@@ -152,22 +154,91 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
}
}
// Detect AD CS certificate templates where current principal has dangerous control rights (ESC4-style)
private void PrintAdcsEsc4LikeTemplates()
// Detect AD CS misconfigurations
private void PrintAdcsMisconfigurations()
{
try
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("AD CS templates with dangerous ACEs (ESC4)");
Beaprint.LinkPrint(
"https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates.html#esc4",
"If you can modify a template (WriteDacl/WriteOwner/GenericAll), you can abuse ESC4");
Beaprint.MainPrint("AD CS misconfigurations for ESC");
Beaprint.LinkPrint("https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates.html");
if (!Checks.IsPartOfDomain)
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] Host is not domain-joined. Skipping.");
return;
}
Beaprint.InfoPrint("Check for ADCS misconfigurations in the local DC registry");
bool IsDomainController = RegistryHelper.GetReg("HKLM", @"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS")?.ValueCount > 0;
if (IsDomainController)
{
// For StrongBinding and CertificateMapping, More details in KB014754 - Registry key information:
// https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16
uint? strongBinding = RegistryHelper.GetDwordValue("HKLM", @"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc", "StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement");
switch (strongBinding)
{
case 0:
Beaprint.BadPrint(" StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement: 0 — Weak mapping allowed, vulnerable to ESC9.");
break;
case 2:
Beaprint.GoodPrint(" StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement: 2 — Prevents weak UPN/DNS mappings even if SID extension missing, not vulnerable to ESC9.");
break;
// 1 is default behavior now I think?
case 1:
default:
Beaprint.NoColorPrint($" StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement: {strongBinding} — Allow weak mapping if SID extension missing, may be vulnerable to ESC9.");
break;
}
uint? certMapping = RegistryHelper.GetDwordValue("HKLM", @"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL", "CertificateMappingMethods");
if (certMapping.HasValue && (certMapping & 0x4) != 0)
Beaprint.BadPrint($" CertificateMappingMethods: {certMapping} — Allow UPN-based mapping, vulnerable to ESC10.");
else if(certMapping.HasValue && ((certMapping & 0x1) != 0 || (certMapping & 0x2) != 0))
Beaprint.NoColorPrint($" CertificateMappingMethods: {certMapping} — Allow weak Subject/Issuer certificate mapping.");
// 0x18 (strong mapping) is default behavior if not the flags above I think?
else
Beaprint.GoodPrint($" CertificateMappingMethods: {certMapping} — Strong Certificate mapping enabled.");
// We take the Active CA, can they be several?
string caName = RegistryHelper.GetRegValue("HKLM", $@"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration", "Active");
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(caName))
{
// Obscure Source for InterfaceFlag Enum:
// https://www.sysadmins.lv/apidocs/pki/html/T_PKI_CertificateServices_Flags_InterfaceFlagEnum.htm
uint? interfaceFlags = RegistryHelper.GetDwordValue("HKLM", $@"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\{caName}", "InterfaceFlags");
if (!interfaceFlags.HasValue || (interfaceFlags & 512) == 0)
Beaprint.BadPrint(" IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST not set in InterfaceFlags — vulnerable to ESC11.");
else
Beaprint.GoodPrint(" IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST set in InterfaceFlags — not vulnerable to ESC11.");
string policyModule = RegistryHelper.GetRegValue("HKLM", $@"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\{caName}\PolicyModules", "Active");
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(policyModule))
{
string disableExtensionList = RegistryHelper.GetRegValue("HKLM", $@"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\{caName}\PolicyModules\{policyModule}", "DisableExtensionList");
// zOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2)
if (disableExtensionList?.Contains("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2") == true)
Beaprint.BadPrint(" szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT disabled for the entire CA — vulnerable to ESC16.");
else
Beaprint.GoodPrint(" szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT not disabled for the CA — not vulnerable to ESC16.");
}
else
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] Policy Module not found. Skipping.");
}
}
else
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] Certificate Authority not found. Skipping.");
}
}
else
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] Host is not a domain controller. Skipping ADCS Registry check");
}
// Detect AD CS certificate templates where current principal has dangerous control rights(ESC4 - style)
Beaprint.InfoPrint("\nIf you can modify a template (WriteDacl/WriteOwner/GenericAll), you can abuse ESC4");
var configNC = GetRootDseProp("configurationNamingContext");
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(configNC))
{