fix: Add test for rosenpass_constant_time::compare being little endian

It only takes a few seconds to run, enable it.

Signed-off-by: Paul Spooren <mail@aparcar.org>

.github/workflows/nix.yaml

@@ -223,6 +223,29 @@ jobs:
           authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
       - name: Build
         run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.release-package --print-build-logs
+  aarch64-linux---release-package:
+    name: Build aarch64-linux.release-package
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - aarch64-linux---rosenpass-oci-image
+      - aarch64-linux---rosenpass
+    steps:
+      - run: |
+          DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+          sudo apt-get update -q -y && sudo apt-get install -q -y qemu-system-aarch64 qemu-efi binfmt-support qemu-user-static
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+          extra_nix_config: |
+            system = aarch64-linux
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.aarch64-linux.release-package --print-build-logs
   x86_64-linux---rosenpass:
     name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass
     runs-on:
@@ -239,6 +262,27 @@ jobs:
           authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
       - name: Build
         run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
+  aarch64-linux---rosenpass:
+    name: Build aarch64-linux.rosenpass
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs: []
+    steps:
+      - run: |
+          DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+          sudo apt-get update -q -y && sudo apt-get install -q -y qemu-system-aarch64 qemu-efi binfmt-support qemu-user-static
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+          extra_nix_config: |
+            system = aarch64-linux
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.aarch64-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
   x86_64-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
     name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
     runs-on:
@@ -256,6 +300,28 @@ jobs:
           authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
       - name: Build
         run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
+  aarch64-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
+    name: Build aarch64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - aarch64-linux---rosenpass
+    steps:
+      - run: |
+          DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+          sudo apt-get update -q -y && sudo apt-get install -q -y qemu-system-aarch64 qemu-efi binfmt-support qemu-user-static
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+          extra_nix_config: |
+            system = aarch64-linux
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.aarch64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
   x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static:
     name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static
     runs-on:

.github/workflows/qc.yaml

@@ -25,6 +25,34 @@ jobs:
       - name: Run ShellCheck
         uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master
 
+  rustfmt:
+    name: Rust Format
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - name: Run Rust Formatting Script
+        run: bash format_rust_code.sh --mode check
+
+  cargo-bench:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: actions/cache@v3
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/bin/
+            ~/.cargo/registry/index/
+            ~/.cargo/registry/cache/
+            ~/.cargo/git/db/
+            target/
+          key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
+      - name: Install libsodium
+        run: sudo apt-get install -y libsodium-dev
+        # liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
+        # the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
+        # by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_. Setting it to 8 MiB
+      - run: RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo bench --workspace
+
   cargo-audit:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
@@ -93,7 +121,7 @@ jobs:
         # liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
         # the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
         # by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_. Setting it to 8 MiB
-      - run: RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test
+      - run: RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test --workspace --all-features
 
   cargo-test-nix-devshell-x86_64-linux:
     runs-on:
@@ -116,7 +144,7 @@ jobs:
         with:
           name: rosenpass
           authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - run: nix develop --command cargo test
+      - run: nix develop --command cargo test --workspace --all-features
 
   cargo-fuzz:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -146,5 +174,5 @@ jobs:
           cargo fuzz run fuzz_handle_msg -- -max_total_time=5
           ulimit -s 8192000 && RUST_MIN_STACK=33554432000 && cargo fuzz run fuzz_kyber_encaps -- -max_total_time=5
           cargo fuzz run fuzz_mceliece_encaps -- -max_total_time=5
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_box_sodium_alloc -- -max_total_time=5
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_vec_sodium_alloc -- -max_total_time=5
+          cargo fuzz run fuzz_box_secret_alloc -- -max_total_time=5
+          cargo fuzz run fuzz_vec_secret_alloc -- -max_total_time=5

Cargo.toml

@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@ members = [
     "ciphers",
     "util",
     "constant-time",
-    "sodium",
     "oqs",
     "to",
     "fuzz",
     "secret-memory",
-    "lenses",
 ]
 
 default-members = [
@@ -27,13 +25,11 @@ tag-prefix = ""
 rosenpass = { path = "rosenpass" }
 rosenpass-util = { path = "util" }
 rosenpass-constant-time = { path = "constant-time" }
-rosenpass-sodium = { path = "sodium" }
 rosenpass-cipher-traits = { path = "cipher-traits" }
 rosenpass-ciphers = { path = "ciphers" }
 rosenpass-to = { path = "to" }
 rosenpass-secret-memory = { path = "secret-memory" }
 rosenpass-oqs = { path = "oqs" }
-rosenpass-lenses = { path = "lenses" }
 criterion = "0.4.0"
 test_bin = "0.4.0"
 libfuzzer-sys = "0.4"
@@ -42,19 +38,24 @@ doc-comment = "0.3.3"
 base64 = "0.21.5"
 zeroize = "1.7.0"
 memoffset = "0.9.0"
-lazy_static = "1.4.0"
 thiserror = "1.0.50"
 paste = "1.0.14"
 env_logger = "0.10.1"
 toml = "0.7.8"
 static_assertions = "1.1.0"
-allocator-api2 = "0.2.16"
+allocator-api2 = "0.2.14"
+allocator-api2-tests = "0.2.14"
+memsec = "0.6.3"
 rand = "0.8.5"
+typenum = "1.17.0"
 log = { version = "0.4.20" }
 clap = { version = "4.4.10", features = ["derive"] }
 serde = { version = "1.0.193", features = ["derive"] }
 arbitrary = { version = "1.3.2", features = ["derive"] }
 anyhow = { version = "1.0.75", features = ["backtrace", "std"] }
 mio = { version = "0.8.9", features = ["net", "os-poll"] }
-libsodium-sys-stable= { version = "1.20.4", features = ["use-pkg-config"] }
 oqs-sys = { version = "0.8", default-features = false, features = ['classic_mceliece', 'kyber']  }
+blake2 = "0.10.6"
+chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", default-features = false, features = [ "std", "heapless" ] }
+zerocopy = { version = "0.7.32", features = ["derive"] }
+home = "0.5.9"

analysis/01_secrecy.entry.mpv

@@ -3,12 +3,33 @@
 #define SESSION_START_EVENTS 0
 #define RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS 0
 
+
 #include "config.mpv"
 #include "prelude/basic.mpv"
 #include "crypto/key.mpv"
 #include "crypto/kem.mpv"
+
 #include "rosenpass/oracles.mpv"
 
+nounif v:seed_prec;   attacker(prepare_seed(trusted_seed( v )))/6217[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(prepare_seed( v ))/6216[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_kem_sk( v ))/6215[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_key( v ))/6214[hypothesis].
+nounif v:key_prec;    attacker(prepare_key(trusted_key( v )))/6213[hypothesis].
+nounif v:kem_sk_prec; attacker(prepare_kem_sk(trusted_kem_sk( v )))/6212[hypothesis].
+nounif v:key;         attacker(prepare_key( v ))/6211[hypothesis].
+nounif v:kem_sk;      attacker(prepare_kem_sk( v ))/6210[hypothesis].
+nounif Spk:kem_sk_tmpl;
+  attacker(Creveal_kem_pk(Spk))/6110[conclusion].
+nounif sid:SessionId, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Seski:seed_tmpl, Ssptr:seed_tmpl;
+  attacker(Cinitiator( *sid, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Seski, *Ssptr ))/6109[conclusion].
+nounif sid:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Septi:seed_tmpl, Sspti:seed_tmpl, ih:InitHello_t;
+  attacker(Cinit_hello( *sid, *biscuit_no, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Septi, *Sspti, *ih ))/6108[conclusion].
+nounif rh:RespHello_t;
+  attacker(Cresp_hello( *rh ))/6107[conclusion].
+nounif Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t;
+  attacker(Cinit_conf( *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *ic ))/6106[conclusion].
+
 let main = rosenpass_main.
 
 @lemma "state coherence, initiator: Initiator accepting a RespHello message implies they also generated the associated InitHello message"

analysis/02_availability.entry.mpv

@@ -10,6 +10,26 @@
 
 let main = rosenpass_main.
 
+nounif v:seed_prec;   attacker(prepare_seed(trusted_seed( v )))/6217[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(prepare_seed( v ))/6216[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_kem_sk( v ))/6215[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_key( v ))/6214[hypothesis].
+nounif v:key_prec;    attacker(prepare_key(trusted_key( v )))/6213[hypothesis].
+nounif v:kem_sk_prec; attacker(prepare_kem_sk(trusted_kem_sk( v )))/6212[hypothesis].
+nounif v:key;         attacker(prepare_key( v ))/6211[hypothesis].
+nounif v:kem_sk;      attacker(prepare_kem_sk( v ))/6210[hypothesis].
+nounif Spk:kem_sk_tmpl;
+  attacker(Creveal_kem_pk(Spk))/6110[conclusion].
+nounif sid:SessionId, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Seski:seed_tmpl, Ssptr:seed_tmpl;
+  attacker(Cinitiator( *sid, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Seski, *Ssptr ))/6109[conclusion].
+nounif sid:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Septi:seed_tmpl, Sspti:seed_tmpl, ih:InitHello_t;
+  attacker(Cinit_hello( *sid, *biscuit_no, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Septi, *Sspti, *ih ))/6108[conclusion].
+nounif rh:RespHello_t;
+  attacker(Cresp_hello( *rh ))/6107[conclusion].
+nounif Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t;
+  attacker(Cinit_conf( *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *ic ))/6106[conclusion].
+
+
 @lemma "non-interruptability: Adv cannot prevent a genuine InitHello message from being accepted"
 lemma ih:InitHello_t, psk:key, sski:kem_sk, sskr:kem_sk;
   event(IHRjct(ih, psk, sskr, kem_pub(sski)))

analysis/03_identity_hiding_initiator.entry.mpv

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#define INITIATOR_TEST 1
+
+#include "rosenpass/03_identity_hiding.mpv"
+
+// nounif a:Atom, s:seed, a2:Atom;
+// 	ConsumeSeed(a, s, a2) / 6300[conclusion].
+
+nounif v:seed_prec;   attacker(prepare_seed(trusted_seed( v )))/6217[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(prepare_seed( v ))/6216[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_kem_sk( v ))/6215[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_key( v ))/6214[hypothesis].
+nounif v:key_prec;    attacker(prepare_key(trusted_key( v )))/6213[hypothesis].
+nounif v:kem_sk_prec; attacker(prepare_kem_sk(trusted_kem_sk( v )))/6212[hypothesis].
+nounif v:key;         attacker(prepare_key( v ))/6211[hypothesis].
+nounif v:kem_sk;      attacker(prepare_kem_sk( v ))/6210[hypothesis].
+nounif Spk:kem_sk_tmpl;
+  attacker(Creveal_kem_pk(Spk))/6110[conclusion].
+nounif sid:SessionId, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Seski:seed_tmpl, Ssptr:seed_tmpl;
+  attacker(Cinitiator( *sid, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Seski, *Ssptr ))/6109[conclusion].
+nounif sid:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Septi:seed_tmpl, Sspti:seed_tmpl, ih:InitHello_t;
+  attacker(Cinit_hello( *sid, *biscuit_no, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Septi, *Sspti, *ih ))/6108[conclusion].
+nounif rh:RespHello_t;
+  attacker(Cresp_hello( *rh ))/6107[conclusion].
+nounif Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t;
+  attacker(Cinit_conf( *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *ic ))/6106[conclusion].

analysis/03_identity_hiding_responder.entry.mpv

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#define RESPONDER_TEST 1
+
+#include "rosenpass/03_identity_hiding.mpv"
+
+// select k:kem_pk,ih: InitHello_t;         attacker(prf(prf(prf(prf(key0, PROTOCOL), MAC), kem_pk2b(k) ), IH2b(ih))) phase 1/6300[hypothesis].
+
+// select epki:kem_pk, sctr:bits, pidiC:bits, auth:bits, epki2:kem_pk, sctr2:bits, pidiC2:bits, auth2:bits;
+// 	mess(D, prf(prf(prf(prf(key0,PROTOCOL),MAC),kem_pk2b(kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(responder1)))),
+// 			IH2b(InitHello(secure_sidi, *epki, *sctr, *pidiC, *auth)))
+// 		) [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// select epki:kem_pk, sctr:bits, pidiC:bits, auth:bits, epki2:kem_pk, sctr2:bits, pidiC2:bits, auth2:bits;
+// attacker(choice[prf(prf(prf(prf(key0,PROTOCOL),MAC),kem_pk2b(kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(responder1)))),
+// 		IH2b(InitHello(secure_sidi, *epki, *sctr, *pidiC, *auth))),
+
+// 		prf(prf(prf(prf(key0,PROTOCOL),MAC),kem_pk2b(kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(responder2)))),
+// 				IH2b(InitHello(secure_sidi, *epki2, *sctr2, *pidiC2, *auth2)))]
+// 	) [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// select 
+// attacker(prf(prf(key0,PROTOCOL),MAC)) [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// select 
+// attacker(prf(key0,PROTOCOL)) [conclusion].
+
+// select  
+// attacker(key0) [conclusion].
+
+// select  
+// attacker(PROTOCOL) [conclusion].
+
+// select 
+// attacker(kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(responder1))) /9999 [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// select 
+// attacker(kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(responder2))) /9999 [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// nounif ih:InitHello_t;
+// 	attacker(ih) / 9999 [hypothesis].
+
+// nounif rh:RespHello_t;
+// 	attacker(rh) / 9999 [hypothesis].
+
+// nounif ic:InitConf_t;
+// 	attacker(ic) / 9999 [hypothesis].
+
+// nounif k:key;
+// attacker(ck_hs_enc( *k )) [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// nounif k:key;
+// attacker(ck_hs_enc( *k )) phase 1   [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// nounif k:key, b:bits;
+// attacker(ck_mix( *k , *b ))   [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// nounif k:key, b:bits;
+// attacker(ck_mix( *k , *b ))phase 1   [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// // select k:kem_pk, epki2:kem_pk, sctr2:bits, pidiC2:bits, auth2:bits, epki:kem_pk, sctr:bits, pidiC:bits, auth:bits;
+// // attacker(choice[Envelope(prf(prf(prf(prf(key0,PROTOCOL),MAC),kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(responder1))),
+// // 	InitHello(secure_sidi, *epki2, *sctr2, *pidiC2, *auth2)
+// // 	), InitHello(secure_sidi, *epki2, *sctr2, *pidiC2, *auth2))
+// // 	Envelope(prf(prf(prf(prf(key0,PROTOCOL),MAC),kem_pub(trusted_kem_sk(responder2))),
+// // 		InitHello(secure_sidi, *epki, *sctr, *pidiC, *auth)),
+// // 		InitHello(secure_sidi, *epki, *sctr, *pidiC, *auth))
+// // 	]) / 9999[hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// nounif k:key, b1:bits, b2:bits;
+// 	attacker(xaead_enc( *k, *b1, *b2)) / 9999[hypothesis,conclusion].
+
+// nounif pk:kem_pk, k:key; 
+// 	attacker(kem_enc( *pk , *k )) / 9999[hypothesis,conclusion].
+
+// nounif sid:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Septi:seed_tmpl, Sspti:seed_tmpl, ih:InitHello_t;
+//   attacker(Cinit_hello( *sid, *biscuit_no, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Septi, *Sspti, *ih ))/9999[hypothesis, conclusion].
+// nounif Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t;
+//   attacker(Cinit_conf( *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *ic ))/9999[hypothesis, conclusion].
+// nounif sid:SessionId, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Seski:seed_tmpl, Ssptr:seed_tmpl;
+//   attacker(Cinitiator( *sid, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Seski, *Ssptr )) /9999 [hypothesis, conclusion].
+
+// nounif sid:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Septi:seed_tmpl, Sspti:seed_tmpl, ih:InitHello_t;
+//   mess(C, Cinit_hello( *sid, *biscuit_no, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Septi, *Sspti, *ih ))/9999[hypothesis, conclusion].
+// nounif Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t;
+//   mess(C, Cinit_conf( *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *ic ))/9999[hypothesis, conclusion].
+// nounif sid:SessionId, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Seski:seed_tmpl, Ssptr:seed_tmpl;
+//   mess(C, Cinitiator( *sid, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Seski, *Ssptr )) /9999 [hypothesis, conclusion].
+// nounif rh:RespHello_t;
+//   attacker(Cresp_hello( *rh ))[conclusion].
+// nounif v:seed_prec;   attacker(prepare_seed(trusted_seed( v )))/6217[hypothesis].
+// nounif v:seed;        attacker(prepare_seed( v ))/6216[hypothesis].
+// nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_kem_sk( v ))/6215[hypothesis].
+// nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_key( v ))/6214[hypothesis].
+// nounif v:key_prec;    attacker(prepare_key(trusted_key( v )))/6213[hypothesis].
+// nounif v:kem_sk_prec; attacker(prepare_kem_sk(trusted_kem_sk( v )))/6212[hypothesis].
+// nounif v:key;         attacker(prepare_key( v ))/6211[hypothesis].
+// nounif v:kem_sk;      attacker(prepare_kem_sk( v ))/6210[hypothesis].

analysis/03_identity_hiding_test.entry.mpv

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#define INITIATOR_TEST 1
+#define CUSTOM_MAIN 1
+
+#include "rosenpass/03_identity_hiding.mpv"
+
+let Oinitiator_bad_actor_inner(sk_tmp:kem_sk_prec) =
+
+  in(C, Cinitiator(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Seski, Ssptr));
+
+  #if RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS
+    new call:Atom;
+  #else
+    call <- Cinitiator(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Seski, Ssptr);
+  #endif
+
+  in(C, last_cookie:key);
+  tmpl <- make_trusted_kem_sk(sk_tmp);
+  out(C, setup_kem_sk(tmpl));
+  Oinitiator_inner(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, tmpl, Seski, Ssptr, last_cookie, C, call).
+
+let Oinitiator_bad_actor() =
+  Oinitiator_bad_actor_inner(responder1) | Oinitiator_bad_actor_inner(responder2) | Oinitiator_bad_actor_inner(initiator1) | Oinitiator_bad_actor_inner(initiator2).
+
+
+let identity_hiding_main2() = 
+  0 | Oinitiator_bad_actor() | rosenpass_main2() | participants_communication() | phase 1; secretCommunication().
+
+
+let main = identity_hiding_main2.

analysis/04_dos_protection.entry.mpv

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+#define CHAINING_KEY_EVENTS 1
+#define MESSAGE_TRANSMISSION_EVENTS 0
+#define SESSION_START_EVENTS 0
+#define RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS 0
+#define COOKIE_EVENTS 1
+#define KEM_EVENTS 1
+
+#include "config.mpv"
+#include "prelude/basic.mpv"
+#include "crypto/key.mpv"
+#include "crypto/kem.mpv"
+#include "rosenpass/handshake_state.mpv"
+
+/* The cookie data structure is implemented based on the WireGuard protocol.
+ * The ip and port is based purely on the public key and the implementation of the private cookie key is intended to mirror the biscuit key.
+ * The code tests the response to a possible DOS attack by setting up alternative branches for the protocol
+ * processes: Oinit_conf, Oinit_hello and resp_hello to simulate what happens when the responder or initiator is overloaded.
+ * When under heavy load a valid cookie is required. When such a cookie is not present a cookie message is sent as a response.
+ * Queries then test to make sure that expensive KEM operations are only conducted after a cookie has been successfully validated.
+ */
+
+type CookieMsg_t.
+fun CookieMsg(
+  SessionId,  // sender
+  bits,     // nonce
+  bits      // cookie
+) : CookieMsg_t [data].
+
+#define COOKIE_EVENTS(eventLbl) \
+  COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _UnderLoadEV) (SessionId, SessionId, Atom).)   \
+  COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieValidated) (SessionId, SessionId, Atom).)   \
+  COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieSent) (SessionId, SessionId, Atom, CookieMsg_t).)
+
+fun cookie_key(kem_sk) : key [private].
+fun ip_and_port(kem_pk):bits.
+letfun create_mac2_key(sskm:kem_sk, spkt:kem_pk) = prf(cookie_key(sskm), ip_and_port(spkt)).
+letfun create_cookie(sskm:kem_sk, spkm:kem_pk, spkt:kem_pk, nonce:bits, msg:bits) = xaead_enc(lprf2(COOKIE, kem_pk2b(spkm), nonce),
+    k2b(create_mac2_key(sskm, spkm)), msg).
+
+#define COOKIE_PROCESS(eventLbl, innerFunc) \
+  new nonce:bits; \
+  in(C, Ccookie(mac1, mac2)); \
+  COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _UnderLoadEV) (sidi, sidr, call);)  \
+  msgB <- Envelope(mac1, msg); \
+  mac2_key <- create_mac2_key(sskm, spkt); \
+  if k2b(create_mac2(mac2_key, msgB)) = mac2 then  \
+    COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieValidated) (sidi, sidr, call);)  \
+    innerFunc \
+  else \
+    cookie <- create_cookie(sskm, spkm, spkt, nonce, msg); \
+    cookie_msg <- CookieMsg(sidi, nonce, cookie); \
+    COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieSent) (sidi, sidr, call, cookie_msg);)  \
+    out(C, cookie_msg). \
+
+#include "rosenpass/oracles.mpv"
+
+#include "rosenpass/responder.macro"
+COOKIE_EVENTS(Oinit_conf)
+let Oinit_conf_underLoad() =
+  in(C, Cinit_conf(Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, ic));
+  in(C, last_cookie:bits);
+
+  msg <- IC2b(ic);
+  let InitConf(sidi, sidr, biscuit, auth) = ic in 
+
+  new call:Atom;
+
+  SETUP_HANDSHAKE_STATE()
+
+  COOKIE_PROCESS(Oinit_conf, Oinit_conf_inner(Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, ic, call))
+
+#include "rosenpass/responder.macro"
+COOKIE_EVENTS(Oinit_hello)
+let Oinit_hello_underLoad() =
+
+  in(C, Cinit_hello(sidr, biscuit_no, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Septi, Sspti, ih));
+  in(C, Oinit_hello_last_cookie:key);
+  new call:Atom;
+
+  msg <- IH2b(ih);
+  let InitHello(sidi, epki, sctr, pidic, auth) = ih in
+  SETUP_HANDSHAKE_STATE()
+
+  COOKIE_PROCESS(Oinit_hello, Oinit_hello_inner(sidr, biscuit_no, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Septi, Sspti, ih, Oinit_hello_last_cookie, C, call))
+
+let rosenpass_dos_main() = 0
+  | !Oreveal_kem_pk
+  | REP(INITIATOR_BOUND, Oinitiator)
+  | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_hello)
+  | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_conf)
+  | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_hello_underLoad)
+  | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_conf_underLoad).
+
+let main = rosenpass_dos_main.
+
+select cookie:CookieMsg_t;         attacker(cookie)/6220[hypothesis].
+nounif v:key;         attacker(prepare_key( v ))/6217[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(prepare_seed( v ))/6216[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(prepare_seed( v ))/6216[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_kem_sk( v ))/6215[hypothesis].
+nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_key( v ))/6214[hypothesis].
+nounif v:kem_sk;      attacker(prepare_kem_sk( v ))/6210[hypothesis].
+
+// nounif Spk:kem_sk_tmpl;
+//   attacker(Creveal_kem_pk(Spk))/6110[conclusion].
+// nounif sid:SessionId, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Seski:seed_tmpl, Ssptr:seed_tmpl;
+//   attacker(Cinitiator( *sid, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Seski, *Ssptr ))/6109[conclusion].
+// nounif sid:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Septi:seed_tmpl, Sspti:seed_tmpl, ih:InitHello_t;
+//   attacker(Cinit_hello( *sid, *biscuit_no, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Septi, *Sspti, *ih ))/6108[conclusion].
+nounif rh:RespHello_t;
+  attacker(Cresp_hello( *rh ))/6107[conclusion].
+nounif Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t;
+  attacker(Cinit_conf( *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *ic ))/6106[conclusion].
+
+@reachable "DOS protection: cookie sent"
+query sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, call:Atom, cookieMsg:CookieMsg_t;
+  event (Oinit_hello_CookieSent(sidi, sidr, call, cookieMsg)).
+
+@lemma "DOS protection: Oinit_hello kem use when under load implies validated cookie"
+lemma sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, call:Atom;
+event(Oinit_hello_UnderLoadEV(sidi, sidr, call))
+  && event(Oinit_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, call))
+  ==> event(Oinit_hello_CookieValidated(sidi, sidr, call)).
+
+@lemma "DOS protection: Oinit_conf kem use when under load implies validated cookie"
+lemma sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, call:Atom;
+event(Oinit_conf_UnderLoadEV(sidi, sidr, call))
+  && event(Oinit_conf_KemUse(sidi, sidr, call))
+  ==> event(Oinit_conf_CookieValidated(sidi, sidr, call)).
+
+@lemma "DOS protection: Oresp_hello kem use when under load implies validated cookie"
+lemma sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, call:Atom;
+event(Oresp_hello_UnderLoadEV(sidi, sidr, call))
+  && event(Oresp_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, call))
+  ==> event(Oresp_hello_CookieValidated(sidi, sidr, call)).
+

analysis/config.mpv

@@ -88,6 +88,18 @@ set verboseCompleted=VERBOSE.
 #define SES_EV(...)
 #endif
 
+#if COOKIE_EVENTS
+#define COOKIE_EV(...) __VA_ARGS__
+#else
+#define COOKIE_EV(...)
+#endif
+
+#if KEM_EVENTS
+#define KEM_EV(...) __VA_ARGS__
+#else
+#define KEM_EV(...)
+#endif
+
 
 (* TODO: Authentication timing properties *)
 (* TODO: Proof that every adversary submitted package is equivalent to one generated by the proper algorithm using different coins. This probably requires introducing an oracle that extracts the coins used and explicitly adding the notion of coins used for Packet->Packet steps and an inductive RNG notion. *)

analysis/rosenpass/03_identity_hiding.mpv

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/*
+  This identity hiding process tests whether the rosenpass protocol is able to protect the identity of an initiator or responder.
+  The participants in the test are trusted initiators, trusted responders and compromised initiators and responders.
+  The test consists of two phases. In the first phase all of the participants can communicate with each other using the rosenpass protocol.
+  An attacker observes the first phase and is able to intercept and modify messages and choose participants to communicate with each other
+
+  In the second phase if the anonymity of an initiator is being tested then one of two trusted initiators is chosen.
+  The chosen initiator communicates directly with a trusted responder.
+  If an attacker can determine which initiator was chosen then the anonymity of the initiator has been compromised.
+  Otherwise the protocol has successfully protected the initiators’ identity.
+
+  If the anonymity of a responder is being tested then one of two trusted responders is chosen instead.
+  Then an initiator communicates directly with the chosen responder.
+  If an attacker can determine which responder was chosen then the anonymity of the responder is compromised.
+  Otherwise the protocol successfully protects the identity of a responder.
+
+  The Proverif code treats the public key as synonymous with identity.
+  In the above test when a responder or initiator is chosen what is actually chosen is the public/private key pair to use for communication.
+  Traditionally when a responder or initiator is chosen they would be chosen randomly.
+  The way Proverif makes a "choice" is by simulating multiple processes, one process per choice
+  Then the processes are compared and if an association between a public key and a process can be made the test fails.
+  As the choice is at least as bad as choosing the worst possible option the credibility of the test is maintained.
+  The drawback is that Proverif is only able to tell if the identity can be brute forced but misses any probabilistic associations.
+  As usual Proverif also assumes perfect encryption and in particular assumes encryption cannot be linked to identity.
+
+  One of the tradeoffs made here is that the choice function in Proverif is slow but this is in favour of being able to write more precise tests.
+  Another issue is the choice function does not work with queries so a test needs to be run for each set of assumptions.
+  In this case the test uses secure rng and a fresh secure biscuit key.
+*/
+
+#include "config.mpv"
+
+#define CHAINING_KEY_EVENTS 1
+#define MESSAGE_TRANSMISSION_EVENTS 1
+#define SESSION_START_EVENTS 0
+#define RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS 0
+#undef FULL_MODEL
+#undef SIMPLE_MODEL
+#define SIMPLE_MODEL 1
+
+#include "prelude/basic.mpv"
+#include "crypto/key.mpv"
+#include "rosenpass/oracles.mpv"
+#include "crypto/kem.mpv"
+
+#define NEW_TRUSTED_SEED(name)            \
+  new MCAT(name, _secret_seed):seed_prec; \
+  name <- make_trusted_seed(MCAT(name, _secret_seed)); \
+
+free D:channel [private].
+free secure_biscuit_no:Atom [private].
+free secure_sidi,secure_sidr:SessionId [private].
+free secure_psk:key [private].
+free initiator1, initiator2:kem_sk_prec.
+free responder1, responder2:kem_sk_prec.
+
+let secure_init_hello(initiator: kem_sk_tmpl, sidi : SessionId, psk: key_tmpl, responder: kem_sk_tmpl) =
+
+  new epkit:kem_pk;    // epki
+  new sctrt:bits;      // sctr 
+  new pidiCt:bits;      // pidiC
+  new autht:bits;       // auth
+
+  NEW_TRUSTED_SEED(seski_trusted_seed)
+  NEW_TRUSTED_SEED(ssptr_trusted_seed)
+  new last_cookie:key;
+  new call:Atom;
+
+  Oinitiator_inner(sidi, initiator, psk, responder, seski_trusted_seed, ssptr_trusted_seed, last_cookie, D, call).
+
+let secure_resp_hello(initiator: kem_sk_tmpl, responder: kem_sk_tmpl, sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, psk:key_tmpl) =
+
+  in(D, InitHello(=secure_sidi, epki, sctr, pidiC, auth));
+
+  ih <- InitHello(sidi, epki, sctr, pidiC, auth);
+  NEW_TRUSTED_SEED(septi_trusted_seed)
+  NEW_TRUSTED_SEED(sspti_trusted_seed)
+  new last_cookie:key;
+  new call:Atom;
+
+  Oinit_hello_inner(sidr, biscuit_no, responder, psk, initiator, septi_trusted_seed, sspti_trusted_seed, ih, last_cookie, D, call).
+
+let secure_init_conf(initiator: kem_sk_tmpl, responder: kem_sk_tmpl, psk:key_tmpl, sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId) =
+  in(D,  InitConf(=sidi, =sidr, biscuit, auth3));
+  ic <- InitConf(sidi,sidr,biscuit, auth3);
+  NEW_TRUSTED_SEED(seski_trusted_seed)
+  NEW_TRUSTED_SEED(ssptr_trusted_seed)
+  new last_cookie:key;
+  call <- Cinit_conf(initiator, psk, responder, ic);
+
+  Oinit_conf_inner(initiator, psk, responder, ic, call).
+
+let secure_communication(initiator: kem_sk_tmpl, responder:kem_sk_tmpl, key:key) =
+  key_tmpl <- prepare_key(key);
+  (!secure_init_hello(initiator, secure_sidi, key_tmpl, responder))
+  | !secure_resp_hello(initiator, responder, secure_sidi, secure_sidr, secure_biscuit_no, key_tmpl)
+  | !(secure_init_conf(initiator, responder, key_tmpl, secure_sidi, secure_sidr)).
+
+let participant_communication_initiator(participant:kem_sk_tmpl) =
+  in(C, responder:kem_sk_tmpl);
+  in(C, k:key);
+  secure_communication(participant, responder, k).
+
+let participant_communication_responder(participant:kem_sk_tmpl) =
+  in(C, initiator:kem_sk_tmpl);
+  in(C, k:key);
+  secure_communication(initiator, participant, k).
+
+let participants_communication() =
+  initiator1_tmpl <- make_trusted_kem_sk(initiator1);
+  initiator2_tmpl <- make_trusted_kem_sk(initiator2);
+  responder1_tmpl <- make_trusted_kem_sk(responder1);
+  responder2_tmpl <- make_trusted_kem_sk(responder2);
+
+  !participant_communication_initiator(initiator1_tmpl) | !participant_communication_responder(initiator1_tmpl)
+  | !participant_communication_initiator(initiator2_tmpl) | !participant_communication_responder(initiator2_tmpl)
+  | !participant_communication_initiator(responder1_tmpl) | !participant_communication_responder(responder1_tmpl)
+  | !participant_communication_initiator(responder2_tmpl) | !participant_communication_responder(responder2_tmpl).
+
+let pipeChannel(D:channel, C:channel) =
+  in(D, b:bits);
+  out(C, b).
+
+let secretCommunication() =
+
+#ifdef INITIATOR_TEST
+  initiator_seed <- choice[make_trusted_kem_sk(initiator1), make_trusted_kem_sk(initiator2)];
+#else
+  initiator_seed <- make_trusted_kem_sk(initiator1);
+#endif
+#ifdef RESPONDER_TEST
+  responder_seed <- choice[make_trusted_kem_sk(responder1), make_trusted_kem_sk(responder2)];
+#else
+  responder_seed <- make_trusted_kem_sk(responder1);
+#endif
+
+  secure_communication(initiator_seed, responder_seed, secure_psk) | !pipeChannel(D, C).
+
+let reveal_pks() =
+  out(C, setup_kem_pk(make_trusted_kem_sk(responder1)));
+  out(C, setup_kem_pk(make_trusted_kem_sk(responder2)));
+  out(C, setup_kem_pk(make_trusted_kem_sk(initiator1)));
+  out(C, setup_kem_pk(make_trusted_kem_sk(initiator2))).
+
+let rosenpass_main2() = 
+  REP(INITIATOR_BOUND, Oinitiator)
+  | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_hello)
+  | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_conf).
+
+let identity_hiding_main() = 
+  0 | reveal_pks() | rosenpass_main2() | participants_communication() | phase 1; secretCommunication().
+
+#ifndef CUSTOM_MAIN
+let main = identity_hiding_main.
+#endif 

analysis/rosenpass/cookie.mpv

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+
+fun cookie_key(kem_sk) : key [private].
+fun ip_and_port(kem_pk):bits.
+letfun create_mac2_key(sskm:kem_sk, spkt:kem_pk) = prf(cookie_key(sskm), ip_and_port(spkt)).
+
+letfun create_cookie(sskm:kem_sk, spkm:kem_pk, spkt:kem_pk, nonce:bits, msg:bits) = xaead_enc(lprf2(COOKIE, kem_pk2b(spkm), nonce),
+    k2b(create_mac2_key(sskm, spkm)), msg).
+
+type CookieMsg_t.
+fun CookieMsg(
+  SessionId,	// sender
+  bits, 		// nonce
+  bits			// cookie
+) : CookieMsg_t [data].
+
+
+#define COOKIE_PROCESS(eventLbl, innerFunc)       \
+  in(C, Ccookie(mac1, mac2));	\
+  COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _UnderLoadEV) (spkm, spkt, last_cookie);)	\
+  msgB <- Envelope(mac1, RH2b(rh));	\
+  mac2_key <- create_mac2_key(sskm, spkt)	\
+  let RespHello(sidi, sidr, ecti, scti, biscuit, auth) = rh in \
+  if Envelope(mac2_key, msgB) = mac2 then	\
+    COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieValidated) (spkm, last_cookie);)	\
+    innerFunc	\
+  else	\
+    new nonce:bits;	\
+    cookie <- create_cookie(sskm, spkm, spkt, nonce, msg)	\
+    cookie_msg <- CookieMsg(sidi, nonce, cookie);	\
+    COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieSent) (spkm, cookie, cookie_k, cookie_msg);)	\
+    out(C, cookie_msg).	
+
+#define COOKIE_EVENTS(eventLbl) \
+	COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _UnderLoadEV) (kem_pk, kem_pk, bits).)		\
+	COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieValidated) (kem_pk, bits, key, CookieMsg_t).)		\
+	COOKIE_EV(event MCAT(eventLbl, _CookieSent) (kem_pk, bits).)		

analysis/rosenpass/oracles.mpv

@@ -41,23 +41,32 @@ restriction s:seed, p1:Atom, p2:Atom, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
   event(ConsumeSeed(p1, s, ad1)) && event(ConsumeSeed(p2, s, ad2))
     ==> p1 = p2 && ad1 = ad2.
 
+letfun create_mac2(k:key, msg:bits) = prf(k,msg).
+
 #include "rosenpass/responder.macro"
 fun Cinit_conf(kem_sk_tmpl, key_tmpl, kem_pk_tmpl, InitConf_t) : Atom [data].
 CK_EV(  event OskOinit_conf(key, key). )
 MTX_EV( event ICRjct(InitConf_t, key, kem_sk, kem_pk). )
 SES_EV( event ResponderSession(InitConf_t, key). )
-event ConsumeBiscuit(Atom, kem_sk, kem_pk, Atom).
-let Oinit_conf() = 
-  in(C, Cinit_conf(Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, ic));
-#if RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS
-  new call:Atom;
-#else
-  call <- Cinit_conf(Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, ic);
+KEM_EV(event Oinit_conf_KemUse(SessionId, SessionId, Atom).)
+#ifdef KEM_EVENTS
+  restriction sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
+    event(Oinit_conf_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad1)) && event(Oinit_conf_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad2))
+      ==> ad1 = ad2.
 #endif
+event ConsumeBiscuit(Atom, kem_sk, kem_pk, Atom).
+
+fun Ccookie(key, bits) : Atom[data].
+
+let Oinit_conf_inner(Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t, call:Atom) =
+
   SETUP_HANDSHAKE_STATE()
+
   eski <- kem_sk0;
   epki <- kem_pk0;
   let try_ = (
+    let InitConf(sidi, sidr, biscuit, auth) = ic in 
+    KEM_EV(event Oinit_conf_KemUse(sidi, sidr, call);)
     INITCONF_CONSUME()
     event ConsumeBiscuit(biscuit_no, sskm, spkt, call);
     CK_EV(  event OskOinit_conf(ck_rh, osk); )
@@ -72,11 +81,21 @@ let Oinit_conf() =
     0
 #endif
   ).
+  
+let Oinit_conf() = 
+
+  in(C, Cinit_conf(Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, ic));
+  #if RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS
+    new call:Atom;
+  #else
+    call <- Cinit_conf(Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, ic);
+  #endif
+
+  Oinit_conf_inner(Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, ic, call).
 
 restriction biscuit_no:Atom, sskm:kem_sk, spkr:kem_pk, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
   event(ConsumeBiscuit(biscuit_no, sskm, spkr, ad1)) && event(ConsumeBiscuit(biscuit_no, sskm, spkr, ad2))
     ==> ad1 = ad2.
-
 // TODO: Restriction biscuit no invalidation
 
 #include "rosenpass/initiator.macro"
@@ -85,27 +104,56 @@ CK_EV(  event OskOresp_hello(key, key, key). )
 MTX_EV( event RHRjct(RespHello_t, key, kem_sk, kem_pk). )
 MTX_EV( event ICSent(RespHello_t, InitConf_t, key, kem_sk, kem_pk). )
 SES_EV( event InitiatorSession(RespHello_t, key). )
-let Oresp_hello(HS_DECL_ARGS) =
-  in(C, Cresp_hello(RespHello(sidr, =sidi, ecti, scti, biscuit, auth)));
-  rh <- RespHello(sidr, sidi, ecti, scti, biscuit, auth);
-  /* try */ let ic = (
-    ck_ini <- ck;
-    RESPHELLO_CONSUME()
-    ck_ih <- ck;
-    INITCONF_PRODUCE()
-    CK_EV (event OskOresp_hello(ck_ini, ck_ih, osk); ) // TODO: Queries testing that there is no duplication
-    MTX_EV( event ICSent(rh, ic, psk, sski, spkr); )
-    SES_EV( event InitiatorSession(rh, osk); )
-    ic
-  /* success */ ) in (
-    out(C, ic)
-  /* fail */ ) else (
-#if MESSAGE_TRANSMISSION_EVENTS
-    event RHRjct(rh, psk, sski, spkr)
-#else
-    0
+
+KEM_EV(event Oresp_hello_KemUse(SessionId, SessionId, Atom).)
+#ifdef KEM_EVENTS
+restriction sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
+  event(Oresp_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad1)) && event(Oresp_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad2))
+    ==> ad1 = ad2.
+#endif
+
+#ifdef COOKIE_EVENTS
+COOKIE_EVENTS(Oresp_hello)
+#endif
+let Oresp_hello(HS_DECL_ARGS, C_in:channel, call:Atom) =
+  in(C_in, Cresp_hello(RespHello(sidr, =sidi, ecti, scti, biscuit, auth)));
+  in(C_in, mac2_key:key);
+  rh <- RespHello(sidr, sidi, ecti, scti, biscuit, auth);
+  #ifdef COOKIE_EVENTS
+    msg <- RH2b(rh);
+
+    COOKIE_PROCESS(Oresp_hello,
+  #endif
+    /* try */ let ic = (
+      ck_ini <- ck;
+      KEM_EV(event Oresp_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, call);)
+      RESPHELLO_CONSUME()
+      ck_ih <- ck;
+      INITCONF_PRODUCE()
+      CK_EV (event OskOresp_hello(ck_ini, ck_ih, osk); ) // TODO: Queries testing that there is no duplication
+      MTX_EV( event ICSent(rh, ic, psk, sski, spkr); )
+      SES_EV( event InitiatorSession(rh, osk); )
+      ic
+    /* success */ ) in (
+      icbits <- IC2b(ic);
+      mac <- create_mac(spkt, icbits);
+      mac2 <- create_mac2(mac2_key, mac_envelope2b(mac));
+      out(C_in, ic);
+      out(C_in, mac);
+      out(C_in, mac2)
+
+    /* fail */ ) else (
+  #if MESSAGE_TRANSMISSION_EVENTS
+      event RHRjct(rh, psk, sski, spkr)
+  #else
+      0
+  #endif
+    )
+#ifdef COOKIE_EVENTS
+  )
+#else
+  .
 #endif
-  ).
 
 // TODO: Restriction: Biscuit no invalidation
 
@@ -116,24 +164,33 @@ MTX_EV( event IHRjct(InitHello_t, key, kem_sk, kem_pk). )
 MTX_EV( event RHSent(InitHello_t, RespHello_t, key, kem_sk, kem_pk). )
 event ConsumeSidr(SessionId, Atom).
 event ConsumeBn(Atom, kem_sk, kem_pk, Atom).
-let Oinit_hello() = 
-  in(C, Cinit_hello(sidr, biscuit_no, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Septi, Sspti, ih));
-#if RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS
-  new call:Atom;
-#else
-  call <- Cinit_hello(sidr, biscuit_no, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Septi, Sspti, ih);
+KEM_EV(event Oinit_hello_KemUse(SessionId, SessionId, Atom).)
+
+#ifdef KEM_EVENTS
+restriction sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
+  event(Oinit_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad1)) && event(Oinit_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad2))
+    ==> ad1 = ad2.
 #endif
+
+let Oinit_hello_inner(sidm:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt: kem_sk_tmpl, Septi: seed_tmpl, Sspti: seed_tmpl, ih: InitHello_t, mac2_key:key, C_out:channel, call:Atom) = 
   // TODO: This is ugly
   let InitHello(sidi, epki, sctr, pidiC, auth) = ih in
+
   SETUP_HANDSHAKE_STATE()
+
   eski <- kem_sk0;
-  epti <- rng_key(setup_seed(Septi)); // RHR4
-  spti <- rng_key(setup_seed(Sspti)); // RHR5
+
   event ConsumeBn(biscuit_no, sskm, spkt, call);
   event ConsumeSidr(sidr, call);
+
+  epti <- rng_key(setup_seed(Septi)); // RHR4
+  spti <- rng_key(setup_seed(Sspti)); // RHR5
   event ConsumeSeed(Epti, setup_seed(Septi), call);
   event ConsumeSeed(Spti, setup_seed(Sspti), call);
+  // out(C_out, spkt);
+
   let rh = (
+    KEM_EV(event Oinit_hello_KemUse(sidi, sidr, call);)
     INITHELLO_CONSUME()
     ck_ini <- ck;
     RESPHELLO_PRODUCE()
@@ -141,7 +198,14 @@ let Oinit_hello() =
     MTX_EV( event RHSent(ih, rh, psk, sskr, spki); )
     rh
   /* success */ ) in (
-    out(C, rh)
+    rhbits <- RH2b(rh);
+    mac <- create_mac(spkt, rhbits);
+    
+    out(C_out, rh);
+    out(C_out, mac);
+    mac2 <- create_mac2(mac2_key, mac_envelope2b(mac));
+    out(C_out, mac2)
+
   /* fail */ ) else (
 #if MESSAGE_TRANSMISSION_EVENTS
     event IHRjct(ih, psk, sskr, spki)
@@ -150,6 +214,18 @@ let Oinit_hello() =
 #endif
   ).
 
+let Oinit_hello() = 
+  in(C, Cinit_hello(sidr, biscuit_no, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Septi, Sspti, ih));
+  in(C, mac2_key:key);
+
+  #if RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS
+    new call:Atom;
+  #else
+    call <- Cinit_hello(sidr, biscuit_no, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Septi, Sspti, ih);
+  #endif
+
+  Oinit_hello_inner(sidr, biscuit_no, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Septi, Sspti, ih, mac2_key, C, call).
+
 restriction sid:SessionId, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
   event(ConsumeSidr(sid, ad1)) && event(ConsumeSidr(sid, ad2))
     ==> ad1 = ad2.
@@ -166,27 +242,55 @@ fun Cinitiator(SessionId, kem_sk_tmpl, key_tmpl, kem_pk_tmpl, seed_tmpl, seed_tm
 CK_EV( event OskOinitiator_ck(key). )
 CK_EV( event OskOinitiator(key, key, kem_sk, kem_pk, key). )
 MTX_EV( event IHSent(InitHello_t, key, kem_sk, kem_pk). )
-event ConsumeSidi(SessionId, Atom).
-let Oinitiator() =
-  in(C, Cinitiator(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Seski, Ssptr));
-#if RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS
-  new call:Atom;
-#else
-  call <- Cinitiator(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Seski, Ssptr);
+KEM_EV(event Oinitiator_inner_KemUse(SessionId, SessionId, Atom).)
+
+#ifdef KEM_EVENTS
+restriction sidi:SessionId, sidr:SessionId, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
+  event(Oinitiator_inner_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad1)) && event(Oinitiator_inner_KemUse(sidi, sidr, ad2))
+    ==> ad1 = ad2.
 #endif
-  SETUP_HANDSHAKE_STATE()
-  RNG_KEM_PAIR(eski, epki, Seski) // IHI3
-  sidr <- sid0;
-  sptr <- rng_key(setup_seed(Ssptr)); // IHI5
-  event ConsumeSidi(sidi, call);
-  event ConsumeSeed(Sptr, setup_seed(Ssptr), call);
-  event ConsumeSeed(Eski, setup_seed(Seski), call);
-  INITHELLO_PRODUCE()
-  CK_EV( event OskOinitiator_ck(ck); ) 
-  CK_EV( event OskOinitiator(ck, psk, sski, spkr, sptr); )
-  MTX_EV( event IHSent(ih, psk, sski, spkr); )
-  out(C, ih);
-  Oresp_hello(HS_PASS_ARGS).
+event ConsumeSidi(SessionId, Atom).
+
+let Oinitiator_inner(sidi: SessionId, Ssskm: kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk: key_tmpl, Sspkt: kem_sk_tmpl, Seski: seed_tmpl, Ssptr: seed_tmpl, last_cookie:key, C_out:channel, call:Atom) =
+
+    SETUP_HANDSHAKE_STATE()
+    sidr <- sid0;
+
+    KEM_EV(event Oinitiator_inner_KemUse(sidi, sidr, call);)
+
+    RNG_KEM_PAIR(eski, epki, Seski) // IHI3
+    sptr <- rng_key(setup_seed(Ssptr)); // IHI5
+    event ConsumeSidi(sidi, call);
+    event ConsumeSeed(Sptr, setup_seed(Ssptr), call);
+    event ConsumeSeed(Eski, setup_seed(Seski), call);
+
+    INITHELLO_PRODUCE()
+    CK_EV( event OskOinitiator_ck(ck); ) 
+    CK_EV( event OskOinitiator(ck, psk, sski, spkr, sptr); )
+    MTX_EV( event IHSent(ih, psk, sski, spkr); )
+  
+    out(C_out, ih);
+    ihbits <- IH2b(ih);
+    mac <- create_mac(spkt, ihbits);
+    out(C_out, mac);
+    mac2 <- create_mac2(last_cookie, mac_envelope2b(mac));
+    out(C_out, mac2);
+
+    Oresp_hello(HS_PASS_ARGS, C_out, call).
+
+let Oinitiator() =
+
+  in(C, Cinitiator(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Seski, Ssptr));
+
+  #if RANDOMIZED_CALL_IDS
+    new call:Atom;
+  #else
+    call <- Cinitiator(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Seski, Ssptr);
+  #endif
+
+  in(C, last_cookie:key);
+  Oinitiator_inner(sidi, Ssskm, Spsk, Sspkt, Seski, Ssptr, last_cookie, C, call).
+
 
 restriction sid:SessionId, ad1:Atom, ad2:Atom;
   event(ConsumeSidi(sid, ad1)) && event(ConsumeSidi(sid, ad2))
@@ -207,21 +311,3 @@ let rosenpass_main() = 0
   | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_hello)
   | REP(RESPONDER_BOUND, Oinit_conf).
 
-nounif v:seed_prec;   attacker(prepare_seed(trusted_seed( v )))/6217[hypothesis].
-nounif v:seed;        attacker(prepare_seed( v ))/6216[hypothesis].
-nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_kem_sk( v ))/6215[hypothesis].
-nounif v:seed;        attacker(rng_key( v ))/6214[hypothesis].
-nounif v:key_prec;    attacker(prepare_key(trusted_key( v )))/6213[hypothesis].
-nounif v:kem_sk_prec; attacker(prepare_kem_sk(trusted_kem_sk( v )))/6212[hypothesis].
-nounif v:key;         attacker(prepare_key( v ))/6211[hypothesis].
-nounif v:kem_sk;      attacker(prepare_kem_sk( v ))/6210[hypothesis].
-nounif Spk:kem_sk_tmpl;
-  attacker(Creveal_kem_pk(Spk))/6110[conclusion].
-nounif sid:SessionId, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Seski:seed_tmpl, Ssptr:seed_tmpl;
-  attacker(Cinitiator( *sid, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Seski, *Ssptr ))/6109[conclusion].
-nounif sid:SessionId, biscuit_no:Atom, Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, Septi:seed_tmpl, Sspti:seed_tmpl, ih:InitHello_t;
-  attacker(Cinit_hello( *sid, *biscuit_no, *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *Septi, *Sspti, *ih ))/6108[conclusion].
-nounif rh:RespHello_t;
-  attacker(Cresp_hello( *rh ))/6107[conclusion].
-nounif Ssskm:kem_sk_tmpl, Spsk:key_tmpl, Sspkt:kem_sk_tmpl, ic:InitConf_t;
-  attacker(Cinit_conf( *Ssskm, *Spsk, *Sspkt, *ic ))/6106[conclusion].

analysis/rosenpass/protocol.mpv

@@ -2,6 +2,26 @@
 #include "crypto/kem.mpv"
 #include "rosenpass/handshake_state.mpv"
 
+fun Envelope(
+  key,
+  bits
+): bits [data].
+
+type mac_envelope_t.
+fun mac_envelope(
+  key,
+  bits
+) : mac_envelope_t.
+
+fun mac_envelope2b(mac_envelope_t) : bits [typeConverter].
+
+letfun create_mac(pk:kem_pk, payload:bits) = mac_envelope(lprf2(MAC, kem_pk2b(pk), payload), payload).
+
+fun mac_envelope_pk_test(mac_envelope_t, kem_pk) : bool
+  reduc forall pk:kem_pk, b:bits;
+    mac_envelope_pk_test(mac_envelope(prf(prf(prf(prf(key0,PROTOCOL),MAC),kem_pk2b(pk)),
+        b), b), pk) = true.
+
 type InitHello_t.
 fun InitHello(
   SessionId, // sidi
@@ -11,6 +31,8 @@ fun InitHello(
   bits       // auth
 ) : InitHello_t [data].
 
+fun IH2b(InitHello_t) : bitstring [typeConverter].
+
 #define INITHELLO_PRODUCE()       \
   ck <- lprf1(CK_INIT, kem_pk2b(spkr)); /* IHI1 */ \
   /* not handled here */                /* IHI2 */ \
@@ -41,7 +63,9 @@ fun RespHello(
     bits       // auth
 ) : RespHello_t [data].
 
-#define RESPHELLO_PRODUCE()                   \
+fun RH2b(RespHello_t) : bitstring [typeConverter].
+
+#define RESPHELLO_PRODUCE()  \
   /* not handled here */           /* RHR1 */ \
   MIX2(sid2b(sidr), sid2b(sidi))   /* RHR3 */ \
   ENCAPS_AND_MIX(ecti, epki, epti) /* RHR4 */ \
@@ -67,13 +91,14 @@ fun InitConf(
     bits       // auth
 ) : InitConf_t [data].
 
+fun IC2b(InitConf_t) : bitstring [typeConverter].
+
 #define INITCONF_PRODUCE()                  \
   MIX2(sid2b(sidi), sid2b(sidr)) /* ICI3 */ \
   ENCRYPT_AND_MIX(auth, empty)   /* ICI4 */ \
   ic <- InitConf(sidi, sidr, biscuit, auth);
 
 #define INITCONF_CONSUME()                        \
-  let InitConf(sidi, sidr, biscuit, auth) = ic in \
   LOAD_BISCUIT(biscuit_no, biscuit)   /* ICR1 */    \
   ENCRYPT_AND_MIX(rh_auth, empty)     /* ICIR */    \
   ck_rh <- ck;                        /* ---- */ /* TODO: Move into oracles.mpv */ \

ciphers/Cargo.toml

@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ readme = "readme.md"
 
 [dependencies]
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-constant-time = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-secret-memory = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-oqs = { workspace = true }
+rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
 static_assertions = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true }
+chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }
+blake2 = { workspace = true }

ciphers/src/lib.rs

@@ -9,14 +9,12 @@ const_assert!(KEY_LEN == hash_domain::KEY_LEN);
 
 /// Authenticated encryption with associated data
 pub mod aead {
-    pub use rosenpass_sodium::aead::chacha20poly1305_ietf::{
-        decrypt, encrypt, KEY_LEN, NONCE_LEN, TAG_LEN,
-    };
+    pub use crate::subtle::chacha20poly1305_ietf::{decrypt, encrypt, KEY_LEN, NONCE_LEN, TAG_LEN};
 }
 
 /// Authenticated encryption with associated data with a constant nonce
 pub mod xaead {
-    pub use rosenpass_sodium::aead::xchacha20poly1305_ietf::{
+    pub use crate::subtle::xchacha20poly1305_ietf::{
         decrypt, encrypt, KEY_LEN, NONCE_LEN, TAG_LEN,
     };
 }

ciphers/src/subtle/blake2b.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+
+use blake2::digest::crypto_common::generic_array::GenericArray;
+use blake2::digest::crypto_common::typenum::U32;
+use blake2::digest::crypto_common::KeySizeUser;
+use blake2::digest::{FixedOutput, Mac, OutputSizeUser};
+use blake2::Blake2bMac;
+
+use rosenpass_to::{ops::copy_slice, with_destination, To};
+use rosenpass_util::typenum2const;
+
+type Impl = Blake2bMac<U32>;
+
+type KeyLen = <Impl as KeySizeUser>::KeySize;
+type OutLen = <Impl as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize;
+
+const KEY_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { KeyLen };
+const OUT_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { OutLen };
+
+pub const KEY_MIN: usize = KEY_LEN;
+pub const KEY_MAX: usize = KEY_LEN;
+pub const OUT_MIN: usize = OUT_LEN;
+pub const OUT_MAX: usize = OUT_LEN;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn hash<'a>(key: &'a [u8], data: &'a [u8]) -> impl To<[u8], anyhow::Result<()>> + 'a {
+    with_destination(|out: &mut [u8]| {
+        let mut h = Impl::new_from_slice(key)?;
+        h.update(data);
+
+        // Jesus christ, blake2 crate, your usage of GenericArray might be nice and fancy
+        // but it introduces a ton of complexity. This cost me half an hour just to figure
+        // out the right way to use the imports while allowing for zeroization.
+        // An API based on slices might actually be simpler.
+        let mut tmp = Zeroizing::new([0u8; OUT_LEN]);
+        let mut tmp = GenericArray::from_mut_slice(tmp.as_mut());
+        h.finalize_into(&mut tmp);
+        copy_slice(tmp.as_ref()).to(out);
+
+        Ok(())
+    })
+}

ciphers/src/subtle/chacha20poly1305_ietf.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+use rosenpass_to::ops::copy_slice;
+use rosenpass_to::To;
+use rosenpass_util::typenum2const;
+
+use chacha20poly1305::aead::generic_array::GenericArray;
+use chacha20poly1305::ChaCha20Poly1305 as AeadImpl;
+use chacha20poly1305::{AeadCore, AeadInPlace, KeyInit, KeySizeUser};
+
+pub const KEY_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { <AeadImpl as KeySizeUser>::KeySize };
+pub const TAG_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { <AeadImpl as AeadCore>::TagSize };
+pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { <AeadImpl as AeadCore>::NonceSize };
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn encrypt(
+    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(nonce);
+    let (ct, mac) = ciphertext.split_at_mut(ciphertext.len() - TAG_LEN);
+    copy_slice(plaintext).to(ct);
+    let mac_value = AeadImpl::new_from_slice(key)?.encrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, ad, ct)?;
+    copy_slice(&mac_value[..]).to(mac);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn decrypt(
+    plaintext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    ciphertext: &[u8],
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(nonce);
+    let (ct, mac) = ciphertext.split_at(ciphertext.len() - TAG_LEN);
+    let tag = GenericArray::from_slice(mac);
+    copy_slice(ct).to(plaintext);
+    AeadImpl::new_from_slice(key)?.decrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, ad, plaintext, tag)?;
+    Ok(())
+}

ciphers/src/subtle/incorrect_hmac_blake2b.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 use anyhow::ensure;
-use rosenpass_constant_time::xor;
-use rosenpass_sodium::hash::blake2b;
-use rosenpass_to::{ops::copy_slice, with_destination, To};
 use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 
+use rosenpass_constant_time::xor;
+use rosenpass_to::{ops::copy_slice, with_destination, To};
+
+use crate::subtle::blake2b;
+
 pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
 pub const KEY_MIN: usize = KEY_LEN;
 pub const KEY_MAX: usize = KEY_LEN;

ciphers/src/subtle/mod.rs

@@ -1 +1,4 @@
+pub mod blake2b;
+pub mod chacha20poly1305_ietf;
 pub mod incorrect_hmac_blake2b;
+pub mod xchacha20poly1305_ietf;

ciphers/src/subtle/xchacha20poly1305_ietf.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+use rosenpass_to::ops::copy_slice;
+use rosenpass_to::To;
+use rosenpass_util::typenum2const;
+
+use chacha20poly1305::aead::generic_array::GenericArray;
+use chacha20poly1305::XChaCha20Poly1305 as AeadImpl;
+use chacha20poly1305::{AeadCore, AeadInPlace, KeyInit, KeySizeUser};
+
+pub const KEY_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { <AeadImpl as KeySizeUser>::KeySize };
+pub const TAG_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { <AeadImpl as AeadCore>::TagSize };
+pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = typenum2const! { <AeadImpl as AeadCore>::NonceSize };
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn encrypt(
+    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(nonce);
+    let (n, ct_mac) = ciphertext.split_at_mut(NONCE_LEN);
+    let (ct, mac) = ct_mac.split_at_mut(ct_mac.len() - TAG_LEN);
+    copy_slice(nonce).to(n);
+    copy_slice(plaintext).to(ct);
+    let mac_value = AeadImpl::new_from_slice(key)?.encrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, ad, ct)?;
+    copy_slice(&mac_value[..]).to(mac);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn decrypt(
+    plaintext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    ciphertext: &[u8],
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let (n, ct_mac) = ciphertext.split_at(NONCE_LEN);
+    let (ct, mac) = ct_mac.split_at(ct_mac.len() - TAG_LEN);
+    let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(n);
+    let tag = GenericArray::from_slice(mac);
+    copy_slice(ct).to(plaintext);
+    AeadImpl::new_from_slice(key)?.decrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, ad, plaintext, tag)?;
+    Ok(())
+}

constant-time/Cargo.toml

@@ -11,5 +11,12 @@ readme = "readme.md"
 
 # See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
 
+[features]
+constant_time_tests = []
+
 [dependencies]
 rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
+memsec = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+rand = "0.8.5"

constant-time/src/compare.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/// Compares two slices of memory containing arbitrary-length little endian unsigned integers
+/// and returns an integer indicating the relationship between the slices.
+///
+/// ## Returns
+///
+/// - -1 if a < b
+/// - 0 if a = b
+/// - 1 if a > b
+///
+/// ## Leaks
+/// If the two slices have differents lengths, the function will return immediately. This
+/// effectively leaks the information whether the slices have equal length or not. This is widely
+/// considered safe.
+///
+/// The execution time of the function grows approx. linear with the length of the input. This is
+/// considered safe.
+///
+/// ## Tests
+///
+/// ```rust
+/// use rosenpass_constant_time::compare;
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[], &[]),    0);
+///
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[0], &[1]), -1);
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[0], &[0]), 0);
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[1], &[0]), 1);
+///
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[0, 0], &[1, 0]), -1);
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[0, 0], &[0, 0]), 0);
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[1, 0], &[0, 0]), 1);
+///
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[1, 0], &[0, 1]), -1);
+/// assert_eq!(compare(&[0, 1], &[0, 0]), 1);
+/// ```
+///
+/// For discussion on how to ensure the constant-time execution of this function, see
+/// <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/232>
+#[inline]
+pub fn compare(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> i32 {
+    assert!(a.len() == b.len());
+    unsafe { memsec::memcmp(a.as_ptr(), b.as_ptr(), a.len()) }
+}

constant-time/src/increment.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+use core::hint::black_box;
+
+/// Interpret the given slice as a little-endian unsigned integer
+/// and increment that integer.
+///
+/// # Leaks
+/// TODO: mention here if this function leaks any information, see
+/// <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/232>
+///
+/// ## Tests
+/// For discussion on how to ensure the constant-time execution of this function, see
+/// <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/232>
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// use rosenpass_constant_time::increment as inc;
+/// use rosenpass_to::To;
+///
+/// fn testcase(v: &[u8], correct: &[u8]) {
+///   let mut v = v.to_owned();
+///   inc(&mut v);
+///   assert_eq!(&v, correct);
+/// }
+///
+/// testcase(b"", b"");
+/// testcase(b"\x00", b"\x01");
+/// testcase(b"\x01", b"\x02");
+/// testcase(b"\xfe", b"\xff");
+/// testcase(b"\xff", b"\x00");
+/// testcase(b"\x00\x00", b"\x01\x00");
+/// testcase(b"\x01\x00", b"\x02\x00");
+/// testcase(b"\xfe\x00", b"\xff\x00");
+/// testcase(b"\xff\x00", b"\x00\x01");
+/// testcase(b"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", b"\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00");
+/// testcase(b"\x00\xa3\x00\x77\x00\x00", b"\x01\xa3\x00\x77\x00\x00");
+/// testcase(b"\xff\xa3\x00\x77\x00\x00", b"\x00\xa4\x00\x77\x00\x00");
+/// testcase(b"\xff\xff\xff\x77\x00\x00", b"\x00\x00\x00\x78\x00\x00");
+/// ```
+#[inline]
+pub fn increment(v: &mut [u8]) {
+    let mut carry = 1u8;
+    for val in v.iter_mut() {
+        let (v, c) = black_box(*val).overflowing_add(black_box(carry));
+        *black_box(val) = v;
+        *black_box(&mut carry) = black_box(black_box(c) as u8);
+    }
+}

constant-time/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,26 +1,17 @@
-use rosenpass_to::{with_destination, To};
+//! constant-time implementations of some primitives
+//!
+//! Rosenpass internal library providing basic constant-time operations.
+//!
+//! ## TODO
+//! Figure out methodology to ensure that code is actually constant time, see
+//! <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/232>
 
-/// Xors the source into the destination
-///
-/// # Examples
-///
-/// ```
-/// use rosenpass_constant_time::xor;
-/// use rosenpass_to::To;
-/// assert_eq!(
-///     xor(b"world").to_this(|| b"hello".to_vec()),
-///     b"\x1f\n\x1e\x00\x0b");
-/// ```
-///
-/// # Panics
-///
-/// If source and destination are of different sizes.
-#[inline]
-pub fn xor<'a>(src: &'a [u8]) -> impl To<[u8], ()> + 'a {
-    with_destination(|dst: &mut [u8]| {
-        assert!(src.len() == dst.len());
-        for (dv, sv) in dst.iter_mut().zip(src.iter()) {
-            *dv ^= *sv;
-        }
-    })
-}
+mod compare;
+mod increment;
+mod memcmp;
+mod xor;
+
+pub use compare::compare;
+pub use increment::increment;
+pub use memcmp::memcmp;
+pub use xor::xor;

constant-time/src/memcmp.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/// compares two sclices of memory content and returns whether they are equal
+///
+/// ## Leaks
+/// If the two slices have differents lengths, the function will return immediately. This
+/// effectively leaks the information whether the slices have equal length or not. This is widely
+/// considered safe.
+///
+/// The execution time of the function grows approx. linear with the length of the input. This is
+/// considered safe.
+///
+/// ## Tests
+/// [`tests::memcmp_runs_in_constant_time`] runs a stasticial test that the equality of the two
+/// input parameters does not correlate with the run time.
+///
+/// For discussion on how to (further) ensure the constant-time execution of this function,
+/// see <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/232>
+#[inline]
+pub fn memcmp(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    a.len() == b.len()
+        && unsafe { memsec::memeq(a.as_ptr() as *const u8, b.as_ptr() as *const u8, a.len()) }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(test, feature = "constant_time_tests"))]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use rand::seq::SliceRandom;
+    use rand::thread_rng;
+    use std::time::Instant;
+
+    #[test]
+    /// tests whether [memcmp] actually runs in constant time
+    ///
+    /// This test function will run an equal amount of comparisons on two different sets of parameters:
+    /// - completely equal slices
+    /// - completely unequal slices.
+    /// All comparisons are executed in a randomized order. The test will fail if one of the
+    /// two sets is checked for equality significantly faster than the other set
+    /// (absolute correlation coefficient ≥ 0.01)
+    fn memcmp_runs_in_constant_time() {
+        // prepare data to compare
+        let n: usize = 1E6 as usize; // number of comparisons to run
+        let len = 1024; // length of each slice passed as parameters to the tested comparison function
+        let a1 = "a".repeat(len);
+        let a2 = a1.clone();
+        let b = "b".repeat(len);
+
+        let a1 = a1.as_bytes();
+        let a2 = a2.as_bytes();
+        let b = b.as_bytes();
+
+        // vector representing all timing tests
+        //
+        // Each element is a tuple of:
+        // 0: whether the test compared two equal slices
+        // 1: the duration needed for the comparison to run
+        let mut tests = (0..n)
+            .map(|i| (i < n / 2, std::time::Duration::ZERO))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        tests.shuffle(&mut thread_rng());
+
+        // run comparisons / call function to test
+        for test in tests.iter_mut() {
+            let now = Instant::now();
+            if test.0 {
+                memcmp(a1, a2);
+            } else {
+                memcmp(a1, b);
+            }
+            test.1 = now.elapsed();
+            // println!("eq: {}, elapsed: {:.2?}", test.0, test.1);
+        }
+
+        // sort by execution time and calculate Pearson correlation coefficient
+        tests.sort_by_key(|v| v.1);
+        let tests = tests
+            .iter()
+            .map(|t| (if t.0 { 1_f64 } else { 0_f64 }, t.1.as_nanos() as f64))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        // averages
+        let (avg_x, avg_y): (f64, f64) = (
+            tests.iter().map(|t| t.0).sum::<f64>() / n as f64,
+            tests.iter().map(|t| t.1).sum::<f64>() / n as f64,
+        );
+        assert!((avg_x - 0.5).abs() < 1E-12);
+        // standard deviations
+        let sd_x = 0.5;
+        let sd_y = (1_f64 / n as f64
+            * tests
+                .iter()
+                .map(|t| {
+                    let difference = t.1 - avg_y;
+                    difference * difference
+                })
+                .sum::<f64>())
+        .sqrt();
+        // covariance
+        let cv = 1_f64 / n as f64
+            * tests
+                .iter()
+                .map(|t| (t.0 - avg_x) * (t.1 - avg_y))
+                .sum::<f64>();
+        // Pearson correlation
+        let correlation = cv / (sd_x * sd_y);
+        println!("correlation: {:.6?}", correlation);
+        assert!(
+            correlation.abs() < 0.01,
+            "execution time correlates with result"
+        )
+    }
+}

constant-time/src/xor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+use core::hint::black_box;
+use rosenpass_to::{with_destination, To};
+
+/// Xors the source into the destination
+///
+/// # Panics
+/// If source and destination are of different sizes.
+///
+/// # Leaks
+/// TODO: mention here if this function leaks any information, see
+/// <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/232>
+///
+/// ## Tests
+/// For discussion on how to ensure the constant-time execution of this function, see
+/// <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/232>
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// use rosenpass_constant_time::xor;
+/// use rosenpass_to::To;
+/// assert_eq!(
+///     xor(b"world").to_this(|| b"hello".to_vec()),
+///     b"\x1f\n\x1e\x00\x0b");
+/// ```
+#[inline]
+pub fn xor(src: &[u8]) -> impl To<[u8], ()> + '_ {
+    with_destination(|dst: &mut [u8]| {
+        assert!(black_box(src.len()) == black_box(dst.len()));
+        for (dv, sv) in dst.iter_mut().zip(src.iter()) {
+            *black_box(dv) ^= black_box(*sv);
+        }
+    })
+}

doc/rosenpass.1

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ If you are not specifically tasked with developing post-quantum secure systems,
 you probably do not need this tool.
 .Ss COMMANDS
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ar keygen private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path>
+.It Ar gen-keys --secret-key <file-path> --public-key <file-path>
 Generate a keypair to use in the exchange command later.
 Send the public-key file to your communication partner and keep the private-key
 file secret!

flake.nix

@@ -291,7 +291,6 @@
               ];
               buildPhase = ''
                 export HOME=$(mktemp -d)
-                export OSFONTDIR="$(kpsewhich --var-value TEXMF)/fonts/{opentype/public/nunito,truetype/google/noto}"
                 latexmk -r tex/CI.rc
               '';
               installPhase = ''

format_rust_code.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+
+# Parse command line options
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+    case "$1" in
+        --mode)
+            mode="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
+        *)
+            echo "Unknown option: $1"
+            exit 1
+            ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+# Check if mode is specified
+if [ -z "$mode" ]; then
+    echo "Please specify the mode using --mode option. Valid modes are 'check' and 'fix'."
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Find all Markdown files in the current directory and its subdirectories
+mapfile -t md_files < <(find . -type f -name "*.md")
+
+count=0
+# Iterate through each Markdown file
+for file in "${md_files[@]}"; do
+    # Use awk to extract Rust code blocks enclosed within triple backticks
+    rust_code_blocks=$(awk '/```rust/{flag=1; next}/```/{flag=0} flag' "$file")
+
+    # Count the number of Rust code blocks
+    num_fences=$(awk '/```rust/{f=1} f{if(/```/){f=0; count++}} END{print count}' "$file")
+
+    if [ -n "$rust_code_blocks" ]; then
+        echo "Processing Rust code in $file"
+        # Iterate through each Rust code block
+        for ((i=1; i <= num_fences ; i++)); do
+            # Extract individual Rust code block using awk
+            current_rust_block=$(awk -v i="$i" '/```rust/{f=1; if (++count == i) next} f&&/```/{f=0;next} f' "$file")
+            # Variable to check if we have added the main function
+            add_main=0  
+            # Check if the Rust code block is already inside a function
+            if ! echo "$current_rust_block" | grep -q "fn main()"; then
+                # If not, wrap it in a main function
+                current_rust_block=$'fn main() {\n'"$current_rust_block"$'\n}'
+                add_main=1
+            fi
+            if [ "$mode" == "check" ]; then
+                # Apply changes to the Rust code block
+                formatted_rust_code=$(echo "$current_rust_block" | rustfmt)
+                # Use rustfmt to format the Rust code block, remove first and last lines, and remove the first 4 spaces if added  main function
+                if [ "$add_main" == 1 ]; then
+                    formatted_rust_code=$(echo "$formatted_rust_code" | sed '1d;$d' | sed 's/^    //')
+                    current_rust_block=$(echo "$current_rust_block" | sed '1d;')
+                    current_rust_block=$(echo "$current_rust_block" | sed '$d')
+                fi
+                if [ "$formatted_rust_code" == "$current_rust_block" ]; then
+                    echo "No changes needed in Rust code block $i in $file"
+                else
+                    echo -e "\nChanges needed in Rust code block $i in $file:\n"
+                    echo "$formatted_rust_code"
+                    count=+1
+                fi
+
+            elif [ "$mode" == "fix" ]; then
+                # Replace current_rust_block with formatted_rust_code in the file
+                formatted_rust_code=$(echo "$current_rust_block" | rustfmt)
+                # Use rustfmt to format the Rust code block, remove first and last lines, and remove the first 4 spaces if added  main function
+                if [ "$add_main" == 1 ]; then
+                    formatted_rust_code=$(echo "$formatted_rust_code" | sed '1d;$d' | sed 's/^    //')
+                    current_rust_block=$(echo "$current_rust_block" | sed '1d;')
+                    current_rust_block=$(echo "$current_rust_block" | sed '$d')
+                fi
+                # Check if the formatted code is the same as the current Rust code block
+                if [ "$formatted_rust_code" == "$current_rust_block" ]; then
+                    echo "No changes needed in Rust code block $i in $file"
+                else
+                    echo "Formatting Rust code block $i in $file"
+                    # Replace current_rust_block with formatted_rust_code in the file
+                    # Use awk to find the line number of the pattern
+
+                    start_line=$(grep -n "^\`\`\`rust" "$file" | sed -n "${i}p" | cut -d: -f1)
+                    end_line=$(grep -n "^\`\`\`" "$file" | awk -F: -v start_line="$start_line" '$1 > start_line {print $1; exit;}')
+
+                    if [ -n "$start_line" ] && [ -n "$end_line" ]; then
+                        # Print lines before the Rust code block
+                        head -n "$((start_line - 1))" "$file"
+
+                        # Print the formatted Rust code block
+                        echo "\`\`\`rust"
+                        echo "$formatted_rust_code"
+                        echo "\`\`\`"
+
+                        # Print lines after the Rust code block
+                        tail -n +"$((end_line + 1))" "$file"
+                    else
+                        # Rust code block not found or end line not found
+                        cat "$file"
+                    fi > tmpfile && mv tmpfile "$file"
+
+                fi
+            else  
+                echo "Unknown mode: $mode. Valid modes are 'check' and 'fix'."
+                exit 1
+            fi
+        done
+    fi
+done
+
+# CI failure if changes are needed
+if [ $count -gt 0 ]; then
+    echo "CI failed: Changes needed in Rust code blocks."
+    exit 1
+fi

fuzz/Cargo.toml

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ arbitrary = { workspace = true }
 libfuzzer-sys = { workspace = true }
 stacker = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-secret-memory = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-ciphers = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-cipher-traits = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
@@ -49,13 +48,13 @@ test = false
 doc = false
 
 [[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_box_sodium_alloc"
-path = "fuzz_targets/box_sodium_alloc.rs"
+name = "fuzz_box_secret_alloc"
+path = "fuzz_targets/box_secret_alloc.rs"
 test = false
 doc = false
 
 [[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_vec_sodium_alloc"
-path = "fuzz_targets/vec_sodium_alloc.rs"
+name = "fuzz_vec_secret_alloc"
+path = "fuzz_targets/vec_secret_alloc.rs"
 test = false
 doc = false

fuzz/fuzz_targets/aead_enc_into.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ extern crate rosenpass;
 use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
 
 use rosenpass_ciphers::aead;
-use rosenpass_sodium::init as sodium_init;
 
 #[derive(arbitrary::Arbitrary, Debug)]
 pub struct Input {
@@ -16,8 +15,6 @@ pub struct Input {
 }
 
 fuzz_target!(|input: Input| {
-    sodium_init().unwrap();
-
     let mut ciphertext: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(input.plaintext.len() + 16);
     ciphertext.resize(input.plaintext.len() + 16, 0);
 

fuzz/fuzz_targets/blake2b.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ extern crate rosenpass;
 
 use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
 
-use rosenpass_sodium::{hash::blake2b, init as sodium_init};
+use rosenpass_ciphers::subtle::blake2b;
 use rosenpass_to::To;
 
 #[derive(arbitrary::Arbitrary, Debug)]
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ pub struct Blake2b {
 }
 
 fuzz_target!(|input: Blake2b| {
-    sodium_init().unwrap();
-
     let mut out = [0u8; 32];
 
     blake2b::hash(&input.key, &input.data).to(&mut out).unwrap();

fuzz/fuzz_targets/box_secret_alloc.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+use rosenpass_secret_memory::alloc::secret_box;
+
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+    let _ = secret_box(data);
+});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/box_sodium_alloc.rs

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-use rosenpass_sodium::{
-    alloc::{Alloc as SodiumAlloc, Box as SodiumBox},
-    init,
-};
-
-fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
-    let _ = init();
-    let _ = SodiumBox::new_in(data, SodiumAlloc::new());
-});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/handle_msg.rs

@@ -5,11 +5,8 @@ use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
 
 use rosenpass::protocol::CryptoServer;
 use rosenpass_secret_memory::Secret;
-use rosenpass_sodium::init as sodium_init;
 
 fuzz_target!(|rx_buf: &[u8]| {
-    sodium_init().unwrap();
-
     let sk = Secret::from_slice(&[0; 13568]);
     let pk = Secret::from_slice(&[0; 524160]);
 

fuzz/fuzz_targets/vec_secret_alloc.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+use rosenpass_secret_memory::alloc::secret_vec;
+
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+    let mut vec = secret_vec();
+    vec.extend_from_slice(data);
+});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/vec_sodium_alloc.rs

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-use rosenpass_sodium::{
-    alloc::{Alloc as SodiumAlloc, Vec as SodiumVec},
-    init,
-};
-
-fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
-    let _ = init();
-    let mut vec = SodiumVec::new_in(SodiumAlloc::new());
-    vec.extend_from_slice(data);
-});

lenses/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-lenses"
-version = "0.1.0"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal library for parsing binary data securely"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
-
-[dependencies]
-paste = { workspace = true }
-thiserror = { workspace = true }

lenses/readme.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass internal binary parsing library
-
-This is an internal library; no guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

lenses/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
-use std::result::Result;
-
-/// Common trait shared by all Lenses
-pub trait LenseView {
-    const LEN: usize;
-}
-
-/// Error during lense creation
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Clone)]
-pub enum LenseError {
-    #[error("buffer size mismatch")]
-    BufferSizeMismatch,
-}
-
-pub type LenseResult<T> = Result<T, LenseError>;
-
-impl LenseError {
-    pub fn ensure_exact_buffer_size(len: usize, required: usize) -> LenseResult<()> {
-        (len == required)
-            .then_some(())
-            .ok_or(LenseError::BufferSizeMismatch)
-    }
-
-    pub fn ensure_sufficient_buffer_size(len: usize, required: usize) -> LenseResult<()> {
-        (len >= required)
-            .then_some(())
-            .ok_or(LenseError::BufferSizeMismatch)
-    }
-}
-
-/// A macro to create data lenses.
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! lense(
-    // prefix          @ offset       ; optional meta    ; field name   : field length, ...
-    (token_muncher_ref @ $offset:expr ; $( $attr:meta )* ; $field:ident : $len:expr $(, $( $tail:tt )+ )?) =>  {
-        ::paste::paste!{
-
-        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
-        $( #[ $attr ] )*
-        ///
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
-        /// bytes long
-        pub fn $field(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-            &self.0[$offset .. $offset + $len]
-        }
-
-        /// The bytes until the
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link Self::$field)]
-        /// field
-        pub fn [< until_ $field >](&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-            &self.0[0 .. $offset]
-        }
-
-        // if the tail exits, consume it as well
-        $(
-        lense!{token_muncher_ref @ $offset + $len ; $( $tail )+ }
-        )?
-        }
-    };
-
-    // prefix          @ offset       ; optional meta    ; field name   : field length, ...
-    (token_muncher_mut @ $offset:expr ; $( $attr:meta )* ; $field:ident : $len:expr $(, $( $tail:tt )+ )?) =>  {
-        ::paste::paste!{
-
-        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
-        $( #[ $attr ] )*
-        ///
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
-        /// bytes long
-        pub fn [< $field _mut >](&mut self) -> &mut __ContainerType::Output {
-            &mut self.0[$offset .. $offset + $len]
-        }
-
-        // if the tail exits, consume it as well
-        $(
-        lense!{token_muncher_mut @ $offset + $len ; $( $tail )+ }
-        )?
-        }
-    };
-
-    // switch that yields literals unchanged, but creates docstring links to
-    // constants
-    // TODO the doc string link doesn't work if $x is taken from a generic,
-    (maybe_docstring_link $x:literal) => (stringify!($x));
-    (maybe_docstring_link $x:expr) => (stringify!([$x]));
-
-    // struct name  < optional generics     >    := optional doc string      field name   : field length, ...
-($type:ident $( < $( $generic:ident ),+ > )? := $( $( #[ $attr:meta ] )* $field:ident : $len:expr ),+) => (::paste::paste!{
-
-        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
-        /// A data lense to manipulate byte slices.
-        ///
-        //// # Fields
-        ///
-        $(
-        /// - `
-        #[doc = stringify!($field)]
-        /// `:
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
-        /// bytes
-        )+
-        pub struct $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? > (
-            __ContainerType,
-            // The phantom data is required, since all generics declared on a
-            // type need to be used on the type.
-            // https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/error_codes/E0392.html
-            $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData<$generic> ),+ )?
-        );
-
-        impl<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )? > $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? >{
-            $(
-            /// Size in bytes of the field `
-            #[doc = !($field)]
-            /// `
-            pub const fn [< $field _len >]() -> usize{
-                $len
-            }
-            )+
-
-            /// Verify that `len` exactly holds [Self]
-            pub fn check_size(len: usize) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult<()> {
-                ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseError::ensure_exact_buffer_size(len, $( $len + )+ 0)
-            }
-        }
-
-        // read-only accessor functions
-        impl<'a, __ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )?> $type<&'a __ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )?>
-        where
-            __ContainerType: std::ops::Index<std::ops::Range<usize>> + ?Sized,
-        {
-            lense!{token_muncher_ref @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
-
-            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
-            pub fn all_bytes(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-                &self.0[0..Self::LEN]
-            }
-        }
-
-        // mutable accessor functions
-        impl<'a, __ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )?> $type<&'a mut __ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )?>
-        where
-            __ContainerType: std::ops::IndexMut<std::ops::Range<usize>> + ?Sized,
-        {
-            lense!{token_muncher_ref @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
-            lense!{token_muncher_mut @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
-
-            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
-            pub fn all_bytes(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-                &self.0[0..Self::LEN]
-            }
-
-            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
-            pub fn all_bytes_mut(&mut self) -> &mut __ContainerType::Output {
-                &mut self.0[0..Self::LEN]
-            }
-        }
-
-        // lense trait, allowing us to know the implementing lenses size
-        impl<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )? > LenseView for $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? >{
-            /// Number of bytes required to store this type in binary format
-            const LEN: usize = $( $len + )+ 0;
-        }
-
-        /// Extension trait to allow checked creation of a lense over
-        /// some byte slice that contains a
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $type)]
-        pub trait [< $type Ext >] {
-            type __ContainerType;
-
-            /// Create a lense to the byte slice
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >>;
-
-            /// Create a lense to the byte slice, automatically truncating oversized buffers
-            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >>;
-        }
-
-        impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a [u8] {
-            type __ContainerType = &'a [u8];
-
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                $type::<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >::check_size(self.len())?;
-                Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
-            }
-
-            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
-                ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseError::ensure_sufficient_buffer_size(self.len(), required_size)?;
-                [< $type Ext >]::[< $type:snake >](&self[..required_size])
-            }
-        }
-
-        impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a mut [u8] {
-            type __ContainerType = &'a mut [u8];
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                $type::<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >::check_size(self.len())?;
-                Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
-            }
-
-            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
-                ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseError::ensure_sufficient_buffer_size(self.len(), required_size)?;
-                [< $type Ext >]::[< $type:snake >](&mut self[..required_size])
-            }
-        }
-    });
-);

rosenpass/Cargo.toml

@@ -16,16 +16,13 @@ harness = false
 [dependencies]
 rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-constant-time = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-ciphers = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-cipher-traits = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-secret-memory = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-lenses = { workspace = true }
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
 static_assertions = { workspace = true }
 memoffset = { workspace = true }
-libsodium-sys-stable = { workspace = true }
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 paste = { workspace = true }
 log = { workspace = true }
@@ -35,6 +32,8 @@ toml = { workspace = true }
 clap = { workspace = true }
 mio = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
+zerocopy = { workspace = true }
+home = { workspace = true }
 
 [build-dependencies]
 anyhow = { workspace = true }

rosenpass/benches/handshake.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
 use anyhow::Result;
-use rosenpass::pqkem::KEM;
-use rosenpass::{
-    pqkem::StaticKEM,
-    protocol::{CryptoServer, HandleMsgResult, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey},
-    sodium::sodium_init,
-};
+use rosenpass::protocol::{CryptoServer, HandleMsgResult, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey};
+
+use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
+use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::StaticKem;
 
 use criterion::{black_box, criterion_group, criterion_main, Criterion};
 
@@ -41,7 +39,7 @@ fn hs(ini: &mut CryptoServer, res: &mut CryptoServer) -> Result<()> {
 
 fn keygen() -> Result<(SSk, SPk)> {
     let (mut sk, mut pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
-    StaticKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
+    StaticKem::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
     Ok((sk, pk))
 }
 
@@ -58,7 +56,6 @@ fn make_server_pair() -> Result<(CryptoServer, CryptoServer)> {
 }
 
 fn criterion_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
-    sodium_init().unwrap();
     let (mut a, mut b) = make_server_pair().unwrap();
     c.bench_function("cca_secret_alloc", |bench| {
         bench.iter(|| {

rosenpass/build.rs

@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ fn generate_man() -> String {
         return man;
     }
 
-    // TODO: Link to online manual here
-    "Cannot render manual page\n".into()
+    "Cannot render manual page. Please visit https://rosenpass.eu/docs/manuals/\n".into()
 }
 
 fn man() {

rosenpass/src/cli.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 use anyhow::{bail, ensure};
-use clap::Parser;
+use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
 use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
 use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::StaticKem;
 use rosenpass_secret_memory::file::StoreSecret;
@@ -12,9 +12,50 @@ use crate::protocol::{SPk, SSk, SymKey};
 
 use super::config;
 
+/// struct holding all CLI arguments for `clap` crate to parse
 #[derive(Parser, Debug)]
 #[command(author, version, about, long_about)]
-pub enum Cli {
+pub struct CliArgs {
+    /// lowest log level to show – log messages at higher levels will be omitted
+    #[arg(long = "log-level", value_name = "LOG_LEVEL", group = "log-level")]
+    log_level: Option<log::LevelFilter>,
+
+    /// show verbose log output – sets log level to "debug"
+    #[arg(short, long, group = "log-level")]
+    verbose: bool,
+
+    /// show no log output – sets log level to "error"
+    #[arg(short, long, group = "log-level")]
+    quiet: bool,
+
+    #[command(subcommand)]
+    pub command: CliCommand,
+}
+
+impl CliArgs {
+    /// returns the log level filter set by CLI args
+    /// returns `None` if the user did not specify any log level filter via CLI
+    ///
+    /// NOTE: the clap feature of ["argument groups"](https://docs.rs/clap/latest/clap/_derive/_tutorial/chapter_3/index.html#argument-relations)
+    /// ensures that the user can not specify more than one of the possible log level arguments.
+    /// Note the `#[arg("group")]` in the [`CliArgs`] struct.
+    pub fn get_log_level(&self) -> Option<log::LevelFilter> {
+        if self.verbose {
+            return Some(log::LevelFilter::Info);
+        }
+        if self.quiet {
+            return Some(log::LevelFilter::Error);
+        }
+        if let Some(level_filter) = self.log_level {
+            return Some(level_filter);
+        }
+        None
+    }
+}
+
+/// represents a command specified via CLI
+#[derive(Subcommand, Debug)]
+pub enum CliCommand {
     /// Start Rosenpass in server mode and carry on with the key exchange
     ///
     /// This will parse the configuration file and perform the key exchange
@@ -87,6 +128,15 @@ pub enum Cli {
         force: bool,
     },
 
+    /// Deprecated - use gen-keys instead
+    #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
+    #[allow(rustdoc::invalid_html_tags)]
+    Keygen {
+        // NOTE yes, the legacy keygen argument initially really accepted "privet-key", not "secret-key"!
+        /// public-key <PATH> private-key <PATH>
+        args: Vec<String>,
+    },
+
     /// Validate a configuration
     Validate { config_files: Vec<PathBuf> },
 
@@ -95,12 +145,14 @@ pub enum Cli {
     Man,
 }
 
-impl Cli {
-    pub fn run() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let cli = Self::parse();
-
-        use Cli::*;
-        match cli {
+impl CliCommand {
+    /// runs the command specified via CLI
+    ///
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - This method consumes the [`CliCommand`] value. It might be wise to use a reference...
+    pub fn run(self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        use CliCommand::*;
+        match self {
             Man => {
                 let man_cmd = std::process::Command::new("man")
                     .args(["1", "rosenpass"])
@@ -119,6 +171,40 @@ impl Cli {
                 config::Rosenpass::example_config().store(config_file)?;
             }
 
+            // Deprecated - use gen-keys instead
+            Keygen { args } => {
+                log::warn!("The 'keygen' command is deprecated. Please use the 'gen-keys' command instead.");
+
+                let mut public_key: Option<PathBuf> = None;
+                let mut secret_key: Option<PathBuf> = None;
+
+                // Manual arg parsing, since clap wants to prefix flags with "--"
+                let mut args = args.into_iter();
+                loop {
+                    match (args.next().as_deref(), args.next()) {
+                        (Some("private-key"), Some(opt)) | (Some("secret-key"), Some(opt)) => {
+                            secret_key = Some(opt.into());
+                        }
+                        (Some("public-key"), Some(opt)) => {
+                            public_key = Some(opt.into());
+                        }
+                        (Some(flag), _) => {
+                            bail!("Unknown option `{}`", flag);
+                        }
+                        (_, _) => break,
+                    };
+                }
+
+                if secret_key.is_none() {
+                    bail!("private-key is required");
+                }
+                if public_key.is_none() {
+                    bail!("public-key is required");
+                }
+
+                generate_and_save_keypair(secret_key.unwrap(), public_key.unwrap())?;
+            }
+
             GenKeys {
                 config_file,
                 public_key,
@@ -160,12 +246,7 @@ impl Cli {
                 }
 
                 // generate the keys and store them in files
-                let mut ssk = crate::protocol::SSk::random();
-                let mut spk = crate::protocol::SPk::random();
-                StaticKem::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
-
-                ssk.store_secret(skf)?;
-                spk.store_secret(pkf)?;
+                generate_and_save_keypair(skf, pkf)?;
             }
 
             ExchangeConfig { config_file } => {
@@ -202,7 +283,7 @@ impl Cli {
                         Ok(config) => {
                             eprintln!("{file:?} is valid TOML and conforms to the expected schema");
                             match config.validate() {
-                                Ok(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} is passed all logical checks"),
+                                Ok(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} has passed all logical checks"),
                                 Err(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} contains logical errors"),
                             }
                         }
@@ -246,3 +327,12 @@ impl Cli {
         srv.event_loop()
     }
 }
+
+/// generate secret and public keys, store in files according to the paths passed as arguments
+fn generate_and_save_keypair(secret_key: PathBuf, public_key: PathBuf) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let mut ssk = crate::protocol::SSk::random();
+    let mut spk = crate::protocol::SPk::random();
+    StaticKem::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
+    ssk.store_secret(secret_key)?;
+    spk.store_secret(public_key)
+}

rosenpass/src/config.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+//! Configuration readable from a config file.
+//!
+//! Rosenpass supports reading its configuration from a TOML file. This module contains a struct
+//! [`Rosenpass`] which holds such a configuration.
+//!
+//! ## TODO
+//! - support `~` in <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/237>
+//! - provide tooling to create config file from shell <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/247>
+
 use std::{
     collections::HashSet,
     fs,
@@ -12,57 +21,123 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct Rosenpass {
+    /// path to the public key file
     pub public_key: PathBuf,
 
+    /// path to the secret key file
     pub secret_key: PathBuf,
 
+    /// list of [`SocketAddr`] to listen on
+    ///
+    /// Examples:
+    /// - `0.0.0.0:123`
     pub listen: Vec<SocketAddr>,
 
+    /// log verbosity
+    ///
+    /// This is subject to change. See [`Verbosity`] for details.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub verbosity: Verbosity,
+
+    /// list of peers
+    ///
+    /// See the [`RosenpassPeer`] type for more information and examples.
     pub peers: Vec<RosenpassPeer>,
 
+    /// path to the file which provided this configuration
+    ///
+    /// This item is of course not read from the TOML but is added by the algorithm that parses
+    /// the config file.
     #[serde(skip)]
     pub config_file_path: PathBuf,
 }
 
+/// ## TODO
+/// - replace this type with [`log::LevelFilter`], also see <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/pull/246>
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub enum Verbosity {
     Quiet,
     Verbose,
 }
 
+/// ## TODO
+/// - examples
+/// - documentation
 #[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct RosenpassPeer {
+    /// path to the public key of the peer
     pub public_key: PathBuf,
+
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - documentation
     pub endpoint: Option<String>,
+
+    /// path to the pre-shared key with the peer
+    ///
+    /// NOTE: this item can be skipped in the config if you do not use a pre-shared key with the peer
     pub pre_shared_key: Option<PathBuf>,
 
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - documentation
     #[serde(default)]
     pub key_out: Option<PathBuf>,
 
-    // TODO make this field only available on binary builds, not on library builds
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - documentation
+    /// - make this field only available on binary builds, not on library builds <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/249>
     #[serde(flatten)]
     pub wg: Option<WireGuard>,
 }
 
+/// ## TODO
+/// - documentation
 #[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct WireGuard {
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - documentation
     pub device: String,
+
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - documentation
     pub peer: String,
 
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - documentation
     #[serde(default)]
     pub extra_params: Vec<String>,
 }
 
 impl Rosenpass {
-    /// Load a config file from a file path
+    /// load configuration from a TOML file
     ///
-    /// no validation is conducted
+    /// NOTE: no validation is conducted, e.g. the paths specified in the configuration are not
+    /// checked whether they even exist.
+    ///
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - consider using a different algorithm to determine home directory – the below one may
+    ///   behave unexpectedly on Windows
     pub fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(p: P) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
+        // read file and deserialize
         let mut config: Self = toml::from_str(&fs::read_to_string(&p)?)?;
 
+        // resolve `~` (see https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/237)
+        use util::resolve_path_with_tilde;
+        resolve_path_with_tilde(&mut config.public_key);
+        resolve_path_with_tilde(&mut config.secret_key);
+        for peer in config.peers.iter_mut() {
+            resolve_path_with_tilde(&mut peer.public_key);
+            if let Some(ref mut psk) = &mut peer.pre_shared_key {
+                resolve_path_with_tilde(psk);
+            }
+            if let Some(ref mut ko) = &mut peer.key_out {
+                resolve_path_with_tilde(ko);
+            }
+        }
+
+        // add path to "self"
         config.config_file_path = p.as_ref().to_owned();
+
+        // return
         Ok(config)
     }
 
@@ -83,18 +158,22 @@ impl Rosenpass {
     }
 
     /// Validate a configuration
+    ///
+    /// ## TODO
+    /// - check that files do not just exist but are also readable
+    /// - warn if neither out_key nor exchange_command of a peer is defined (v.i.)
     pub fn validate(&self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        // check the public-key file exists
+        // check the public key file exists
         ensure!(
             self.public_key.is_file(),
-            "public-key file {:?} does not exist",
+            "could not find public-key file {:?}: no such file",
             self.public_key
         );
 
         // check the secret-key file exists
         ensure!(
             self.secret_key.is_file(),
-            "secret-key file {:?} does not exist",
+            "could not find secret-key file {:?}: no such file",
             self.secret_key
         );
 
@@ -374,7 +453,7 @@ mod test {
     use super::*;
 
     fn split_str(s: &str) -> Vec<String> {
-        s.split(" ").map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
+        s.split(' ').map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -442,3 +521,67 @@ mod test {
         )
     }
 }
+
+pub mod util {
+    use std::path::PathBuf;
+    /// takes a path that can potentially start with a `~` and resolves that `~` to the user's home directory
+    ///
+    /// ## Example
+    /// ```
+    /// use rosenpass::config::util::resolve_path_with_tilde;
+    /// std::env::set_var("HOME","/home/dummy");
+    /// let mut path = std::path::PathBuf::from("~/foo.toml");
+    /// resolve_path_with_tilde(&mut path);
+    /// assert!(path == std::path::PathBuf::from("/home/dummy/foo.toml"));
+    /// ```
+    pub fn resolve_path_with_tilde(path: &mut PathBuf) {
+        if let Some(first_segment) = path.iter().next() {
+            if !path.has_root() && first_segment == "~" {
+                let home_dir = home::home_dir().unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                    log::error!("config file contains \"~\" but can not determine home diretory");
+                    std::process::exit(1);
+                });
+                let orig_path = path.clone();
+                path.clear();
+                path.push(home_dir);
+                for segment in orig_path.iter().skip(1) {
+                    path.push(segment);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    mod test {
+        use super::*;
+        #[test]
+        fn test_resolve_path_with_tilde() {
+            let test = |path_str: &str, resolved: &str| {
+                let mut path = PathBuf::from(path_str);
+                resolve_path_with_tilde(&mut path);
+                assert!(
+                    path == PathBuf::from(resolved),
+                    "Path {:?} has been resolved to {:?} but should have been resolved to {:?}.",
+                    path_str,
+                    path,
+                    resolved
+                );
+            };
+            // set environment because otherwise the test result would depend on the system running this
+            std::env::set_var("USER", "dummy");
+            std::env::set_var("HOME", "/home/dummy");
+
+            // should resolve
+            test("~/foo.toml", "/home/dummy/foo.toml");
+            test("~//foo", "/home/dummy/foo");
+            test("~/../other_user/foo", "/home/dummy/../other_user/foo");
+
+            // should _not_ resolve
+            test("~foo/bar", "~foo/bar");
+            test(".~/foo", ".~/foo");
+            test("/~/foo.toml", "/~/foo.toml");
+            test(r"~\foo", r"~\foo");
+            test(r"C:\~\foo.toml", r"C:\~\foo.toml");
+        }
+    }
+}

rosenpass/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-use rosenpass_lenses::LenseError;
-
 pub mod app_server;
 pub mod cli;
 pub mod config;
@@ -14,11 +12,3 @@ pub enum RosenpassError {
     #[error("invalid message type")]
     InvalidMessageType(u8),
 }
-
-impl From<LenseError> for RosenpassError {
-    fn from(value: LenseError) -> Self {
-        match value {
-            LenseError::BufferSizeMismatch => RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch,
-        }
-    }
-}

rosenpass/src/main.rs

@@ -1,18 +1,32 @@
+use clap::Parser;
 use log::error;
-use rosenpass::cli::Cli;
-use rosenpass_util::attempt;
+use rosenpass::cli::CliArgs;
 use std::process::exit;
 
 /// Catches errors, prints them through the logger, then exits
 pub fn main() {
-    env_logger::init();
+    // parse CLI arguments
+    let args = CliArgs::parse();
 
-    let res = attempt!({
-        rosenpass_sodium::init()?;
-        Cli::run()
-    });
+    // init logging
+    {
+        let mut log_builder = env_logger::Builder::from_default_env(); // sets log level filter from environment (or defaults)
+        if let Some(level) = args.get_log_level() {
+            log::debug!("setting log level to {:?} (set via CLI parameter)", level);
+            log_builder.filter_level(level); // set log level filter from CLI args if available
+        }
+        log_builder.init();
 
-    match res {
+        // // check the effectiveness of the log level filter with the following lines:
+        // use log::{debug, error, info, trace, warn};
+        // trace!("trace dummy");
+        // debug!("debug dummy");
+        // info!("info dummy");
+        // warn!("warn dummy");
+        // error!("error dummy");
+    }
+
+    match args.command.run() {
         Ok(_) => {}
         Err(e) => {
             error!("{e}");

rosenpass/src/msgs.rs

@@ -6,129 +6,108 @@
 //! always serialized instance of the data in question. This is closely related
 //! to the concept of lenses in function programming; more on that here:
 //! [https://sinusoid.es/misc/lager/lenses.pdf](https://sinusoid.es/misc/lager/lenses.pdf)
-//!
-//! # Example
-//!
-//! The following example uses the [`lense` macro](rosenpass_lenses::lense) to create a lense that
-//! might be useful when dealing with UDP headers.
-//!
-//! ```
-//! use rosenpass_lenses::{lense, LenseView};
-//! use rosenpass::RosenpassError;
-//! # fn main() -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-//!
-//! lense! {UdpDatagramHeader :=
-//!     source_port: 2,
-//!     dest_port: 2,
-//!     length: 2,
-//!     checksum: 2
-//! }
-//!
-//! let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
-//!
-//! // read-only lense, no check of size:
-//! let lense = UdpDatagramHeader(&buf);
-//! assert_eq!(lense.checksum(), &[0, 0]);
-//!
-//! // mutable lense, runtime check of size
-//! let mut lense = buf.as_mut().udp_datagram_header()?;
-//! lense.source_port_mut().copy_from_slice(&53u16.to_be_bytes()); // some DNS, anyone?
-//!
-//! // the original buffer is still available
-//! assert_eq!(buf, [0, 53, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
-//!
-//! // read-only lense, runtime check of size
-//! let lense = buf.as_ref().udp_datagram_header()?;
-//! assert_eq!(lense.source_port(), &[0, 53]);
-//! # Ok(())
-//! # }
-//! ```
+//! To achieve this we utilize the zerocopy library.
 
 use super::RosenpassError;
 use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
 use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::{EphemeralKem, StaticKem};
 use rosenpass_ciphers::{aead, xaead, KEY_LEN};
-use rosenpass_lenses::{lense, LenseView};
+use std::mem::size_of;
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes};
 
-// Macro magic ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-
-lense! { Envelope<M> :=
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct Envelope<M: AsBytes + FromBytes> {
     /// [MsgType] of this message
-    msg_type: 1,
+    pub msg_type: u8,
     /// Reserved for future use
-    reserved: 3,
+    pub reserved: [u8; 3],
     /// The actual Paylod
-    payload: M::LEN,
+    pub payload: M,
     /// Message Authentication Code (mac) over all bytes until (exclusive)
     /// `mac` itself
-    mac: 16,
+    pub mac: [u8; 16],
     /// Currently unused, TODO: do something with this
-    cookie: 16
+    pub cookie: [u8; 16],
 }
 
-lense! { InitHello :=
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct InitHello {
     /// Randomly generated connection id
-    sidi: 4,
+    pub sidi: [u8; 4],
     /// Kyber 512 Ephemeral Public Key
-    epki: EphemeralKem::PK_LEN,
+    pub epki: [u8; EphemeralKem::PK_LEN],
     /// Classic McEliece Ciphertext
-    sctr: StaticKem::CT_LEN,
+    pub sctr: [u8; StaticKem::CT_LEN],
     /// Encryped: 16 byte hash of McEliece initiator static key
-    pidic: aead::TAG_LEN + 32,
+    pub pidic: [u8; aead::TAG_LEN + 32],
     /// Encrypted TAI64N Time Stamp (against replay attacks)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN
+    pub auth: [u8; aead::TAG_LEN],
 }
 
-lense! { RespHello :=
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct RespHello {
     /// Randomly generated connection id
-    sidr: 4,
+    pub sidr: [u8; 4],
     /// Copied from InitHello
-    sidi: 4,
+    pub sidi: [u8; 4],
     /// Kyber 512 Ephemeral Ciphertext
-    ecti: EphemeralKem::CT_LEN,
+    pub ecti: [u8; EphemeralKem::CT_LEN],
     /// Classic McEliece Ciphertext
-    scti: StaticKem::CT_LEN,
+    pub scti: [u8; StaticKem::CT_LEN],
     /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN,
+    pub auth: [u8; aead::TAG_LEN],
     /// Responders handshake state in encrypted form
-    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN
+    pub biscuit: [u8; BISCUIT_CT_LEN],
 }
 
-lense! { InitConf :=
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct InitConf {
     /// Copied from InitHello
-    sidi: 4,
+    pub sidi: [u8; 4],
     /// Copied from RespHello
-    sidr: 4,
+    pub sidr: [u8; 4],
     /// Responders handshake state in encrypted form
-    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN,
+    pub biscuit: [u8; BISCUIT_CT_LEN],
     /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN
+    pub auth: [u8; aead::TAG_LEN],
 }
 
-lense! { EmptyData :=
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct EmptyData {
     /// Copied from RespHello
-    sid: 4,
+    pub sid: [u8; 4],
     /// Nonce
-    ctr: 8,
+    pub ctr: [u8; 8],
     /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN
+    pub auth: [u8; aead::TAG_LEN],
 }
 
-lense! { Biscuit :=
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct Biscuit {
     /// H(spki) – Ident ifies the initiator
-    pidi: KEY_LEN,
+    pub pidi: [u8; KEY_LEN],
     /// The biscuit number (replay protection)
-    biscuit_no: 12,
+    pub biscuit_no: [u8; 12],
     /// Chaining key
-    ck: KEY_LEN
+    pub ck: [u8; KEY_LEN],
 }
 
-lense! { DataMsg :=
-    dummy: 4
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct DataMsg {
+    pub dummy: [u8; 4],
 }
 
-lense! { CookieReply :=
-    dummy: 4
+#[repr(packed)]
+#[derive(AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+pub struct CookieReply {
+    pub dummy: [u8; 4],
 }
 
 // Traits /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@@ -178,7 +157,7 @@ impl TryFrom<u8> for MsgType {
 }
 
 /// length in bytes of an unencrypted Biscuit (plain text)
-pub const BISCUIT_PT_LEN: usize = Biscuit::<()>::LEN;
+pub const BISCUIT_PT_LEN: usize = size_of::<Biscuit>();
 
 /// Length in bytes of an encrypted Biscuit (cipher text)
 pub const BISCUIT_CT_LEN: usize = BISCUIT_PT_LEN + xaead::NONCE_LEN + xaead::TAG_LEN;

rosenpass/src/protocol.rs

@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@
 //! };
 //! # fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
 //!
-//! // always initialize libsodium before anything
-//! rosenpass_sodium::init()?;
-//!
 //! // initialize secret and public key for peer a ...
 //! let (mut peer_a_sk, mut peer_a_pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
 //! StaticKem::keygen(peer_a_sk.secret_mut(), peer_a_pk.secret_mut())?;
@@ -68,27 +65,33 @@
 //! # }
 //! ```
 
-use crate::{hash_domains, msgs::*};
-use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
-use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-use rosenpass_ciphers::hash_domain::{SecretHashDomain, SecretHashDomainNamespace};
-use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::{EphemeralKem, StaticKem};
-use rosenpass_ciphers::{aead, xaead, KEY_LEN};
-use rosenpass_lenses::LenseView;
-use rosenpass_secret_memory::{Public, Secret};
-use rosenpass_util::{cat, mem::cpy_min, ord::max_usize, time::Timebase};
 use std::collections::hash_map::{
     Entry::{Occupied, Vacant},
     HashMap,
 };
 use std::convert::Infallible;
+use std::mem::size_of;
+
+use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
+
+use memoffset::span_of;
+use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
+use rosenpass_ciphers::hash_domain::{SecretHashDomain, SecretHashDomainNamespace};
+use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::{EphemeralKem, StaticKem};
+use rosenpass_ciphers::{aead, xaead, KEY_LEN};
+use rosenpass_constant_time as constant_time;
+use rosenpass_secret_memory::{Public, Secret};
+use rosenpass_util::{cat, mem::cpy_min, ord::max_usize, time::Timebase};
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, Ref};
+
+use crate::{hash_domains, msgs::*, RosenpassError};
 
 // CONSTANTS & SETTINGS //////////////////////////
 
 /// Size required to fit any message in binary form
 pub const RTX_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = max_usize(
-    <Envelope<(), InitHello<()>> as LenseView>::LEN,
-    <Envelope<(), InitConf<()>> as LenseView>::LEN,
+    size_of::<Envelope<InitHello>>(),
+    size_of::<Envelope<InitConf>>(),
 );
 
 /// A type for time, e.g. for backoff before re-tries
@@ -738,11 +741,12 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     // TODO remove unnecessary copying between global tx_buf and per-peer buf
     // TODO move retransmission storage to io server
     pub fn initiate_handshake(&mut self, peer: PeerPtr, tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize> {
-        let mut msg = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<InitHello<()>>()?; // Envelope::<InitHello>::default(); // TODO
-        self.handle_initiation(peer, msg.payload_mut().init_hello()?)?;
-        let len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::InitHello, msg)?;
+        // Envelope::<InitHello>::default(); // TODO
+        let mut msg = truncating_cast_into::<Envelope<InitHello>>(tx_buf)?;
+        self.handle_initiation(peer, &mut msg.payload)?;
+        let len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::InitHello, &mut msg)?;
         peer.hs()
-            .store_msg_for_retransmission(self, &tx_buf[..len])?;
+            .store_msg_for_retransmission(self, msg.as_bytes())?;
         Ok(len)
     }
 }
@@ -792,50 +796,45 @@ impl CryptoServer {
 
         let peer = match rx_buf[0].try_into() {
             Ok(MsgType::InitHello) => {
-                let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitHello<&[u8]>>()?;
+                let msg_in: Ref<&[u8], Envelope<InitHello>> =
+                    Ref::new(rx_buf).ok_or(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch)?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<RespHello<&mut [u8]>>()?;
-                let peer = self.handle_init_hello(
-                    msg_in.payload().init_hello()?,
-                    msg_out.payload_mut().resp_hello()?,
-                )?;
-                len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::RespHello, msg_out)?;
+                let mut msg_out = truncating_cast_into::<Envelope<RespHello>>(tx_buf)?;
+                let peer = self.handle_init_hello(&msg_in.payload, &mut msg_out.payload)?;
+                len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::RespHello, &mut msg_out)?;
                 peer
             }
             Ok(MsgType::RespHello) => {
-                let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<RespHello<&[u8]>>()?;
+                let msg_in: Ref<&[u8], Envelope<RespHello>> =
+                    Ref::new(rx_buf).ok_or(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch)?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<InitConf<&mut [u8]>>()?;
-                let peer = self.handle_resp_hello(
-                    msg_in.payload().resp_hello()?,
-                    msg_out.payload_mut().init_conf()?,
-                )?;
-                len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::InitConf, msg_out)?;
+                let mut msg_out = truncating_cast_into::<Envelope<InitConf>>(tx_buf)?;
+                let peer = self.handle_resp_hello(&msg_in.payload, &mut msg_out.payload)?;
+                len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::InitConf, &mut msg_out)?;
                 peer.hs()
-                    .store_msg_for_retransmission(self, &tx_buf[..len])?;
+                    .store_msg_for_retransmission(self, &msg_out.as_bytes()[..len])?;
                 exchanged = true;
                 peer
             }
             Ok(MsgType::InitConf) => {
-                let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitConf<&[u8]>>()?;
+                let msg_in: Ref<&[u8], Envelope<InitConf>> =
+                    Ref::new(rx_buf).ok_or(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch)?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<EmptyData<&mut [u8]>>()?;
-                let peer = self.handle_init_conf(
-                    msg_in.payload().init_conf()?,
-                    msg_out.payload_mut().empty_data()?,
-                )?;
-                len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::EmptyData, msg_out)?;
+                let mut msg_out = truncating_cast_into::<Envelope<EmptyData>>(tx_buf)?;
+                let peer = self.handle_init_conf(&msg_in.payload, &mut msg_out.payload)?;
+                len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::EmptyData, &mut msg_out)?;
                 exchanged = true;
                 peer
             }
             Ok(MsgType::EmptyData) => {
-                let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<EmptyData<&[u8]>>()?;
+                let msg_in: Ref<&[u8], Envelope<EmptyData>> =
+                    Ref::new(rx_buf).ok_or(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch)?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                self.handle_resp_conf(msg_in.payload().empty_data()?)?
+                self.handle_resp_conf(&msg_in.payload)?
             }
             Ok(MsgType::DataMsg) => bail!("DataMsg handling not implemented!"),
             Ok(MsgType::CookieReply) => bail!("CookieReply handling not implemented!"),
@@ -855,15 +854,15 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     ///
     /// The message type is explicitly required here because it is very easy to
     /// forget setting that, which creates subtle but far ranging errors.
-    pub fn seal_and_commit_msg<M: LenseView>(
+    pub fn seal_and_commit_msg<M: AsBytes + FromBytes>(
         &mut self,
         peer: PeerPtr,
         msg_type: MsgType,
-        mut msg: Envelope<&mut [u8], M>,
+        msg: &mut Ref<&mut [u8], Envelope<M>>,
     ) -> Result<usize> {
-        msg.msg_type_mut()[0] = msg_type as u8;
+        msg.msg_type = msg_type as u8;
         msg.seal(peer, self)?;
-        Ok(<Envelope<(), M> as LenseView>::LEN)
+        Ok(size_of::<Envelope<M>>())
     }
 }
 
@@ -1169,32 +1168,31 @@ impl IniHsPtr {
 
 // CRYPTO/HANDSHAKE HANDLING /////////////////////
 
-impl<M> Envelope<&mut [u8], M>
+impl<M> Envelope<M>
 where
-    M: LenseView,
+    M: AsBytes + FromBytes,
 {
     /// Calculate the message authentication code (`mac`)
     pub fn seal(&mut self, peer: PeerPtr, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Result<()> {
         let mac = hash_domains::mac()?
             .mix(peer.get(srv).spkt.secret())?
-            .mix(self.until_mac())?;
-        self.mac_mut()
-            .copy_from_slice(mac.into_value()[..16].as_ref());
+            .mix(&self.as_bytes()[span_of!(Self, msg_type..mac)])?;
+        self.mac.copy_from_slice(mac.into_value()[..16].as_ref());
         Ok(())
     }
 }
 
-impl<M> Envelope<&[u8], M>
+impl<M> Envelope<M>
 where
-    M: LenseView,
+    M: AsBytes + FromBytes,
 {
     /// Check the message authentication code
     pub fn check_seal(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Result<bool> {
         let expected = hash_domains::mac()?
             .mix(srv.spkm.secret())?
-            .mix(self.until_mac())?;
-        Ok(rosenpass_sodium::helpers::memcmp(
-            self.mac(),
+            .mix(&self.as_bytes()[span_of!(Self, msg_type..mac)])?;
+        Ok(constant_time::memcmp(
+            &self.mac,
             &expected.into_value()[..16],
         ))
     }
@@ -1281,15 +1279,16 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         biscuit_ct: &mut [u8],
     ) -> Result<&mut Self> {
         let mut biscuit = Secret::<BISCUIT_PT_LEN>::zero(); // pt buffer
-        let mut biscuit = (&mut biscuit.secret_mut()[..]).biscuit()?; // lens view
+        let mut biscuit: Ref<&mut [u8], Biscuit> =
+            Ref::new(biscuit.secret_mut().as_mut_slice()).unwrap();
 
         // calculate pt contents
         biscuit
-            .pidi_mut()
+            .pidi
             .copy_from_slice(peer.get(srv).pidt()?.as_slice());
-        biscuit.biscuit_no_mut().copy_from_slice(&*srv.biscuit_ctr);
+        biscuit.biscuit_no.copy_from_slice(&*srv.biscuit_ctr);
         biscuit
-            .ck_mut()
+            .ck
             .copy_from_slice(self.ck.clone().danger_into_secret().secret());
 
         // calculate ad contents
@@ -1300,7 +1299,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
             .into_value();
 
         // consume biscuit no
-        rosenpass_sodium::helpers::increment(&mut *srv.biscuit_ctr);
+        constant_time::increment(&mut *srv.biscuit_ctr);
 
         // The first bit of the nonce indicates which biscuit key was used
         // TODO: This is premature optimization. Remove!
@@ -1310,7 +1309,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         n[0] |= (bk.0 as u8 & 0x1) << 7;
 
         let k = bk.get(srv).key.secret();
-        let pt = biscuit.all_bytes();
+        let pt = biscuit.as_bytes();
         xaead::encrypt(biscuit_ct, k, &*n, &ad, pt)?;
 
         self.mix(biscuit_ct)
@@ -1336,18 +1335,19 @@ impl HandshakeState {
 
         // Allocate and decrypt the biscuit data
         let mut biscuit = Secret::<BISCUIT_PT_LEN>::zero(); // pt buf
-        let mut biscuit = (&mut biscuit.secret_mut()[..]).biscuit()?; // slice
+        let mut biscuit: Ref<&mut [u8], Biscuit> =
+            Ref::new(biscuit.secret_mut().as_mut_slice()).unwrap();
         xaead::decrypt(
-            biscuit.all_bytes_mut(),
+            biscuit.as_bytes_mut(),
             bk.get(srv).key.secret(),
             &ad,
             biscuit_ct,
         )?;
 
         // Reconstruct the biscuit fields
-        let no = BiscuitId::from_slice(biscuit.biscuit_no());
-        let ck = SecretHashDomain::danger_from_secret(Secret::from_slice(biscuit.ck())).dup();
-        let pid = PeerId::from_slice(biscuit.pidi());
+        let no = BiscuitId::from_slice(&biscuit.biscuit_no);
+        let ck = SecretHashDomain::danger_from_secret(Secret::from_slice(&biscuit.ck)).dup();
+        let pid = PeerId::from_slice(&biscuit.pidi);
 
         // Reconstruct the handshake state
         let mut hs = Self { sidi, sidr, ck };
@@ -1363,8 +1363,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         // indicates retransmission
         // TODO: Handle retransmissions without involving the crypto code
         ensure!(
-            rosenpass_sodium::helpers::compare(biscuit.biscuit_no(), &*peer.get(srv).biscuit_used)
-                >= 0,
+            constant_time::compare(&biscuit.biscuit_no, &*peer.get(srv).biscuit_used) >= 0,
             "Rejecting biscuit: Outdated biscuit number"
         );
 
@@ -1412,11 +1411,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
 impl CryptoServer {
     /// Implementation of the cryptographic protocol using the already
     /// established primitives
-    pub fn handle_initiation(
-        &mut self,
-        peer: PeerPtr,
-        mut ih: InitHello<&mut [u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
+    pub fn handle_initiation(&mut self, peer: PeerPtr, ih: &mut InitHello) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
         let mut hs = InitiatorHandshake::zero_with_timestamp(self);
 
         // IHI1
@@ -1424,25 +1419,25 @@ impl CryptoServer {
 
         // IHI2
         hs.core.sidi.randomize();
-        ih.sidi_mut().copy_from_slice(&hs.core.sidi.value);
+        ih.sidi.copy_from_slice(&hs.core.sidi.value);
 
         // IHI3
         EphemeralKem::keygen(hs.eski.secret_mut(), &mut *hs.epki)?;
-        ih.epki_mut().copy_from_slice(&hs.epki.value);
+        ih.epki.copy_from_slice(&hs.epki.value);
 
         // IHI4
-        hs.core.mix(ih.sidi())?.mix(ih.epki())?;
+        hs.core.mix(ih.sidi.as_slice())?.mix(ih.epki.as_slice())?;
 
         // IHI5
         hs.core
             .encaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
-                ih.sctr_mut(),
+                ih.sctr.as_mut_slice(),
                 peer.get(self).spkt.secret(),
             )?;
 
         // IHI6
         hs.core
-            .encrypt_and_mix(ih.pidic_mut(), self.pidm()?.as_ref())?;
+            .encrypt_and_mix(ih.pidic.as_mut_slice(), self.pidm()?.as_ref())?;
 
         // IHI7
         hs.core
@@ -1450,7 +1445,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             .mix(peer.get(self).psk.secret())?;
 
         // IHI8
-        hs.core.encrypt_and_mix(ih.auth_mut(), &[])?;
+        hs.core.encrypt_and_mix(ih.auth.as_mut_slice(), &[])?;
 
         // Update the handshake hash last (not changing any state on prior error
         peer.hs().insert(self, hs)?;
@@ -1458,32 +1453,28 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         Ok(peer)
     }
 
-    pub fn handle_init_hello(
-        &mut self,
-        ih: InitHello<&[u8]>,
-        mut rh: RespHello<&mut [u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
+    pub fn handle_init_hello(&mut self, ih: &InitHello, rh: &mut RespHello) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
         let mut core = HandshakeState::zero();
 
-        core.sidi = SessionId::from_slice(ih.sidi());
+        core.sidi = SessionId::from_slice(&ih.sidi);
 
         // IHR1
         core.init(self.spkm.secret())?;
 
         // IHR4
-        core.mix(ih.sidi())?.mix(ih.epki())?;
+        core.mix(&ih.sidi)?.mix(&ih.epki)?;
 
         // IHR5
         core.decaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
             self.sskm.secret(),
             self.spkm.secret(),
-            ih.sctr(),
+            &ih.sctr,
         )?;
 
         // IHR6
         let peer = {
             let mut peerid = PeerId::zero();
-            core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut *peerid, ih.pidic())?;
+            core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut *peerid, &ih.pidic)?;
             self.find_peer(peerid)
                 .with_context(|| format!("No such peer {peerid:?}."))?
         };
@@ -1493,46 +1484,42 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             .mix(peer.get(self).psk.secret())?;
 
         // IHR8
-        core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], ih.auth())?;
+        core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], &ih.auth)?;
 
         // RHR1
         core.sidr.randomize();
-        rh.sidi_mut().copy_from_slice(core.sidi.as_ref());
-        rh.sidr_mut().copy_from_slice(core.sidr.as_ref());
+        rh.sidi.copy_from_slice(core.sidi.as_ref());
+        rh.sidr.copy_from_slice(core.sidr.as_ref());
 
         // RHR3
-        core.mix(rh.sidr())?.mix(rh.sidi())?;
+        core.mix(&rh.sidr)?.mix(&rh.sidi)?;
 
         // RHR4
-        core.encaps_and_mix::<EphemeralKem, { EphemeralKem::SHK_LEN }>(rh.ecti_mut(), ih.epki())?;
+        core.encaps_and_mix::<EphemeralKem, { EphemeralKem::SHK_LEN }>(&mut rh.ecti, &ih.epki)?;
 
         // RHR5
         core.encaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
-            rh.scti_mut(),
+            &mut rh.scti,
             peer.get(self).spkt.secret(),
         )?;
 
         // RHR6
-        core.store_biscuit(self, peer, rh.biscuit_mut())?;
+        core.store_biscuit(self, peer, &mut rh.biscuit)?;
 
         // RHR7
-        core.encrypt_and_mix(rh.auth_mut(), &[])?;
+        core.encrypt_and_mix(&mut rh.auth, &[])?;
 
         Ok(peer)
     }
 
-    pub fn handle_resp_hello(
-        &mut self,
-        rh: RespHello<&[u8]>,
-        mut ic: InitConf<&mut [u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
+    pub fn handle_resp_hello(&mut self, rh: &RespHello, ic: &mut InitConf) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
         // RHI2
         let peer = self
-            .lookup_handshake(SessionId::from_slice(rh.sidi()))
+            .lookup_handshake(SessionId::from_slice(&rh.sidi))
             .with_context(|| {
                 format!(
                     "Got RespHello packet for non-existent session {:?}",
-                    rh.sidi()
+                    rh.sidi
                 )
             })?
             .peer();
@@ -1557,52 +1544,52 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         ensure!(
             exp == got,
             "Unexpected package in session {:?}. Expected {:?}, got {:?}.",
-            SessionId::from_slice(rh.sidi()),
+            SessionId::from_slice(&rh.sidi),
             exp,
             got
         );
 
         let mut core = hs!().core.clone();
-        core.sidr.copy_from_slice(rh.sidr());
+        core.sidr.copy_from_slice(&rh.sidr);
 
         // TODO: decaps_and_mix should take Secret<> directly
         //       to save us from the repetitive secret unwrapping
 
         // RHI3
-        core.mix(rh.sidr())?.mix(rh.sidi())?;
+        core.mix(&rh.sidr)?.mix(&rh.sidi)?;
 
         // RHI4
         core.decaps_and_mix::<EphemeralKem, { EphemeralKem::SHK_LEN }>(
             hs!().eski.secret(),
             &*hs!().epki,
-            rh.ecti(),
+            &rh.ecti,
         )?;
 
         // RHI5
         core.decaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
             self.sskm.secret(),
             self.spkm.secret(),
-            rh.scti(),
+            &rh.scti,
         )?;
 
         // RHI6
-        core.mix(rh.biscuit())?;
+        core.mix(&rh.biscuit)?;
 
         // RHI7
-        core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], rh.auth())?;
+        core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], &rh.auth)?;
 
         // TODO: We should just authenticate the entire network package up to the auth
         // tag as a pattern instead of mixing in fields separately
 
-        ic.sidi_mut().copy_from_slice(rh.sidi());
-        ic.sidr_mut().copy_from_slice(rh.sidr());
+        ic.sidi.copy_from_slice(&rh.sidi);
+        ic.sidr.copy_from_slice(&rh.sidr);
 
         // ICI3
-        core.mix(ic.sidi())?.mix(ic.sidr())?;
-        ic.biscuit_mut().copy_from_slice(rh.biscuit());
+        core.mix(&ic.sidi)?.mix(&ic.sidr)?;
+        ic.biscuit.copy_from_slice(&rh.biscuit);
 
         // ICI4
-        core.encrypt_and_mix(ic.auth_mut(), &[])?;
+        core.encrypt_and_mix(&mut ic.auth, &[])?;
 
         // Split() – We move the secrets into the session; we do not
         // delete the InitiatorHandshake, just clear it's secrets because
@@ -1617,31 +1604,27 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         Ok(peer)
     }
 
-    pub fn handle_init_conf(
-        &mut self,
-        ic: InitConf<&[u8]>,
-        mut rc: EmptyData<&mut [u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
+    pub fn handle_init_conf(&mut self, ic: &InitConf, rc: &mut EmptyData) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
         // (peer, bn) ← LoadBiscuit(InitConf.biscuit)
         // ICR1
         let (peer, biscuit_no, mut core) = HandshakeState::load_biscuit(
             self,
-            ic.biscuit(),
-            SessionId::from_slice(ic.sidi()),
-            SessionId::from_slice(ic.sidr()),
+            &ic.biscuit,
+            SessionId::from_slice(&ic.sidi),
+            SessionId::from_slice(&ic.sidr),
         )?;
 
         // ICR2
         core.encrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; aead::TAG_LEN], &[])?;
 
         // ICR3
-        core.mix(ic.sidi())?.mix(ic.sidr())?;
+        core.mix(&ic.sidi)?.mix(&ic.sidr)?;
 
         // ICR4
-        core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], ic.auth())?;
+        core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], &ic.auth)?;
 
         // ICR5
-        if rosenpass_sodium::helpers::compare(&*biscuit_no, &*peer.get(self).biscuit_used) > 0 {
+        if constant_time::compare(&*biscuit_no, &*peer.get(self).biscuit_used) > 0 {
             // ICR6
             peer.get_mut(self).biscuit_used = biscuit_no;
 
@@ -1682,19 +1665,19 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             .get_mut(self)
             .as_mut()
             .context("Cannot send acknowledgement. No session.")?;
-        rc.sid_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.sidt.value);
-        rc.ctr_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.txnm.to_le_bytes());
+        rc.sid.copy_from_slice(&ses.sidt.value);
+        rc.ctr.copy_from_slice(&ses.txnm.to_le_bytes());
         ses.txnm += 1; // Increment nonce before encryption, just in case an error is raised
 
-        let n = cat!(aead::NONCE_LEN; rc.ctr(), &[0u8; 4]);
+        let n = cat!(aead::NONCE_LEN; &rc.ctr, &[0u8; 4]);
         let k = ses.txkm.secret();
-        aead::encrypt(rc.auth_mut(), k, &n, &[], &[])?; // ct, k, n, ad, pt
+        aead::encrypt(&mut rc.auth, k, &n, &[], &[])?; // ct, k, n, ad, pt
 
         Ok(peer)
     }
 
-    pub fn handle_resp_conf(&mut self, rc: EmptyData<&[u8]>) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
-        let sid = SessionId::from_slice(rc.sid());
+    pub fn handle_resp_conf(&mut self, rc: &EmptyData) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
+        let sid = SessionId::from_slice(&rc.sid);
         let hs = self
             .lookup_handshake(sid)
             .with_context(|| format!("Got RespConf packet for non-existent session {sid:?}"))?;
@@ -1717,16 +1700,16 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             })?;
             // the unwrap can not fail, because the slice returned by ctr() is
             // guaranteed to have the correct size
-            let n = u64::from_le_bytes(rc.ctr().try_into().unwrap());
+            let n = u64::from_le_bytes(rc.ctr.try_into().unwrap());
             ensure!(n >= s.txnt, "Stale nonce");
             s.txnt = n;
             aead::decrypt(
                 // pt, k, n, ad, ct
                 &mut [0u8; 0],
                 s.txkt.secret(),
-                &cat!(aead::NONCE_LEN; rc.ctr(), &[0u8; 4]),
+                &cat!(aead::NONCE_LEN; &rc.ctr, &[0u8; 4]),
                 &[],
-                rc.auth(),
+                &rc.auth,
             )?;
         }
 
@@ -1737,6 +1720,10 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     }
 }
 
+fn truncating_cast_into<T: FromBytes>(buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<Ref<&mut [u8], T>, RosenpassError> {
+    Ok(Ref::new(&mut buf[..size_of::<T>()]).ok_or(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch)?)
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test {
     use super::*;
@@ -1757,8 +1744,6 @@ mod test {
     /// Through all this, the handshake should still successfully terminate;
     /// i.e. an exchanged key must be produced in both servers.
     fn handles_incorrect_size_messages() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
-
         stacker::grow(8 * 1024 * 1024, || {
             const OVERSIZED_MESSAGE: usize = ((MAX_MESSAGE_LEN as f32) * 1.2) as usize;
             type MsgBufPlus = Public<OVERSIZED_MESSAGE>;
@@ -1770,14 +1755,10 @@ mod test {
 
             // Process the entire handshake
             let mut msglen = Some(me.initiate_handshake(PEER0, &mut *resbuf).unwrap());
-            loop {
-                if let Some(l) = msglen {
-                    std::mem::swap(&mut me, &mut they);
-                    std::mem::swap(&mut msgbuf, &mut resbuf);
-                    msglen = test_incorrect_sizes_for_msg(&mut me, &*msgbuf, l, &mut *resbuf);
-                } else {
-                    break;
-                }
+            while let Some(l) = msglen {
+                std::mem::swap(&mut me, &mut they);
+                std::mem::swap(&mut msgbuf, &mut resbuf);
+                msglen = test_incorrect_sizes_for_msg(&mut me, &*msgbuf, l, &mut *resbuf);
             }
 
             assert_eq!(
@@ -1804,8 +1785,8 @@ mod test {
             }
 
             let res = srv.handle_msg(&msgbuf[..l], resbuf);
-            assert!(matches!(res, Err(_))); // handle_msg should raise an error
-            assert!(!resbuf.iter().find(|x| **x != 0).is_some()); // resbuf should not have been changed
+            assert!(res.is_err()); // handle_msg should raise an error
+            assert!(!resbuf.iter().any(|x| *x != 0)); // resbuf should not have been changed
         }
 
         // Apply the proper handle_msg operation

rosenpass/tests/integration_test.rs

@@ -30,11 +30,8 @@ fn generate_keys() {
 
 fn find_udp_socket() -> u16 {
     for port in 1025..=u16::MAX {
-        match UdpSocket::bind(("127.0.0.1", port)) {
-            Ok(_) => {
-                return port;
-            }
-            _ => {}
+        if UdpSocket::bind(("127.0.0.1", port)).is_ok() {
+            return port;
         }
     }
     panic!("no free UDP port found");
@@ -54,9 +51,9 @@ fn check_exchange() {
     for (secret_key_path, pub_key_path) in secret_key_paths.iter().zip(public_key_paths.iter()) {
         let output = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
             .args(["gen-keys", "--secret-key"])
-            .arg(&secret_key_path)
+            .arg(secret_key_path)
             .arg("--public-key")
-            .arg(&pub_key_path)
+            .arg(pub_key_path)
             .output()
             .expect("Failed to start {BIN}");
 

secret-memory/Cargo.toml

@@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ readme = "readme.md"
 [dependencies]
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
 rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
-libsodium-sys-stable = { workspace = true }
-lazy_static = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
+memsec = { workspace = true }
+allocator-api2 = { workspace = true }
+log = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+allocator-api2-tests = { workspace = true }

secret-memory/src/alloc/memsec.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+use std::fmt;
+use std::ptr::NonNull;
+
+use allocator_api2::alloc::{AllocError, Allocator, Layout};
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Default)]
+struct MemsecAllocatorContents;
+
+/// Memory allocation using using the memsec crate
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct MemsecAllocator {
+    _dummy_private_data: MemsecAllocatorContents,
+}
+
+/// A box backed by the memsec allocator
+pub type MemsecBox<T> = allocator_api2::boxed::Box<T, MemsecAllocator>;
+
+/// A vector backed by the memsec allocator
+pub type MemsecVec<T> = allocator_api2::vec::Vec<T, MemsecAllocator>;
+
+pub fn memsec_box<T>(x: T) -> MemsecBox<T> {
+    MemsecBox::<T>::new_in(x, MemsecAllocator::new())
+}
+
+pub fn memsec_vec<T>() -> MemsecVec<T> {
+    MemsecVec::<T>::new_in(MemsecAllocator::new())
+}
+
+impl MemsecAllocator {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            _dummy_private_data: MemsecAllocatorContents,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+unsafe impl Allocator for MemsecAllocator {
+    fn allocate(&self, layout: Layout) -> Result<NonNull<[u8]>, AllocError> {
+        // Call memsec allocator
+        let mem: Option<NonNull<[u8]>> = unsafe { memsec::malloc_sized(layout.size()) };
+
+        // Unwrap the option
+        let Some(mem) = mem else {
+            log::error!("Allocation {layout:?} was requested but memsec returned a null pointer");
+            return Err(AllocError);
+        };
+
+        // Ensure the right alignment is used
+        let off = (mem.as_ptr() as *const u8).align_offset(layout.align());
+        if off != 0 {
+            log::error!("Allocation {layout:?} was requested but memsec returned allocation \
+                with offset {off} from the requested alignment. Memsec always allocates values \
+                at the end of a memory page for security reasons, custom alignments are not supported. \
+                You could try allocating an oversized value.");
+            unsafe { memsec::free(mem) };
+            return Err(AllocError);
+        };
+
+        Ok(mem)
+    }
+
+    unsafe fn deallocate(&self, ptr: NonNull<u8>, _layout: Layout) {
+        unsafe {
+            memsec::free(ptr);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for MemsecAllocator {
+    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+        fmt.write_str("<memsec based Rust allocator>")
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use allocator_api2_tests::make_test;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    make_test! { test_sizes(MemsecAllocator::new()) }
+    make_test! { test_vec(MemsecAllocator::new()) }
+    make_test! { test_many_boxes(MemsecAllocator::new()) }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn memsec_allocation() {
+        let alloc = MemsecAllocator::new();
+        memsec_allocation_impl::<0>(&alloc);
+        memsec_allocation_impl::<7>(&alloc);
+        memsec_allocation_impl::<8>(&alloc);
+        memsec_allocation_impl::<64>(&alloc);
+        memsec_allocation_impl::<999>(&alloc);
+    }
+
+    fn memsec_allocation_impl<const N: usize>(alloc: &MemsecAllocator) {
+        let layout = Layout::new::<[u8; N]>();
+        let mem = alloc.allocate(layout).unwrap();
+
+        // https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/memory_management#guarded-heap-allocations
+        // promises us that allocated memory is initialized with the magic byte 0xDB
+        // and memsec promises to provide a reimplementation of the libsodium mechanism;
+        // it uses the magic value 0xD0 though
+        assert_eq!(unsafe { mem.as_ref() }, &[0xD0u8; N]);
+
+        let mem = NonNull::new(mem.as_ptr() as *mut u8).unwrap();
+        unsafe { alloc.deallocate(mem, layout) };
+    }
+}

secret-memory/src/alloc/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+pub mod memsec;
+
+pub use crate::alloc::memsec::{
+    memsec_box as secret_box, memsec_vec as secret_vec, MemsecAllocator as SecretAllocator,
+    MemsecBox as SecretBox, MemsecVec as SecretVec,
+};

secret-memory/src/lib.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ pub mod debug;
 pub mod file;
 pub mod rand;
 
+pub mod alloc;
+
 mod public;
 pub use crate::public::Public;
 

secret-memory/src/public.rs

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ pub struct Public<const N: usize> {
 impl<const N: usize> Public<N> {
     /// Create a new [Public] from a byte slice
     pub fn from_slice(value: &[u8]) -> Self {
-        copy_slice(value).to_this(|| Self::zero())
+        copy_slice(value).to_this(Self::zero)
     }
 
     /// Create a new [Public] from a byte array

secret-memory/src/secret.rs

@@ -1,21 +1,96 @@
-use crate::file::StoreSecret;
+use std::cell::RefCell;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::convert::TryInto;
+use std::fmt;
+use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
+use std::path::Path;
+
 use anyhow::Context;
-use lazy_static::lazy_static;
 use rand::{Fill as Randomize, Rng};
-use rosenpass_sodium::alloc::{Alloc as SodiumAlloc, Box as SodiumBox, Vec as SodiumVec};
-use rosenpass_util::{
-    b64::b64_reader,
-    file::{fopen_r, LoadValue, LoadValueB64, ReadExactToEnd},
-    functional::mutating,
-};
-use std::{collections::HashMap, convert::TryInto, fmt, path::Path, sync::Mutex};
 use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
 
+use rosenpass_util::b64::b64_reader;
+use rosenpass_util::file::{fopen_r, LoadValue, LoadValueB64, ReadExactToEnd};
+use rosenpass_util::functional::mutating;
+
+use crate::alloc::{secret_box, SecretBox, SecretVec};
+use crate::file::StoreSecret;
+
 // This might become a problem in library usage; it's effectively a memory
 // leak which probably isn't a problem right now because most memory will
 // be reused…
-lazy_static! {
-    static ref SECRET_CACHE: Mutex<SecretMemoryPool> = Mutex::new(SecretMemoryPool::new());
+thread_local! {
+    static SECRET_CACHE: RefCell<SecretMemoryPool> = RefCell::new(SecretMemoryPool::new());
+}
+
+fn with_secret_memory_pool<Fn, R>(mut f: Fn) -> R
+where
+    Fn: FnMut(Option<&mut SecretMemoryPool>) -> R,
+{
+    // This acquires the SECRET_CACHE
+    SECRET_CACHE
+        .try_with(|cell| {
+            // And acquires the inner reference
+            cell.try_borrow_mut()
+                .as_deref_mut()
+                // To call the given function
+                .map(|pool| f(Some(pool)))
+                .ok()
+        })
+        .ok()
+        .flatten()
+        // Failing that, the given function is called with None
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| f(None))
+}
+
+// Wrapper around SecretBox that applies automatic zeroization
+#[derive(Debug)]
+struct ZeroizingSecretBox<T: Zeroize + ?Sized>(Option<SecretBox<T>>);
+
+impl<T: Zeroize> ZeroizingSecretBox<T> {
+    fn new(boxed: T) -> Self {
+        ZeroizingSecretBox(Some(secret_box(boxed)))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: Zeroize + ?Sized> ZeroizingSecretBox<T> {
+    fn from_secret_box(inner: SecretBox<T>) -> Self {
+        Self(Some(inner))
+    }
+
+    fn take(mut self) -> SecretBox<T> {
+        self.0.take().unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: Zeroize + ?Sized> ZeroizeOnDrop for ZeroizingSecretBox<T> {}
+impl<T: Zeroize + ?Sized> Zeroize for ZeroizingSecretBox<T> {
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        if let Some(inner) = &mut self.0 {
+            let inner: &mut SecretBox<T> = inner; // type annotation
+            inner.zeroize()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: Zeroize + ?Sized> Drop for ZeroizingSecretBox<T> {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        self.zeroize()
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: Zeroize + ?Sized> Deref for ZeroizingSecretBox<T> {
+    type Target = T;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &T {
+        self.0.as_ref().unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: Zeroize + ?Sized> DerefMut for ZeroizingSecretBox<T> {
+    fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T {
+        self.0.as_mut().unwrap()
+    }
 }
 
 /// Pool that stores secret memory allocations
@@ -23,12 +98,9 @@ lazy_static! {
 /// Allocation of secret memory is expensive. Thus, this struct provides a
 /// pool of secret memory, readily available to yield protected, slices of
 /// memory.
-///
-/// Further information about the protection in place can be found in in the
-/// [libsodium documentation](https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/memory_management#guarded-heap-allocations)
 #[derive(Debug)] // TODO check on Debug derive, is that clever
 struct SecretMemoryPool {
-    pool: HashMap<usize, Vec<SodiumBox<[u8]>>>,
+    pool: HashMap<usize, Vec<ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8]>>>,
 }
 
 impl SecretMemoryPool {
@@ -41,33 +113,37 @@ impl SecretMemoryPool {
     }
 
     /// Return secret back to the pool for future re-use
-    pub fn release<const N: usize>(&mut self, mut sec: SodiumBox<[u8; N]>) {
+    pub fn release<const N: usize>(&mut self, mut sec: ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8; N]>) {
         sec.zeroize();
 
         // This conversion sequence is weird but at least it guarantees
         // that the heap allocation is preserved according to the docs
-        let sec: SodiumVec<u8> = sec.into();
-        let sec: SodiumBox<[u8]> = sec.into();
+        let sec: SecretVec<u8> = sec.take().into();
+        let sec: SecretBox<[u8]> = sec.into();
 
-        self.pool.entry(N).or_default().push(sec);
+        self.pool
+            .entry(N)
+            .or_default()
+            .push(ZeroizingSecretBox::from_secret_box(sec));
     }
 
     /// Take protected memory from the pool, allocating new one if no suitable
     /// chunk is found in the inventory.
     ///
     /// The secret is guaranteed to be full of nullbytes
-    pub fn take<const N: usize>(&mut self) -> SodiumBox<[u8; N]> {
+    pub fn take<const N: usize>(&mut self) -> ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8; N]> {
         let entry = self.pool.entry(N).or_default();
-        match entry.pop() {
-            None => SodiumBox::new_in([0u8; N], SodiumAlloc::default()),
-            Some(sec) => sec.try_into().unwrap(),
-        }
+        let inner = match entry.pop() {
+            None => secret_box([0u8; N]),
+            Some(sec) => sec.take().try_into().unwrap(),
+        };
+        ZeroizingSecretBox::from_secret_box(inner)
     }
 }
 
-/// Storeage for a secret backed by [rosenpass_sodium::alloc::Alloc]
+/// Storage for secret data
 pub struct Secret<const N: usize> {
-    storage: Option<SodiumBox<[u8; N]>>,
+    storage: Option<ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8; N]>>,
 }
 
 impl<const N: usize> Secret<N> {
@@ -81,9 +157,12 @@ impl<const N: usize> Secret<N> {
     pub fn zero() -> Self {
         // Using [SecretMemoryPool] here because this operation is expensive,
         // yet it is used in hot loops
-        Self {
-            storage: Some(SECRET_CACHE.lock().unwrap().take()),
-        }
+        let buf = with_secret_memory_pool(|pool| {
+            pool.map(|p| p.take())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| ZeroizingSecretBox::new([0u8; N]))
+        });
+
+        Self { storage: Some(buf) }
     }
 
     /// Returns a new [Secret] that is randomized
@@ -107,13 +186,6 @@ impl<const N: usize> Secret<N> {
     }
 }
 
-impl<const N: usize> ZeroizeOnDrop for Secret<N> {}
-impl<const N: usize> Zeroize for Secret<N> {
-    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
-        self.secret_mut().zeroize();
-    }
-}
-
 impl<const N: usize> Randomize for Secret<N> {
     fn try_fill<R: Rng + ?Sized>(&mut self, rng: &mut R) -> Result<(), rand::Error> {
         // Zeroize self first just to make sure the barriers from the zeroize create take
@@ -124,11 +196,26 @@ impl<const N: usize> Randomize for Secret<N> {
     }
 }
 
+impl<const N: usize> ZeroizeOnDrop for Secret<N> {}
+impl<const N: usize> Zeroize for Secret<N> {
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        if let Some(inner) = &mut self.storage {
+            inner.zeroize()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl<const N: usize> Drop for Secret<N> {
     fn drop(&mut self) {
-        self.storage
-            .take()
-            .map(|sec| SECRET_CACHE.lock().unwrap().release(sec));
+        with_secret_memory_pool(|pool| {
+            if let Some((pool, secret)) = pool.zip(self.storage.take()) {
+                pool.release(secret);
+            }
+        });
+
+        // This should be unnecessary: The pool has one item – the inner secret – which
+        // zeroizes itself on drop. Calling it should not do any harm though…
+        self.zeroize()
     }
 }
 
@@ -197,20 +284,18 @@ mod test {
     /// check that we can alloc using the magic pool
     #[test]
     fn secret_memory_pool_take() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
         const N: usize = 0x100;
         let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
-        let secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
+        let secret: ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
         assert_eq!(secret.as_ref(), &[0; N]);
     }
 
     /// check that a secrete lives, even if its [SecretMemoryPool] is deleted
     #[test]
     fn secret_memory_pool_drop() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
         const N: usize = 0x100;
         let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
-        let secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
+        let secret: ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
         std::mem::drop(pool);
         assert_eq!(secret.as_ref(), &[0; N]);
     }
@@ -218,17 +303,16 @@ mod test {
     /// check that a secrete can be reborn, freshly initialized with zero
     #[test]
     fn secret_memory_pool_release() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
         const N: usize = 1;
         let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
-        let mut secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
+        let mut secret: ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
         let old_secret_ptr = secret.as_ref().as_ptr();
 
         secret.as_mut()[0] = 0x13;
         pool.release(secret);
 
         // now check that we get the same ptr
-        let new_secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
+        let new_secret: ZeroizingSecretBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
         assert_eq!(old_secret_ptr, new_secret.as_ref().as_ptr());
 
         // and that the secret was zeroized

sodium/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-sodium"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal bindings to libsodium"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-[dependencies]
-rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-libsodium-sys-stable = { workspace = true }
-log = { workspace = true }
-allocator-api2 = { workspace = true }

sodium/readme.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass internal libsodium bindings
-
-Rosenpass internal library providing bindings to libsodium.
-
-This is an internal library; not guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

sodium/src/aead/chacha20poly1305_ietf.rs

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::ffi::c_ulonglong;
-use std::ptr::{null, null_mut};
-
-pub const KEY_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize;
-pub const TAG_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_ABYTES as usize;
-pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn encrypt(
-    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    plaintext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == KEY_LEN);
-    assert!(nonce.len() == NONCE_LEN);
-    let mut clen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt,
-        ciphertext.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut clen,
-        plaintext.as_ptr(),
-        plaintext.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        null(), // nsec is not used
-        nonce.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(clen as usize == ciphertext.len());
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn decrypt(
-    plaintext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    ciphertext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == KEY_LEN);
-    assert!(nonce.len() == NONCE_LEN);
-    let mut mlen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt,
-        plaintext.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut mlen as *mut c_ulonglong,
-        null_mut(), // nsec is not used
-        ciphertext.as_ptr(),
-        ciphertext.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        nonce.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(mlen as usize == plaintext.len());
-    Ok(())
-}

sodium/src/aead/mod.rs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-pub mod chacha20poly1305_ietf;
-pub mod xchacha20poly1305_ietf;

sodium/src/aead/xchacha20poly1305_ietf.rs

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::ffi::c_ulonglong;
-use std::ptr::{null, null_mut};
-
-pub const KEY_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize;
-pub const TAG_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES as usize;
-pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn encrypt(
-    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    plaintext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize);
-    let (n, ct) = ciphertext.split_at_mut(NONCE_LEN);
-    n.copy_from_slice(nonce);
-    let mut clen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt,
-        ct.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut clen,
-        plaintext.as_ptr(),
-        plaintext.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        null(), // nsec is not used
-        nonce.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(clen as usize == ct.len());
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn decrypt(
-    plaintext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    ciphertext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == KEY_LEN);
-    let (n, ct) = ciphertext.split_at(NONCE_LEN);
-    let mut mlen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt,
-        plaintext.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut mlen as *mut c_ulonglong,
-        null_mut(), // nsec is not used
-        ct.as_ptr(),
-        ct.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        n.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(mlen as usize == plaintext.len());
-    Ok(())
-}

sodium/src/alloc/allocator.rs

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-use allocator_api2::alloc::{AllocError, Allocator, Layout};
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::fmt;
-use std::os::raw::c_void;
-use std::ptr::NonNull;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-struct AllocatorContents;
-
-/// Memory allocation using sodium_malloc/sodium_free
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-pub struct Alloc {
-    _dummy_private_data: AllocatorContents,
-}
-
-impl Alloc {
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Alloc {
-            _dummy_private_data: AllocatorContents,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-unsafe impl Allocator for Alloc {
-    fn allocate(&self, layout: Layout) -> Result<NonNull<[u8]>, AllocError> {
-        // Call sodium allocator
-        let ptr = unsafe { libsodium::sodium_malloc(layout.size()) };
-
-        // Ensure the right allocation is used
-        let off = ptr.align_offset(layout.align());
-        if off != 0 {
-            log::error!("Allocation {layout:?} was requested but libsodium returned allocation \
-                with offset {off} from the requested alignment. Libsodium always allocates values \
-                at the end of a memory page for security reasons, custom alignments are not supported. \
-                You could try allocating an oversized value.");
-            return Err(AllocError);
-        }
-
-        // Convert to a pointer size
-        let ptr = core::ptr::slice_from_raw_parts_mut(ptr as *mut u8, layout.size());
-
-        // Conversion to a *const u8, then to a &[u8]
-        match NonNull::new(ptr) {
-            None => {
-                log::error!(
-                    "Allocation {layout:?} was requested but libsodium returned a null pointer"
-                );
-                Err(AllocError)
-            }
-            Some(ret) => Ok(ret),
-        }
-    }
-
-    unsafe fn deallocate(&self, ptr: NonNull<u8>, _layout: Layout) {
-        unsafe {
-            libsodium::sodium_free(ptr.as_ptr() as *mut c_void);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl fmt::Debug for Alloc {
-    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
-        fmt.write_str("<libsodium based Rust allocator>")
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// checks that the can malloc with libsodium
-    #[test]
-    fn sodium_allocation() {
-        crate::init().unwrap();
-        let alloc = Alloc::new();
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<0>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<7>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<8>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<64>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<999>(&alloc);
-    }
-
-    fn sodium_allocation_impl<const N: usize>(alloc: &Alloc) {
-        crate::init().unwrap();
-        let layout = Layout::new::<[u8; N]>();
-        let mem = alloc.allocate(layout).unwrap();
-
-        // https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/memory_management#guarded-heap-allocations
-        // promises us that allocated memory is initialized with the magic byte 0xDB
-        assert_eq!(unsafe { mem.as_ref() }, &[0xDBu8; N]);
-
-        let mem = NonNull::new(mem.as_ptr() as *mut u8).unwrap();
-        unsafe { alloc.deallocate(mem, layout) };
-    }
-}

sodium/src/alloc/mod.rs

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-//! Access to sodium_malloc/sodium_free
-
-mod allocator;
-pub use allocator::Alloc;
-
-/// A box backed by sodium_malloc
-pub type Box<T> = allocator_api2::boxed::Box<T, Alloc>;
-
-/// A vector backed by sodium_malloc
-pub type Vec<T> = allocator_api2::vec::Vec<T, Alloc>;

sodium/src/hash/blake2b.rs

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use rosenpass_to::{with_destination, To};
-use std::ffi::c_ulonglong;
-use std::ptr::null;
-
-pub const KEY_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_KEYBYTES_MIN as usize;
-pub const KEY_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_KEYBYTES_MAX as usize;
-pub const OUT_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_BYTES_MIN as usize;
-pub const OUT_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_BYTES_MAX as usize;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn hash<'a>(key: &'a [u8], data: &'a [u8]) -> impl To<[u8], anyhow::Result<()>> + 'a {
-    with_destination(|out: &mut [u8]| {
-        assert!(key.is_empty() || (KEY_MIN <= key.len() && key.len() <= KEY_MAX));
-        assert!(OUT_MIN <= out.len() && out.len() <= OUT_MAX);
-        let kptr = match key.len() {
-            // NULL key
-            0 => null(),
-            _ => key.as_ptr(),
-        };
-        sodium_call!(
-            crypto_generichash_blake2b,
-            out.as_mut_ptr(),
-            out.len(),
-            data.as_ptr(),
-            data.len() as c_ulonglong,
-            kptr,
-            key.len()
-        )
-    })
-}

sodium/src/hash/mod.rs

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-pub mod blake2b;

sodium/src/helpers.rs

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::os::raw::c_void;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn memcmp(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
-    a.len() == b.len()
-        && unsafe {
-            let r = libsodium::sodium_memcmp(
-                a.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
-                b.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
-                a.len(),
-            );
-            r == 0
-        }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn compare(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> i32 {
-    assert!(a.len() == b.len());
-    unsafe { libsodium::sodium_compare(a.as_ptr(), b.as_ptr(), a.len()) }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn increment(v: &mut [u8]) {
-    unsafe {
-        libsodium::sodium_increment(v.as_mut_ptr(), v.len());
-    }
-}

sodium/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-
-macro_rules! sodium_call {
-    ($name:ident, $($args:expr),*) => { ::rosenpass_util::attempt!({
-        anyhow::ensure!(unsafe{libsodium::$name($($args),*)} > -1,
-            "Error in libsodium's {}.", stringify!($name));
-        Ok(())
-    })};
-    ($name:ident) => { sodium_call!($name, ) };
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn init() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    log::trace!("initializing libsodium");
-    sodium_call!(sodium_init)
-}
-
-pub mod aead;
-pub mod alloc;
-pub mod hash;
-pub mod helpers;

to/README.md

@@ -12,15 +12,17 @@ The crate provides chained functions to simplify allocating the destination para
 For now this crate is experimental; patch releases are guaranteed not to contain any breaking changes, but minor releases may.
 
 ```rust
-use std::ops::BitXorAssign;
-use rosenpass_to::{To, to, with_destination};
 use rosenpass_to::ops::copy_array;
+use rosenpass_to::{to, with_destination, To};
+use std::ops::BitXorAssign;
 
 // Destination functions return some value that implements the To trait.
 // Unfortunately dealing with lifetimes is a bit more finicky than it would#
 // be without destination parameters
-fn xor_slice<'a, T>(src: &'a[T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + 'a
-        where T: BitXorAssign + Clone {
+fn xor_slice<'a, T>(src: &'a [T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + 'a
+where
+    T: BitXorAssign + Clone,
+{
     // Custom implementations of the to trait can be created, but the easiest
     with_destination(move |dst: &mut [T]| {
         assert!(src.len() == dst.len());
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ assert_eq!(&dst[..], &flip01[..]);
 // The builtin function copy_array supports to_value() since its
 // destination parameter is a fixed size array, which can be allocated
 // using default()
-let dst : [u8; 4] = copy_array(flip01).to_value();
+let dst: [u8; 4] = copy_array(flip01).to_value();
 assert_eq!(&dst, flip01);
 ```
 
@@ -84,7 +86,9 @@ Functions declared like this are more cumbersome to use when the destination par
 use std::ops::BitXorAssign;
 
 fn xor_slice<T>(dst: &mut [T], src: &[T])
-        where T: BitXorAssign + Clone {
+where
+    T: BitXorAssign + Clone,
+{
     assert!(src.len() == dst.len());
     for (d, s) in dst.iter_mut().zip(src.iter()) {
         *d ^= s.clone();
@@ -114,8 +118,8 @@ assert_eq!(&dst[..], &flip01[..]);
 There are a couple of ways to use a function with destination:
 
 ```rust
-use rosenpass_to::{to, To};
 use rosenpass_to::ops::{copy_array, copy_slice_least};
+use rosenpass_to::{to, To};
 
 let mut dst = b"           ".to_vec();
 
@@ -129,7 +133,8 @@ copy_slice_least(b"This is fin").to(&mut dst[..]);
 assert_eq!(&dst[..], b"This is fin");
 
 // You can allocate the destination variable on the fly using `.to_this(...)`
-let tmp = copy_slice_least(b"This is new---").to_this(|| b"This will be overwritten".to_owned());
+let tmp =
+    copy_slice_least(b"This is new---").to_this(|| b"This will be overwritten".to_owned());
 assert_eq!(&tmp[..], b"This is new---verwritten");
 
 // You can allocate the destination variable on the fly `.collect(..)` if it implements default
@@ -147,8 +152,11 @@ assert_eq!(&tmp[..], b"Fixed");
 The to crate provides basic functions with destination for copying data between slices and arrays.
 
 ```rust
+use rosenpass_to::ops::{
+    copy_array, copy_slice, copy_slice_least, copy_slice_least_src, try_copy_slice,
+    try_copy_slice_least_src,
+};
 use rosenpass_to::{to, To};
-use rosenpass_to::ops::{copy_array, copy_slice, copy_slice_least, copy_slice_least_src, try_copy_slice, try_copy_slice_least_src};
 
 let mut dst = b"           ".to_vec();
 
@@ -161,18 +169,33 @@ to(&mut dst[4..], copy_slice_least_src(b"!!!"));
 assert_eq!(&dst[..], b"Hell!!!orld");
 
 // Copy a slice, copying as many bytes as possible
-to(&mut dst[6..], copy_slice_least(b"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"));
+to(
+    &mut dst[6..],
+    copy_slice_least(b"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"),
+);
 assert_eq!(&dst[..], b"Hell!!xxxxx");
 
 // Copy a slice, will return None and abort if the sizes do not much
 assert_eq!(Some(()), to(&mut dst[..], try_copy_slice(b"Hello World")));
 assert_eq!(None, to(&mut dst[..], try_copy_slice(b"---")));
-assert_eq!(None, to(&mut dst[..], try_copy_slice(b"---------------------")));
+assert_eq!(
+    None,
+    to(&mut dst[..], try_copy_slice(b"---------------------"))
+);
 assert_eq!(&dst[..], b"Hello World");
 
 // Copy a slice, will return None and abort if source is longer than destination
-assert_eq!(Some(()), to(&mut dst[4..], try_copy_slice_least_src(b"!!!")));
-assert_eq!(None, to(&mut dst[4..], try_copy_slice_least_src(b"-------------------------")));
+assert_eq!(
+    Some(()),
+    to(&mut dst[4..], try_copy_slice_least_src(b"!!!"))
+);
+assert_eq!(
+    None,
+    to(
+        &mut dst[4..],
+        try_copy_slice_least_src(b"-------------------------")
+    )
+);
 assert_eq!(&dst[..], b"Hell!!!orld");
 
 // Copy fixed size arrays all at once
@@ -186,12 +209,14 @@ assert_eq!(&dst, b"Hello");
 The easiest way to declare a function with destination is to use the with_destination function.
 
 ```rust
-use rosenpass_to::{To, to, with_destination};
 use rosenpass_to::ops::copy_array;
+use rosenpass_to::{to, with_destination, To};
 
 /// Copy the given slice to the start of a vector, reusing its memory if possible
 fn copy_to_vec<'a, T>(src: &'a [T]) -> impl To<Vec<T>, ()> + 'a
-        where T: Clone {
+where
+    T: Clone,
+{
     with_destination(move |dst: &mut Vec<T>| {
         dst.clear();
         dst.extend_from_slice(src);
@@ -217,7 +242,9 @@ The same pattern can be implemented without `to`, at the cost of being slightly
 ```rust
 /// Copy the given slice to the start of a vector, reusing its memory if possible
 fn copy_to_vec<T>(dst: &mut Vec<T>, src: &[T])
-        where T: Clone {
+where
+    T: Clone,
+{
     dst.clear();
     dst.extend_from_slice(src);
 }
@@ -240,11 +267,11 @@ Alternative functions are returned, that return a `to::Beside` value, containing
 destination variable and the return value.
 
 ```rust
-use std::cmp::{min, max};
-use rosenpass_to::{To, to, with_destination, Beside};
+use rosenpass_to::{to, with_destination, Beside, To};
+use std::cmp::{max, min};
 
 /// Copy an array of floats and calculate the average
-pub fn copy_and_average<'a>(src: &'a[f64]) -> impl To<[f64], f64> + 'a {
+pub fn copy_and_average<'a>(src: &'a [f64]) -> impl To<[f64], f64> + 'a {
     with_destination(move |dst: &mut [f64]| {
         assert!(src.len() == dst.len());
         let mut sum = 0f64;
@@ -300,8 +327,8 @@ assert_eq!(tmp, Beside([42f64; 3], 42f64));
 When Beside values contain a `()`, `Option<()>`, or `Result<(), Error>` return value, they expose a special method called `.condense()`; this method consumes the Beside value and condenses destination and return value into one value.
 
 ```rust
+use rosenpass_to::Beside;
 use std::result::Result;
-use rosenpass_to::{Beside};
 
 assert_eq!((), Beside((), ()).condense());
 
@@ -318,8 +345,8 @@ assert_eq!(Err(()), Beside(42, err_unit).condense());
 When condense is implemented for a type, `.to_this(|| ...)`, `.to_value()`, and `.collect::<...>()` on the `To` trait can be used even with a return value:
 
 ```rust
+use rosenpass_to::ops::try_copy_slice;
 use rosenpass_to::To;
-use rosenpass_to::ops::try_copy_slice;;
 
 let tmp = try_copy_slice(b"Hello World").collect::<[u8; 11]>();
 assert_eq!(tmp, Some(*b"Hello World"));
@@ -337,8 +364,8 @@ assert_eq!(tmp, None);
 The same naturally also works for Results, but the example is a bit harder to motivate:
 
 ```rust
+use rosenpass_to::{to, with_destination, To};
 use std::result::Result;
-use rosenpass_to::{to, To, with_destination};
 
 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Default)]
 struct InvalidFloat;
@@ -380,8 +407,8 @@ Condensation is implemented through a trait called CondenseBeside ([local](Conde
 If you can not implement this trait because its for an external type (see [orphan rule](https://doc.rust-lang.org/book/ch10-02-traits.html#implementing-a-trait-on-a-type)), this crate welcomes contributions of new Condensation rules.
 
 ```rust
-use rosenpass_to::{To, with_destination, Beside, CondenseBeside};
 use rosenpass_to::ops::copy_slice;
+use rosenpass_to::{with_destination, Beside, CondenseBeside, To};
 
 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Default)]
 struct MyTuple<Left, Right>(Left, Right);
@@ -396,7 +423,10 @@ impl<Val, Right> CondenseBeside<Val> for MyTuple<(), Right> {
 }
 
 fn copy_slice_and_return_something<'a, T, U>(src: &'a [T], something: U) -> impl To<[T], U> + 'a
-        where T: Copy, U: 'a {
+where
+    T: Copy,
+    U: 'a,
+{
     with_destination(move |dst: &mut [T]| {
         copy_slice(src).to(dst);
         something
@@ -417,7 +447,7 @@ Using `with_destination(...)` is convenient, but since it uses closures it resul
 Implementing the ToTrait manual is the right choice for library use cases.
 
 ```rust
-use rosenpass_to::{to, To, with_destination};
+use rosenpass_to::{to, with_destination, To};
 
 struct TryCopySliceSource<'a, T: Copy> {
     src: &'a [T],
@@ -425,17 +455,20 @@ struct TryCopySliceSource<'a, T: Copy> {
 
 impl<'a, T: Copy> To<[T], Option<()>> for TryCopySliceSource<'a, T> {
     fn to(self, dst: &mut [T]) -> Option<()> {
-        (self.src.len() == dst.len())
-            .then(|| dst.copy_from_slice(self.src))
+        (self.src.len() == dst.len()).then(|| dst.copy_from_slice(self.src))
     }
 }
 
 fn try_copy_slice<'a, T>(src: &'a [T]) -> TryCopySliceSource<'a, T>
-        where T: Copy {
+where
+    T: Copy,
+{
     TryCopySliceSource { src }
 }
 
-let mut dst = try_copy_slice(b"Hello World").collect::<[u8; 11]>().unwrap();
+let mut dst = try_copy_slice(b"Hello World")
+    .collect::<[u8; 11]>()
+    .unwrap();
 assert_eq!(&dst[..], b"Hello World");
 assert_eq!(None, to(&mut dst[..], try_copy_slice(b"---")));
 ```
@@ -445,8 +478,8 @@ assert_eq!(None, to(&mut dst[..], try_copy_slice(b"---")));
 Destinations can also be used with methods. This example demonstrates using destinations in an extension trait for everything that implements `Borrow<[T]>` for any `T` and a concrete `To` trait implementation.
 
 ```rust
+use rosenpass_to::{to, with_destination, To};
 use std::borrow::Borrow;
-use rosenpass_to::{to, To, with_destination};
 
 struct TryCopySliceSource<'a, T: Copy> {
     src: &'a [T],
@@ -454,24 +487,24 @@ struct TryCopySliceSource<'a, T: Copy> {
 
 impl<'a, T: Copy> To<[T], Option<()>> for TryCopySliceSource<'a, T> {
     fn to(self, dst: &mut [T]) -> Option<()> {
-        (self.src.len() == dst.len())
-            .then(|| dst.copy_from_slice(self.src))
+        (self.src.len() == dst.len()).then(|| dst.copy_from_slice(self.src))
     }
 }
 
 trait TryCopySliceExt<'a, T: Copy> {
-    fn try_copy_slice(&'a self)  -> TryCopySliceSource<'a, T>;
+    fn try_copy_slice(&'a self) -> TryCopySliceSource<'a, T>;
 }
 
 impl<'a, T: 'a + Copy, Ref: 'a + Borrow<[T]>> TryCopySliceExt<'a, T> for Ref {
-    fn try_copy_slice(&'a self)  -> TryCopySliceSource<'a, T> {
-        TryCopySliceSource {
-            src: self.borrow()
-        }
+    fn try_copy_slice(&'a self) -> TryCopySliceSource<'a, T> {
+        TryCopySliceSource { src: self.borrow() }
     }
 }
 
-let mut dst = b"Hello World".try_copy_slice().collect::<[u8; 11]>().unwrap();
+let mut dst = b"Hello World"
+    .try_copy_slice()
+    .collect::<[u8; 11]>()
+    .unwrap();
 assert_eq!(&dst[..], b"Hello World");
 assert_eq!(None, to(&mut dst[..], b"---".try_copy_slice()));
 ```

to/src/ops.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use crate::{with_destination, To};
 /// # Panics
 ///
 /// This function will panic if the two slices have different lengths.
-pub fn copy_slice<'a, T>(origin: &'a [T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + 'a
+pub fn copy_slice<T>(origin: &[T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + '_
 where
     T: Copy,
 {
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ where
 /// # Panics
 ///
 /// This function will panic if destination is shorter than origin.
-pub fn copy_slice_least_src<'a, T>(origin: &'a [T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + 'a
+pub fn copy_slice_least_src<T>(origin: &[T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + '_
 where
     T: Copy,
 {
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ where
 /// destination.
 ///
 /// Copies as much data as is present in the shorter slice.
-pub fn copy_slice_least<'a, T>(origin: &'a [T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + 'a
+pub fn copy_slice_least<T>(origin: &[T]) -> impl To<[T], ()> + '_
 where
     T: Copy,
 {
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ where
 /// Function with destination that attempts to copy data from origin into the destination.
 ///
 /// Will return None if the slices are of different lengths.
-pub fn try_copy_slice<'a, T>(origin: &'a [T]) -> impl To<[T], Option<()>> + 'a
+pub fn try_copy_slice<T>(origin: &[T]) -> impl To<[T], Option<()>> + '_
 where
     T: Copy,
 {
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ where
 /// Destination may be longer than origin.
 ///
 /// Will return None if the destination is shorter than origin.
-pub fn try_copy_slice_least_src<'a, T>(origin: &'a [T]) -> impl To<[T], Option<()>> + 'a
+pub fn try_copy_slice_least_src<T>(origin: &[T]) -> impl To<[T], Option<()>> + '_
 where
     T: Copy,
 {
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ where
 }
 
 /// Function with destination that copies all data between two array references.
-pub fn copy_array<'a, T, const N: usize>(origin: &'a [T; N]) -> impl To<[T; N], ()> + 'a
+pub fn copy_array<T, const N: usize>(origin: &[T; N]) -> impl To<[T; N], ()> + '_
 where
     T: Copy,
 {

util/Cargo.toml

@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ readme = "readme.md"
 [dependencies]
 base64 = { workspace = true }
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
+typenum = { workspace = true }
+static_assertions = { workspace = true }

util/src/file.rs

@@ -6,21 +6,21 @@ use std::{fs::OpenOptions, path::Path};
 
 /// Open a file writable
 pub fn fopen_w<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> std::io::Result<File> {
-    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
+    OpenOptions::new()
         .read(false)
         .write(true)
         .create(true)
         .truncate(true)
-        .open(path)?)
+        .open(path)
 }
 /// Open a file readable
 pub fn fopen_r<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> std::io::Result<File> {
-    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
+    OpenOptions::new()
         .read(true)
         .write(false)
         .create(false)
         .truncate(false)
-        .open(path)?)
+        .open(path)
 }
 
 pub trait ReadExactToEnd {

util/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+#![recursion_limit = "256"]
+
 pub mod b64;
 pub mod file;
 pub mod functional;
@@ -5,3 +7,4 @@ pub mod mem;
 pub mod ord;
 pub mod result;
 pub mod time;
+pub mod typenum;

util/src/result.rs

@@ -35,25 +35,30 @@ pub trait GuaranteedValue {
 /// ```
 /// use std::num::Wrapping;
 /// use std::result::Result;
-/// use std::convert::Infallible
+/// use std::convert::Infallible;
+/// use std::ops::Add;
 ///
-/// trait FailableAddition {
+/// use rosenpass_util::result::{Guaranteed, GuaranteedValue};
+///
+/// trait FailableAddition: Sized {
 ///   type Error;
 ///   fn failable_addition(&self, other: &Self) -> Result<Self, Self::Error>;
 /// }
 ///
+/// #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
 /// struct OverflowError;
 ///
-/// impl<T> FailableAddition for Wrapping<T> {
+/// impl<T> FailableAddition for Wrapping<T>
+///   where for <'a> &'a Wrapping<T>: Add<Output = Wrapping<T>> {
 ///   type Error = Infallible;
 ///   fn failable_addition(&self, other: &Self) -> Guaranteed<Self> {
-///     self + other
+///     Ok(self + other)
 ///   }
 /// }
 ///
-/// impl<T> FailableAddition for u32 {
-///   type Error = Infallible;
-///   fn failable_addition(&self, other: &Self) -> Guaranteed<Self> {
+/// impl FailableAddition for u32 {
+///   type Error = OverflowError;
+///   fn failable_addition(&self, other: &Self) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
 ///     match self.checked_add(*other) {
 ///         Some(v) => Ok(v),
 ///         None => Err(OverflowError),
@@ -64,10 +69,11 @@ pub trait GuaranteedValue {
 /// fn failable_multiply<T>(a: &T, b: u32)
 ///         -> Result<T, T::Error>
 ///     where
-///         T: FailableAddition<Error> {
+///         T: FailableAddition {
+///     assert!(b >= 2); // Acceptable only because this is for demonstration purposes
 ///     let mut accu = a.failable_addition(a)?;
-///     for _ in ..(b-1) {
-///         accu.failable_addition(a)?;
+///     for _ in 2..b {
+///         accu = accu.failable_addition(a)?;
 ///     }
 ///     Ok(accu)
 /// }
@@ -75,12 +81,12 @@ pub trait GuaranteedValue {
 /// // We can use .guaranteed() with Wrapping<u32>, since the operation uses
 /// // the Infallible error type.
 /// // We can also use unwrap which just happens to not raise an error.
-/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&Wrapping::new(42u32), 3).guaranteed(), 126);
-/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&Wrapping::new(42u32), 3).unwrap(), 126);
+/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&Wrapping(42u32), 3).guaranteed(), Wrapping(126));
+/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&Wrapping(42u32), 3).unwrap(), Wrapping(126));
 ///
 /// // We can not use .guaranteed() with u32, since there can be an error.
 /// // We can however use unwrap(), which may panic
-/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&42u32, 3).guaranteed(), 126); // COMPILER ERROR
+/// //assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&42u32, 3).guaranteed(), 126); // COMPILER ERROR
 /// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&42u32, 3).unwrap(), 126);
 /// ```
 pub type Guaranteed<T> = Result<T, Infallible>;

util/src/typenum.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+use typenum::bit::{B0, B1};
+use typenum::int::{NInt, PInt, Z0};
+use typenum::marker_traits as markers;
+use typenum::uint::{UInt, UTerm};
+
+/// Convenience macro to convert type numbers to constant integers
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! typenum2const {
+    ($val:ty) => {
+        typenum2const!($val as _)
+    };
+    ($val:ty as $type:ty) => {
+        <$val as $crate::typenum::IntoConst<$type>>::VALUE
+    };
+}
+
+/// Trait implemented by constant integers to facilitate conversion to constant integers
+pub trait IntoConst<T> {
+    const VALUE: T;
+}
+
+struct ConstApplyNegSign<T: AssociatedUnsigned, Param: IntoConst<<T as AssociatedUnsigned>::Type>>(
+    *const T,
+    *const Param,
+);
+struct ConstApplyPosSign<T: AssociatedUnsigned, Param: IntoConst<<T as AssociatedUnsigned>::Type>>(
+    *const T,
+    *const Param,
+);
+struct ConstLshift<T, Param: IntoConst<T>, const SHIFT: i32>(*const T, *const Param); // impl IntoConst<T>
+struct ConstAdd<T, Lhs: IntoConst<T>, Rhs: IntoConst<T>>(*const T, *const Lhs, *const Rhs); // impl IntoConst<T>
+
+/// Assigns an unsigned type to a signed type
+trait AssociatedUnsigned {
+    type Type;
+}
+
+macro_rules! impl_into_const {
+    ( $from:ty as $to:ty := $impl:expr) => {
+        impl IntoConst<$to> for $from {
+            const VALUE: $to = $impl;
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+macro_rules! impl_numeric_into_const_common {
+    ($type:ty) => {
+        impl_into_const! { Z0 as $type := 0 }
+        impl_into_const! { B0 as $type := 0 }
+        impl_into_const! { B1 as $type := 1 }
+        impl_into_const! { UTerm as $type := 0 }
+
+        impl<Param: IntoConst<$type>, const SHIFT: i32> IntoConst<$type>
+            for ConstLshift<$type, Param, SHIFT>
+        {
+            const VALUE: $type = Param::VALUE << SHIFT;
+        }
+
+        impl<Lhs: IntoConst<$type>, Rhs: IntoConst<$type>> IntoConst<$type>
+            for ConstAdd<$type, Lhs, Rhs>
+        {
+            const VALUE: $type =
+                <Lhs as IntoConst<$type>>::VALUE + <Rhs as IntoConst<$type>>::VALUE;
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+macro_rules! impl_numeric_into_const_unsigned {
+    ($($to_list:ty),*) =>  {
+        $( impl_numeric_into_const_unsigned! { @impl $to_list } )*
+    };
+
+    (@impl $type:ty) =>  {
+        impl_numeric_into_const_common!{ $type }
+
+        impl AssociatedUnsigned for $type {
+            type Type = $type;
+        }
+
+        impl<Param: IntoConst<$type>> IntoConst<$type> for ConstApplyPosSign<$type, Param> {
+            const VALUE : $type = Param::VALUE;
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+macro_rules! impl_numeric_into_const_signed {
+    ($($to_list:ty : $unsigned_list:ty),*) =>  {
+        $( impl_numeric_into_const_signed! { @impl $to_list : $unsigned_list} )*
+    };
+
+    (@impl $type:ty : $unsigned:ty) =>  {
+        impl_numeric_into_const_common!{ $type }
+
+        impl AssociatedUnsigned for $type {
+            type Type = $unsigned;
+        }
+
+        impl<Param: IntoConst<$unsigned>> IntoConst<$type> for ConstApplyPosSign<$type, Param> {
+            const VALUE : $type = Param::VALUE as $type;
+        }
+
+        impl<Param: IntoConst<$unsigned>> IntoConst<$type> for ConstApplyNegSign<$type, Param> {
+            const VALUE : $type =
+                if Param::VALUE == (1 as $unsigned).rotate_right(1) {
+                    // Handle the negative value without an associated positive value (e.g. -128
+                    // for i8)
+                    < $type >::MIN
+                } else {
+                    -(Param::VALUE as $type)
+                };
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+impl_into_const! { B0 as bool := false }
+impl_into_const! { B1 as bool := true }
+impl_numeric_into_const_unsigned! { usize, u8, u16, u32, u64, u128 }
+impl_numeric_into_const_signed! { isize : usize, i8 : u8, i16 : u16, i32 : u32, i64 : u64, i128 : u128 }
+
+// Unsigned type numbers to const integers
+impl<Ret, Rest, Bit> IntoConst<Ret> for UInt<Rest, Bit>
+where
+    Rest: IntoConst<Ret>,
+    Bit: IntoConst<Ret>,
+    ConstLshift<Ret, Rest, 1>: IntoConst<Ret>,
+    ConstAdd<Ret, ConstLshift<Ret, Rest, 1>, Bit>: IntoConst<Ret>,
+{
+    const VALUE: Ret = <ConstAdd<Ret, ConstLshift<Ret, Rest, 1>, Bit> as IntoConst<Ret>>::VALUE;
+}
+
+// Signed type numbers with positive sign to const integers
+impl<Ret, Unsigned> IntoConst<Ret> for PInt<Unsigned>
+where
+    Ret: AssociatedUnsigned,
+    Unsigned: markers::Unsigned + markers::NonZero + IntoConst<<Ret as AssociatedUnsigned>::Type>,
+    ConstApplyPosSign<Ret, Unsigned>: IntoConst<Ret>,
+{
+    const VALUE: Ret = <ConstApplyPosSign<Ret, Unsigned> as IntoConst<Ret>>::VALUE;
+}
+
+// Signed type numbers with negative sign to const integers
+impl<Ret, Unsigned> IntoConst<Ret> for NInt<Unsigned>
+where
+    Ret: AssociatedUnsigned,
+    Unsigned: markers::Unsigned + markers::NonZero + IntoConst<<Ret as AssociatedUnsigned>::Type>,
+    ConstApplyNegSign<Ret, Unsigned>: IntoConst<Ret>,
+{
+    const VALUE: Ret = <ConstApplyNegSign<Ret, Unsigned> as IntoConst<Ret>>::VALUE;
+}
+
+mod test {
+    use static_assertions::const_assert_eq;
+    use typenum::consts::*;
+    use typenum::op;
+
+    macro_rules! test_const_conversion {
+        // Type groups
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u7 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (u8, u16, u32, u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (i8, i16, i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u8 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (u8, u16, u32, u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (    i16, i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u15 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (    u16, u32, u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (    i16, i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u16 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (    u16, u32, u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (         i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u31 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (         u32, u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (         i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u32 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (         u32, u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (              i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u63 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (              u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (              i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u64 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (              u64, u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (                   i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u127 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (                   u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (                   i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= u128 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (                   u128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (                       ) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= i8 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (i8, i16, i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= i16 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (    i16, i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= i32 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (         i32, i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= i64 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (              i64, i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) >= i128 = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { ($typenum) as (                   i128) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        // Basic operation
+
+        () => {};
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) as () = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) as ($type:ty) = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { @impl ($typenum) as ($type) = $const } )*
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (($($typenum:ty),*) as ($type_head:ty, $($type_tail:ty),*) = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            $( test_const_conversion! { @impl ($typenum) as ($type_head) = $const } )*
+            test_const_conversion! { ($($typenum),*) as ($($type_tail),*) = $const }
+            $( test_const_conversion! { $($rest)* } )?
+        };
+
+        (@impl ($typenum:ty) as ($type:ty) = $const:expr $(; $($rest:tt)*)?) => {
+            const_assert_eq!(typenum2const!($typenum as $type), $const);
+            $( test_const_conversion!($($rest)*); )?
+        };
+    }
+
+    test_const_conversion! {
+        (B0, False) as (bool, bool) = false;
+
+        (B0, U0, Z0) >= u7 = 0;
+        (B1, U1, P1) >= u7 = 1;
+
+        (U2, P2) >= u7 = 2;
+        (B1, True) as (bool) = true;
+        (U3, P3) >= u7 = 3;
+        (U8, P8) >= u7 = 8;
+        (U127, P127) >= u7 = 127;
+        (U220, P220) >= u8 = 220;
+        (U255, P255) >= u8 = 255;
+        (U1000, P1000) >= u15 = 1000;
+        (U10000, P10000) >= u15 = 10000;
+        (U16384, P16384) >= u15 = 16384;
+        (U32768, P32768) >= u16 = 32768;
+        (U65536, P65536) >= u31 = 65536;
+        (U100000, P100000) >= u31 = 100000;
+        (U1000000000, P1000000000) >= u31 = 1000000000;
+        (U2147483648, P2147483648) >= u32 = 2147483648;
+        (U1000000000000000000, P1000000000000000000) >= u63 = 1000000000000000000;
+        (U1000000000000000000, P1000000000000000000) >= u63 = 1000000000000000000;
+
+        (U9223372036854775808) >= u64 = 9223372036854775808;
+        (U10000000000000000000) >= u64 = 10000000000000000000;
+
+        (N10000) >= i16 = -10000;
+        (N1000000) >= i32 = -1000000;
+        (N1000000000) >= i32 = -1000000000;
+        (N1000000000000) >= i64 = -1000000000000;
+    }
+
+    const_assert_eq!(127, (!(1u8.rotate_right(1)) - 0) as _);
+    const_assert_eq!(126, (!(1u8.rotate_right(1)) - 1) as _);
+    const_assert_eq!(255, (!(0u8.rotate_right(1)) - 0) as _);
+    const_assert_eq!(254, (!(0u8.rotate_right(1)) - 1) as _);
+
+    test_const_conversion! {
+        (op!(pow(U2, U7) - U1))   >= u7   = (!(1u8.rotate_right(1)) - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U7) - U2))   >= u7   = (!(1u8.rotate_right(1)) - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U15) - U1))  >= u15  = (!(1u16.rotate_right(1)) - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U15) - U2))  >= u15  = (!(1u16.rotate_right(1)) - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U31) - U1))  >= u31  = (!(1u32.rotate_right(1)) - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U31) - U2))  >= u31  = (!(1u32.rotate_right(1)) - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U63) - U1))  >= u63  = (!(1u64.rotate_right(1)) - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U63) - U2))  >= u63  = (!(1u64.rotate_right(1)) - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U127) - U1)) >= u127 = (!(1u128.rotate_right(1)) - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U127) - U2)) >= u127 = (!(1u128.rotate_right(1)) - 1) as _;
+
+        (op!(pow(U2, U8) - U1))   >= u8   = (u8::MAX - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U8) - U2))   >= u8   = (u8::MAX - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U16) - U1))  >= u16  = (u16::MAX - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U16) - U2))  >= u16  = (u16::MAX - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U32) - U1))  >= u32  = (u32::MAX - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U32) - U2))  >= u32  = (u32::MAX - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U64) - U1))  >= u64  = (u64::MAX - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U64) - U2))  >= u64  = (u64::MAX - 1) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U128) - U1)) >= u128 = (u128::MAX - 0) as _;
+        (op!(pow(U2, U128) - U2)) >= u128 = (u128::MAX - 1) as _;
+
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P7) + Z0)) >= i8 = (i8::MIN + 0) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P7) + P1)) >= i8 = (i8::MIN + 1) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P15) + Z0)) >= i16 = (i16::MIN + 0) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P15) + P1)) >= i16 = (i16::MIN + 1) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P31) + Z0)) >= i32 = (i32::MIN + 0) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P31) + P1)) >= i32 = (i32::MIN + 1) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P63) + Z0)) >= i64 = (i64::MIN + 0) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P63) + P1)) >= i64 = (i64::MIN + 1) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P127) + Z0)) >= i128 = (i128::MIN + 0) as _;
+        (op!(Z0 - pow(P2, P127) + P1)) >= i128 = (i128::MIN + 1) as _;
+    }
+}